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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation starts by noting a tension in Catholic Social Teaching between the right of certain 
persons to immigrate, and the right of polities to control their borders, and seeks to find a way to 
resolve that tension. In a first moment, we ask whether the “right to immigrate” made sense only 
before the mass international migration movements starting around 1980, and before “globalisa-
tion”, and whether polities today are morally justified in adopting increasingly harsh immigration 
restriction measures unilaterally. After rejecting this hypothesis by using an interdisciplinary analy-
sis of the changes in the phenomenon of human mobility in recent decades, we propose another 
hypothesis to resolve the tension. We claim that the two rights are not “absolute” rights, and must 
be kept in tension. Which one of them trumps the other in concrete situations is determined partly 
by a set of (moral) priority rules, and partly through political discernment via fair democratic pro-
cesses (which are always necessary so as to formulate concrete policies which require the consent 
of the governed). The rest of this dissertation provides a well-documented argument in favour of 
this second hypothesis, and in the process, we formulate a number of priority rules which help ac-
tivists and policy makers, qua citizens and qua Christian disciples, adjudicate between rights claims 
based on the right to immigrate and the right to political sovereignty. The work also includes a sys-
tematic and historical presentation of Catholic Social Teaching on migration, a case study on immi-
gration and emigration in Malta, a diachronic analysis of concepts related to human mobility in the 
Hebrew Bible, a philosophical reflection on Political Sovereignty in a “globalising” world, and a vir-
tue ethics approach to the notions of solidarity, hospitality and kinship.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
0.1 Two Rights in Conflict? 
This dissertation seeks to reflect on a number of pressing issues in the ethics of immigration policy, 
starting from Catholic Social Teaching (CST), and following the methodology outlined in the second 
and third parts of this introductory chapter. Let us start by presenting an overview of the following 
chapters to give the reader a sense of what to expect from this work.  
Concerning immigration policy, in the last 60 years, Catholic Social Teaching has proposed a posi-
tion between “open borders” and “closed borders”, which we could call “porous borders”. Using 
typically Catholic “both / and” approach, it has defended the right of certain types of migrants to 
immigrate (not only to emigrate), while not denying the right of polities to “control their borders”. 
Both rights can be held together only assuming that (a) we deny absolutist versions of both individ-
ual rights and of political sovereignty, (b) we place limits on both the “right to immigrate”, and the 
“right to keep people out”. This dissertation can be seen as consisting of two movements: a decon-
structive movement (0.2) which links individual rights to duties, and critiques Westphalian “absolut-
ist” notions of political sovereignty, and a constructive movement (0.3) which seeks to propose 
some priority rules that help us to understand better when people have a right to immigrate and 
when they don´t, and when polities have a duty to let foreigners enter and stay, and when they 
don´t. The listing of priority rules we propose, though not pretending to be “definitive” or “com-
plete” in any way, helps us to take a step closer to understanding what “porous borders” should 
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look like, and to inspire Christian advocacy in civil society, while also shaping our way of living hos-
pitality and civic kinship. 
0.2 Deconstructive Moment 
After a chapter on the methodology which we will follow in this dissertation, we present, in Chapter 
2 a summary of Catholic Social Teaching (CST) on migration and borders. CST sketches an ethics of 
immigration policy by identifying a set of rights (and corresponding duties) and a set of right-order 
principles relevant to human mobility and political boundaries: many such rights and principles can 
be found in official Church documents, though often not fully expounded and supported by rigor-
ous argument. Tensions, real or apparent, between such rights and principles are not usually ex-
plored and dealt with. That is why, after a first moment where we list and comment the major 
rights and principles synchronically, we focus on a particular issue in CST which is central to our dis-
sertation — the tension between the right of persons to immigrate into a country and the right of 
states to control their borders. We then analyse the diachronic development of official Catholic 
doctrine on this issue. 
The main conclusion of Chapter 2 is that, in recent years, there has been a certain shift in emphasis 
in CST on migration. Recent documents speak clearly about the right of nations to control their 
borders, and risk being interpreted as supporting unilateral immigration restriction, which earlier 
CST documents reject (in favour of multilateral immigration management and the respect of certain 
persons´ right to immigrate). Either (Hypothesis A) these rights are irreconcilable today, and one of 
them has to be declared void (given the changes in the phenomenon of human migration in the last 
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few decades), or else (Hypothesis B) a way of adjudicating between these conflicting rights claims 
needs to be provided. 
The deconstructive moment of our dissertation seeks to negate Hypothesis A. Chapter 3 seeks to 
show that, even though the phenomenon of migration has changed in the past decades, these 
changes do not warrant a substantial change in the ethical evaluation of the phenomenon devel-
oped in CST between the 1950s and 1970s. The chapter sets out to support this claim with the 
presentation of a wide panorama of data concerning human migration in recent decades, set in his-
torical perspective, and using economics, law, sociology, psychology and security approaches to the 
reality of migration in today´s world. Globalisation, mass emigration, international terrorism and 
the ecological crisis in recent years do not entail that we should abandon the right to immigrate. 
Rather, given that the issue of border control has come to the fore, we can discern, more than ever 
before, the need for a moral framework within which to adjudicate conflicting rights claims regard-
ing immigration, and to make the “right to immigrate” more receivable and concrete. This points to 
a constructive moment where moral theologians need to fill this lacuna and provide such a frame-
work, namely by formulating clear priority rules. 
Through the use of a case study, Chapter 4 consolidates the deconstructive argument above, while 
providing a bridge to the constructive moment of our dissertation. On the deconstructive side, we 
trace Malta´s experience of almost 200 years of mass emigration and its sudden transition to be-
coming a migrant-receiving country in recent years. We conclude that the Maltese case demon-
strates within the confines of a microcosm that some of the problems being faced today by mi-
grant-sending and migrant-receiving countries are not so “new” after all. On the constructive side, 
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from a historical and particular perspective, this chapter inaugurates our ethical reflection on the 
right to immigrate, namely by developing the Principle of History-Laden Interdependence and a 
related priority rule. Finally, the Maltese case study, using qualitative and quantitative studies, also 
provides empirical data regarding the legal, political, economic, social and cultural implications of 
irregular and asylum immigration to Malta in recent years, the beginnings of a difficult process of 
adjustment to an increasingly multicultural society, and the challenges of integration. All this helps 
us to prepare a reflection on integration capacity developed in chapters 6 and 7. 
0.3 Constructive Moment 
Chapter 5 builds on the objections to immigration restriction presented in previous chapters, and in 
this sense also has a deconstructive component. However, its main aim is to develop an ethical 
framework which helps us propose a number of priority rules. These rules allow us to define the 
parameters of an immigration management approach suggested by CST, which is multilateral, soli-
dary and compatible with the right to immigrate, properly understood. To do so, this chapter seeks 
to understand (1) how to reconceptualise the notion of political sovereignty in the 21st century, (2) 
who is the “forced migrant” who has a prima facie right to immigrate to satisfy her basic needs and 
those of her family, and (3) how to tackle the complex issues raised by conflicting rights claims. We 
distinguish here two orders of problems concerning the rights of immigrants and of polities: one 
concerning the origin and foundation of such rights and their lexical ordering, the other concerning 
the more precise content of the rights and priority rules in question.  
As regards the origin and foundation of such rights, we explore an increasing number of “cosmopol-
itan” contemporary political philosophers who in the name of human rights challenge absolutist 
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notions of political sovereignty, and take positions akin to CST’s “porous borders” approach. Yet, we 
also appreciate the importance placed by civic republicans on the exercise of popular sovereignty, 
but seek to reinterpret this in favour of seeking ways of including immigrants from the decisions 
that affect them rather than excluding them and so create a new politically-disenfranchised under-
class. This nuanced position, though not argued exhaustively in the chapter, seems very plausible 
from a philosophical standpoint, while being most congruent to the stance taken in CST. As regards 
the content of the rights of immigrants and receiving polities, the second part of the chapter uses 
the foundations above, and a distinction between different types of stay, to present an argument in 
favour of a number of priority rules, namely, the Recipient Country Selection Rule, the Immigrant 
Entry and Sojourn Selection Rule, the Immigrant Residency and Naturalisation Selection Rule as 
well as a Procedural Rule.  
The sixth chapter, focussing on an analysis of Old Testament materials, seeks to supplement the 
more universal and cross-cultural approach in the Chapter 5 with a reflection based a rich human 
tradition which has had to deal with migrants and strangers for several hundred years. When ade-
quately approached (6.1), the Bible, which brings together law and narrative, provides valuable re-
sources towards a deeper reflection on a number of key concepts: hospitality and kinship (6.2), na-
tional identity (6.3), and “strangeness” / “otherness” (6.4). The biblical approach allows us to deep-
en the historical and theological dimension of our investigation and thus helps us to refine and ex-
pand on the preliminary priority rules presented in the previous chapter, namely through the Na-
tional Narrative and Integration Capacity Rules (6.6). 
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The Old Testament teaches us a lot about hospitality, but it struggles with integrating the other. 
This difficulty brings us to the synthesis proposed in our final chapter, which distinguishes two 
components within the virtue of solidarity with immigrants: hospitality (both settler and itinerant) 
and kinship. These two components are already announced in Chapter 5, which links different 
rights and priority rules to different types of stay (sojourn/long-term residency), and thus implies 
that a just relationship with different types of immigrants requires different types of practices. The 
virtue ethics approach we take in Chapter 7 gives due importance to the virtue of hospitality and 
the practices related to this virtue, but invites to go beyond mere hospitality and to develop prac-
tices based on the virtue of kinship-fraternity. To be sure, such a transition is a very difficult one 
and may seem too idealistic in the current political contexts of many Western democracies. For this 
reason, rather than make the case again for the priority rules using the language of duty and law, 
we choose to reflect on how narrative and ritual, in the city as in the Church, can help us foster 
hospitable and kindred citizenship and discipleship. Hopefully, this can create movements within 
civil society which challenge the ecology of fear pushing for greater immigration restriction, and 
propose reasonable rules (such as the priority rules proposed in this dissertation) as guides in the 
formulation of fairer immigration laws and policies. 
C h a p t e r :  1  — P a g e :  7 
 
CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Migrants´ Stories 1.1.1 STEVE´S STORY 
In this chapter, we will present the methodology we will follow in our dissertation. We shall start 
here with some reflections on the hermeneutical approach we believe is necessary for an investiga-
tion in the human sciences which aims to be rigorous and intellectually honest, and which has to 
deal with narratives of various sorts. In his book, The Great Exodus, Lawrence Attard (1989, 37–38) 
published this interview, given in Malta by Mr Steve Pace on the 30th November, 1983. Mr Pace was 
a typical Maltese emigrant who escaped the grinding poverty in Malta after the Armistice in 1918 
caused a considerable reduction in activity and personnel at the British naval base in Malta and 
hence widespread unemployment: 
I tried to reach America as a stowaway but was caught while the ship was still in [Malta´s] Grand Har-
bour. I was seventeen then. When my father and mother realised that there was no stopping me, they 
decided to give me £29. In all I carried on me £40 when I finally sailed from Grand Harbour sometime 
early in 1920. There were about eighty other men going to the USA. 
I was able to read and write and I knew a little English. My companions and myself left Malta for Syra-
cuse on the ferry and then travelled all the way by train to the French port of Cherbourg. That journey 
took five days. From Cherbourg we went on a ship called the "Adriatic" which carried us to New York. 
That crossing took nine days. In New York we were taken to Ellis Island where they fixed letters of the 
alphabet on us. They examined us for trachoma and our general health. The whole thing took about 
five hours. I think I was able to pass quickly because I knew some English and I had enough money on 
me. 
From New York I took a train to Detroit. I wanted to go to Detroit because I knew that I had an uncle 
there, but I had no idea where he lived and he knew nothing about my arrival. In New York and in De-
troit I was met by no one. However, as soon as I arrived in Detroit, I started looking for Maltese immi-
grants. After four days one of them told me where to find my uncle. My first job was with Chrysler. I 
worked in the Paint Shop but this job lasted only six weeks because most of us workers were sacked. 
This meant I was two years out of work. During my first two years in America I never wrote back home 
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because I did not have the money to buy stamps with. Eventually my mother contacted the British Con-
sul in Detroit to see what had happened to me. The Consul found me out and he gave me some 
stamps. I was then so hard up that I couldn't afford a pair of shoes. Most Maltese were in the same 
predicament. At first we were given tickets to buy our groceries, but then they stopped giving such 
tickets to those of us who were single. 
Few Maltese had steady jobs then. Those who worked sometimes would give us ten cents to buy two 
eggs. We lived in a lodging house which was owned by a Maltese known to us as Pawlu iż-Żgħajjar or 
Tiny Paul. He hailed from Qormi. Twenty-four men lived in that house. We ate spaghetti for our only 
meal and sometimes we were given a loaf of bread by the Salvation Army. When one of us had a ciga-
rette, we would share it. Winters in Michigan were much colder than in Malta. At times the tempera-
tures stayed below zero for weeks. For one whole year we had no heating in our lodging house. Most 
of us were young and single and we were able to survive. 
Fortunately relations between Maltese themselves were friendly. We helped each other when we 
could. Some would lend money without charging any interest. The Maltese got on well with other im-
migrants. Except on one occasion when the Irish Gang of Fifth Street attacked the Maltese. I think the 
fight ended in a draw. Next the Irish attacked the Chinese, but the Chinese were prepared for the fight 
and obtained an easy victory over the Irish. 
I remember one fact very clearly. It was 1932. I had been waiting for hours to register for work. It was 
snowing very hard. After waiting for some hours someone came out of the office and said that work 
would be offered only to those who were American citizens. At that time I still had my British passport, 
so I said I was American and gave them the address of my American girl friend. I got a job. 
Later I opened a grocery shop. When Prohibition was lifted I opened a Beer Garden where most of my 
patrons were Irish. Business was good and after the Depression I did very well. In 1935 I went back to 
Malta for the first time since 1920. Since then I was able to visit Malta regularly. In 1974, after fifty-
four years living in the USA, I decided to retire to Malta. Since that year I have been going regularly to 
the USA where my son lives. In spite of the hardship endured, I am proud of my American citizenship 
and I am glad that I emigrated when I was only a youngster. I can say that most Maltese who lived in 
Detroit have done very well for themselves. 
Steve´s story introduces us to some of the complexity of the phenomonenon of human mobility. 
Depending on what we choose to highlight, we could come to some very different conclusions on 
what “economic” migration entails. Some would note that Steve tried to travel as a stowaway, lied 
to his employers about his status (pretending to be a US citizen), preferred to stay in Detroit during 
the Depression (instead of going back home or looking for a job somewhere else) and was involved 
in fights among immigrant gangs. They would conclude that Steve´s story is yet another proof of 
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the theory that poor immigrants tend to be violent, ignorant and obtuse cheaters. Others, however, 
would see this as an impressive success story, the realization of the “American Dream”: here is a 
migrant entrepreneur who integrated very well, became a citizen and is proud to be American. 
Others still would note the fact that he returned to Malta with some of the capital accumulated and 
intepret it in different ways: Steve might be seen as a “typical” first generation migrant who is nev-
er truly at home in the receiving country, or else as a person who inhabits two cultures with ease. 
Some would also comment that if, with his family’s help, Steve could pay the passage and get 
through the controls at Ellis Island, he was not “poor” by Maltese standards. Rather, immigration 
was a rite of passage for the generation that missed the Great War: he was therefore a restless, ad-
venterous young man bent on proving to himself and to others that he was “a man”, and making a 
fortune abroad.  
When studying immigration we come accross various “stories”. They may be qualitative narratives 
of immigration experiences, such as the one above. They may be quantitative collections of data 
selected by economists or sociologists and interpreted in one direction or another. In philosophical 
and theological Ethics, we also deal with “classic” stories, such as textbook cases, thought experi-
ments, and narratives from religious traditions4. For example, the Parable of the Good Samaritan 
(Lk 10:25-37) is a commonplace5 in debates on the ethics of borders and on migration, especially in 
4 For example, cf. Peter Singer’s famous “Shallow Pond” case and Appiah’s (2007, 158f) discussion of it; the 
universal compassion (karuṇā and anukampā) of the Buddha; Mencius´ discussion of the case of the child 
about to fall into a well (The Mencius 2A:6); the story of the first Hijra (when Mohammad´s companions 
were given asylum by the King of Ethiopia) (Ibn Hishâm 1955, 56–60; Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah 2003, 261–
265). 
5 Regarding the use of commonplaces in ethical reflection, see Jonsen and Toulmin (1990, 74). 
                                                     
C h a p t e r :  1  — P a g e :  10 
 
documents and speeches of Church leaders6; the immigrant in the story is the Samaritan, but most 
interpreters seems to ignore this fact and associate immigrants with the victim. One might even 
compare the bandits in the story to irregular migrants preying on the poor in our societies.  
The complexity of immigration stories allows for many interpretations. There is no “view from no-
where” when debating or studying a “hot” issue like this: we always listen to stories about immigra-
tion and read economic and sociological data from a certain stance. There are two things I would 
like to note at this point. Firstly, the different readings of Steve´s story and the Parable come from 
different stances, which we can demarcate from one another by tracing imaginary lines between 
interpretative communities. Secondly, the stances themselves are built on narratives, and inter-
rupted by narratives. As we shall see below, by being coherent and intellectually honest, we may, at 
some point, actually allow those stories to start challenging our initial stances and “pre-
comprehensions”. Hence, instead of being closed in a vicious circle where every new story about 
immigration is used to confirm our “pre-judgements” on the issue, we can climb a hermeneutical 
helix which allows us to look down the ladder at some point and reshape the lower rungs. For ex-
ample, literature and cinema can be important sources of interpretative narratives which might 
help us rethink our initial stances7, as is good journalism done by both “natives” 8 and “immi-
6 Cf. explicit references in M1997§2, M1999§5, EM 3, (Willimon 2011), ES-PM (intro.) and implicit references 
in GS 27.  
7 For instance, the attitudes of Walt Kowalski, in Clint Eastwood´s feature film Gran Torino (2008), and Wal-
ter, in Thomas McCarthy´s The Visitor (2007) change radically when they find themselves obliged to relate 
with immigrants whom they initially see as repulsive and criminal. 
8 Journalism does not provide “bare facts”, but rather stories which present these “facts” in a certain way. 
Maltese and Italian newspapers often give prominence to news about new boatloads of undocumented im-
migrants arriving in Malta or Lampedusa, creating the impression of an on-going invasion, and to crimes 
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grants”9 who take big risks to provide us with other elements in the construction of our narrative 
understanding of immigration.  
Yet, it is good to state at the beginning where we stand, what “fore-judgements” do we carry into 
this investigation, what worldview encumbers10 our judgment, especially in the light of the herme-
neutical thought of 20th century authors, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricœur.  1.1.2 MY STANCE AND MY NARRATIVES 
A doctoral thesis in the field of theological Ethics can be a “dry” narrative, populated mostly by ar-
guments rather than eccentric and fascinating characters. Unlike biblical parables or Clint Eastwood 
committed by people with immigrant-sounding names. This is a very partial and facile way of reporting on 
the phenomenon of migration. Yet, there are good journalists committed to tell us a richer story by adopting 
a different perspective. For instance, Fabrizio Gatti, an Italian journalist, has managed to pass himself off as 
an undocumented immigrant on many occasions and his articles help us see how migrants are treated in Ita-
ly and elsewhere (Gatti 2000; 2003; 2005; 2006; 2007). His book Bilal — Viaggiare, lavorare, morire da clan-
destini (Gatti 2008) gives witness to the life of migrants and refugees on their way to Europe, and how they 
travel, work and die in the deserts and cities of North Africa. Another daring Italian journalist, Gabriele del 
Grande, writes an influential blog, Fortress Europe (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com) and has published 
two books, Mamadou va a morire (2008) and Il mare di mezzo (2009a) relating his encounters with immi-
grants and their families along migration routes in Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, 
Malta, Turkey and Greece. Other journalists have accompanied undocumented migrants travelling to the US 
through Mexico. Cf., for instance, the documentaries by Prieto Tassier and López Castillo (2011), Al Jazeera 
Mexico team (2011) and Bill Groody (2005), and Don Bartletti´s photoessay “Bound to El Norte", which won 
the Pulitzer Prize in 2003 (cf. Bartletti 2006).  
9 One example is Jose Antonio Vargas, a former reporter for The Washington Post who in 2008 shared a Pu-
litzer Prize. In an article published in the Magazine section of the New York Times on the 22 June, 2011, Var-
gas revealed that he has lived in the US as an undocumented migrant since 1993, when, as a child, his family 
paid a coyote to smuggle him in from the Philippines (Vargas 2011). Vargas, who considers himself an Ameri-
can, founded the campaign Define American, (www.defineamerican.com) seeking to reorient the stalled 
conversation on immigration reform in the US Another immigrant who decided to tell his story (of disillu-
sionment and failure) and that of other migrants — this time through a 9-part TV series, which was aired on 
Al Jazeera English and a documentary called Surprising Europe, which premiered in The Hague on 27 March 
2011— is the Ugandan photojournalist Ssuuna Golooba (Akomolafe 2011). 
10 For a critique of the Enlightenment anthropology which tends to see individuals as “unencumbered 
selves”, see Sandel (1998, 82–95). 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
C h a p t e r :  1  — P a g e :  12 
 
films, it does not aim primarily to stimulate the desires and imagination of the reader and spur her 
into action, inspired by the values of some “hero” or “heroine”. Yet like these narratives, a disserta-
tion in Ethics uses a descriptive approach to reality which points the intellect towards normative 
solutions to normative problems: it can be, in this way, a narrative that interrupts other narratives, 
and that helps the reader challenge her “fore-judgments” regarding a topic such as immigration. 
But let us here focus on the author, who could himself be challenged in the process of working on a 
project like this. 
I embark on this work by bringing in my training as a Jesuit priest and theological ethicist, as well as 
my personal story as a migrant and the stories of other migrants I have met, to bear on my re-
search. Three narratives, in particular, shape the stance from which I approach the subject of hu-
man migration. One is my personal story as a white, 37-year old Maltese man, born to well-
travelled parents who lived abroad for long periods in their youth. I grew up in a middle-class fami-
ly, studied and lived in six different Western countries, and volunteered with various faith-based 
organizations working with migrants11. Another narrative is that provided by my worldview as a 
Roman Catholic priest of the Society of Jesus, a very international religious Order that was founded 
by Ignatius Loyola, a person who called himself “the pilgrim” and lived as one. It is an Order mis-
11 For instance, before I joined the Society of Jesus, I had volunteered with the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) in 
Malta. This faith-based organization has since grown considerably with the influx of immigrants in recent 
years, becoming in the 2000s one of the major NGOs in Malta fighting xenophobia and discrimination against 
refugees. JRS Malta grew from a small office to one of Malta´s most prominent NGO´s and human rights or-
ganizations. Dr Katrine Camilleri, legal expert and current director of JRS Malta, was awarded the Nansen 
Refugee Award in 2008 by the UNHCR. 
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sioned to the “frontiers”12, committed to social justice, and with a long history of defiance towards 
unreasonable or unfair border laws13. Finally, in Chapter 1, I present the Catholic Teaching on Mi-
gration, an authoritative normative meta-narrative which I adhere to as a professional ethicist 
working within a particular religious institution.  
1.2 Catholic Social Teaching on Migration as Point of Departure 
In this section, I discuss further the methodology we will adopt in our dissertation, which herme-
neutically starts from a reality already being assessed morally by an active subject, whose observa-
tion and analysis leads to a renewed assessment (1.2.1). It keeps theological and philosophical Eth-
ics in dialogue (1.2.2). In this context, I also delimit our field of study (1.2.3).  1.2.1 A SITUATED APPROACH TO DEBATES ON IMMIGRATION 
1.2.1.1 “See-Judge-Act”: The Pastoral Cycle 
In Catholic praxis and theoretical reflection, the classical method used to approach social issues is a 
hermeneutical process originally proposed by Joseph Cardijn and the Young Christian Workers´ 
12 For various articles on this topic, see the Review of Ignatian Spirituality 119 (2008). Pope Benedict XVI, in 
his address to the General Congregation of the Society of Jesus (21st February, 2008), recognised that the 
place of Jesuits is still at the frontiers (AAS 100 (2008), 167), not only challenging physical and political barri-
ers to their freedom of movement, but also challenging the barriers situated in the minds and hearts of peo-
ple who resist welcoming faith and justice into their world. 
13 For example, a 1647 ordinance, published in The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes Concerning the 
Inhabitants of the Massachusets (1648, 26) states that Jesuits trying to enter the Bay Colony should be ban-
ished, and if caught a second time, put to death (unless shipwrecked). A similar law from the state of New 
York (enacted on the 9th August, 1700) threatens Jesuits with perpetual imprisonment (W. H. Bennett 1909, 
206–210). 
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movement in the early 20th century14. It is popularly known as the “see-judge-act” process, and 
sometimes referred to as the “circle of praxis” or the “pastoral cycle”15. The “judge” moment actu-
ally fuses together data analysis — and interpretation of a more descriptive kind (“social analysis”) 
— with a moral assessment (philosophical and theological) having a prescriptive intent: we could 
therefore speak more accurately of the “see-analyse-assess-act” process. Some documents of 
Catholic Social teaching (CST) have proposed this method as the privileged method to be followed 
in theological reflection on social issues (MM 236-7; cf. GS 4; OA 4; Elsbernd 1995, 42).  
In the light of our above discussion, and of the great epistemological debates or the 20th century (in 
both Continental and Anglo-American Philosophy16), there is a good and a bad way of understand-
ing the “see-judge-act” methodology. A bad way is to think of it as a linear process starting from 
“nowhere”, what Husserl calls the “natural attitude” (Beyer 2013): we first observe “facts” (and lis-
ten to narratives) from a “neutral” stance, then we judge what we observe (that is, we analyse the 
data and interpret the narratives on the descriptive level, and then jump to the prescriptive level 
and make moral claims), and finally we act according to that judgment. A good way to understand 
Cardijn´s method is to see it as a circular, or better, helical process. We always find ourselves acting 
14 One of the first mentions of the “see-judge-act” method is in a 1935 address on “Three Truths” (Cardijn 
1955, 86–87). 
15 Cf. Holland and Henriot (1983, 7–10); Pelegri (1979, 153–167). 
16 Continental Phenomenology, starting with Dilthey´s characterization of the “sciences of the spirit”, and 
Husserl´s critique of the “natural viewpoint”, then with Merleau-Ponty´s anaylisis of perception and 
Heidegger´s reflection on the human self as a being situated “in the world”, and more recently with herme-
neutical approaches of Gadamer and Ricoeur, has helped us to see the human person as a hermeneutical 
being, already engaged inextricably in the reality around her, yet somewhat able to follow, together with 
others, a project which makes life meaningful and ethical. Analytical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, 
starting with authors like Quine, Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, have underlined the theory-ladenness of all hu-
man observation, and shown that falsification offers a better basis to approach the truth than verification.  
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in the world and making moral judgments about things. New data and new narratives are not 
grasped as brute facts by “unencumbered selves”, people with no history and no prior interpreta-
tive keys to reality. Different people read Steve´s story, or the parable of the Good Samaritan, in 
very different ways because their observation of reality, their way of listening to a new narrative, is 
“theory-laden”17. The circularity of the process could become vicious if new narratives are not al-
lowed to challenge the fore-judgements that we carry with us whenever we set out exploring reali-
ty and making observations. Yet, the circularity can be allowed to develop into a helical process in 
the sense that every cycle of seeing, judging and acting leads us to another cycle, and with every 
cycle, we go up one level. This dynamic allows us to shift our position and gaze down critically on 
our previous experience of seeing, judging and acting.  
Such a methodology recognises that we are always in the middle of things, and we start dealing 
with circumstances in life already situated somewhere. As we navigate the seas of knowledge on 
rickety boats, we can only improve the boat design from the inside, while sailing, using new flotsam 
to add features and replace old planks. We do not leave our situation to look at reality “from no-
where”. Rather, a rigorous methodology allows us to start from somewhere — it could be any-
where, in fact, so long as it is plausible and is somewhat ethically acceptable — and embark on a 
process in the search for coherence and truth, which will then allow us to critique our fore-
judgments and put into question bit by bit our original stance. Given that they are part of a contin-
uous helix, the different steps in the process (see-judge(analyse/assess)-act) can be stated in a dif-
17 The debate concerning the theory-ladenness of observation has marked the Philosophy of Science consid-
erably in the 20th century. It is mainly associated with figures such as Norwood Russell Hanson, Thomas 
Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend (Brewer and Lambert 2001). 
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ferent sequence. In the light of the above, for didactic purposes, we could designate the mid-point 
of the “judge” as the start of the cycle, and actually talk of an “assess-act-see-analyse” process.  
1.2.1.2 “Assess-Act-See-Analyse”: Reconceptualising the Traditional Methodology 
Let us start with the first step: assessing reality. Putting the “assess” step at the start of the cycle 
helps us see better what we are doing in ethics, and avoid certain accusations, such as that of suc-
cumbing to the “naturalistic fallacy”, whereby we move from purely empirical data to normative 
claims. The claim that all observation is to some extent “theory-laden” means that even the most 
rigorous natural scientist, when she goes out into the field to collect data, has certain theories “at 
the back of her mind” which shape the way she observes things and notes down observations. She 
cannot write down that she has seen a “rabbit” if she has no idea (and no rudimentary definition) of 
what a “rabbit” is. In moral thought, our observation is even more “theory laden”. When we ob-
serve corpses lying along the border between the US and Mexico, we do not only have a definition 
of “human corpse” and “national border” at the back of our minds, but also theories about justice 
and freedom. That is probably why we care to go to the border and start making these observations 
in the first place. Hence, because we have a worldview which gives us a sense of right and wrong, 
and because we are always in the middle of action (praxis), even when we are “theorizing”, we can 
say that all observation is situated within action, and all action is inhabited by a worldview that al-
lows us to morally assess reality (and make sense of our acting and observing).  
This takes us to steps 2 (act) and 3 (see). The conclusion of the above discussion is that we always 
come to the “act” step from the “assess” step. All conscious and non-banal human action (actus 
humanus, not actus hominis) presupposes a prior moral evaluation of reality (even though it may be 
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mostly intuitive in the act of a child), and by calling the methodology “see-judge-act” we may forget 
this. Keeping in mind the classical distinction between prâxis and poíēsis, the “action” flowing from 
moral assessment is praxical, but praxis incorporates “poietical” components such as observation 
and data analysis18 which do not have, in themselves, a moral intentionality, but obtain one from 
the praxical action which envelopes them and gives them meaning. So the last two steps in our four 
step cycle (assess-act-see-analyse) are “poietical” actions which make sense in the context of the 
person’s praxical action (step 2), informed by their prior moral worldview (step 1). 
The analysis and interpretation of reality, are presented here as the step 4 of the cycle. When seen 
as part of the moral act of the person seeking to comprehend reality, the analysis and interpreta-
tion of data is not done purely on the basis of “empirical” observation. Social data (and immigrant 
narratives) would have no moral value if they were lists of purely empirical “facts”. Any attempt to 
derive a moral reflection from such “raw” data would incur the “naturalistic fallacy”. Yet analysis 
(step 4) can lead to a new assessment (step 1), when one recognises that the results are situated 
within a pre-existing moral debate, and linked to prior moral assessments19.  
18 Theory (theōría), if by this we mean natural scientific theories without substantial metaphysical underpin-
nings, is merely a complex construct of poíēsis: it produces explanations of reality which serve to procure 
necessities and support praxical action. Moral and political systems, however, can be considered as the theo-
retical part of praxis: they help us understand what the good life is, and live it out of freedom, not necessity 
(cf. Volpi 2010). 
19 This process does not happen only in the work of ethicists, but also in the work of natural scientists. Let us 
give an example. You cannot conclude simply from observing x rabbits passing by in time t in zone z (say, 
somewhere in Australia) that z is infested with rabbits and action should be taken to eradicate these “pests”. 
All you can do with this empirical data is jot it down on your notebook and calculate the rabbit density per 
square kilometre. Calling rabbit densities above a certain threshold an “infestation” is already a value 
judgement, since the term is negatively charged, and implies that there is something wrong about those 
population densities. Going from there to calling the authorities and asking them to set myxomatosis-
infected traps to get rid of the rabbits is clearly a decision of a moral and political nature; it is not warranted 
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1.2.1.3 The Use of this Methodology in the Dissertation 
These methodological remarks are very relevant to our reflections in the following chapters. We 
will make descriptive observations about immigration (“irregular migration is happening”, “most 
immigrants find jobs and contribute to the economy of the receiving country”, “most immigrants 
come from low HDI countries”): this is the “see” step and the “analyse” step. We will argue, from a 
prescriptive stance, that certain things should be done (“we should adopt certain priority rules 
when admitting or integrating immigrants”; “we should promote hospitality and kinship”): this is 
the “act” step. But we don’t go directly from “see” to “act” on the basis of the analysis. Rather, 
when we see, we are already acting, and carrying certain moral assessments at the “back of our 
mind”, such as “basic human rights to safety and subsistence should be respected”, or “it is wrong 
to deny entry to refugees”: this is the “assess” step. This is why I would describe the methodology 
of this dissertation as an “assess-act-see-analyse… and assess again… and then act” cycle20.  
by the observation alone. Rather, the observation triggers a response based on a moral stance you had be-
fore ever going out to count rabbits, for instance, on the claim that rabbits in Australia compete with endem-
ic mammals and their population growth should be kept in check to maintain biodiversity, or that rabbits 
damage crops and harm the profitability of farms and the wellbeing of farmers, which is a bad thing. The 
moral claim that we can, and should, kill certain animals to protect other animals or to allow certain humans 
to earn a living and flourish, is certainly a theory that encumbers the observations and actions of the scien-
tist out there in the bush. Not everyone would agree with this claim, and it is certainly not something built 
from pure empirical observation. Yet most scientific action, as most human action, has a practical intent, and 
places data analysis at the service of decision-making which is moral and political. When scientists or other 
people do this, they obviously do not argue from “x is happening” to “we should do y” (naturalistic fallacy). 
Rather they assume normative theories (of a moral and political nature), such as “when x happens, some-
thing is wrong and we should do y” (assess), and then note that “x is happening” (act/see/analyse) and con-
clude that “we should do y” (assess/act). 
20 CST itself somehow recognises this; for instance, in MM 220, it is clear that the “observations”, which lead 
to social analysis, ethical judgments and praxis, are themselves rooted in a history of action in the world 
which assumes certain basic principles, such as the dignity of the human person (cf. GS 46). Christian obser-
vation of the world is always theory-laden and praxis-laden with some notion (not always fully thematised or 
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Given my initial stance and my “fore-judgements” (my personal experience, my Jesuit vocation, my 
profession as a Catholic Moral Theologian, mentioned above), I come to this project with a certain 
way of assessing things, with moral claims which encumber my observation. I thus start the cycle by 
presenting the rights claims and right-order principles in Catholic Social Teaching (Chapter 1), which 
will give the reader a good idea of where I stand as I embark on this project. This is the “assess” 
step. I then act as a researcher through, precisely through the observation of reality of immigration 
and the analysis of this observation (Chapters 2 and 3). This is the “act/see” step combined with an 
“analyse” step. This first cycle then leads to a second cycle which starts with a philosophical (moral) 
reflection on the phenomenon of human mobility (Chapter 4). This second “assess” step responds 
to the data presented and analysed in Chapters 2 and 3. It is also compatible with the reflection 
from Catholic Social Teaching (Chapter 1) of my first assess step, but now it allows me to critique, 
re-assess or refine certain tenets of Catholic Social Teaching on migration21. This then takes me, in 
Chapter 5, to a second “act/see” step. Here I observe the phenomenon of migration, and the way 
immigrants are treated, in biblical Israel, on the basis of a historical approach to the biblical texts of 
the Old Testament. This second “act/see” step is combined with an “analyse” step, given that we 
will primarily read the Old Testament as a historical artefact, rather than a normative text. We will 
clearly defined) of human dignity and the common good, and with a history of action in favour of both. Re-
peated cycles of seeing, judging and acting, starting from this situation, have led the Catholic Church to de-
velop a complex body of Social Teaching many rungs up the helical ladder. 
21 The most important thing about the “see-judge-act” methodology adopted in Catholic Social Thought is 
that it is not rigid and has a great potential for self-correction and self-critique. The young Josef Ratzinger 
(1969) did not shy away from noting the limitations of CST in the past, and criticising the doctrine of some of 
the popes for being too rigid and not in dialogue with sociology and history. The fact that such a critical 
scholar could himself become pope and major authority behind contemporary CST indicates that — putting 
aside some very sensitive issues — there is a space for a rich and critical internal dialogue within the Catholic 
Church. 
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finally embark on the third “assess” step in Chapter 6, presenting the virtues of hospitality and kin-
ship, and a series of priority rules, which should guide the action of the author and the reader out-
side of the narrative text of the dissertation, in “real” life. To be sure, the steps are not always as 
separate as this scheme suggests. Some of the priority rules are presented in chapters concerned 
mainly with observation and analysis of data and narratives. 1.2.2 A PUBLIC EXERCISE AND A THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE 
As a result of the Reformation, European secularization and the modern reorganization of universi-
ties, most of our contemporaries tend to think that there is a very clear separation between philo-
sophical and theological Ethics. There are militants on both sides, some asking “where is Jesus 
Christ in this argument?” or “where is this in the Bible” at every turn, to make sure their theological 
Ethics doesn’t become “too philosophical”, while others are constantly trying to blot out any refer-
ence to God or to religion from their work in a struggle to convince themselves and others that they 
are doing “philosophical Ethics, not Theology”.  
To be sure, there are distinctions to be made, but a strict separation does not make sense from the 
Catholic viewpoint. Firstly, such separation flies in the face of the Catholic tradition which has 
sought — using language such as that of the “natural law” — to make the basic ethical principles 
which Christians use to shape their life comprehensible and acceptable to all peoples. Secondly, 
when defended from a theological position, this “great divide” tacitly makes Christian ethics sur-
render to a pessimistic anthropology that denies the possibility of a real dialogue between the “jus-
tified/baptized” and the “sinner/unbaptized”, and so, between Christians and members of other 
religions, or between Christians and “the world”. Such a Manichean anthropology is certainly not 
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compatible with Catholic tradition and not helpful in an intellectual exercise such as this disserta-
tion22.  
Finally, when defended from a philosophical viewpoint, this attitude of strict compartmentalisation 
is highly suspect, since it seems to imply that theological reflections on the good life, or practices 
and narratives pertaining to certain human communities, should be excluded a-critically from Phi-
losophy, simply because they are “religious”. This constitutes an attempt on the nature of Philoso-
phy itself by excluding a priori a huge portion of human experience, human self-understanding and 
of human interconnectedness from Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics, thus reducing Philoso-
phy to a yet another politically- and ideologically-censored examination of human life. These disci-
plines owe many of their classical concepts and arguments to religious traditions and it would be a 
great loss to Philosophy if the bridges were burnt, under the assumption that Philosophy has noth-
ing (more) to learn from Religion or Theology.  
The methodology used in this dissertation will distinguish, but not separate, philosophical and theo-
logical sources, arguments and conclusions in Ethics. On the one hand, I am convinced by Paul Ric-
22 Such approach assumes that, given the extreme corruption of fallen human nature, there are no shared 
values and no commensurable experiences of the virtuous life between different cultures and religions. Yet, 
if human nature were truly so depraved, nobody would have believed in Jesus of Nazareth and followed him 
when he appeared in history, and there would be no Church today; this is why the Catholic approach insists 
that original sin does not completely blot out the human heart´s ability to recognise Christ and his message 
as “good” news, implying some “natural” or “existential” openness to what is authentically “good”. In spite 
of considerable impact of Augustine´s pessimism and his anti-Pelagian rhetoric on Christian thought, the 
medieval Christian tradition has always insisted, e.g. in authors like St Bernard, that fallen humans still are 
beings made in God´s “image”, even though they may have lost their originary “likeness” to God. The imago 
Dei constitutes a vestige of godliness deep within the heart of every human being, allowing them to recog-
nise and follow what is truly good, and therefore (to some extent) both the moral law and the revelation of 
God in Jesus. Aquinas speaks in this sense of the “intellectus agens” (cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 5, a. 4 ad 
1; In De Anima III, lectio X); modern authors like Karl Rahner (1961b) refer to the “supernatural existential”.  
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oeur´s (1986, 347f.) claim that great works of literature, religious myths and symbols, and rich nar-
ratives provided by the great traditions of humanity “donnent à penser”, that is, they “offer food for 
thought”, they provide seed capital for philosophical, ethical and political thinking (cf. De Oliveira 
2004)23. I appreciate the fact that philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas (Habermas and Ratzinger 
2007, 43–47) are realizing that the great religious and philosophical traditions of humanity have 
been actively involved in a quest for a shared yet rooted moral understanding of human action ever 
since the “Axial Age”, in spite of the many tragic moments when “religious arguments” were used 
to justify violence against and even the extermination of people perceived as “different”,  “bad” or 
“expendable” in quests for hegemony and domination which were mostly political in nature. That is 
why I believe that most of the rights and principles presented by CST resonate within the hearts of 
most human persons and can be understood and adopted by all “people of good will”. On occasion, 
these rights and principles may be translated into philosophical concepts and argued for rigorously 
23 The complexity, ambiguity and intellectual “messiness” of symbolic language is not merely a symptom of 
simplistic, pre-scientific or pre-political understandings of the world, but often betrays an excess of meaning 
that offers a deeper understanding of human realities which are inherently “messy” and complex. Such ex-
cess of meaning is lost when we try to “demythologise” them à la Bultmann, or “translate” them into “pure-
ly” secular concepts or into rationalistic language typical of natural science. Stories from the Bible, the Had-
ith, the Bhagavad Gita, and also classical narratives from Shakespeare and Dostoyevsky, can be accessible —
to some extent— to most readers. The heroes, holy persons and role-models presented in these texts allow 
us to use our imagination to think “oneself as another”, narrate who we are and who we want to be, as in-
spired by these characters, and develop our sense of what is good and what is just (cf. Ricoeur 1995, 140–
168). This repeated exercise of “moral imagination” engenders a “moral wisdom” within cultures, social 
groups and cosmopolitan human societies. This wisdom or moral “commonsense”, whether acknowledged 
or not, conscious or not, is an essential touchstone used by ethics scholars as they develop moral theories; 
and moral commonsense and moral theory are reciprocally fine-tuned using dialectical processes such as 
what Rawls (2005b, 20f. 48–51) calls “reflective equilibrium”. In this way, moral philosophers come to articu-
late moral systems, using abstract concepts and rigorous arguments, and provide catalogues of virtues, 
elaborate systems of moral norms, principles and values, and taxonomies of moral cases, which, working 
together as a complex whole, allow us to act morally and build our moral character, as individuals, communi-
ties, societies and members of the human race. 
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with no reference to religious authorities. But, many a time, they may also be simply presented in a 
“public” religious language, or through religiously-derived narratives that can be understood more 
directly by people open enough to listen to this idiom and willing to explore it, willing to find paral-
lels in their experience, culture, religion or worldview24. This is why, in my discussion of CST (be-
low), the biblical approach to migration and borders (Chapter 5) and the Christian understanding of 
hospitality (Chapter 6), I also seek to dialogue with, and remain comprehensible and convincing to 
readers from other denominations, religions and worldviews.  
On the other hand, I believe that Theology should listen to, and reflect upon, some of the debates 
in contemporary Philosophy. I seek to do this in Chapter 4. Catholic theological Ethics has learned 
many things from modern Philosophy, which on occasion has prodded the Church to ask itself 
whether certain moral principles and practices, which it had been taking for granted for many cen-
turies, were truly faithful to the Gospel and the old tradition of the Church, or whether they were 
24 I do not believe that religious ideas, arguments and narratives in the field of ethics (or politics) should al-
ways be translated into non-religious language or “public reason” when submitted to the general public. 
Rawls (2005a, 215) insists on the use of public reason, and assuming we should vote according to the ideal of 
public reason, criticizes citizens who “talk before one another one way and vote another”. However, in the 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls (2005a, 443–445) restricts the forum of “public reason” considerably 
and distinguishes it from another very “public” forum, called “background culture”, where “nonpublic rea-
sons” are allowed. He compares this forum to what David Hollenbach (1995) calls “civil society”. I believe 
that in most public fora, there are situations where religious language, presented in a way which remains 
faithful to the religious worldview but is comprehensible to the particular audience being addressed, can be 
“public” enough to make sense and be appreciated by listeners from different religions or cultures. Many 
people can appreciate a good deal of what Christians say when they claim that “human beings have dignity 
because they are created in the image of God”. Even though they may be non-believers or not agree with 
this doctrine, they can get a sense of the “sacredness” Christians attach to the human person and may find 
elements in their worldview which resonate with this Christian teaching. This is even truer when we present 
Gospel parables or stories from the life of Jesus and the saints; most people can make sense of these narra-
tives and let them challenge their ethical thinking, even if they are non-believers. Often, however, philosoph-
ical or secular “translations” of some major ethical notions present in Christianity (and other religions), such 
as human rights, are very useful: they allow us to dialogue in public with people who are suspicious of reli-
gious language or whose worldview may be very different from ours.  
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rooted in accommodations and compromises with the socio-political realities of the Roman Empire, 
Medieval feudalism or Renaissance culture. The Catholic Church´s initial opposition to the recogni-
tion of certain human rights25 and to the abolition of slavery26 are well-known examples.  Outsiders 
can often help us understand better who we are, and challenge us to be coherent and faithful to 
our roots. Philosophical and theological Ethics can therefore welcome and critique one another re-
ciprocally, and learn from each other. 
Bringing philosophical and theological Ethics to work together in this way, as ways of thinking which 
are distinct but not separate, we are reminded once more of the mystery of the Incarnation. As 
Chalcedon (and Rahner) teach us, what is divine is not at odds with what is human, and what can-
not manifest itself in a fully human form and speak to the heart of all persons of “good will” cannot 
be credibly associated with what Christians call “God”. In this deep sense, all Theology should be 
“public” and “anthropological”, but our reflection on issues such as migration and borders will seek 
to be an exercise in Theology that is manifestly so. 
25 In the XIXth century, the Catholic Church considered certain human rights (e.g. freedom of conscience, ex-
pression) as philosophical inventions which were contrary to Christian morals and condemned them (Cf. 
Mirari vos (Gregory XVI) and Pascendi Dominici gregis (Pius IX)). Later, after World War II, the Church real-
ised that these same rights, when properly understood, are fully compatible with Gospel values and are ul-
timately based on a notion of human dignity which has deep biblical and theological roots. Recent popes 
have championed these rights. 
26 Catholic theology did not condemn slavery and continued to stand by the classical arguments used to justi-
fy this horrible institution until several Western governments (mostly influenced by philosophical argu-
ments) abolished slavery in the XIXth century, and until Great Britain (through the personal efforts of Vis-
count Palmerston) pressured pope Gregory XVI to condemn the slave trade. Finally, in 1839, Gregory con-
sented, and published the document In supremo Apostolato fastigio (Noonan 2006, 104–109). Many dec-
ades later, John Paul II, in his 1993 encyclical Veritatis splendor n. 80, did not hesitate to call slavery an “in-
trinsic evil”, something so bad that it cannot be justified or excused by mitigating circumstances, in spite of 
the fact that most of his predecessors had in fact justified or excused it. Modern philosophy has helped us 
see that the biblical God does not want or condone slavery, in spite of the biblical passages which take this 
institution for granted. 
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 1.2.3 PRELIMINARY DELIMITATION OF THE FIELD OF RESEARCH 
I offer here a preliminary delimitation of my field of research. This dissertation is a reflection on the 
“ethics of migration and borders”. However, I will do ethics in a particular way (following the meth-
odology described in the previous paragraphs) and I will deal with particular types of migration and 
particular types of borders. Given my present situation as a citizen of Malta and the European Un-
ion, and an “alien temporarily and legally present on US soil”, I am particularly interested in the 
border between rich countries and blocks (such as the EU and the US) and their neighbours (such as 
North Africa and Mexico). How “open” should that border be? Who should be allowed across, and 
following which rationale, which criteria? How many should be allowed across, for how long, and 
under what conditions?  
As regards to what type of migration, I will not focus on convention refugees, though many of these 
refugees who actually reach the “First World” — most do not! — end up settling permanently in 
the new country and becoming “immigrants”. Most people and politicians in rich, Western nations 
agree (at least in principle) that refugees according to the “strict” definition of the Refugee Conven-
tion27 should be allowed in, granted asylum and allowed to live in the receiving country at least for 
as long as the source of the persecution being feared ceases to exist or be harmful. Though much 
ethical reflection is still needed on actual practices of reception and integration of convention refu-
27 The 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees (Article 1:A:2, amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees Article 1:2) defines a refugee as someone who is “owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his for-
mer habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it”. 
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gees, other categories of migrants are much more problematic from an ethical point of view, and 
hence offer fertile ground for a more original reflection28. I also bracket the debate on family reuni-
fication, since this tends to shift the discussion to the rights of the citizens and permanent residents 
who sponsor potential new immigrants, whereas I prefer to limit the debate to immigrants who 
have not yet crossed the border, or who have not settled in and become “integrated”. 
My focus is on the portion of migrants which lies between two extremes: “strict” convention refu-
gees on the one hand and “empowered” economic migrants on the other. (By “empowered eco-
nomic migrants” I mean people who have their rights adequately respected and their needs ade-
quately satisfied in the country of origin, but who migrate mainly to earn more money and attain a 
better standard of living)29. These two limits correspond to relatively clear cases: “strict” conven-
tion refugees have a strict moral right to be allowed to enter and stay; “empowered” economic mi-
grants have no real prima facie moral right to be allowed to enter and stay in another country. Yet, 
between these limits lie a number of other cases which are hazier, namely, forced migrants who are 
not considered “refugees” under a strict interpretation of the Refugee Convention, environmental 
migrants, and migrants whose economic situation in the sending country “forces” them to seek a 
decent salary and standard of living abroad to meet their needs and provide for their families.  
28 Furthermore, I do not focus on tourists, seafarers or aircraft crewmembers, persons who live abroad tem-
porarily for studies or training, highly-skilled workers recruited by receiving countries to ease labour short-
ages in certain sectors of the economy, businesspersons representing foreign companies in countries open 
to investment, and rich persons who are enticed to transfer their residence to receiving countries and bring 
their wealth with them. I will also avoid the complicated but important topic of welcoming and integrating 
travelling people. 
29 A more precise definition of this term will be provided below, in section 5.3.3.2. 
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What are the rights of these people as they try to cross borders into wealthy nations? What are 
their duties with respect to their families, to the sending countries and to the receiving countries? 
What rights do states and receiving communities have with respect to this kind of migrant? Can 
they simply close their borders to these people whenever they please, and for whatever reason? Or 
are there ethical criteria which will help determine how many migrants in these categories should 
be allowed in every year, and provide a rationale for granting and refusing entry, and establishing 
entry criteria or quotas? We will start to tackle these questions by giving an overview of Catholic 
Social Teaching on migration in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2: CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON MIGRATION 
AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR AN ETHICS OF BORDERS 
2.0 Introduction 
This introductory chapter sets up the framework of our research. We here present a summary of 
Catholic Social Teaching on migration and borders. After an introductory section (2.1), we list and 
comment on the Teaching synchronically in the form of a set of rights (and corresponding duties) 
and a set of right-order principles (2.2). We then focus on a particular issue in CST which is central to 
our dissertation — the tension between the right of persons to immigrate into a country and the 
right of states to control their borders — and analyse the diachronic development of official Catholic 
doctrine on this issue (2.3). In the process, we will note some of the strengths and limitations of this 
teaching; this will help us discern the call being made to Moral Theology to develop more concrete 
guidance to the faithful on this subject (2.4).  
We end the chapter by mapping out the rest of our dissertation and formulating the main question 
of our investigation (2.5), which can be summarized as follows: Given the limitations of CST and the 
actual situation of international migration (Chapters 3-4), what can contemporary Philosophy 
(Chapter 5) and biblical exegesis (Chapter 6) offer in the way of a conceptual framework to help us 
reflect ethically on this topic (Chapter 7)? How can we use that framework within both a (i) philo-
sophical and (ii) theological reflection to determine a number of (iii) criteria that will help us evalu-
ate border policies and naturalisation laws ethically (Chapter 7, Conclusion)? 
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2.1 Human Mobility in Catholic Social Thought  2.1.1 CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON IMMIGRATION: END OR BEGINNING OF OUR QUEST? 
In his famous 1951 paper “Chalcedon: End or Beginning?”, Karl Rahner30 re-opened a huge dossier 
in Systematic Theology. In the process, however, he also challenged Theology to adopt a new way 
of seeing its great moments of sedimentation, those moments when landmark authoritative deci-
sions are taken on what the Church believes on certain questions, when official “teaching” is de-
fined and promulgated. Rahner invites us to see these moments not only as moments when discus-
sion and reflection ends, but also as moments when discussion and reflection start anew, having 
made one step forward. To use Rahnerian jargon, official Church teaching is not only that-toward-
which our theological, philosophical and political thinking in the public sphere is oriented, but also 
that-starting-from-which we begin thinking anew, discussing among ourselves and with others. In 
this dissertation, I take this cue from Rahner and consider Catholic Social Teaching on migration 
primarily as a starting point of my discussion. 
As we stated in the Introduction, this dissertation starts from CST, as a “praxical” way of under-
standing the reality of migration and presenting the worldview from which we embark on this pro-
ject. As we develop some of the resources and principles of CST itself, we observe and analyse reali-
ty, and then dialogue with human sciences and Philosophy so as to propose a moral assessment in 
later chapters which does not simply repeat CST, and may at times be critical of certain aspects of 
30 This paper was originally published in English with the title “Current Problems in Christology” (Rahner 
1961a). 
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Church Teaching, especially those expressed in minor or dated documents31. This is why we think 
that CST should be seen as a point of departure, rather than a point of arrival, of a scholarly work 
such as this. In the hermeneutical process of a doctoral thesis in theological Ethics, CST is best un-
derstood as the background which sets the stage for a new cycle of observation, judgment and ac-
tion pursued in the doctoral project, rather than some predetermined standard of orthodoxy which 
the judging phase of the project should reconfirm, conform to and defend, as in classical “apologet-
ics”32. There would be no point in writing a dissertation to argue that the judgment warranted by 
the observations and justifying the subsequent course of action is nothing other than what is al-
ready contained in Church documents. If it were so, one ought rather to dedicate oneself to writing 
guidebooks on CST, rather than pursue a career in theological and ethical research. 
31 Pope Paul VI has helped us overcome the traditional separation between the ecclesia docens and the ec-
clesia discens by arguing —in line with the teaching of Vatican II (cf. GS 43; 62)— that any concrete social 
teaching pronounced by Church authority must be linked to a learning process involving consultation with 
others and the use of human sciences; while the general principles of CST are considered “stable” and in 
conformity with objective truth, their material elaboration and application to particular circumstances in 
particular moments of history requires an on-going local discernment which is fallible (OA 4; cf. US-EJ 20; 
Elsbernd 1995). Regarding migration, Paul VI states that “a study must […] be made on scientific lines, in 
consultation with others, on what the causes and consequences of these phenomena are, and an examina-
tion made of how travellers of this kind can be helped towards natural and supernatural development, and 
also from what dangers they must be safeguarded” (AC §472, in Baggio and Pettenà 2009). This work can 
then guide the action of the Church and allow her to “make known her mind on social, economic, cultural 
and other problems which often give rise to these migrations” (ibid.). Furthermore, EM 71 asks Episcopal 
Conferences to entrust to Catholic university faculties in their territories “the task of studying the various 
aspects of migration more thoroughly for the benefit of concrete pastoral service for migrants”, and also to 
program “compulsory courses of theological specialization” for this purpose. 
32 Catholic Theology after the Reformation and before Vatican II has often limited itself to expose a series of 
rigid doctrines and to defended them “apologetically” in front of a straw-man outsider, without actually en-
tering into a serious debate with the real others (cf. Blondel 1994, 129–150). The Council specifically sought 
to overcome this understanding of the role of Theology in documents such as Gaudium et Spes. 
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 2.1.2 PRELIMINARY MORAL ASSESSMENT: ALLEGIANCES IN TENSION 
2.1.2.1 A Right to Immigrate and a Right to Control One´s Borders 
In 1971, Pope Paul VI insisted that “it is necessary that the law [of receiving countries should be] 
established in such a way that the right of [persons] to immigrate is recognised and their integra-
tion is made easier” (OA 17). Though the official English translation mistranslates this as “the right 
to emigrate”, the pope is clearly indicating that migrants have a right to move in33. In 2003, the 
American bishops claimed that according to the Catholic Church, “sovereign nations have the right 
to control their borders” (USMX-SNL 36). Though this claim is hard to find stated as such in im-
portant documents of the Roman Magisterium, which prefer to make guarded phrases on the “right 
to dominion”34 and the “right to control and limit the flow of migrants when for the common good 
33 The Latin says “right to migrate”, but the context makes it clear that Paul VI is claiming that there is a right 
to immigrate: “Necessarium est […] ut lex de illorum statu condatur, qua ipsis migrandi agnoscatur ius, facil-
ius iidem populi corpori inserantur […]”. The position of the Catholic Church on this issue does not mirror 
that taken by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognises a right to emigrate without 
the corresponding right to immigrate somewhere. CST generally speaks of the “right to migrate” to designate 
both rights (e.g. iure personali migrationis in GS 65). The teaching goes back to Pius XII, who in his 1952 
Christmas Address (AAS 45 [1953]: 41-24) declares that there is a natural right not to be impeded while emi-
grating or immigrating ([il] diritto naturale della persona di non essere impedita nella emigrazione o immi-
grazione). Cf. note 52.  
34 For instance, EF §102 (cf. numbering in Baggio and Pettenà edition) does recognise state sovereignty, but 
insists that it not be used as excuse to limit immigration: “The [right of] dominion of particular policies (do-
minium singularum civitatum), although it must be respected, cannot be exaggerated to the point that ac-
cess to this land is, for inadequate or unjustified reasons, denied to needy and decent people from other 
nations, provided of course, that the public wealth (utilitas publica), considered very carefully, does not for-
bid this”. Similarly, sovereignty cannot be invoked to deny the right to emigrate. “Of its very nature, civil au-
thority exists, not to confine men within the frontiers of their own nations, but primarily to protect the 
common good of the State, which certainly cannot be divorced from the common good of the entire human 
family” (PT 98). 
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serious and objective reasons exist which affect the migrants’ own interests”35 (M 1999 2), it is 
clear that many Catholics (including major bishops´ conferences) are convinced that states do have 
a right to keep migrants out. Is Catholic Social Teaching on Migration self-contradictory? The rest of 
this chapter will examine this and other tensions within CST, and place them within a larger con-
text. 
2.1.2.2 The Common Good 
Before proceeding any further, it is important to realize that CST reflects on migration from three 
particular vantage points: that of the person and one´s family (familial perspective); that of society 
and the body politic (societal perspective); that of the whole human race (cosmopolitan or univer-
sal perspective). All of these perspectives or “horizons” are important and allow us to see the 
goods produced and distributed, as well as the burdens and injustices endured, by the different ac-
tors in the phenomenon of migration. Equating these goods together is not a matter of applying a 
standard mathematical formula but rather a matter of phronesis (prudential judgment). We under-
stand what is truly the “common good” by fusing together these horizons. While including human 
rights as conditions of possibility for the flourishing of persons, families, societies and, ultimately, 
the whole human race, in a just system of relationships among humans and with other creatures, 
the common good is not merely a list of objects or even human capacities acquired through the 
promotion of rights and distribution of certain goods.  
35 Official documents which mention this right (e.g. EM 21) refer to GS 87, which does not speak of interna-
tional migration, but rather of migration from rural to urban areas of the same country. 
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Understood in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition which undergirds most Catholic ethics, the “good” 
life achievable in this world is an activity which is an end in itself (even though related and some-
how subjected to the beatific vision in the afterlife). Yet this good life of a single person becomes 
“common” when enmeshed with that of other similar beings, since humans are fundamentally rela-
tional. The common good is thus properly understood as a complex of “social” and “political” activi-
ties36, conducted by societies of “city animals” — as Aristotle defined human beings — whose rela-
tionships are rightly ordered. To be able to participate in such a common good, and not be margin-
alised or “cut off” from such a complex of activities, persons and groups have to be allowed certain 
basic freedoms and political rights; they also need to develop certain capabilities to participate ef-
fectively in the common good, and hence should be guaranteed a number of socio-economic and 
cultural rights37. Fundamental human rights are therefore pre-requisites in the attainment of the 
common good. CST mentions a number of rights related to the phenomenon of migration, and pro-
vides several principles which help us to understand how human relationships can be rightly or-
dered so that all can justly partake in and of the common good38.  
36 In other words, activities relating to the “polis”, the city. According to this understanding, the common 
good does not refer primarily to material or spiritual objects in themselves, or to states of mind, but to rela-
tional activities. However, a number of prerequisites are needed to participate in such activities, which can 
be considered part of the common good itself (cf. Hollenbach 2002, 81–86). 
37 An adequate view of the Common Good implies taking into account “all those social conditions which fa-
vor the full development of human personality” MM 65. Cf. Hollenbach (1979, 41–100; 2002, 159–165), Ha-
bermas (1998, 121–125), Nussbaum (2007, 284–291). 
38 Cf. Christiansen (2005, 227f). “The common good of individual states is something that cannot be deter-
mined without reference to the human person, and the same is true of the common good of all states taken 
together. Hence the public authority of the world community must likewise have as its special aim the 
recognition, respect, safeguarding and promotion of the rights of the human person” (PT 139; cf. PT 64). 
“The common good is best safeguarded when personal rights and duties are guaranteed. The chief concern 
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However, before delving into rights and principles as presented in Church documents, let us return 
briefly to the three perspectives mentioned above which help us see the allegiances in tension in 
the documents. The universal or cosmopolitan perspective is important for most Christian churches. 
Many churches, referring to the “Great Commission”, insist on the universality of the Gospel mes-
sage and of the Church which brings together those who receive it. For Catholics, “catholicity” is 
one of the marks of the Church of Christ39. The Church sees itself as a “sign and instrument of 
communion with God and unity among men” (LG 1). She is  
sent to all peoples of every time and place, [and] is not bound exclusively and indissolubly to any race 
or nation, any particular way of life or any customary way of life recent or ancient. Faithful to her own 
tradition and at the same time conscious of her universal mission, she can enter into communion with 
the various civilizations, to their enrichment and the enrichment of the Church herself (GS 58). 
This cosmopolitanism inherent in Christianity is however lived in rooted, situated communities of 
“human” proportions; this is where the familial and societal perspectives come in to temper Chris-
tian cosmopolitanism, and distinguish it from bland universalist ideologies and projects of cultural 
homogenization or world government. Fraternal hearts, whose love and solidarity embraces the 
whole wide world, are raised in the virtues of charity within small human communities, starting 
from the family, the neighbourhood, the school and the parish community. Yet, the concentric cir-
cles of proximity which trace familial, racial, religious or socio-political boundaries around the self 
can never stop the Christian from being a true neighbour to the stranger in need who happens to 
of civil authorities must therefore be to ensure that these rights are recognised, respected, co-ordinated, 
defended and promoted, and that each individual is enabled to perform his duties more easily” (PT 60).  
39 Other mainstream Christian churches, for example, the Anglican Communion, hold similar teaching, 
though their notion of “catholicity” may be somewhat different from that employed by Catholic theology. 
Regarding the use of this notion as a framework for a theology of migration, see Robert Schreiter (2008). 
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be physically close, nor can they so dilute charity at the outer circle of humanity as to make it indif-
ferent to the rights and needs of people at the other end of the globe. The boundary tension be-
tween local and universal has an important impact on CST when it comes to speak about sovereign-
ty, migration and borders. 
The three perspectives are also linked to Church structures: the universal Church (which manifests 
itself in the Pope and the Roman Dicasteries, Synods and Ecumenical Councils), the local Church 
(which manifests itself in the Conferences of bishops and their commissions, Diocesan synods, and, 
to some extent, in the parishes) and the domestic Church (which can be found alive in the nuclear 
and extended family). These structures also imply certain allegiances, which have to be held in ten-
sion. To some extent, the institutional church — both universal and local — claims to represent the 
migrants (being the Mystical Body of Christ — M1985 3; being truly “catholic” — M1985 2; offering 
pastoral care “without frontiers” — CHM 26). Xenophobia goes against the nature of the Church 
(L1983), and “excessive” nationalism is constantly critiqued in CST (e.g. AG 15; EM 8). Popes have 
insisted that the Church is “ferment in the construction of human unity, of a civilization of love” 
(PFD 5). Yet, as we shall see, the Catholic Church — universal and local — is also tempted to use a 
language of complementarity or simple reconciliation of conflicting rights claims that ultimately 
makes her seem to take the side of the nation-state or to unwittingly advocate unlimited tolerance 
of the status quo. Dioceses, bishops´ conferences and their institutions are bound and restricted by 
national borders, and ever since the Emperor Constantine, the whole Catholic Church has been or-
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ganized territorially as a stable community with dioceses and parishes often mapped on parallel 
units of civil administration40.  
In spite of its historical resistance to the Westphalian system and the modern notion of state sover-
eignty, the Roman Catholic Church too participates in today´s nation-state system, since its central 
“governing body”, the Apostolic See, is physically situated in and intimately linked to a particular 
“nation state” — the Vatican City State — with well-defined borders and with its own state appa-
ratus. The Apostolic See also has its own network of ambassadors (nuncios). To be sure, this “privi-
leged” situation has often been used to solve dilemmas linked to the system of nation-states (offer-
ing shelter and documents to certain refugees and stateless persons), and to represent the “voice 
of the voiceless” in forums like the UN General Assembly, but it also projects an image of the “Pil-
grim Church” which seems to be far from the precarious itinerant life of Jesus and the apostles. The 
local and domestic Churches too face similar tensions: they are inserted in a locality and often de-
pend on the nation state and on the sense of identity it provides to understand themselves and 
their mission; they may gladly collect and send money and goods to refugees and migrants in for-
eign lands, but welcoming a migrant into one´s Church or into one´s home may be, at times, very 
challenging. Local church communities are often tempted to see the immigrant as the “other”, ra-
40 Vatican Council II does not put this organization into question and underlines the importance of territorial-
ity and the parish system, cf. Sacrosanctum Concilium 42; Presbyterorum Ordinis 6; Lumen Gentium 28. Some 
more recent documents, however, argue that the Church should become more mobile to match the modern 
world on the move. Though parish structure is still very important and relevant today, we must also think 
“trans-territorially”, and the Church needs to “overcome habits rooted in the static” (CHM 20). Orobator 
(2005, chap. 4) reflects on how the “settled Church” setup influences the pastoral work with refugees and 
immigrants in Africa. 
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ther than as a constitutive member of their church which, though locally-situated, is nonetheless 
called to embody the catholicity and inclusiveness of Christ´s Body.  
I believe it is difficult for any Christian church today to challenge nation states and take prophetic 
stances on certain issues like migration. Bigger churches like the Roman Catholic Church, the Angli-
can Church in the UK or the national Orthodox Churches may not want to antagonize governments 
(or conservative political parties) with whom they collaborate on many issues, or to be seen as ex-
erting an excessive influence on the electorate. Smaller churches, on the other hand, often lack 
structures and institutions to think and act effectively on such international issues41. The Christian 
faithful as well as ordained ministers, immersed in a culture hostile to immigration, are often all too 
willing to take for granted modern ideas on the inviolability of sovereignty and they often simply 
assume there is nothing morally wrong with arbitrarily closing borders to protect one´s society from 
an “invasion” of “illegals”. While Catholics are not shy to be countercultural on topics such as abor-
tion, torture or capital punishment, to be counter-cultural on the issue of migration requires that 
we challenge the notion of sovereignty itself, and this is like opening once again a very disturbing 
chapter of Church history, advocating for a return to a more cosmopolitan view of human society 
which the Church had painfully and slowly given up after Westphalia.  
To be sure, the institutional Church has not been silent on the rights of migrants and asylum seek-
ers; it has claimed it has a right and a duty to speak about these issues, not only to its members, but 
41 For instance, Graham James, an Anglican bishop raised in the Congregational Church, comments on his 
experiences of the difficulties faced by smaller Christian churches without a parochial system and with few 
or no enduring structures to be “mission-shaped” and deal with new challenges such as the phenomenon of 
immigration (James 2006, 6). 
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to all peoples. Being an “expert in humanity” (Paul VI 1965) the Church has something to say about 
social justice that is truly universal (O’Brien and Shannon 2010, 310–311; cf. M1998 2), and this is 
part of the core mission of the Church: “proclaiming the Gospel permits and demands the full salva-
tion of man, his authentic and effective ‘liberation’, in order to reach the conditions proper to the 
fullness of his dignity”42 (CHM 17; cf. EN 30-39; O’Brien and Shannon 2010, 310–311). In some 
Western European countries, the official organs  of the mainstream Churches, and some faith-
based organizations, have been vocal in defending the rights of asylum seekers (Snyder 2012, 201–
207), but from my experience, most people in the pews (and many members of the clergy) have 
never heard of Catholic Church´s stance on the “right to immigrate”. In the US, several Catholic 
bishops have famously championed immigration reform (cf. Baggio and Pettenà 2009), but many 
people in the pews see such social justice issues as an “optional” part of Catholic ethics, compared 
to “real” issues like abortion or euthanasia (G. A. Smith 2006).  
As a result, many actors in government and civil society, even in “very Catholic” countries like Mal-
ta, seem little aware of the Church´s thought on the issue of borders and migration, and many 
Catholics think this teaching is very peripheral or optional to their faith, or that the Church should 
not be talking on these issues. Furthermore, those who know something about the Church´s teach-
ing on migration and borders often know it in an oversimplified form, as we noted in the introduc-
tion of Section 2.1. Even in high-level local documents such as Strangers No Longer (USMX-SNL 33-
42 Most Church documents which speak on immigration (and their official translations, especially those pub-
lished in past decades) do not use inclusive language. As a rule, we will not try to amend them or hide the 
fact that the Catholic Magisterium is not generally very sensitive to this issue. Obviously, the full liberation of 
“man”, in this text, means the full liberation of “humankind”, and not merely of the “male gender”. For the 
Catholic Church, that liberation, in its historical dimension, certainly includes the emancipation of women; 
however, what should be appropriately included in such emancipation is a very contentious subject. 
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38) 43, pastors and local bishops often present the teaching as striking a balance between two com-
plementary “rights”, kept in tension by the notion of the common good: the right of people to im-
migrate44 and the right of sovereign states to control their borders (often presented as equivalent 
to a “right to restrict immigration” for some “good reason”). Stated in this form, persons not ac-
quainted with the Catholic understanding of rights and the common good may be tempted to think 
that one of the following options is true. (a) Either these are “absolute” rights which do come in 
conflict, but being absolute, each believer or state is allowed to decide which right trumps which, 
and act accordingly. Or, (b) CST uses the word “rights” lightly, situating them in an irenic world 
where they practically never give rise to truly conflicting claims. As we shall see, neither of these 
theses is correct. It is important, therefore, to take a good look at what the Church documents say 
about the issue.  2.1.3 IMMERSED OBSERVATION: MIGRATION AS SEEN BY MIGRANTS AND LOCAL COMMUNI-TIES 
The Catholic Church has a long tradition of accompanying migrants and speaking up for their rights, 
though for many years official teaching has tended to see migration primarily through the lens of 
Italian priests reflecting from Italy on the phenomenon of human mobility (especially that of fellow 
Italians). Of primary importance are two bodies: the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Mi-
grants and Itinerant People (PCPCM), which was instituted in 1970 as the then Pontifical Commis-
43 This document summarizes Church teaching on migration in five principles (n. 33-38). “I. Persons have the 
right to find opportunities in their homeland. […] II. Persons have the right to migrate to support themselves 
and their families. […] III. Sovereign nations have the right to control their borders. […] IV. Refugees and asy-
lum seekers should be afforded protection. […] V. The human dignity and human rights of undocumented 
migrants should be respected.” 
44 See note 53. 
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sion for the Pastoral Care of Migration and Tourism and then restructured in 1988, and the Interna-
tional Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), established in 195145. These are linked to and often 
staffed by people from various organizations founded within the Catholic Church to accompany and 
advocate for migrants and refugees, for instance the religious congregations founded by Blessed 
Giovanni Battista Scalabrini.  
These organizations have contributed considerably to CST on migration, bringing together people 
working in the field, in close contact with migrants and with local receiving communities, people 
trained in human sciences like sociology and psychology, as well as theologians and pastors. Even 
though, traditionally, CST documents avoid citing secular and scientific sources, the reflection which 
gives rise to the social, ethical, political and theological “judgments” on the phenomenon of migra-
tion is often based on accurate quantitative and qualitative observation of the reality on the 
ground, seen, as we have said, from the standpoint of believers with a certain worldview. Tables A1 
to A4 in Annex A offer a summary of observations found in various documents issued by Popes, 
Roman dicasteries and Bishops´ conferences in Europe and North America. 
When reflecting on the “causes” of migration (Table A1), CST sees a number of factors at play: 
“pull” factors, “push” factors, subjective motives and facilitating factors46. CST also observes the 
45 The ICMC often functions as an NGO, but was originally constituted as, and still is, an “international com-
mission of Catholic Bishops Conferences and Episcopal assemblies of similar status working with migrants 
and refugees on national and regional levels”. Cf. http://www.icmc.net/structure-and-governance (accessed 
on 2nd June, 2013).  
46 Push factors include violence and injustice, poverty and economic mismanagement, environmental and 
climate-related factors and even national policies that favour or promote emigration in the countries of 
origin. Some push factors depend on actors outside the sending country (which could be active in local and 
regional conflicts, and may interfere in the economic life of the sending country) and on international struc-
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effects of migration, firstly on the migrants themselves (Table A2). It dwells little on the positive ef-
fects, assuming that there are positive effects if people are ready to face so many difficulties and 
hardships to move to another country and adapt to another culture; it mentions the fact that mi-
grants and receiving communities are enriched by the cultural exchange and the dialogue it occa-
sions. Church institutions often see persons as “migrants” when they are in difficulty; migrants who 
are fully integrated blend into parish communities and cease to be referred to as “immigrants”. This 
is perhaps one reason why the documents tend to emphasise the negative effects of migration on 
the migrants: issues, or more precisely, “problems”, which are economic and work-related (e.g. ex-
ploitation), social (e.g. marginalisation), personal and family-related (e.g. abuse, insecurity, difficul-
ty to raise and educate children), as well as legal, religious and moral ones. 
As regards the effects on sending communities (Table A3), CST mentions remittances and their posi-
tive effects, while noting the negative social effects of the separation on families and communities. 
Various documents also survey the effects on receiving communities (Table A4): immigration has 
positive effects being culturally enriching and overall socially and economically beneficial to 
wealthy and stable receiving countries but also has negative effects (e.g. rise in xenophobia, spaces 
of illegality which surround irregular migration and possible wage competition, especially with un-
ionized native labour). 
tures such as economic globalisation, the effects of trade agreements, and demographic imbalances. Pull 
factors are mainly linked to higher wages and better living conditions in a foreign country, or at least better 
economic opportunities and personal freedoms, both real and perceived. People do not always move from 
where the push is greatest to where the pull is strongest; one has to add to this picture subjective motives 
and facilitating factors, such as transportation and communication links, transnational networks, cultural and 
linguistic affinities, family relations, etc. 
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All of these observations are, of course, situated. A nationalist politician, a Chicago-school econo-
mist, or a philosopher who believes in totally-open borders may see the reality differently. In Chap-
ter 3, we bring these observations into dialogue with data analysed by social sciences to see how 
we can make this picture a more complete and rigorous representation of reality, without however 
pretending to present some fictional “view from nowhere”. 
2.2 Rights and Right Order in Catholic Social Teaching on Migration 2.2.1 JUDGING THE SITUATION (I): A SERIES OF RIGHTS 
Christians have reflected on the phenomenon of human migration for many centuries. One of the 
key Catholic authors at the dawn of modernity, Francisco de Vitoria, is known for his argument in 
favour of the right to travel and dwell in foreign countries (Vitoria 1991, 278f). The argument prob-
ably works much better when applied to peaceful individuals and groups than to expansionist na-
tions whose settlers are always accompanied by technologically advanced conquering armies, such 
as those of Vitoria´s Spain. At the wake of the industrial revolution, with its multiple effects on de-
mography and warfare, various popes expressed their concern about the situation of refugees and 
migrants47, but the nucleus of CST on migration took shape during the pontificate of Pius XII. Pope 
Pius was deeply moved by the plight of refugees and stateless people during and after the turmoil 
of World War II, and also by the situation of migrants leaving the European continent devastated 
and impoverished by war to look for jobs and start a new life abroad. This led him to reflect on such 
47 For a brief history of the Catholic Church´s concern about the situation of migration between the Industrial 
Revolution and Pius XII, cf. ES-PM II:2:2, ES-IE 61ff and EM 19. EF (part I) offers a lengthy excursus on the 
subject.  
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issues in a number of speeches and radio addresses48. These reflections were developed and inte-
grated in 1952 in an important Church document —the pastoral constitution Exsul Familia Naza-
rethana49. Most of the intuitions in this landmark text were developed by John XXIII, the Second 
Vatican Council and especially during Paul VI´s pontificate. Paul VI was very concerned with the sit-
uation of migrants. After World War II, as Substitute at the Secretariat of State, the then Msgr. Gio-
vanni Battista Montini was personally involved in the setting up of the International Catholic Migra-
tion Commission (ICMC), which was instituted on the 5th June, 1951. During his pontificate, Paul VI 
continued to press the Church to reflect on the issue of migration, and various important docu-
ments were produced by the Vatican dicasteries. In 1969, the Sacred Congregation for Bishops pub-
lished De Pastorali Migratorum Cura and in 1978, the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Mi-
grants and Itinerant People published Church and Human Mobility; both documents are considered 
very important texts on the issue. More recently, in 2004, the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral 
Care of Migrants and Itinerant People issued the Instruction Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi. To 
these documents, we need to add the messages that the Popes issue yearly to commemorate the 
World Day of Migrants and Refugees.  
Documents issued by local bishops and bishops´ conferences on this issue are also important, given 
OA 4´s claim that “in the face of [the] widely varying situations [in today´s world] it is difficult for 
48 The best known is the radio message broadcast on Pentecost 1941, “La Solennità di Pentecoste”, written 
to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Leo XIII´s Rerum novarum – cf. AAS 33 (1941): 195ff. (cf. p. 203 
in particular as regards migration). Some letters to individuals and associations also provide an occasion for 
reflection on the topic of migration, for instance Pius XII´s 1948 letter to Archbishop John T. McNicholas and 
the National Catholic Welfare Conference (AAS 41 (1949): 69-70) contains an interesting reflection on immi-
gration and sovereignty.  
49 Pius XII´s reflection on migration continued to evolve after EF. For example, the 1952 Christmas Address 
attacks the injustice of restrictive immigration policies in wealthy countries (AAS 45 (1953), 41-42). 
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[popes] to utter a unified message and to put forward a solution which has universal validity”, and 
hence Catholics should heed on-going local discernment on particular problems — which is, of 
course, fallible, but also more concrete. In the light of John Paul II´s 1997 Apostolic letter Apostolos 
Suos, the doctrinal authority of documents issued by bishops´ conferences is limited, unless they 
are unanimously approved or given the “recognitio” of the Holy See. Nonetheless, we will use such 
documents with due caution in our review of CST on migration, especially when they are clearly in 
line with papal teaching and can stand on their own theological, biblical and philosophical feet with 
the intrinsic authority of the arguments they furnish. 
In its reflection on the ethics of borders and migration, the Church sets forth the rights of the per-
sons and groups concerned. These rights are based on human dignity, and their practical applica-
tion “fits into the concept of the universal common good” (CHM 17; cf. M2001 3). Since John XXIII, 
at least, Catholic teaching has fully embraced the use of the language of rights. PT 9 claims that  
any well-regulated and productive association of men in society demands the acceptance of one fun-
damental principle: that each individual man is truly a person. His is a nature that is endowed with in-
telligence and free will. As such he has rights and duties, which together flow as a direct consequence 
from his nature. These rights and duties are universal and inviolable, and therefore altogether inalien-
able. 
More recently, countering the tendency of some Catholics to insist unilaterally on notions of “right 
order” and to consider the language of rights as problematic in societies of late modernity, Pope 
Benedict XVI made it clear in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on April 18, 2008 
that Catholics should oppose communitarian or culture-based scepticism on human rights and con-
tinue to defend the universality of fundamental human rights and the use of rights language (AAS 
100 (2008), 334). He also notes, however, the problem of putting too much emphasis on legislative 
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enactment and focussing on the legal aspect of possessing rights, understood as something sepa-
rate from the ethical and rational context which grounds these rights and links them to an end. 
It is true that there are many risks involved when using the language of rights today. Many of our 
contemporaries seem all too ready to make rights claims and to “invent” new actionable rights to 
advance their interests, but not so willing to recognise the duties that come with such rights. Lists 
of rights are often understood as catalogues of fully independent “absolute” rights, rather than 
complex mosaics whose elements are interdependent50. This prevalent “piecemeal” way of under-
standing rights, coupled with various forms of scepticism on human rights, often gives rise to a 
“pick and mix” attitude towards human rights. Furthermore, the subject of rights is often seen as a 
monadic self, an “individual”, rather than a person embedded in a web of social relationships which 
need to be rightly ordered51. All of these factors contribute to misunderstandings when CST on mi-
gration and borders is presented simply as a list of rights. As John Paul II insists, “one cannot speak 
of a ‘right’ for the migrant or for the receiving country, without speaking of ‘duties’, of reciprocal 
duties” (PFD 3). To help the reader understand CST better, we present in Table A5 (in Annex A) a 
number of rights with their corresponding duties, and, in Tables A6 and A7 (discussed in the follow-
ing section of this chapter), we present a series of principles that help us set these rights in a 
50 Mary Ann Glendon (1998) argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has an intention-
al architecture, as in the French civil law tradition, and the articles (rights) work together as a whole. Unlike 
the US Bill of Rights, it should not be read as a list, with a series of independent elements added piecemeal 
(as in common law systems). 
51 “Without a renewed education in solidarity, an overemphasis on equality can give rise to an individualism 
in which each one claims his own rights without wishing to be answerable for the common good” (OA 23). 
For a concise distinction between justice understood simply as rights, and justice understood as right order, 
cf. Carlson (2008, 308–310). 
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framework of principles that will help us to understand how CST conceives the right ordering of 
modern human societies in view of the common good. 
We can distinguish four classes of rights in CST on migration (cf. Annex A5 for all documentation): 
(A) basic freedoms and political rights of persons, (B) socio-economic rights of persons, (C) rights of 
families and groups affected by migration, and (D) rights of polities affected by migration. As men-
tioned above, the rights presented are primarily moral imperatives regarding what is due to certain 
persons and groups, and the corresponding duties on the side of those who should be giving others 
their due. As far as possible, though, such moral rights should be entrenched in national and inter-
national legislation in ways that are overall beneficial to the common good and do not unjustly cur-
tail the rights of others.  
CST insists that people should not be left stateless or in danger of persecution; this is why it de-
clares that people have a right to some nationality (A1), and that refugees and forced migrants have 
a right to asylum (A2). Both rights are grounded in human dignity and are seen as necessary to ac-
cede to other rights and to participate in the common good; both entail corresponding duties on 
the part of the international community. CST claims that people have a right to migrate, both to 
emigrate from their home country (A3) and to immigrate into another country (A4) together with 
their families (cf. right to family reunification, C1): 
Persons have a right to migrate if certain conditions are met, namely, if due to poverty and overpopu-
lation in their home country, or due to conditions imposed by the state which offend human dignity 
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(DPMC 7), persons “cannot use the material and spiritual goods which allow ready access to one´s ful-
filment”52 and/or cannot adequately provide for their family.  
CST uses various strategies to argue for this right, invoking human flourishing, duties towards one´s 
family, freedom of movement, the unity of the human family and the universal destination of cre-
ated things. Two observations should be made regarding this right. First, the popes do not make a 
clear distinction between the right to emigrate and the right to immigrate, as some political philos-
ophers and international law experts tend to do (Christiansen 1988, 87); the right to emigrate (exit 
one´s home country) would be vacuous if there were no corresponding right to enter some other 
country53. To be sure, this is not an “absolute” right, and should not be understood as a right to en-
52 GS 26 argues that such goods are necessary to achieve the common good, and notes that “there is a grow-
ing awareness of the exalted dignity proper to the human person, since he stands above all things, and his 
rights and duties are universal and inviolable. Therefore, there must be made available to all men everything 
necessary for leading a life truly human, such as food, clothing, and shelter; the right to choose a state of life 
freely and to found a family, the right to education, to employment, to a good reputation, to respect, to ap-
propriate information, to activity in accord with the upright norm of one's own conscience, to protection of 
privacy and rightful freedom even in matters religious.” Cf. DPMC 7 for the application of GS 26 to interna-
tional migration. 
53 Some Catholics have been led to believe that CST makes this distinction by misleading translations from 
the Latin, where iure personali migrationis (in GS 65) and migrandi […] ius (in OA 17) is rendered as “the 
(personal) right to emigrate”. The translations are particularly problematic in the case of OA 17. The Latin 
text is the following: “Omnino necessarium est illam exsuperari agendi rationem, in nimio propriae nationis 
studio positam, ut lex de illorum statu condatur, qua ipsis migrandi agnoscatur ius, facilius iidem populi cor-
pori inserantur, expeditius iis reddatur suae artis profectus, et copia praebeatur convenienti domo utendi, 
ubi familiae, data opportunitate, cum iis coniungi possint” (Paul VI 1971a). This text may be rendered more 
literally as follows: “It is altogether necessary that we overcome a way of proceeding which places excessive 
emphasis on one’s own nation, so that their law {of receiving countries} is established in such a way that the 
right of these {immigrants} to migrate is recognized, etc.” The official English translation states: “It is urgently 
necessary for people to go beyond a narrowly nationalist attitude in their regard and to give them a charter 
which will assure them a right to emigrate, favor their integration, facilitate their professional advancement 
and give them access to decent housing where, if such is the case, their families can join them” (O’Brien and 
Shannon 2010, 287; Baggio and Pettenà 2009, 177). The French (Paul VI 1971b), Italian (Paul VI 1971c) and 
Spanish (Paul VI 1971d) versions are very similar; the editors of these versions and of the English version 
have even added a title to this paragraph, calling it: “Right to emigrate”. It is however clear from the context 
(and from the Latin text) that the paragraph does not deal with assuring the right to exit a country (emi-
grate) but with recognising (agnosco) the right of migrants to enter (ius migrandi… facilius inserantur) anoth-
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ter and stay in any country whenever one wishes. Nevertheless, in the current political situation 
where there are no longer any developed countries with permissive border policies, we cannot 
simply tell people who leave their country and knock at our door that they have a right to emigrate 
but that they should “immigrate elsewhere”. There must be grave reasons to refuse entry to immi-
grants and to deny such a right. Second, CST recognises the right to migrate for economic reasons 
even though not all “economic migrants” are entitled to immigrate into a foreign country. The doc-
uments identify one class of “economic migrants” which possess this right: these are the people 
who, due to poverty and rapid population growth in their home countries cannot find adequately-
paid employment there to feed their families or to attain a decent standard of living that allows 
them to flourish as human persons. The popes recognise that the situation of these people may, at 
times, be more precarious that that of convention refugees. Both groups of people migrate due to 
some sort of “necessity” (M1992 3) and the current political arguments that easily recognise the 
rights of “true” refugees but not those of “economic” migrants may be unjustified54. The docu-
ments also underline the right to basic freedoms in one´s homeland (A5), which, when not respect-
er country (immigrate). Furthermore, the English translation warps the Latin lex de illorum statu (which ob-
viously refers to the concrete immigration and integration laws and policies of receiving countries) into 
something unrecognisable by using the word “charter”. The word “charter” is practically never used in Eng-
lish to refer to laws and policies of a particular state, but usually denotes legal documents such as the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights. To suggest that receiving countries may indulge in drafting non-actionable 
“charters” of rights which assure that people somewhere else in the world have a right leave their country of 
origin, without adding what the international community —and they themselves, through their very own 
legal system— should do to make this possible (i.e. provide for the reception of such migrants) sounds dou-
bly cynical, and is certainly not what Paul VI is asking for.  
54 US Immigration laws and policies enacted in the 1980s, for instance, easily recognised the rights of political 
refugees fleeing communist regimes, but placed many restrictions on immigration from impoverished coun-
tries in Central America. It was far from obvious, at the time, that the latter did not “need” to leave their 
country as much as the former (Christiansen 1988, 91). 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
C h a p t e r :  2  — P a g e :  49 
 
ed, pushes people to migrate and go through the many difficulties (and often harrowing experienc-
es) linked to the migration.  
As far as possible, people should not feel forced to migrate, so CST also insist on the right to (ade-
quate) employment in one´s homeland (B1). To be sure, some poor countries can do much more to 
create good jobs for their citizens and attract investment, but they often have serious structural 
problems that weigh on their economies, and cannot be expected to provide a decent standard of 
living for their citizens unless helped effectively by wealthier nations. This right also applies to the 
citizens of receiving countries who may be having difficulty finding jobs because of wage competi-
tion with migrants; one has to see the real dimensions of this problem (often exaggerated by politi-
cians, labour unions and media) and seek appropriate solutions which are fair towards migrants and 
persons affected by migration. This brings us to other socio-economic rights claimed by CST for mi-
grants: the right to be helped to integrate in a new country (B2) and the right (of migrants) to re-
ceive equal pay for equal work (B3), when one compares their salaries with those of native workers. 
Among the rights of families and groups affected by migration, CST makes a special emphasis on 
the right to family reunification (C1), linking it to the dignity of the family and the need of having 
united, functioning and healthy families to ensure the future of societies in both sending and re-
ceiving countries. The documents also refers to the right of host communities (and migrants) to live 
in a cohesive and well-ordered society (C2) — which implies ensuring the rule of law (by creating 
realistic and enforceable laws concerning migration, and then seeing that they are respected by all) 
and the effective integration of immigrants —, the right of migrants (and also native minorities) to 
keep their native identity (C3), the right to public profession of religion (c4) and the right to full 
membership in the local church (C5).  
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The last group of rights defended by CST concern the rights of polities. Sovereign states have a right 
to limit “brain drain” and capital flight (D1), and the right to sovereignty (D2) implies the right to 
protect one´s own territory, and to take proper measures to safeguard legitimate national interests, 
to protect one´s citizens from harmful persons and harmful objects which criminals and enemies 
might try to smuggle across the borders. This right therefore implies a right to control borders. 
While noting the existence of such rights, the Catholic Church often insists that the prerogatives of 
states are limited by ethical imperatives, should not unduly restrict freedom, should respect human 
dignity and advance the common good. CST does not like to emphasise the prerogatives of modern 
states, but rather seeks to highlight the rights of individuals and small groups, and the duties of 
states. Sovereign states are well aware of their prerogatives, and often seek to exaggerate them to 
advance their interests at the expense of vulnerable individuals and groups. Similarly, ethical sys-
tems built on human rights after the experiences of totalitarianism in the XXth century are often 
sceptical of the “rights” of states. If, as we have mentioned above, the language of rights could be 
problematic when appropriated in a piecemeal and absolutist fashion by individuals, it is much 
more problematic when states appropriate it in such a manner: they end up constituting them-
selves into judges and plaintiffs against those who are seen to violate their prerogatives and this 
seems to be an excellent recipe for injustice.  2.2.2 JUDGING THE SITUATION (II): A RIGHTLY-ORDERED WORLD 
Well aware of such problems, CST does not simply present us with lists of rights and duties. Firstly, 
it offers us a way of thinking about rights that seeks to avoid some of the issues mentioned above. 
In CST, rights are not subjected to a consequentialist calculus which assumes we can easily do away 
with the rights of certain people or groups for the greater good of a nation, or of the human race. 
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Nonetheless, the approach is not purely deontological in the Kantian sense. Rights are understood 
as situated within a teleological ordering: they serve to build a truly just society, a series of rightly-
ordered relationships that ensure “shalom”, that is, fully-flourishing relational being across human 
society. Such a “peace”, according to John XXIII, rests on four pillars: truth, justice, charity and free-
dom55. This end, which human societies should seek and human rights are seen to promote, is of-
ten called the “common good”, and, as mentioned above, it is best understood as a complex of 
rights-empowered activities which constitute the life of the polis, be it on the level of the neigh-
bourhood, city, state or region, or on the international level. 
Secondly, to help us understand better how rights and duties fit together into a complex web of just 
relationships that build up the common good, CST offers us a number of principles that provide a 
glimpse of what a rightly-ordered society would look like. The principles proposed by Catholic 
teaching may sound like lofty ideals; indeed they tell us how people who are trained in Christian 
virtues go about seeing the world and doing things. The language of right-order principles, howev-
er, is not just a prophetic language addressed to believers; it can truly help shape policy when one 
factors in the legitimate tensions that mould the conscience of policy makers and legislators, as well 
as the necessary compromises that must be made in a pluralistic society to craft laws and policies 
that are reasonable, enforceable, beneficial in the long term and not unduly restrictive of personal 
freedoms. Given the numerous principles in CST that help us reflect on the phenomenon of migra-
tion, I have distinguished, in Annex A, between general principles applied to migration (Table A6) 
55 Pope John asks us to “bring the relationships of daily life into conformity with a more human standard, 
based, as it must be, on truth, tempered by justice, motivated by mutual love, and holding fast to the prac-
tice of freedom.” (PT 149; cf. PT 163. 167, CHM 16). 
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and principles which are more specific to the issues surrounding migration and borders (Table A7). 
Detailed documentation for the principles outlined below can be found in those tables. 
One of the most important general principles is the principle of the universal destination of created 
goods (G1). National sovereignty and private property draw borders around some goods, allowing 
certain people to benefit from them and not others. History has shown that it is very difficult if not 
impossible to abolish such borders, and more harm than good has been done trying to do so. How-
ever, God´s desire is that created goods should flow fairly to all, and the borders which are useful to 
promote good stewardship and industriousness should not be allowed to breed greed and cause 
deprivation and exclusion. Borders are never absolute; they are useful, but we have to remember 
that if we go back in history, it is virtually impossible to establish legitimate entitlements to proper-
ty, even intellectual property (most “new” ideas basically appropriate and recombine knowledge 
from the public domain). Nothing is absolutely mine, no patch of the surface of the Earth belongs 
absolutely to one nation. The needs of others may at times trump our shady entitlements to what, 
according to CST, ultimately belongs to God. When this happens someone may have to force us to 
share our goods with others if we insist on keeping what we hoarded at the expense of others. To 
be sure, this has to be done in an orderly way, as far as possible. Governments can force citizens to 
do so through just taxation or land reform that actually promotes the common good, but there is 
no authority that can force rich states that hoard an unfair share of the world´s wealth to share 
those goods with others. Irregular migration, though disorderly, often forces the hands of such 
states to do more to help developing nations, and to accept more legal immigrants who, by sending 
remittances and reducing unemployment, help poor nations develop. 
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Several other general principles can be linked to the universal destination of created goods. One is 
the principle of solidarity (G2), which is a commitment to the common good that persons and socie-
ties take, to ensure freedom from want in one´s neighbourhood, country and in the whole world56. 
The principle of subsidiarity (G3) ensures a certain autonomy for persons and groups showing soli-
darity to others, warns us against inefficient and oppressive top-down approaches. It teaches us not 
to reduce the needy other to a mere “object” of charity but rather give her the means to eventually 
be able to fend for herself, fight for her rights and help others. Of course, this principle assumes 
that higher levels of authority with a society (e.g. the state) should intervene when lower levels are 
fail to (or cannot) ensure access to basic human rights and the realization of the Common Good; it 
is built on the idea of empowerment, not on the ideology of libertarianism. The principle of priority 
of labour over capital (G4) also can be referred to the universal destination of created goods. “La-
bour” refers to the activity of human persons, be they workers, investors, administrators, etc.; 
goods such as land and money, should be placed at the service of these people and not be consid-
ered as ends in themselves and accumulated indefinitely at the expense of human life, health and 
56 In her doctoral thesis (published online through ProQuest), The Rights of the Stranger, Tisha Rajendra 
(2009, chap. 4) argues that “the key principle for understanding the theological perspective of Catholic Social 
Teaching on migration is solidarity”. Rajendra works through the understanding of solidarity in the docu-
ments and tries to bring out some more concrete implications of this teaching for her reflection on the rights 
of migrants. She insists that solidarity is a duty, not merely a virtue, and that it is social, not only personal. 
The problem, however, is that it is not easy to go from solidarity as a duty of persons to solidarity as a duty 
of institutions, and from there to argue that migrants may, on certain occasions, have a right to demand in 
justice the solidarity of countries when they ask to be received as legal residents and eventually as citizens. If 
migrants cannot make such demands and expect that on certain occasions a country may have a duty to say 
“yes” (even when this is politically inconvenient for those in power), then the “right to immigrate” is not a 
true right. If solidarity can be construed as a vague duty that persons and polities can exercise “when they 
feel like it”, or “maybe in 20 years´ time when the economy will need migrant workers”, or “when the vot-
ers´ attitudes towards migrants change” then its usefulness in a debate concerning rights and justice ends up 
being quite limited. For this reason, in this dissertation, we will first seek to understand immigration as a 
right, and its limits, through a series of priority rules, and then link it to solidarity in the final chapter. 
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well-being. Migration, both regular and irregular, is usually driven by the needs of persons (e.g. la-
bour shortages in receiving countries; unemployment, poverty or persecution in sending countries), 
and in situations of need, wealthy persons who own many goods can use their wealth to exploit 
others, putting labour at the mercy of capital. This principle implies that migrants should be paid a 
fair wage and should work in a safe and healthy environment. Furthermore, it proposes a good ide-
al that is not altogether unrealistic if world trade were to be better regulated: capital should move 
to poor countries to provide good jobs for the people there, rather than force people to migrate 
and uproot themselves to earn a decent salary. 
The principle of just legislation (G5) objects to a purely positivist or politically “realist” attitude to 
legislation. Only just laws are true laws, and one should make sure that just laws are voted for, un-
just laws are repealed and that appropriate modifications are made to past laws which have be-
come unjust due to changing social and political realities. This is a particularly important principle 
when reflecting on laws and policies which concern migrants and refugees; the rationale behind old 
quota systems and visa procedures may have become untenable in the rapidly changing interna-
tional scene, and laws voted in recession years to restrict immigration may soon become inade-
quate when the economy starts to grow. Many people end up migrating irregularly and not cooper-
ating with the law simply because they are not offered legal channels to do so, in a reasonable 
amount of time. We can link this to the previous principles: often, inadequate migration laws and 
quotas are kept in place unjustly since they create a convenient pool of undocumented migrants 
whose labour can be more easily exploited by rich and powerful persons and states. The lack of le-
gal recognition allows companies to easily fire these people when not needed, and states to deport 
these vulnerable people in recession years, instead of recognising their past contributions to the 
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country´s economy and providing them with support. Another general principle of CST insists on 
keeping diversity and universality in a dialogic tension, and invites all persons to be “cosmopolitan 
patriots” (G6). All should be good citizens, rooted in their local communities, but should develop a 
love for humankind and strive to overcome prejudice, xenophobia and excessive nationalism inside 
them and around them.  
Two further general principles have deep theological roots, but can be appreciated even by non-
believers. The framework which helps us understand these principles is that of the inseparability of 
faith and justice: on the one hand, true believers and followers of Christ cannot claim to be faithful 
to their faith if they do not strive for justice in the world (even if that means collaborating with non-
believers and doing things which may not appear to immediately “promote faith”); on the other 
hand, persons who truly seek to build a world which is more just cannot ignore a priori what reli-
gions can teach the world on this topic (even if they be non-believers). In fact, the preferential op-
tion for the poor (G7) and the recognition of structural evil in the world (G8) offer good examples of 
how biblical and theological concepts can help ethics in general to understand better what justice is 
about. The first principle mirrors God´s tendency, manifest in the Judeo-Christian Bible, to side with 
the marginalised. It teaches us that pure legal or commutative justice is not enough to build a just 
world; we should take sides with the marginalised and the needy of the world and seek that they be 
freed from want and allowed to participate effectively in society, even before heeding the com-
plaints of the rich and the powerful who claim that what is “theirs” is “theirs” and should not be 
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given to others57. In a world rife with inequalities, this option can be easily appreciated and adopt-
ed by non-believers seeking to build a more egalitarian world. 
The second principle delves more deeply into the reality of our world. The Christian teaching on 
original sin helps us to reflect on the presence of evil in the world, some of which is structural. In-
spired by this teaching, the principle of acknowledgment of, and resistance to, structural evil helps 
us to see that some of the causes of migration are structural evils and should be resisted, yet the 
same could be said of some of the procedures, laws and institutions which we have put into place 
to keep migrants and asylum seekers and their needs from interrupting our lives and challenging 
our lifestyles. It teaches us to recognise that we cannot deal with these problems on our own, or 
solve them through quick fixes; it makes us realize that while upholding great moral principles and 
rights as the ones mentioned above, we need to build justice slowly in a world which resists it, we 
need to make compromises to reach workable strategies to effectively reduce evil, injustice and 
oppression in the world (rather than jam ourselves in the prophetic “gear” and shut ourselves out 
of the realms of policy-making); it also reminds us that sometimes we may fail, and that even our 
moral judgements may be fallible, since we too are somehow contaminated and corrupted by the 
evil within us and around us58. A secular audience may be uncomfortable with the theology of sin 
57 The “option for the poor” can be linked to the principle of solidarity. In her doctoral thesis on migration, 
Rajendra (2009, chap. 4) does this, referring to the “option for the poor” in Jon Sobrino´s theology. The chal-
lenge, however, when proposing this principle, is to explain how this is not something “optional”, or else 
something required only of Christians and Christian churches. Non-believers and lay governments too are 
challenged by CST to adopt this option and discover through it a fuller meaning of the word “justice”. In-
deed, a deep and complete notion of justice for every human person must include this option (even though 
different lifeworlds and worldviews may imply different ways of putting it into effect). 
58 Protestant reflections on this topic are many and varied, as can be seen from the famous Niebuhr broth-
ers´ 1932 debate in The Christian Century: H. Richard Niebuhr argues from sin to idealist pacifism (since sin-
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which underpins some of CST´s reflections on this principle, but may be quite receptive to lay ver-
sions of Reinhold Niebuhr´s “Christian realism”, present, for example in Barack Obama´s 2009 Nobel 
Lecture. 
Table A7 lists several derived principles which are more specific to the debate on migration and 
borders. They are not usually presented as “principles” in CST or referred to with the titles I pro-
pose in this dissertation, but they are taken for granted or argued for in various official Church doc-
uments on migration; the relevant sources are noted in the Annex. One important principle (S1) in-
sists that justice has priority over relief (or “charitable work”) when dealing with migrants and refu-
gees: CST insists that these people have a number of rights, and that they should be treated in ac-
cordance with certain principles, and what is due in justice to them should be given them. Persons 
and states cannot be allowed to deceive themselves and think that they owe nothing to these peo-
ple, and that they are already being very generous and charitable by giving them things as “gifts” 
ners are ill-equipped to recognise and fight evil), while Reinhold Niebuhr argues from sin to “Christian real-
ism”, which entails responding to political evil with plentiful diplomatic craftiness and military violence, 
when those who consider themselves “good enough” judge it “necessary”. Catholic theology fully recognises 
the presence of sin in world history and in the legal systems and policies of all nation states, and advocates a 
response based on justice, proportionality and discernment of the greater Common Good. No immigration 
policy or legal system that upholds the rights of immigrants and of native communities can be absolutely 
just, since the Kingdom of God is never fully realized in any polity in history. Politicians, when designing laws 
and drafting policies, are aware of the power struggles present in society, and they seek to balance these 
forces, some of which emerge from evil in our world: xenophobia, exploitation, selfish and greedy forms of 
nationalism, profiteering from the imperfect enforcement of laws (or from the situations of public disorder 
or illegality that result from inadequate laws), etc. Catholic theologians recognise that politics and public 
laws cannot aim for utopian justice, but this does not mean that we can accept any form of society that 
maintains relative order and peace and any “effective” manner of balancing the wills to power of the differ-
ent forces within a state and of the different states within the international community. While we should not 
confuse Church and state and while we must recognise the imperfections present in both (when considered 
as realities within history populated by sinful humans) we should not stop striving, imbued with a humble 
hope, so that the Lordship of Christ may exercise itself in both realities, as far as possible, already within his-
tory.  
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which they do not “deserve”. Two other important principles are the principle of regulation of mi-
gration and asylum (S2), and the principle of due respect towards national sovereignty (S4), which 
we will discuss in the next section. The Principle of voluntary repatriation and non-refoulement of 
asylum seekers (S3) demands that asylum seekers be given adequate means to apply for asylum 
and to substantiate and defend their claims of suffering persecution in the home county, and have 
their cases competently judged; if rejected, they should not be deported back to countries where it 
is quite clear that they will suffer persecution.  
Other principles include the principle of historical accountability and recognition of shared historical 
realities (S5), the principle of fair and realistic integration policies (S6), the principle of fair and real-
istic policies in dealing with undocumented migration (S7), the principle of reciprocity (S8), the prin-
ciple of resistance to racism and xenophobia (S9), the principle of seeking comprehensive solutions 
to localized poverty and marginalisation (S10) and the principle of subsidiarity and solidarity applied 
to local churches (S11). I will only specify briefly what CST says on policies which deal with undocu-
mented migration (S7), since this has to do with the categories of migrants we are focussing on in 
this dissertation. 
Firstly, while recognising that some countries may find it truly hard to integrate undocumented 
“economic” migrants and may be justified in deporting migrants in this category, some documents 
note that the work done by these migrants over a number of years is a de facto form of member-
ship in a society. For this reason, persons who have truly grown roots in the new country and con-
tributed to its development should be allowed to regularize their migration status, rather than be 
deported in recession years. Deporting such people, and especially those who entered the country 
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as children, could prove to be a very painful uprooting experience and a form of reverse emigration; 
this should be avoided. Secondly, certain persons should not be considered “economic migrants”. 
Spouses and children who, due to bureaucratic hurdles and unfair policies, feel obliged to migrate 
irregularly to reunite with their family living legally abroad should not be deported but rather of-
fered a regular status. Such people may have a certain obligation to migrate to live together with 
their family members. Other people who migrate because they are obliged to do so are victims of 
armed conflicts, erroneous economic policy or natural disasters, who, as such, are not considered 
convention refugees if one sticks to the very narrow classical definition of “refugee”.  
Finally, CST claims that national interest or prosperity cannot be the only criterion to determine the 
size of the immigrant population which can be supported by the receiving country. Given the huge 
differences in income between rich and poor countries in today´s world, and the great need of cer-
tain migrants, receiving countries or communities should be ready to sacrifice some of the wealth 
they have accumulated (often at the expense of others) to make room for migrants. This reasoning 
follows what we have said on the universal destination of created goods, and the option for the 
poor. When facing a political realist, this is best presented as part of an a fortiori argument, since 
most economic data suggest that at current levels (and in spite of the considerable increase in re-
cent decades) immigration into wealthy countries offers no real threat to the standard of living of 
citizens (provided some social safety net is in place) and is overall clearly beneficial to the econo-
mies of receiving countries. If excessively restrictive policies are not justified when welcoming mi-
grants actually “hurts”, how much more should border policy be generous with “economic” mi-
grants when welcoming such migrants is actually “profitable”? 
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 2.2.3 SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CST ON MIGRATION, TAKEN AS A WHOLE 
I cannot offer, at this point, a general and detailed appraisal of CST on migration, but I believe that 
the rights, duties and principles mentioned above demonstrate the richness of this teaching. I think 
that the documents offer us very valuable ethical insights on many aspects of the phenomenon of 
human mobility. The reflection provided is deeply inspiring, instructive and normative for the praxis 
and reflection not only of Catholics but also for most people who are willing to engage seriously 
with the texts, are committed to justice in our world and embrace a worldview that can support a 
robust notion of human dignity.  
There are several critical observations that one could make to such a vast body of teaching59. How-
ever, I limit my reflection here to two tendencies in CST which, I believe, should be questioned, es-
pecially in the light of the phenomenon of international migration as it presents itself in the 21st 
century and which will help us set the scene for the following section. The first is to assume, maybe 
too quickly, that stability is ideal, and that being uprooted is an evil (e.g. LE 23): CST is strongly bi-
ased in favour of a “settler” or “sedentary” vision of human societies60. In general, destitution may 
be more dehumanizing for an uprooted person and one expects CST to see reality from the eyes of 
59 Other authors have provided valuable appraisals and critiques. For example, in her thesis, Tisha Rajendra 
(2009, chap. 4, conclusion) analyses CST on migration and concludes by noting a series of lacunae or serious 
limitations in the Church´s official teaching on the subject of migration: (1) while underlining the universality 
of human rights, the official documents do not take a clear position on the right of certain migrants (e.g. 
documented guest-workers) to naturalisation after a certain number of years (when even communitarians 
such as Michael Walzer tend to accept this!); (2) while emphasising communal self-determination and the 
universal common good, the documents do not help us understand clearly what are the limits of state sov-
ereignty, if any, and what duties a state has towards insiders and outsiders; (3) while providing a global per-
spective on the issue, the documents do not adequately account for the “realities of globalization and the 
multiple levels of relationships among political communities, individuals and organizations that span political 
communities” (ibid.). 
60 This tendency is most clearly present in the writings of John Paul II; cf. section 1.3.3.2 below. 
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the destitute, not of middle-class globetrotters. However, the apostolic Church is an assembly 
which seeks to follow the itinerant Jesus, not an institution seeking to perpetuate the religious 
branch of the administrative structure of the Roman Empire, and so, it should never forget that na-
tive soil is not the only reality that allows people to be rooted in this world.  
The second tendency is that of understanding the relationship between human need and human 
agency in simplistic terms. CST seems to construe the decision to migrate either as “forced” (by a 
need) or as “free” (freely chosen). Yet, very poor and “needy” persons often do have a number of 
options to choose from: they do have some agency, and their choices are hence not mechanical 
and “forced by necessity”. On the other hand, ´free´ choices of rich and well-educated persons are 
often conditioned by more complex psycho-social “needs”. The choice of an unmarried, pregnant 
Somali woman to migrate (rather than settle down with a man she doesn´t want to marry) may be 
more authentic and existential than that of millionaire who decides he will retire in the Bahamas 
because “everyone is doing so”. We do not completely abandon the language of “forced” migration 
in this dissertation: it obviously has great rhetorical power. Yet, in Chapter 4, we distinguish be-
tween migrants whose basic security and subsistence rights can be met in their countries, and im-
migrants who flee situations of serious poverty and danger. Consciously choosing (or not) to ven-
ture into the unknown with very few resources, which could mean greater poverty and danger than 
those which are known, and a serious risk of death along the way, is human agency at its existential 
best. 
Some documents claim that the ideal is “one in which migration flows are driven by choice, not ne-
cessity” (USMX-SNL 59) but, in the light of the above, I think this tends to misconstrue the phenom-
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enon of human mobility. I therefore prefer to use the language of “empowerment”: some migrants 
(with a decent level of education and financial means, and who would be considered “middle class” 
in their country of origin) are “empowered” migrants: their agency is not skewed by constant 
threats to their basic human rights. Other migrants, are, comparatively, “unempowered”, and this is 
what I understand by “forced migration”. Once a person´s basic rights are guaranteed, she can 
much more effectively develop herself as a “city animal” and a “thinking being”, and open up a 
space of “leisure”, in the sense proposed by classical Philosophy.  
These two observations, taken together, help us see the existential dimension of human mobility, 
which is rarely highlighted in CST. The itinerant life can be the good life, and it can be existentially 
chosen. I believe that the greatest penultimate human “necessity” is a sense of purpose and mean-
ing in life, as Victor Frankl discovered in Nazi forced-labour camps. Some people find meaning by 
resolutely leaving their homeland or adopting an itinerant life. Of course, not all of them have an a 
priori right to enter and stay in a foreign country of their choice. However, CST on migration could 
do well to take the themes of exodus and itinerancy in the Bible and in Christian hagiography seri-
ously and question its bias towards sedentary life and its assumption that uprooting is necessarily 
an “evil”. Contrary to what is assumed too easily by many classic Greek authors, the goods (includ-
ing active political life) provided by one´s own polity — no matter how plentiful — may not be 
enough to provide a good and meaningful life to all citizens. Though it may not always be possible 
to partake of such goods (especially that of full participation in the social and political life of a coun-
try different from the one that a person is born in), and though relatively few people in our “global-
ising” world are truly transnational, CST could do more to remind us that strictly bordered nation-
states are a modern invention and may not survive late modernity. Furthermore, given that, from a 
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Christian perspective, our ultimate “choice” and ultimate “necessity” is union with God, in yearning 
for an unknown that is “bigger” and in showcasing a deep and uncalculating hope, migrants point to 
the ultimate existential decision in life.   
We may say, in conclusion, that while the decision to migrate is almost always a true decision (ex-
cept maybe in the case of people who are kidnapped and trafficked for prostitution) the “ideal” is 
to reduce the influence of violence, destitution and environmental degradation on the people mak-
ing that decision, so that the choice may be more “empowered” and less “forced”. Furthermore, it 
is clearly desirable to develop the economic, cultural and spiritual richness of all the big regions of 
the world (and the interconnectedness of peoples within these regions) so that people may be able 
to flourish not too far away from the place where they were born and raised, in their “home-
region” if not in their “homeland”. That is a much more complex and realistic ideal that the one 
mentioned above, or the even more obscure “right not to have to migrate”. To be sure, “empow-
ered migrants” may have less moral claims to the “right to immigrate” than “forced migrants”, but 
they are generally seen as less threatening by receiving countries and offered better legal paths to 
immigrate. 
2.3 Diachronic Analysis: The Shift from “Regulation” to “Restriction” 
After presenting a synchronic overview of the teaching of the Catholic Church on migration and 
borders in general, I dwell on the problems raised by economic migration and irregular migration. 
This is an issue which is particularly relevant to our project. In fact, much of the political debate on 
migration today centres on undocumented migration. Given the rights and principles mentioned 
above, we are asked how to judge between the conflicting claims made by two groups of people. 
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On the one hand, we have certain immigrants who, according to the criteria of CST, have a prima 
facie moral right to immigrate into a country. On the other hand, we have public authorities who 
(according to the current international system of state sovereignty which recognises no higher au-
thority than the state on matters of immigration) have a prima facie legal (and, to some extent, 
moral) right to judge and deny the rights claims made by non-citizens knocking on their doors.  
Earlier documents of CST gave some rough criteria to adjudicate between these conflicting claims, 
which have been presented above (via the right-order principles). These criteria, however, if they 
are still relevant, need to be worked out in the particular context of today´s world, where irregular 
immigration has become a major form of migration. More recent documents, however, as we shall 
see below, are less willing to help us see more precisely when migrants have a moral right to enter 
and stay in a country —no matter what the immigration laws say— and when states have a moral 
right to restrict immigration and deport this or that person —no matter how many legal loopholes 
an immigration lawyer may find. According to Catholic teaching, laws which do not conform to mo-
rality are not real laws; they should be obeyed only reluctantly and only if disobedience would re-
sult in a greater social evil, and if one is not thereby obliged to directly commit seriously evil acts in 
violation of one´s conscience. It is therefore crucial to provide criteria which help people evaluate 
the morality of immigration and integration policies, to help them form their consciences on this 
matter. 
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 2.3.1 THE NEED TO REGULATE MIGRATION 
2.3.1.1 A Shift in Tone 
The rights, duties and principles above, when presented synchronically, hide a shift in tone within 
CST on migration and borders. It is important to note from the start that the main tenets of the 
teaching have not changed; rather, the more recent documents seem to shy away from recognising 
that most migration in certain parts of the world has become “irregular” because of perverse poli-
cies which calculatingly or not make it so, and from clearly denouncing restrictive immigration poli-
cies, as in the past. The absent or very veiled critique of certain government policies that clearly go 
counter to the rights and principles presented in CST on migration, and the reluctance (by the local 
bishops and the Apostolic See) to apply the principles and rights lucidly to the case of irregular mi-
gration today can be quite misleading to the faithful and to policymakers alike.  
As time goes by, the clear positions of Pius XII, John XXIII, Vatican II and Paul VI could become a dis-
tant memory if not repeated with the same clarity and applied to the current situation. Instead, one 
gets the impression that the teaching is now being presented in obscure and extremely delicate 
diplomatic language, and the critique to the policies of nation states has become so vague that an 
average reader could find it hard to notice that CST requires (of wealthy democratic states or un-
ions, such as EU and the US) anything more than a simple tweaking of current immigration policies. 
I have even met people recently trained in CST who were not aware that the Church upholds the 
right to immigrate, not only the right to emigrate. The problem is further compounded when peo-
ple — even so-called “experts” of CST within the Church itself — read past documents outside their 
historical context, using bad translations. They often end up confusing “regulation” with “re-
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striction”, and not realizing that what often gets translated as “emigrate” or “emigration” is actually 
“migrate” or “[human] migration” in the Latin, and applies equally to immigration.  
To be sure, some aspects of the phenomenon of transnational migration have changed, and it is 
natural for most people to look at latest documents of CST to understand the position of the Catho-
lic Church on the matter. At the end of the XIXth century, and after World War II, most migrants 
were European, documented, and were leaving countries like Italy, Poland and Spain for countries 
like the US, Argentina or France. Today, most migrants are non-European, and those who are most 
visible to people in the West are the undocumented migrants. Countries like Italy have very rapidly 
started to receive large numbers of migrants and though the so-called “immigration crisis” is mostly 
an imaginary crisis created by politicians, lobbies and the media, the challenge of integrating so 
many people from different cultures is indeed real and serious. The easy solution which many 
Western politicians have found to this problem is to claim that their countries cannot absorb so 
many immigrants so rapidly, that people should seek flourishing in their home country or region 
(which could be helped to develop with development aid). Furthermore, they claim that, given the 
fact that some development aid is actually being given to poorer countries (often little, and through 
inefficient channels), only refugees according to the strict definition of the Refugee Convention 
have a right to enter their country to ask for asylum. According to this reading, all the other people 
knocking at the door are “economic migrants” who have no real right to enter wealthy countries 
and eat at their table: letting them in legally is a concession that makes sense only when it serves 
the national interest, and those who enter illegally should be arrested and deported, always assum-
ing that this serves the national interest or, more probably, the populist agenda of some political 
party.  
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CST, seeking to remain “receivable” in such a political climate, has made some concessions to such 
ideas. Most documents up to the pontificate of John Paul II admit sovereignty, and, by extension 
the state´s right to control its borders, but they do so grudgingly, adding limitations and conditions 
and subjecting this right to higher moral imperatives (cf. EF §102, in Baggio and Pettenà 2009; 
Christiansen 1988, 87 f.)61. CST assumes that, except in wartime or in moments of crisis (natural 
disasters, civil wars, etc.), most immigrants do not pose a threat to sovereignty or national security, 
and normally they would not come into a country and stay unless work is available for them. This is 
why, in most of these documents, “controlling national borders” was understood to mean keeping 
criminals or dangerous people out, and closing borders in times of crisis. Classical CST is clearly not 
in favour of adopting policies which systematically restrict immigration.  
2.3.1.2 What Does “Regulation” Mean? 
To be sure, the documents also speak of “regulating migration”62. It is important to understand 
what CST means by this expression. On the local level, “regulating migration” means designing gen-
erous and realistic laws which allow people to enter one´s country in an orderly and legal manner 
so as to avoid discrimination, employment in the informal economy and the concentration of immi-
grants in poor and crime-prone ghetto neighbourhoods. On the international level, which is 
61 “Civil authority exists, not to confine its people within the boundaries of their nation, but rather to protect, 
above all else, the common good of the entire human family”; Pacem in Terris (n. 98). To be sure, when we 
understand correctly the Church´s notion of the universal common good and the purpose of the state, state 
sovereignty cannot be considered absolute, and the right to control and protect borders does not entail an 
absolute right, superseding all other ethical imperatives, to close borders indefinitely for all but some “very 
desirable” rich and educated people. If it were so, and if all states enjoyed such absolute rights, the “right to 
migrate” would fizzle down to nothing, since one cannot have a right if nobody has a duty to respect it. 
62 For an overview of the documents that speak on this issue, cf. the Principle of Regulation of Migration and 
Asylum (S2), in Table A7 of Annex A. 
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deemed the most appropriate level for regulating asylum and migration, this means establishing 
fair and reasonable agreements among sending, transit and receiving countries to ensure that the 
rights of migrants are respected, and that migrants do not have to resort to illegal channels and 
traffickers to enter countries which can support them and need their labour.  
More generally, international “regulation” in CST means signing and ratifying without undue geo-
graphical restrictions documents like: (1) the Refugee Convention (1951) and the Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees (1967); (2) international agreements which offer subsidiary protection to 
forced migrants not considered refugees by (1); (3) the covenants associated with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948); (4) The International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990). For example, several docu-
ments insist that receiving countries should urgently ratify the latter convention (cf. EM 6, M2007, 
USMX-SNL 77 and Caritas Europa et al. (2006b)) but no migrant-receiving state in Western Europe 
or North America has done so until now, nor have other important receiving countries, such as Aus-
tralia, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, India and South Africa. “Regulation”, in this sense, is not 
the same as “restriction”, which is often a knee-jerk reaction to rates of immigration perceived as 
excessive; restriction is often disproportionate and forces many immigrants, needed by the econo-
my, into precisely those shady situations that proper regulation seeks to avoid63. If we were to re-
63 Exsul Familia says that “there would be very great benefits from international regulations in favour of emi-
gration and immigration” (§111 in Baggio and Pettenà 2009), referring to an address given in Rome by Pius 
XII on the 2nd July 1951 to the members of an International Catholic Congress for the Improvement of Rural 
Living Conditions. The accent here is on regulations in favour of migrants, not in favour of states or receiving 
communities; Pius XII was inviting the international community to deal effectively with the problem of state-
lessness and to ensure that the human rights of migrants are respected. To appreciate this, we should re-
member that the Refugee Convention was adopted that same month on the 28th July, and that the Universal 
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duce this to a slogan, we would say that the Catholics have been crying, at least since the 1950s: 
“No to unilateral restriction! Yes to multilateral regulation!” That cry has not changed, but has be-
come muffled in more recent Church documents, while, ironically, more and more experts and re-
ports are adopting precisely this position, and implying that what Pius XII was saying 60 years ago 
was not only morally right, but also politically prudent to maintain the rule of law and sustain eco-
nomic growth64. 
Restrictive “migration reduction” policies, such as those introduced by the US in the 1920s on the 
basis of the “findings” of the Dillingham Commission65, have been very harshly criticized by the 
Declaration of Human Rights had been adopted a year and a half before, on the 10th December, 1948. Nei-
ther does Vatican II take a position in favour of the right of states to restrict immigration.  Although EM 21 
states that “the Council recognized the right of the public authorities, in a particular context, to regulate the 
flow of migration (cf. GS 87)”, this statement could be misleading. The “particular context” was the move-
ment of country dwellers to the cities in the same country, transitum ruricolarum ad urbes; the text in Latin 
makes no reference to (cross-border) migration or sovereignty. The other major Church documents on mi-
gration before the papacy of John Paul II, namely De Pastorali Migratorum Cura (1969) and The Church and 
Human Mobility (1978, May) do not speak of “regulation” of migration in terms of restriction, or the closing 
of borders.  
64 Current authors use the term “management” instead of regulation, given that “regulation” tends to be 
confused with restriction. For instance, John Salt´s (2005, 41) Report to the Council of Europe concludes as 
follows: “First, management rather than control is now the name of the game. There is a recognition by indi-
vidual states and by intergovernmental organisations that international migration cannot be controlled, in 
the sense that countries can turn the taps of movement on or off at their borders. In reality they were never 
able to do that anyway. Second, there is an acceptance that migration is generally a positive phenomenon 
and that the prime purpose of management is to ensure an all-round positive outcome. Third, migration 
management strategies require a comprehensive approach that takes in the complete spectrum of move-
ment and deals with both legal and illegal moves. […] Fourth, countries can no longer act alone. Co-
operation is vital, both with European neighbours and with countries further afield.” 
65 The US Supreme court struck down state-level regulation of immigration in 1786; in 1882 the first federal 
Immigration Act was signed into law, together with the Chinese Exclusion Act which banned the immigration 
of Chinese labourers on purely racial grounds (R. M. Smith 1997, 357f). In the following years, race “science” 
rapidly developed to offer an aura of legitimacy to increasing anti-immigrant hysteria (Marfleet 2005, 120f). 
The Dillingham Commission’s 1917 Report recommended that the US restrict immigration from Italy and 
from Southern and Eastern Europe, since people from these geographical areas were supposedly shown 
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Catholic Church. Pius XII, in his 1952 Christmas Address (AAS 45 [1953]: 41-24), attacks the “nude 
calculus” — at the time mostly based on Malthusian arguments — that gives rise to the policies 
which wealthy nations use to shut the door in the face of people who have a right (and duty) to mi-
grate66. Pope Pius considers immigration restriction akin to state-imposed birth control. He claims 
that recipient countries often go as far as “mechanizing consciences” by manipulating public opin-
ion so that “the natural right of the individual to be unhampered in immigration or emigration is 
not recognised or, in practice, is nullified under the pretext of a common good which is falsely un-
derstood or falsely applied, but sanctioned and made mandatory by legislative or administrative 
measures” (ibid.). 
“scientifically” to have problems integrating themselves and becoming good US citizens. To be sure, any Ital-
ian pope would have found such “findings” offensive. The copious “scientific” report, based on racist hy-
potheses, biased survey questions, dubious methodology and “corrected” answers (Lund 1994), gave rise to 
a series of immigration reduction policies in the 1920s which discriminated against Italians (and Eastern Eu-
ropeans) and were kept in place until 1965, when ethnic quotas were removed. However, the current quota 
system in the US is still overly restrictive, and the quota system, while seeming fair on paper, does not ade-
quately take into account the geographical situation of the US and its relation to its closest neighbours. In 
fact, so as not to be “racially biased” in favour of Mexicans, the US places a similar ceiling (percentagewise) 
on visas to Mexicans as that placed on distant countries which have much fewer historical, social and eco-
nomic ties with the US; the “fairness” and “colour-blindness” of a system of geometric equality which is 
completely out of touch with history and reality hence becomes a new “scientific” justification of racist ex-
clusion. 
66 Here is the orginal text, in Italian: “Quando gli sposi intendono di restare fedeli alle leggi intangibili della 
vita stabilite dal Creatore, o quando per salvaguardare questa fedeltà cercano di svincolarsi dalle strettezze 
che li serrano nella loro patria, e non trovano altro rimedio che la emigrazione — altre volte suggerito dalla 
brama di guadagno, oggi spesso imposto dalla miseria —, eccoli urtarsi, come contro una legge inesorabile, 
ai provvedimenti della società organizzata, al nudo calcolo che ha già determinato quante persone in deter-
minate circostanze un Paese può e deve nutrire, al presente o in avvenire. E sulla via dei calcoli preventivi si 
tenta di meccanizzare anche le coscienze: ed ecco le pubbliche ordinanze per il controllo delle nascite, la 
pressione dell’ apparato amministrativo della cosiddetta sicurezza sociale, e l'influsso esercitato sulla opinio-
ne pubblica nello stesso senso, e finalmente il diritto naturale della persona di non essere impedita nella 
emigrazione o immigrazione, non riconosciuto o praticamente annullato col pretesto di un bene comune 
falsamente inteso o falsamente applicato, ma che provvedimenti legislativi o amministrativi sanciscono e 
rendono valevole.” 
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 2.3.2 THE USE OF LANGUAGE: SUPPORTING NOTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY INCOMPATIBLE WITH CST 
To understand this position, taken by Pius and his successors, we need to understand how CST un-
derstands sovereignty. “Sovereignty”, for the Catholic Church, is inseparable from the moral duty to 
open borders to certain types of immigrants (besides refugees) who, on the basis of moral criteria, 
have a right to enter and stay. A notion of sovereignty which denies that countries are bound by 
this moral duty is not compatible with CST.  
Given that it is precisely this problematic notion of sovereignty that is in fact being taken for grant-
ed by many of our contemporaries in developed nations, Pius and his successors were very careful 
when recognising the rights of states, since language matters greatly in contentious political de-
bates. One might unwittingly end up promoting a notion of sovereignty contrary to CST simply by 
stating the Church´s teaching in ways which place the accent precisely on those certain aspects of 
sovereignty which the Church doesn´t want to accentuate. Furthermore, the notion of sovereignty 
in CST implies international solidarity, and a responsibility to contribute significantly to redress the 
economic and social imbalances in the world. Insofar as boundaries and sovereignty create barriers 
to development and make it harder for the human rights (including the social and economic rights) 
of all peoples to be honoured, and insofar as wealthy countries do not contribute significantly and 
effectively to the development of poorer countries (in ways and quantities which ensure that the 
current imbalances will start diminishing in the foreseeable future), sovereignty is a structure that 
perpetuates certain injustices in the world.  
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In today´s political context, when one defends legitimate political “sovereignty” (as understood by 
CST), one risks being understood as promoting a form of sovereignty which is de facto absolutist, 
morally isolationist and morally exceptionalist: this is what usually comes to mind when someone 
speaks of the “right to control national borders”, the “right to national sovereignty”, and so forth. 
Only in developed countries which make very significant contributions to the development of poor-
er nations can we speak of a “just” exercise of sovereignty when they seek to restrict migration, 
since they are truly doing their fair share in the international effort to deal with the causes that 
force people to migrate. Very few countries, if any, can honestly claim to be doing this today. Other 
nations (in practice, all wealthy nations, today), which hoard a lion´s share of the world´s material 
and intellectual resources, have little moral authority to send away people from poorer nations 
who knock on their door to claim back their key to flourishing, which has been locked inside.  
The absolutist understanding of sovereignty claims that “no matter what we did to others in the 
past, and no matter what I do in the present that may be economically, ecologically, socially or po-
litically detrimental to others (short of declaring a war), nobody can ask anything of our polity in 
justice: it is sovereign and recognises no higher law”. Sovereignty, so understood, is not compatible 
with Christian ethics, as presented in Catholic Church teaching. Sovereign nation-states are a part of 
the human race, and have obligations towards the whole of humanity. This explains, in part, the 
Church´s historical resistance to the Westphalian system at least up until Leo XIII, and in a sense, up 
until the aftermath of World War II, when the international community recognised a series of hu-
man rights and adopted a system of international institutions that put limits on the excesses of ab-
solutist sovereignty (cf. PT 5-7; González-Carvajal Santabárbara (2005, 48–63); Carlson and Owens 
(2003, 1–19)). 
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 2.3.3 DOES REGULATION IMPLY RESTRICTION, TODAY? 
2.3.3.1 Italy´s Transition from Country of Emigration to Immigrant-Receiving Country  
In general, John XXIII and Paul VI stood by, and expanded the teaching of Pius XII on migration. 
However, Pius´ harsh critique of restriction started to be softened in the 1990´s67. During the papa-
cy of John Paul II, Italy became a country of net immigration, and anti-immigrant rhetoric, as well as 
real concerns raised by receiving communities, started to affect deliberation closer to Rome. Clan-
destine migration became a major issue in European politics and some speeches and messages of 
John Paul II started to equate the need to regulate immigration with the (perceived) need to restrict 
immigration. The Church started to give more and more weight to the local common good of re-
ceiving communities, which was hardly a concern before (cf. L1984 2; M2001 3; M2003 2). Already 
in the late 1980´s we can see signs of this shift. For instance, Christian groups in countries like the 
US offered “sanctuary” to undocumented migrants, following classical CST on migration, and judg-
ing unjust their country´s restrictive immigration policy and its unrealistic quotas for migrant work-
ers, which only served to force people into irregular situations. However, John Paul II was not con-
sistent in supporting the work of the Sanctuary movement, and at times preferred to appease gov-
ernments and insist that Catholics are law-abiding citizens rather than criticize national laws68.  
67 For instance, Pacem in Terris (n. 106) claims that a migrant has a right to “enter a political community 
where he hopes he can more fittingly provide a future for himself and his dependents”, and that “as far as 
the common good rightly understood permits, it is the duty of that state to accept such immigrants and to 
help to integrate them into itself as new members”. 
68 In a Sunday Mass in San Antonio, TX on 13th December 1987 John Paul II appeared to endorse the Sanctu-
ary Movement´s work among undocumented migrants, in veiled language typical of Vatican diplomacy (cf. 
The New Mexican, 14th September 1987 edition (The Associated Press 1987a)). The Immigration and Natural-
ization Service asked the Vatican press office to state clearly whether the Pope was applauding an associa-
tion which helped people who violate immigration laws, and Joaquin Navarro-Vals, the Vatican spokesper-
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2.3.3.2 John Paul II: A “Reluctant” Immigrant? 
When reading the documents, one gets the impression that John Paul II, the first “immigrant” bish-
op of Rome since 1523, had a negative view of migration. Previous popes often spoke of the evils 
linked to migration, especially the risk of losing one´s faith, one´s roots and one´s rights, but docu-
ments produced during the papacy of Paul VI, such as De Pastorali Migratorum Cura (1969), were 
more hopeful and positive (cf. FR-QEF D3 p.4). In contrast, John Paul speaks as though the human 
phenomenon of migration itself were an “evil”, albeit a “necessary evil” (LE 23; PFD 3; cf. M1995 3). 
He insists that political and sociological research should focus, in particular, on the “dramatic and 
disturbingly negative aspects” of the phenomenon of migration (M1985 4)69. Certainly, the eco-
nomic and political crises of the 1970´s and 1980´s dampened the optimism of the 1960´s, especial-
ly in developing countries, creating huge waves of forced migration, but surely the pope´s personal 
experience and worldview contributed considerably to this particular appraisal of the phenomenon. 
son, issued a denial (cf. The Los Angeles Times, 15th September 1987 edition (The Associated Press 1987b)). 
Most Catholics still believed that the Pope had said what they understood him to have said (Christiansen 
1988, 81); the Church had always claimed that defending fundamental human rights and helping marginal-
ised people was more important than supporting the agencies and laws which seek to restrict migration and 
close borders, that obligations rooted in the “natural law” trumped those stated in “positive law”, that fun-
damental rights and duties trump border regulations. Yet, we can note in this incident how the Catholic 
Church in the 1980´s warms up to the idea that nations have a right to enforce serious restrictions on immi-
gration, and no longer feels it should insist on the “right to migrate” and the clear corresponding duty on the 
part of receiving countries to draft laws that allow for immigration as strongly as in previous decades.  
69 John Paul II did believe that something positive can come out of the phenomenon, namely, more diverse 
societies in the receiving countries (PFD 3), but this diversity too is deemed problematic. I think that, even 
though it is good at times to focus on the suffering and deprivation of the marginalised, one should not see 
migration in such a pessimistic way. This approach tends to miss the hope, the courage, the sense of adven-
ture of these people, and this depressing narrative tends to reduce them to passive recipients of compassion 
and charity rather than sustain their cause as bearers of rights based in human dignity, and to learn from 
them that trust in Providence that should inspire a pilgrim Church which, like Abraham, Israel in the Exodus, 
Jesus and Paul can only be their true selves by setting off on a journey. Furthermore, this pessimism is not 
warranted by much of the sociological data and the experiences of those who accompany migrants. 
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John Paul´s negative view of migration, as well as the changing situation in Italy, may help explain 
the shift in language, which becomes more and more tolerant of immigration restriction policies, or 
at least less willing to condemn them.  
After the 1987 “Sanctuary Movement Incident” at San Antonio70, a number of papal documents 
start referring explicitly to the right of states to restrict immigration. The Message for World Migra-
tion Day 1992 notes that “developed nations are not always able to assimilate all those who emi-
grate”, while insisting that “the criterion for determining the level that can be supported cannot be 
based solely on protecting [the receiving nations”] prosperity, while failing to take into considera-
tion the needs of persons who are tragically forced to ask for hospitality” (M1992 3). In terms of 
content, this position is similar to that of Pius XII, but the shift in accent is noticeable. While the lat-
ter sees the classical justification for restricting immigration mostly as an unacceptable excuse for 
unjust exclusion (with some exceptions), John Paul presents it as valid rationale and manifestly ac-
cepts the principle of applying quotas.  
To be sure, from a purely theoretical standpoint, John Paul´s statement is correct: one could imag-
ine cases where developed nations are completely overwhelmed with a large influx of immigrants. 
In practice, however, as we shall see in Chapter 2, this is not the case; most developed nations can 
integrate many more immigrants than they are doing at present (even including irregular migrants), 
and, in general, restrictive policies are being put into place simply because these nations want to 
reap the benefits of immigrant labour without paying the cost of treating these persons humanely 
and fairly and offering the possibility of integration to those wishing to stay.  
70 See above, note 68. 
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As we know from decades of experience with immigration control — even Pius XII could reflect on 
at least a century of attempts to ward off irregular immigrants!71 —, quotas and restrictions on im-
migration try to stop the flow, but when work is available and the need to escape poverty or reu-
nite with loved ones is great, people tend to continue coming in, in spite of such restrictions72. It 
comes as no surprise that increasingly restrictive policies are generally accompanied by an increase 
in irregular migration some years later. In the 1992 Message, John Paul acknowledges the existence 
of this phenomenon, and argues that “the work by which undocumented aliens participate in the 
common effort of economic development is a de facto form of membership in a society” (ibid.). 
This is an important point to be made, even though it sounds like offering an ex post facto solution 
to the problems created by excessively restrictive immigration policies. 
2.3.3.3 CST, Immigration Restriction, and the Final Years of John Paul II´s Papacy 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church (provisional edition 1992; definitive edition 1997) clearly 
mentions the right to immigrate, but also mentions the right of political authorities to subject this 
right to “various juridical conditions”73, which sounds quite vague, considering Pius XII´s harsh cri-
71 In 1852, Britain dispatched a steamer patrol to prevent unwanted refugees and migrants from landing on 
the Channel Island of Jersey (after the 1848 revolutions in Europe). Today, 150 years later, countries like Ita-
ly, Spain and Australia are still trying to send away boat people in much the same way. 
72 As we shall see in Chapter 2, the restrictions only serve to make the trip more expensive, traumatic and 
deadly, and the stay more exploitable; “survival of the fittest migrants” actually serves as an artificial selec-
tion strategy to make sure that, as much as possible, only resilient, resourceful and able-bodied refugees and 
migrants reach the developed world. 
73 “The more prosperous nations are obliged, to the extent they are able, to welcome the foreigner in search 
of the security and the means of livelihood which he cannot find in his country of origin. Public authorities 
should see to it that the natural right is respected that places a guest under the protection of those who re-
ceive him. Political authorities, for the sake of the common good for which they are responsible, may make 
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tique of precisely such “legislative and administrative provisions” in his 1952 Christmas Address. 
The Catechism also insists that immigrants should “respect with gratitude the material and spiritual 
heritage of the country that receives them, to obey its laws and to assist in carrying civic burdens” 
(CCC 2241). Though the text of the Catechism does not clearly mention restricting immigration, 
John Paul II’s Message for World Migration Day 1995 seems to interpret it in this way: the Church, 
it claims, “does not deny public authorities the right to control and limit the flow of migrants when 
for the common good serious and objective reasons exist which affect the migrants’ own interests” 
(M1995 2, my emphasis). So at this point, the documents start to recognise the right to restrict mi-
gration, albeit timidly, using double negatives and insisting that this should be done in the interest 
of the migrants themselves.  
In the 1995 Message, for instance, references are made to irregular migration and the evils which 
accompany it (M1995 3). This negative reading is developed further in the Message for World Mi-
gration Day 1996, which deals with the issue of “illegal migration” as something that “should be 
prevented” (M1996 2). The phenomenon of undocumented migration seems too hastily judged in 
this Message: the pope links it immediately to crime and assumes that these migrants compete di-
rectly for jobs with unemployed citizens and legal immigrants (ibid.)74. The solution offered is inter-
the exercise of the right to immigrate subject to various juridical conditions, especially with regard to the 
immigrants' duties toward their country of adoption” (CCC 2241). 
74 The pope does not seem to realize that such a negative view of immigration sounds quite close to what 
the anti-immigrant lobby and its “experts” are claiming in Europe today (mainly against Muslims, and certain 
migrants from Africa and Asia who have little chance of entering legally into Europe), and to what the immi-
gration reduction lobby and its “experts” were claiming almost a century ago in the US (mainly against Cath-
olics, and certain migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe). If one listens to the economical and sociolog-
ical data from less biased sources, one would have to acknowledge that the picture is much more complex. 
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national cooperation for development, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the current eco-
nomic and social imbalances between nations75. Furthermore, instead of defending the right to 
immigrate clearly, as in previous documents, the pope presents the Church’s position on this right 
in the form of a hypothetical question, saying that the Church “asks what the right to emigrate is 
worth without the corresponding right to immigrate” (M1996 3). The pope recognises that Christian 
communities are frequently “infected by a public opinion that is often hostile to immigrants” (ibid.) 
and says that the Church is working to tackle this internal problem, but instead of maintaining the 
more prophetic stances of previous texts and addressing the problem of irregular migration lucidly 
by drawing the logical conclusions from the right to immigrate as presented in the tradition, John 
Paul seems somewhat comfortable presenting arguments which closely resemble those typical of 
the anti-immigration lobby.  
So how should we deal with the problem of irregular migration? John Paul provides a multi-layered 
answer to this question. First, the pope asks social and charitable institutions to help such immi-
grants to try to find ways to regularise their situation, seek acceptance in other countries or return 
to their countries (M1996 4). Second, he recognises that laws may be unjust; for instance, it is un-
justifiable to force “into an illegal situation people whose right to live with their family cannot be 
denied by any law” (idem; cf. Caritas Europa et al. (2003)). Hence, he insists on the harmonization 
As we shall see in the following chapter, most experts, in fact, agree that migration, even irregular migration, 
is overall beneficial to most of the migrants, and to most of the receiving and sending countries.  
75 Again, the pope’s reflection here seems unaware of the data which show that migration and remittances 
—in the political and economic climate that will continue to prevail in the foreseeable future— is far more 
effective in reducing such imbalances than development aid (especially considering the meagre quantities 
and inefficient ways in which it is provided at present, which one cannot realistically expect to change in the 
short and medium term); cf. Pritchett (2006). 
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of migration laws and the equitable distribution of burdens among countries. Finally, he discreetly 
addresses the claim made by some Christian groups and institutions that some migrants should be 
given “sanctuary” when the laws are unjust. The pope says that “solidarity means taking responsi-
bility for those in trouble”, and that for Christians “the migrant is not merely an individual to be 
respected in accordance with the norms established by law, but a person whose presence challeng-
es them and whose needs become an obligation for their responsibility” (M1996 5). The second 
point mentioned shows that certain regulations that seek to limit and restrict immigration may be 
unjust and may violate migrants’ rights. However, it would be useful to go beyond mentioning this 
as a vague possibility and to develop some clear criteria to evaluate the fairness of border policies, 
something that the recent documents seem much less willing to do than the texts of Pius XII and 
John XXIII. 
In M2000 3-4, John Paul II links migration to globalisation, but does not reflect on the duties of 
states that benefit most from the effects of globalisation towards those most negatively affected by 
it, given the national and international economic policies that powerful nations put into place in an 
ever more interdependent world. Then, towards the end of his pontificate, in 2003, we find a pecu-
liar text which puts great emphasis on the rule of law and seems to assume far too easily that posi-
tive law is generally morally just and valid (at least in Europe). Addressing the European Bishops at 
the end of the 2003 synod, John Paul II claimed that “the acceptance of immigrants must always 
respect the norms of law and must therefore be combined, when necessary, with a firm suppres-
sion of abuses” (EE 101, my emphasis). Such a text seems to come from someone completely dif-
ferent from that Karol Wojtyla who in 1965 considered it a folly to make “public order in conformity 
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with juridical norms” a limitation on freedom76. The young Mgr. Wojtyla strongly believed that only 
“public order in conformity with the moral law” can justify limitations on human rights placed by 
states, and he insisted on amending all mention of legal norms or public order in what became Dig-
nitatis Humanae to reflect this, to avoid making concessions to absolutist conceptions of sovereign-
ty and also to avoid any misinterpretation of Church teaching on human rights77. Unfortunately, 
many years later, the elderly and ailing pope John Paul II was less adamant on correcting his 
speechwriters´ drafts on this point, when speaking about migration.  
Even though this is not a major text of CST on the issue and probably has in mind primarily the ac-
tivities of traffickers, and even though it has to be understood in the context of the whole teaching, 
76 Cardinal Wyszyński, in a heated intervention at the Council on the 20th September 1965, attacked the na-
ïveté of Westerners who were ready to make easy concessions to the prerogatives of states, and offer them, 
in the text on religious freedom, a notion of “public order” (not subjected to the objective moral order) with 
which they could easily justify placing arbitrary limitations on human rights (Grootaers 1981, 167 n. 1). Mgr 
Wojtyla too felt that one of the most important issues at the Council was that of defining the precise condi-
tions under which states could invoke “public order” as a reason to limit a natural right, such as that to reli-
gious freedom, so as to prevent the abuse of state power. That is why two days later, on the 22nd September 
1965, Wojtyla, in the name of the Polish bishops, delivered an important speech to the Council after the clo-
sure on the public debate on the fourth version of the schema on Religious Freedom. He argued that “it is 
necessary to state [in the text] that the right to religious freedom, being a natural right (that is, founded on 
the natural law and hence on divine law) cannot be subjected to any limitation, except on the basis of this 
moral law itself. Positive law of human origin cannot place any limits here, unless it does so in conformity 
with moral law. In other words, only an act which is morally wrong, an act which violates moral law, may be 
considered as an abuse of religious freedom. […] Following the same principle of respect towards moral law, 
one should similarly revise the parts [of the schema] concerning the juridical norms which deal with the limi-
tations that can be placed on the exercise of religious freedom, norms which in many places are not only 
inappropriate, but also give rise to abuses against true religious freedom” (Grootaers 1981, 156–157). It is 
useful to read this text again today, replacing the natural right to religious freedom with the natural right to 
migrate (for reasons considered valid by CST); both rights are considered by CST as rights based on the moral 
law. 
77 This is the result, which is not always reflected in the translations: “iustus ordo publicus” (DH 2); “iusto 
ordine publico” (DH 3); “iustae exigentiae ordinis publici” (DH 4); “tamen fieri debet non modo arbitrario aut 
uni parti inique favendo, sed secundum normas iuridicas, ordini morali obiectivo conformes” (DH 7); 
“homines formare satagant, qui ordini morali obsequentes legitimae auctoritati oboediant” (DH 8). 
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we cannot but note that its lack of reference to justice or the “objective moral order” to temper 
positive law seems to hand a blank cheque to lawmakers, border guards and police officers. In this 
sense, it seems to tip the balance to the side of sovereignty, especially when compared to the 
teachings of previous popes which clearly championed the right to immigrate and were extremely 
reluctant to make concessions to the prerogatives of states as regards the restriction of freedoms.  
2.3.3.4 Situating John Paul II´s Later Texts on Immigration in the Wider Context of CST 
I do not believe that this passing comment, in an exhortation to European Bishops, should be given 
too much doctrinal importance; it certainly cannot be understood as contradicting a whole series of 
high-ranking official documents dedicated to the subject of migration. It is however emblematic of 
a shift in tone from older CST documents which were very careful to put the rights of migrants 
ahead of the prerogatives of states. Such a statement could easily be misunderstood, in the context 
of the current anti-immigrant hysteria, as justifying harsh and repressive policies against undocu-
mented migrants, some of whom could be forced migrants and even refugees.   
The current pope, Benedict XVI, has not said anything really different from John Paul II on the sub-
ject78; CV 62 mostly re-echoes previous texts, but sees the issue as balance between rights of mi-
grants and rights of host countries. In this sense, his position tempts the reader to think that there 
is no real conflict between the right to immigrate and the right to control one´s borders (now un-
derstood by some to include the right to restrict immigration and use repressive policies against 
undocumented migrants).  The differences on this issue can also be seen when we compare differ-
78 However, Benedict XVI seems particularly concerned with the effects of migration on students, young 
people and minors (cf. M2008; M2010). 
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ent documents from the bishops´ conferences on the issue, for instance, the document Pastoral de 
las migraciones en España (1994) by the Spanish bishops, and Strangers No Longer (2003), by the 
Mexican and US bishops79. The Spanish bishops, following classical CST on the issue, do not place 
the right to immigrate on the same level as the right of governments to control their borders80. The 
Mexican and American bishops, on the other hand, tend to present the right of individuals and fam-
ilies to immigrate and the right of states to “impose reasonable limits on immigration” as two rights 
of the same order, which “complement each other” (USMX-SNL 39)81; this reading of the Catholic 
tradition may have influenced other bishops (cf. UK-MCM 3)82.  
79 As we said above, though some might simply think that the difference between these two documents is a 
matter of accents, accents make a lot of difference in the real world where complex teachings can be easily 
misinterpreted in a given socio-political climate. 
80 For the Spanish bishops, the right to immigrate is inseparable from the moral obligation of states to open 
their borders to certain groups of immigrants, and to certain asylum seekers who can be considered forced 
migrants, not only to “refugees” according to the strict definition provided by the Refugee Convention  (ES-
PM II:2:3:b). This serious moral duty is not recognised by states nowadays and in such a context, simply say-
ing that “countries have a right to control their borders” could lead to misunderstandings (ES-PM I:2:1:c). Cf. 
RCS 3-4 on “de facto” refugees not recognised by the Refugee Convention. 
81 There is a history behind this “American” reading of CST on migration. In a 1985 statement, “The Pastoral 
Care of Hispanic Immigrants”, the Catholic bishops of Texas claim that “on the legal and moral plane, the 
rights of suffering members of the human family […] must be balanced with the right of a nation to regulate 
the movement of peoples across its border in order to maintain its well-being”. Drew Christiansen, com-
menting in 1988 on this statement, says that “as a matter of legal practice and a question of constitutional 
and statutory law, state control of borders cannot be denied. However, the bishops’ admission, while politi-
cally prudent, is misleading. For since the time of Pius XII magisterial social theology has so thoroughly con-
tested the right of sovereign powers of states to unqualified control of their borders that any assertion of 
sovereign rights in this area must be judged, from the point of view of Catholic social ethics, a secondary or 
residual right, not one of primary importance. The older presumption in favour of state authority holds only 
in exceptionally grave circumstances” (Christiansen 1988, 88).  
82 These bishops easily concede to the state the right to intercept undocumented migrants (USMX-SNL 78), 
linking this to the “security interests” of citizens (when, as we have seen, CST actually insists that restricting 
migration should be done in the interest of the objective common good, and the good of migrants them-
selves). To be sure, the American and Mexican bishops object to “some of the policies and tactics” used by 
governments and law enforcement agencies (USMX-SNL 78ff), for instance the use of excessive force, shack-
ling of hands and feet, discrimination, abuse, dilapidated detention facilities, lack of access of detainees to 
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2.3.3.5 The Urgency of Discernment and Adjudication between Conflicting Claims 
The tension between the right of migrants to immigrate (presented in strong terms, as in the 
Church documents up to the 1990s) and the right of states to restrict immigration (which may seem 
obvious to many people today, but which was never clearly mentioned and developed in CST be-
fore until the 1990s) seems more and more difficult to reconcile now on the basis of CST alone. On 
the one hand, we cannot simply assume, as in the past, that when states restrict immigration in 
times of peace, they are probably in the wrong. This seems to hint at the need for discernment and 
adjudication between conflicting claims. To be sure, such complex moral judgment is not an easy 
task for individual Catholics and sympathetic readers of CST, since the documents remain very 
vague on the extent and limitations of such rights. On the other hand, one may be tempted to think 
that it is safe to assume that when democratic countries (of our day and age) restrict immigration 
to today´s migrants, they have a right to do so and it is morally acceptable, even though the recent 
documents do not support such a position. One might also claim that the reluctance of recent CST 
to condemn immigration restriction and to relativize and bracket the rights of sovereign states and 
receiving communities is a sign of a change in doctrine still in the making, a capitulation to the 
prevalent absolutist understanding of political sovereignty. According to this hyper-nationalist in-
terpretation, though the Church will not easily admit this change in doctrine, such an absolutist un-
derstanding of sovereignty is ideal since it will allow us to resolve the problem without the need of 
complex adjudication of claims, simply by changing our default assumption about who is in the 
lawyers or relatives, corruption, police brutality, lack of transparency and accountability of agencies and de-
tention-centre contractors, etc. What they do not clearly specify is that CST goes much further and insists 
that, as far as possible immigration should not be reduced or restricted except for valid moral reasons. 
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right. Catholic citizens, moral theologians and local bishops will then have no need make any dis-
cernment regarding the moral rightness or wrongness of immigration policies. 
As we said at the beginning of this section, the change in accent and the recent willingness to rec-
ognise more strongly the prerogative of states on the issue of borders and immigration does not 
fundamentally change the main tenets of CST on this topic. However, it does affect the reception of 
CST in a “postmodern” world where many people are increasingly averse to complex moral dis-
cernment, hungry for a clear authoritative word from above, and situated in a strongly polarized 
and indeed “poisoned” political milieu when reflecting on these issues. Most people in the world 
today, both in rich and poor countries, take it for granted that immigration should be restricted. 
Gone are the days when most economists championed opening borders to labour as an obvious 
way of boosting economic growth, when sociologists and politicians spoke positively of multicultur-
alism and presented migrants as heroes, when several countries in the world had permissive border 
regimes that allowed in most (“white”) people who at that time wanted to migrate. Most Catholics 
do not seem to be questioning their countries´ border, immigration and integration policies today; 
they seem so used to categorical statements by bishops and popes on other moral issues that they 
tend to interpret the more conciliatory and diplomatic approach on this issue as a sign that they are 
free to think what they wish, or adopt the position of their favourite politicians and anchor-persons. 
In many wealthy countries, the attitude of citizens towards the phenomenon of migration has be-
come very negative and pessimistic, and general ignorance of the seriousness of the economic, po-
litical and ecological situations faced by poorer countries allows them to construe most interna-
tional migration as a free and capricious choice made by people duped by mass media who think 
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they can make some easy money working abroad but in fact are hurting only themselves, their fam-
ilies and the poor people in the receiving countries by migrating. This simplistic (and in many ways 
erroneous) narrative entails that migrants would be better off staying at home, and that restrictive 
laws are “fine” since they actually promote this “ideal situation”. John Paul II´s (and Benedict XVI´s) 
pessimistic view of migration may actually tempt Catholics to think that this logic is sound and 
compatible with CST. 
2.4 The Road Ahead: Two Attitudes and Two Hypotheses 
I believe it is unfortunate that more and more Catholics seem comfortable with the immigration-
restriction laws and repressive policies being introduced all over the world, even though many such 
laws clearly violate CST criteria, and even though, by CST standards, wealthy states have little moral 
authority to justify immigration restriction (given that they are doing very little to help poorer coun-
tries develop and in some cases are not even sending the aid they had promised in the past). Other 
scholars of CST may, however, question my stance on this point and see this attitude as inevitable 
and not in itself problematic. They may insist that the phenomenon of human mobility has changed 
drastically in recent years, that immigration restriction makes sense today (for a number of rea-
sons), and that CST should move to admit this, in spite of its past hostility to such policies. These 
two conflicting attitudes and readings of recent CST, already sketched in the conclusion of the 
above section, point to two different ways of moving forwards, based on two different hypotheses. 2.4.1 CASE I: HAS THE PHENOMENON ITSELF CHANGED? 
Most people agree that certain aspects of the phenomenon of human mobility have changed in re-
cent years due to globalisation and other factors. There are things which are obviously different in 
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the new waves of “economic” migration — most migrants enter illegally, they are non-European 
and, in Western countries, the most “conspicuous” of immigrants today are Black, mulatto, and/or 
Muslim. Yet, it is far from clear that such changes warrant a change in CST on this issue.  
First of all, we need to ask whether what is new about the “new labour migrations” actually allows 
us to assume (from an ethical standpoint) that governments are usually right when they restrict the 
entry of such migrants. It may actually be true that the new migrants are too many and too cultural-
ly different to integrate themselves effectively, that they are not really migrating because they 
“need” to (but rather to strike it rich or to have an “adventure”), that the labour market is so rigid 
that it can only provide to immigrants the jobs it takes from native workers, and that many con-
temporary migrants are “dangerous” and have a tendency to become criminals or terrorists. If so, 
democratic states would be doing the right thing in keeping these people out. Simply by accepting 
and admitting this, CST could then spare us the complexity and challenge of adjudicating between 
conflicting rights claims. We could now simply shift to a new “default assumption” on who is in the 
right, and ask CST to delicately admit that what Pius XII and Paul VI said in the past does not apply 
any more in the 21st century, in a “globalised” world. However, if we cannot show there has been a 
significant change in the phenomenon itself, and if we are simply witnessing a resurgence (on the 
global level) of the anti-immigrant rhetoric (supported by biased “scientific data”) that was com-
mon in the US about a century ago, then we cannot ask the Church to give up its more prophetic 
stance in favour of immigrants. In this case, we would rather ask from the Church some help to dis-
cern better how to regulate and manage (rather than restrict) the flow in the concrete realities of 
today´s world.  
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To deal with these questions, let us formulate a starting hypothesis:  
Hypothesis A: The phenomenon of labour migration has changed significantly in recent years in its eth-
ically-relevant features, and most of the differences are real, not merely perceived. The changes war-
rant increasingly restrictive immigration policies. 
I believe that, overall, this hypothesis is false, but I have to argue my position in the following chap-
ters. I am ready to concede that there have been some changes in the past decades that do have 
some ethical significance, and that may point to the need of better migration management, but not 
to greater migration restriction. For instance, globalisation has caused the weakening of welfare 
states and made poor people in the First World more vulnerable: this points to the need to regulate 
the flows of certain economic migrants, but probably, what needs to be managed the most is the 
flow of money from the cities and neighbourhood which thrive on immigrant labour to those that 
provide them, and poor “natives”, with services and welfare. Furthermore, pluralism, conflicts of 
identity and the resurgence of politically militant religion — all of which characterize late modernity 
— make it difficult to define “French” or “American” and figure out what are the basic behaviours, 
symbols and beliefs that migrants should be asked to adopt if they want to be active members of 
the receiving society. While recognising the importance of these changes, I still think that they are 
not significant enough to make Hypothesis A true. I do not believe that such problems can allow us 
to make an easy presumption that states are usually morally right when they detain and deport 
immigrants, asserting the prerogatives of sovereignty. I hope that the interdisciplinary survey of the 
phenomenon of labour migration in Chapter 3 will allow us to argue convincingly against this hy-
pothesis. 
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 2.4.2 CASE II: DO WE NEED A BETTER ETHICAL FRAMEWORK TO ADJUDICATE CONFLICTING CLAIMS? 
If Hypothesis A were false, and if, from an ethical standpoint, little has changed in the phenomenon 
of international migration since the 1980s, we would have little reason to shift from a presumption 
in favour of rights of immigrants to a presumption in favour of the rights of states. Yet, CST has 
been telling us in recent years that, though persons have a prima facie right to immigrate into a 
new country, that right is subject to many conditions. We cannot simply assume that a well-
meaning migrant from a poorer country is in the right when she crosses a border irregularly into a 
wealthier country in times of peace. By shining a spotlight not only on the suffering and rights of 
immigrants, but also on the prerogatives and problems of receiving states and societies, CST seems 
to be tacitly admitting that there is a real conflict between rights claims here. Even so, the docu-
ments seem to avoid saying so implicitly. This leads us to a second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis B: CST may have a difficulty admitting that we are dealing with claims in conflict, and that 
making presumptions in favour of one or the other party is not a good way to adjudicate between such 
claims. Yet, by simply listing and juxtaposing seemingly incompatible rights claims, the Catholic Magis-
terium is hinting at the need for a moral framework within which to adjudicate conflicting rights 
claims regarding immigration, and to make the right to immigrate more receivable and concrete. 
Moral theologians need to fill this lacuna and provide such a framework, and we can do so precisely by 
formulating clear priority rules. 
Making presumptions on who “probably” is in the right is an easy way of doing ethics. It is useful to 
pacify scrupulous consciences or to help simple people deal with complex moral dilemmas, but it 
does not help us to make serious moral judgements. To judge claims in conflict, we need clear crite-
ria, and, more specifically, a set of priority rules. This is probably the greatest lacuna in CST on mi-
gration. Though Christian ethics has many resources which can help us see what has priority over 
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what, CST on migration has not laid down clear priority rules that help us see clearly whose claim 
has priority in what circumstances.  
Ethics is not a deductive science, and judging between moral rights claims remains a matter of or-
dered prudential judgment in a given historical context. Priority rules do not provide an automatic 
way of judging between rights in a complex world, but they are helpful, especially when we need to 
transpose moral rights and duties into legal ordinances and bureaucratic protocols. This is why cer-
tain theologians who are well acquainted with CST and the Catholic understanding of human rights 
and the common good, such as David Hollenbach, have argued for the need to clearly specify cer-
tain priority rules to navigate CST´s complex world of rights and right-order principles (Hollenbach 
1979, 174f; 203f).  
If the relationships between different groups in a society are conceived as organic and harmonious, 
and if we assume that the status quo is mostly just, then proposing (non-absolute) lists of rights in 
tension (such as the right to immigrate and the right to restrict immigration) would not pose much 
of a problem: the different groups will find ways to work out a just balance between the claims. 
Such an organicist view of society has been predominant in Catholic theology up until Vatican II (Cf. 
Hollenbach 1979, 160f), and recent papal documents such as CV still seem to play down the exist-
ence of conflictive relationships in human societies. To be sure, Pius XII did not shy away from ad-
mitting the conflict between the “national interest” of states and the rights of migrants and refu-
gees, nor did he assume that the status quo in his day was mostly just, but Pius and his successors 
were not willing to stray away too far from the classical organicist understanding of society. Admit-
ting the reality of social conflict and reflecting on it ethically is dangerous for an institutionalized 
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Church which is at the service of everyone and seeks to follow the example of Jesus Christ, the 
Prince of Peace. Furthermore, offering social analyses of rights conflicts, as is often done in libera-
tionist Theologies, may sound “Marxist”. 
There is nothing “Marxist”, however, in drawing the conclusions from CST on migration and recog-
nising that, at the borders, different sets of rights do clash. Admitting a clash of rights does not nec-
essarily imply provoking a physical clash between people, such as a revolution (even though immi-
grants do get shot while trying to cross certain borders, and are raped and beaten up regularly in 
certain detention centres). However, admitting and reflecting on the conflict between the rights 
claims here is of the essence. Simply stating rights and principles and letting the “competent au-
thorities” decide which ones to respect and which to ignore is not a proper way of solving the mat-
ter, since the authorities in this case are far more partial than in most other social issues. It is unre-
alistic to assume that politicians and border guards, who have all the means and physical power in 
their hands, will be able to discern justly between the rights claims of the state and those of immi-
grants. Ethics has a role to play here in helping people to see how to adjudicate these rights claims. 
Hollenbach (2011, 810–812), for instance, claims that not all non-refugees83 should be admitted as 
legitimate migrants, but the following priority rules should be considered: 
1)  “A rich country that has contributed to causing the economic deprivation of a poor country 
has a special duty to admit economic migrants from that poor country” (ibid.); 
83 The Principle of Non-Refoulement of Refugees clearly takes priority over national sovereignty in times of 
peace. Cf. discussion of this principle in Annex A, Table A7, Principle S3. 
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2) “When a country has a history of political or military involvement in the life of another 
country, the former country can have special duties to admit migrants from the latter” 
(ibid.)84; 
3) Additional grounds could be considered, including “welcoming migrants facing grave need in 
a nearby country” as a form of neighbourly solidarity, or “opening the door to migrants with 
religious or cultural ties to the people of the receiving country” (though the latter is prob-
lematic since it could end up justifying discrimination in favour of “people like us” in a quota 
system)85. 
The main aim of this dissertation is to propose and argue in favour of a series of priority rules such 
as those mentioned by Hollenbach. Such rules put the emphasis on the “who” we should let in, ra-
ther than on the “how many” do we need: we should start to analyse rights claims ethically, rather 
than start by establishing quotas based on economic models. Obviously, there is a limit to “how 
many” can be absorbed and integrated in any given polity, though it is doubtful that any developed 
country today (including a tiny country like Malta) may be anywhere near that limit (even when we 
84 These two priority rules can be linked to Christiansen´s (1988, 91) claim that the obligation of rich nations 
to help poorer nations through international cooperation development aid is “more weighty where political, 
military or economic intervention has either contributed to economic deprivation or prevented its correc-
tion”. Christiansen´s argument is based on Shue (1980, 35–64; 155–174), and gives, as an example, U.S in-
volvement in Central America. 
85 Christiansen (1988, 91) suggests some other priority rules. “The poor ought to have priority over other 
economic migrants in admission to the United States and in eligibility for US citizenship. To effect such a new 
priority for the poor, privileges for men and women with certain employable skills or professional qualifica-
tions need to be strictly limited. […] People who have suffered extreme economic deprivation ought to be 
given the same priority for admission as political refugees from more repressive regimes. The current privi-
leged status of political refugees, especially those fleeing communist regimes, no longer makes moral sense. 
They still deserve special consideration, but alongside refugees from right-wing authoritarian regimes and 
economic migrants from the poorest countries.”   
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count undocumented immigrants). At some point, however, when adjudicating the claims of per-
sons who do not “strictly” have the right to immigrate into a particular country (since they do not 
satisfy the ethical criteria), quotas may be required to cap excessive migration flows, and a discus-
sion on “how many” may be in order, especially if formulated in this way: “how many immigrants 
would we like to include in our project of building a society together?” (ES-IE 82). This question 
helps us realize that rules for admission of migrants should also be linked to integration. The good 
of “political belonging” should not be offered to those who do not really want to build a society to-
gether with current citizens. This is an important matter to consider when distinguishing between 
admitting temporary migrant workers or persons fleeing persecution (who might be returned if the 
persecution ceases in a matter of a few months or years), and admitting permanent residents.  
2.5 A New Cycle of Action: Formulating the Main Question of Our Inves-
tigation 
The lack of clear priority rules is a limitation of CST which may seem quite disappointing to certain 
Catholics who work in the field, or who have a heightened consciousness of the actual situation. 
The moral theologian, however, sees in them a great opportunity to ply her trade and exercise her 
ecclesial vocation by applying general principles to concrete situations, and proposing secondary 
principles or criteria to enlighten the Christian conscience and help Christian communities, under 
the guidance of their pastors, to see, judge and act collectively in their concrete, local context. This 
has, in fact, been precisely the task of Moral Theology over the centuries86. Indeed, if we appreciate 
86 For most of the history of the Church, the Papacy relied on theologians (scholar-bishops, learned monks, 
university professors, manualists) for concrete guidance in ethical matters (Keenan 2006, 171f). Further-
more, in some recent documents (notably Octogesima adveniens n. 4), the popes have stated that in an in-
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the principle of subsidiarity and apply it to the Church itself, then members of Christian communi-
ties should have no qualms about seeking guidance from moral theologians on the issue of migra-
tion, and moral theologians should see here an invitation, being made to them by the Church, to 
investigate such a complex matter in an interdisciplinary way, as is fitting (bringing together the re-
sources of the academia and pastoral reflection from the grassroots), and to help the bishops for-
mulate more concrete proposals in their local context. 
The above limitations raise three sets of interesting questions which we will try to answer in the 
present dissertation. First: how has international “economic” migration changed in recent years? 
Are the changes ethically relevant? Do the changes automatically warrant the restrictive policies 
which are being adopted by wealthy nations worldwide? Second: given the present situation, how 
do we balance the rights of migrants and the rights of states (and receiving communities)? What 
priority rules should we adopt to adjudicate conflicting claims? How can these rules be linked to 
conditions for membership, sensible integration policy and a feasible project for the building of a 
cohesive society and a national identity that includes natives and immigrants? Third: how should 
we understand necessity and human agency in the phenomenon of migration, so as to develop a 
robust notion of a “forced migrant” in a globalising world? How are mobility and stability an inte-
gral part of human reality? 
An interdisciplinary analysis of the actual situation of international migration (Chapters 3-4) will 
provide us with a number of observations that will help us answer some of these questions, espe-
creasingly complex world, one cannot expect it to provide one-size-fits-all solutions and concrete guidance 
on all matters. 
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cially those in the first set. Contemporary Philosophy (Chapter 5) and biblical exegesis (Chapter 6) 
will help us reflect more deeply on the issues of mobility and stability, forced migration, and the 
rights of persons, families and polities. This reflection will lead us to a conceptual framework, both 
philosophical and theological, and based on the virtues of fraternity and hospitality, which will help 
us provide a series of priority rules for adjudicating conflicting claims and so evaluate border poli-
cies and naturalisation laws ethically (Chapter 7).  
2.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to set the tone for a mature discussion on migration and borders in 
a globalising world. I have done this by presenting, with sufficient nuance and complexity, what 
Catholic Teaching says about these issues and by showing how this reflection can serve as a “con-
versation starter”, rather than a “conversation stopper” in the current debates. I have not analysed 
all the tensions present in this body of teaching, nor have I tried to apply this teaching to a particu-
lar case of immigration policy, but have rather limited myself to the preliminary task of clarifying 
what we are actually speaking about when we refer to CST on migration and borders, and to note 
some of its lacunae and problematic elements. After observing and reflecting on CST, and on its 
way of seeing and judging the phenomenon of human migration, we are moved to act. Part of the 
action is also intellectual, and consists precisely in embarking on a new cycle of observation, analy-
sis and reflection through projects such as the present dissertation. This has been facilitated in the 
previous section by a series of questions and a scheme of chapters which will frame our research. 
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CHAPTER 3: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY OVERVIEW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
3.0 Introduction 
While seeking to understand in what ways the phenomenon of human migration has changed in re-
cent years, this chapter provides a wide yet nuanced and well-documented panorama of the phe-
nomenon, bringing together a number of empirical approaches. It sets the stage for philosophical 
and theological reflection in later chapters, and ensures that the ensuing speculative debate is well 
informed of the complexity and concreteness of the situation on the ground. The changes caused by 
demographic shifts (3.1), globalisation and new understandings of political sovereignty (3.2), irregu-
lar migration (3.3), new destination countries and rising xenophobia (3.4), scepticism on integration 
(3.5), and shrinking welfare states (3.6) are explored, to see if, today, they justify increased immi-
gration restriction and the negation of the “right to immigrate” proposed in the mid-20th century 
and defended by CST.  
Ecology and Economics (3.1), Sociology and History (3.2, 3.5, 3.6), Law (3.3), Political Science (3.4) 
and Psychology (3.5) are thus used to reflect on migration in the last decades of the 20th century and 
in the 21st century. In the conclusion (3.7), we review “what´s new” in the phenomenon of human 
mobility in the so-called age of “globalisation”, to see if the empirical reality on the ground today 
has changed in ways that require a rethink of ethics and Catholic Social Thought on the matter or 
not.  
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3.1 Demographics: Volumes Have Changed 
According to the United Nations, “by 2010, the estimated number of international migrants was 
214 million, an increase of 58 million since 1990. International migrants represented 3.1 per cent of 
the total world population” (UN-DESA 2011, xviii). Furthermore, “at the end of 2010, it was esti-
mated that there were 15.4 million refugees and 845,800 asylum-seekers globally” (International 
Organization for Migration 2011, 54). The number of international migrants has more than doubled 
since 1965 (Zlotnik 1998, 431), such that the end of the 20th century, and the start of the 21st have 
been called “the age of migration” (Castles and Miller 2009). These statistics are impressive; no-
body doubts that the volume of migratory flows has increased significantly. The question is whether 
the situation constitutes some sort of “crisis”, or exceptional situation, justifying severe limitations 
to the freedom of movement of persons, and the adoption of harsh immigration restriction policies.  3.1.1 WHY ARE THERE SO MANY MIGRANTS TODAY? BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
When people in wealthy countries speak about “immigrants” today, they do not usually think of 
people with similar or higher levels of wealth and education, coming from countries with similar or 
higher levels of development as theirs. Most people do not object to stockbrokers, software engi-
neers or wealthy retirees moving into their neighbourhood, whatever their race or religion, and 
would be happy to let them buy 3.1% of the housing there, or much more. 214 million middle-class 
people spread out all over the world in this manner would not be a real cause of concern.  
Yet, most of those 214 million persons are not middle-class, and they are not spread evenly around 
the world, and among rich and poor neighbourhoods in receiving countries. Actually, there is often 
a huge economic and developmental differential between sending and receiving countries and this 
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is what mainly drives the flow. This differential fuels dangerous myths about “being invaded by 
hoards of paupers”, it makes integration difficult, it produces an excess of low-skilled labour on the 
international labour markets which private enterprise is tempted to exploit, oftentimes to the det-
riment of local labour and of the migrants themselves. As citizens from certain countries and re-
gions plunged in debt, poverty, ecological crises and political instability come to realize that their 
dearth of civil, social and economic freedoms can no longer be tolerated in a contemporary world 
that produces so much wealth and knowledge, they may feel forced to migrate elsewhere to pro-
vide for themselves and their families at least the minimum of what is considered “decent” in the 
21st century.  
A century ago, masses of people were ready to move to countries where wages (adjusted to Pur-
chasing Power Parity – PPP) were twice those in their own, or even less. Today, wage gaps could be 
tenfold or more (Pritchett 2006, 20–27), and the pressure to migrate is enormous. How did this 
come to be? Why are some countries called “developed” (formerly called “industrialized” and be-
fore that “colonial powers”, and for a reason), while others seem to be stuck with the label “devel-
oping”? 
A more exhaustive answer to this question needs to address three implicit parts of the question, so 
as to trace three periods of world history. (1) How did some countries accumulate enough 
knowledge, wealth and demographic growth at the eve of modernity to embark on colonial ven-
tures? (2) During modernity, why did only a few of the colonies develop so much as to rival their 
colonial masters? (3) Today, after 50 or more years of decolonization and independence, why are 
there so few of the former colonies which seem to be “catching up”? For reasons of space, we can 
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only refer the reader to authors like Jared Diamond (2005) for a serious discussion of the first two 
questions. Ecology, luck and historical accidents (not biological or cultural superiority) explain why 
certain peoples were equipped to colonize others in early modernity; racist segregation, immigra-
tion and education policies in the colonies (together with wholesale massacres of natives in some) 
explain to a good degree why the US, Canada and Australia had a predominantly white, educated 
and effective workforce and bureaucracy after decolonization (and became culturally and economi-
cally very similar to their former colonizers), while other countries did not (and rather had to deal 
with white flight, lack of capital and skills, a poorly educated bureaucracy and the difficulties of 
building an industrial and services sector from scratch). 
Some would object, however, that 45 years or more have passed since most “young” nations be-
came independent, and that they have had ample time to rebuild their institutions and rush to 
catch up with the global West and North, especially given the wealth of natural resources they pos-
sess. Why aren´t many unemployed and impoverished Europeans and Americans migrating to Kin-
shasa, Cuzco, Manila, Abidjan, Hyderabad, Lagos or Tehran to find jobs in the current recession? 
One part of the answer to this third question is that 45 years, for many nations, is not enough to 
“catch up”, though many “new” states have not lost time, and a few have even surpassed their 
former colonizers in human development within a couple of decades87. Another part has to do with 
87 Using the Human Development Index to rank nations, we could highlight South Korea, Singapore, Malta, 
Brunei, Qatar, Bahrain, Chile, Barbados, the Seychelles, Malaysia, Costa Rica and even Cuba: these nations 
have done some impressive “catching up” since independence, and in some cases have reached or surpassed 
their former colonizers in spite of a lack of natural resources. In sub-Saharan and non-continental Africa, Ga-
bon and Botswana, and Mauritius and Cape Verde, are the “stars” which Westerners hardly know about. 
Since they defy the stereotypes, and do not furnish “typical” or “exotic” African news stories, they rarely fea-
ture in the Western newscasts. 
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different demographic histories and futures. A third part of the answer lies in the fact that most un-
employed Europeans and Americans do not seem to have the hope and determination to embark 
on a great adventure and travel the world for a decent job and a promising future, while many Afri-
cans and Asians do.  
However, the most relevant part of the answer lies in the debt burdens that many developing na-
tions got into after the oil crisis of the early 1970s, which made billions of “petro-dollars” easily 
available to poor countries, while crippling the world economy and ending 20 years of economic 
boom (Marfleet 2005, 42–44). As emerging nations borrowed money and equipped themselves to 
export more and more, developed nations struggled with stagflation and importing less and less, 
and soon, poor countries were accumulating infrastructural and industrial white elephants and bor-
rowing more and more money at higher interest rates to service their soaring debt. When they 
could no longer pay their debts, “Washington Consensus” policy prescriptions were imposed by the 
IMF and World Bank to reform the economies of these nations via one-size-fits-all “Structural Ad-
justment Programmes”; the effects of these programmes on human development were, in general, 
devastating (Marfleet 2005, 44f; Stiglitz 2003)88. Increasing poverty and marginalisation led groups 
88 The “Washington Consensus” is a set of economic policy recommendations, summarised in John William-
son´s (1990) famous “ten points” or the mantra “Stabilize, privatize, and liberalize”. These policies, imple-
mented during 1990s, were proposed as a way out of the stagnation of the 1980s, which development econ-
omists call the “lost decade”, but they did not make the situation any better. World Bank economists, such 
as William Easterly (2001, 135) estimate that “in 1980–98, median per capita income growth in developing 
countries was 0.0 percent, as compared to 2.5 percent in 1960–79.” In fact, the World Bank (2005) itself, one 
of the major institutions behind the Washington Consensus, in its lucid report “Economic Growth in the 
1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform”, recognises that the reform policies imposed on developing coun-
tries in the 90s did not have the desired results, and that the way forward should be one of humility, policy 
diversity, selective and modest reforms and experimentation. One of the big lessons learnt is that “institu-
tional quality” is more important for economic growth than policies (especially those which seem to work 
                                                     
C h a p t e r :  3  — P a g e :  100 
 
and regions, frustrated with post-colonial governments’ economic failures, corruption and ethnic 
favouritism, to revolt. Governments started spending most of their shrinking budgets on the mili-
tary, to improve security and political stability, halting educational, healthcare and useful infra-
structural projects, and ultimately stalling economic development. The result was a downward spi-
ral of pauperization and violence, often interlaced with environmental degradation. The result of all 
this was the displacement of millions of people caused by classical Refugee Convention “grounds”, 
but also by poverty and marginalisation, chronic stagnation of human development, deprivation of 
the effective enjoyment and exercise of human rights, ecological crises and the effects of natural 
disasters aggravated and rendered unbearable by the previous factors.  
In the following sections, we explore some of the economic and ecological factors which drive mi-
gration. We discuss refugee movements in section 3.3.2. 3.1.2 ECONOMIC LINKS BETWEEN COUNTRIES, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT THEORIES 
Local Catholic bishops´ conferences and their commissions have often commented on the negative 
impacts of “globalisation” on certain sectors of the population of poorer countries. For instance the 
bishops of the US and Mexico comment negatively on the impact of NAFTA on farmers and small 
only on paper or in a totally different cultural context), and some of the Washington Consensus policies ac-
tually weakened “institutional quality” and as a result produced economic regression (World Bank 2005, 3f). 
Some apologists of these policies like to note that “rapid economic growth in China, India, and a few other 
Asian countries […] resulted in an absolute reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty. [… 
However,] with high levels of trade protection, lack of privatization, extensive industrial policies, and lax fis-
cal and financial policies through the 1990s, these two economies hardly looked like exemplars of the Wash-
ington Consensus” (Rodrik 2006, 975). Meanwhile, during the 90s, it became evident that GDP growth was 
not a very good indicator of human development; for instance, many oil-producing countries increased their 
GDP but did not make significant advances in human development. Work by economists such as Mahbub ul 
Haq and Amartya Sen eventually incorporated the notion of “human capabilities” to produce more adequate 
indicators, such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Inequality-Adjusted HDI (IHDI). 
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businesses in Mexico (USMX-SNL 60), and one of the documents issued by the Episcopal Committee 
on Migrations and Travelling People of the French Bishops´ Conference makes the following obser-
vations: 
Multinationals and large shareholders manipulate Governments and public opinion through their me-
dia and their armies of legal experts. They strongly influence the World Trade Organization which pro-
motes the dumping of agricultural materials, ruining farmers and agribusinesses of developing coun-
tries. They use agreements on intellectual property rights related to trade (covering genetically modi-
fied organisms and medications) to further their interests, preventing the empowerment of farmers 
and the access of disadvantaged masses to medicines, both needed to solve the problem of poverty. 
They entice the World Bank, through the banks, to finance large projects which provide benefits for 
them, but often not for all people concerned (Comité épiscopal des migrations et des gens du voyage 
de la Conférence des évêques de France 2004, A:3). 
This take on contemporary international relations and economic realities may sound excessively 
pessimistic or critical to some readers. What most economists seem to agree upon, however, is that 
“Washington-Consensus” policies imposed in the 1980s and 1990s on developing countries did not 
work. Reputable economists like 2001 Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz (2003), former senior vice-
president and chief economist of the World Bank, have harshly critiqued the policies practiced by 
the IMF at the end of the XXth century, and the World Bank (2005) itself has officially recognised 
some of the mistakes of those years, when the interests of lenders were considered much more 
important than the actual development of poorer countries, and international institutions ended up 
dictating polices that were detrimental to economic growth in the global South. As improved trans-
portation and communication technologies made connections between poorer and richer countries 
easier and cheaper, and as the poverty gap between the global North and South became wider, the 
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pressure on citizens of poorer countries to migrate north became bigger and bigger89. Yet, as we 
shall see below (section 3.3.3), in a world where practically everything is allowed to move freely 
across borders except human beings, such migration is quickly made “illegal”, and becomes prob-
lematic. 
To avoid such a “problem”, development economists have for several decades insisted on the im-
portance of development aid to narrow the gap between rich and poor countries, and minimize mi-
gration, which was seen as problematic for receiving countries (especially after the 1973 recession) 
and also for most sending countries (since, in very poor countries, only very skilled persons could 
afford to migrate, until recently, and the “brain drain” which resulted seemed to further undermine 
development). The thesis was: “it´s either development or migration, and we would much rather 
have the former”. Since the 2000s, however, many economists have started to argue that — from 
an economic perspective — migration is generally beneficial both to receiving countries and to 
sending countries, and that its usefulness as a tool for development cannot be disregarded and de-
nied any longer (UK House of Commons 2004; Clemens 2011; Pritchett 2006, 1f). Their thesis is “we 
need both development and migration; in fact, you can rarely have one without the other.” Let us 
89 Lant Pritchett (2006, chap. 1–2), a socioeconomist who works for the World Bank, notes that two “irresist-
ible” forces that drive human migration today are the gaps in unskilled wages and the current “Everything 
but labour” form of Globalisation. Pritchett shows that in the 19th century people were ready to move in 
great numbers if they could earn twice the salary — adjusted for purchasing power parity — they earned at 
home. Today there are differentials often as high as 10 to 1, so the pressure to move is enormous. Further-
more, the peculiarity of the “New Globalisation” is that, while goods, capital, information, tourists and busi-
nesspersons are allowed to move quite freely across borders, labour movement is strongly restricted. Com-
pared with the 18th century, it is much cheaper and easier (in terms of cultural, social, and psychological ad-
aptation) to migrate today, but for many people it has become legally impossible and potentially deadly.  
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briefly examine these claims from the two perspectives: those of receiving countries and those of 
sending countries. 
Let us first look at the economics of migration from the point of view of receiving countries:  
1. Receiving countries tend to have low birth rates and, given their demographic futures, they 
need to ensure their labour force is large enough to sustain pension schemes and social ser-
vices, and maintain the populations of certain regions (which are shrinking, demographical-
ly) at a high-enough level to make services sustainable, and goods and transportation af-
fordable through economies of scale (Pritchett 2006, 26f; Kunz and Leinonen 2007). At pre-
sent, given the demographic expansion in emerging countries, labour is readily available on 
world markets, but the rate of growth of the world population is slowing, and in a number 
of decades it may prove harder to maintain the size of the labour force in wealthy nations 
without (a) actively attracting (unskilled and semi-skilled) labour from poorer countries, (b) 
increasing birth rates, (c) improving automation technologies and/or (d) scaling down pen-
sion schemes, social services, and services to depopulated regions (cf. The European Com-
mission - Ageing Working Group 2012)90. 
90 The US is generally considered to have less of a problem with ageing than most European countries, given 
its relatively small welfare state and growing population. However, the growth of the US labour force has 
slowed down considerably in recent years, and this accounts for “most of the slow recovery in employment, 
and nearly all of the slow recovery in output” after the Great Recession (Stock and Watson 2012). Studies 
show that the very fact that there is population growth in the US owes much to regular and irregular immi-
gration, and that immigrant homes are more likely to provide children with both mother and father figures 
than the homes of native-born Americans: “According to [our] estimates, some 45% of unauthorized immi-
grants live with a spouse (or cohabiting partner) and child or children, compared with 34% of legal immigrant 
adults and 21% of U.S.-born adults” (Passel and Taylor 2010). 
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2. Continued Employment Growth in “Productivity-Resistant, Low-Skill, Hard-Core Non-
tradable Services” entails an increasing need of low-skilled and semi-skilled labour in devel-
oped countries. While computerized automation has reduced the size of the labour force 
needed in some factories, and may eventually become sophisticated enough for certain del-
icate agricultural work, the information age also means that we need more delivery persons, 
store and warehouse assistants, food preparation workers, cooks and restaurant servers, 
janitors, receptionists, gardeners and landscape artists, packers and hand packagers, home 
health aides, security guards, etc. These jobs cannot be easily outsourced abroad or per-
formed by robots (Pritchett 2006, 34f); they are in themselves dignified jobs, though gener-
ally shunned by citizens of wealthy nations due to low pay, poor working conditions and low 
social standing usually associated with these jobs. Employer sanctions aimed primarily at 
avoiding exploitation (rather than deporting irregular immigrants!) could help improve the 
working conditions and pay associated with these jobs, raise the social standing of such 
jobs, and maybe attract some more native workers into these expanding sectors of the 
economy (Lee 2009). It is important that advocates of immigrant rights do not look at these 
jobs with disdain, and focus their critique on the problem of exploitation. Many first-
generation immigrants may have valid reasons to want to do such jobs in a developed coun-
try, even if they are “overqualified” and if, in an ideal world, they might put their education 
to better use in their home countries. 
3. The “lump of jobs” theory, claiming that there are only so many jobs in a developed econo-
my, and that employing immigrants causes natives to lose their jobs, is fallacious (DeVoretz 
2004). By increasing population size, immigration creates new jobs; by making the jobs re-
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ferred to in (2) competitive in developed countries, immigration contributes to the stabiliza-
tion or expansion of certain parts of the economy, which then creates new higher level jobs 
(in training, management, administration, etc.) typically sought and filled in by natives. A 
famous debate between economists George Borjas and Michael Card on the impact of im-
migrant labour on the employment and welfare of native workers in the US has shown the 
complexity of making such measurements and their dependence on historical contingencies, 
local laws, and on certain assumptions used in the modelling. The general conclusion is that 
“while labour immigration has a minimal or even positive impact on the receiving economy 
as a whole, it seems that its impact on a small but vulnerable segment of the population is 
undesirable” (Castles and Miller 2012; cf. Kleinman 2003; Boeri et al. 2005, 638f). The ra-
tional solution to this problem, of course, is to mitigate these negative effects by helping lo-
cal economies negatively affected by immigration and channelling more immigrant labour 
through the formal economy and legal immigration system, rather than to attempt to stop 
irregular immigration by expensive and potentially deadly border control measures with lim-
ited effectiveness. 
4. Studies regarding the impact of immigration on public finances give complex results. Immi-
grants — even irregular migrants — obviously pay sales taxes, payroll taxes, and others tax-
es that target them directly; in most countries they contribute to healthcare, pension and 
unemployment benefit schemes without being able to use these services when they need 
them. Local governments in democratic countries with some minimal commitment to hu-
man rights need to provide some education for the children of destitute immigrants (even 
irregular immigrants, especially if such children are citizens by birth right) and emergency 
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medical services. In countries like the US, following a simplistic and crassly-self-interested 
calculus based on the “Simon principle”91, the access to such rights for irregular migrants 
has been progressively restricted in recent years, in an attempt to make all immigrants a net 
contributor to public accounts on all levels of government. Most studies in countries which 
provide free basic services to all immigrants (through some sort of firewall that allows eve-
ryone access to basic human-rights services independently of immigration status) conclude 
that immigrants have a negligible or small net positive effect on public finances on the na-
tional or federal level, but a small net negative effect on local public finances, particularly in 
countries where poor regions or neighbourhoods (with overstretched public services) are 
mostly left alone to deal with the influx of refugees and poor immigrants, the benefits of 
whose labour accrue in other neighbourhoods and regions (Yuengert 2003, 39; J. L. Simon 
1996; Ugur 2007, 82–83). The effect of “irregular” and “economic” immigrants, however, is 
probably much more economically positive than what emerges from such studies92. For in-
stance, several recent studies in the U.S concluded that, while unskilled labourers (such as 
labour immigrants), on paper, pay no income taxes, reductions in their hourly wages (or lack 
of compensation for inflation) account for a substantial portion of corporate income tax 
91 “If the marginal immigrant makes a non-negative contribution to the treasury, you continue to admit im-
migrants until the contribution goes to zero” (DeVoretz 2004; cf. J. L. Simon 1984); alternatively, if you can-
not or do not want to stop the inflow, you reduce treasury expenditure on immigrants. The US eliminated 
immigrant access to welfare in the 1996 Welfare Reform. 
92 Economists often limit themselves to compare the actual tax contributions and use of government welfare 
services by foreign-born and native-born, which tend to distort the picture considerably. A more suitable 
method should distinguish refugees (which are admitted for protection) from labour migrants (who are 
somewhat expected to contribute to the economy), estimate contributions over a lifetime, and compare the 
state of public finances in the presence of immigrant labour, with that in its theoretical absence. This would 
give us much different picture from the one above. 
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payments93. This means that, without the availability of low-skilled immigrant labour, local 
and national governments would find it very hard to maintain or increase revenue from cor-
porate taxes. 
5. Immigrants tend to accumulate wealth after arrival (through savings) and by the second 
generation (through education), as shown by empirical data from Canada; this indicates that 
immigration “raises the capital labour ratio in the destination country and may have possi-
ble spill-over effects on the resident population” (DeVoretz 2004). Some authors, such as 
Bowles and Colton (2007), argue that immigrant entrepreneurs have emerged as key en-
gines of growth for many cities in developed countries. 
6. One key issue discussed in the literature is the impact of immigration on social welfare 
states. We discuss this further in section 3.6. 
7. Because of the above, there is renewed enthusiasm, today, for temporary migration and 
new guestworker programmes; this is sometimes called “circular migration”. One could im-
agine international instruments and agreements to facilitate this (e.g. the WTO´s GATS 
Mode 4 or a new multilateral organization, such as the “World Migration Organization” pro-
posed by Ugur (2007, 87f)) though the current trend favours bilateral accords (e.g. the Eu-
ropean “Mobility Partnership” system) which ultimately are most beneficial to receiving 
countries. Of course, there is a problem here since labour-exporting countries want the 
permanent emigration of surplus low-skilled workers and the temporary emigration of the 
93 A 2009 study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Felix 2009) concluded that “from 
1992 to 2005, a one-percentage-point increase in the state corporate tax rate decreased wages 0.52 per-
cent, on average”, and a similar study conducted by the US Treasury in 2007 found that “labor bears a large 
burden from [corporate] tax, possibly exceeding the revenues collected from the tax” (Gentry 2007). 
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highly skilled, while labour-importing countries seek the opposite, and the asymmetry of 
power in international forums has ensured that the latter get what they want, at the ex-
pense of the former´s needs (cf. Appleyard 1989). Given the global “surplus” of low-skilled 
labour on the international labour markets, the demand side gets to impose all sorts of re-
strictions on the entry of low-skilled labourers (and easier deportation of irregular migrants 
and overstayers), while poor nations are not in a position to negotiate fair guestworker 
schemes that protect the rights of their citizens. As we have seen above, this may eventually 
change, as wealthy nations realize their need of unskilled and semi-skilled labourers, but for 
the moment, where it proves politically difficult to provide a fair legal regime to bring in 
such labourers, employers can readily find irregular migrant workers to satisfy their needs 
(Castles and Miller 2009, 67f). 
All this shows that, from the point of receiving countries, immigration (at least at current rates) is 
generally economically beneficial; at best, it can be very beneficial, at worst (e.g. during a grave re-
cession) its impact is neutral (provided negative externalities on low-income households and poor 
neighbourhoods are mitigated). In most developed economies, this conclusion also holds in the 
presence of considerable irregular immigration of low-skilled labour, though such a mode of immi-
gration is undesirable (especially for social, legal and ethical reasons). For example, it is estimated 
that $2.6 trillion would be lost from US cumulative GDP over 10 years if all unauthorized immigrants 
in the country were deported (Hinojosa-Ojeda, 2010). The well-funded efforts of anti-immigrant 
“think-tanks” to prove otherwise are usually discredited by reputable economists; unfortunately 
their clientele is not lacking, and this ensures a continuous supply of half-truths and distorted statis-
tics that serve the agendas of certain politicians and the media. Of course, economic benefits and 
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costs are not the only ones to consider from a political or ethical standpoint; the economic benefits 
accruing to wealthy nations through liberal immigration policies is probably the least relevant of 
ethical criteria when discerning what a just immigration policy should look like. Yet, many citizens in 
wealthy nations simply assume, on the basis of false data and the principle that “charity begins at 
home”, that a “more open” border policy will automatically make them or their country poorer, 
and on that basis refuse even to consider more substantial ethical arguments against immigration 
restriction.  
Let us now look at the economics of migration from the point of view of sending countries:  
1. The first benefit to note is economic remittances. As foreign development aid has been at-
tacked from many sides in recent years, and as the number of emigrants increased, remit-
tances have become the main source of external income for many countries, exceeding both 
foreign aid and foreign direct investment. In some cases, remittances could be spent exclu-
sively on foreign consumer goods (weakening the local economy), and making families de-
pendent on “easy money” and even to buy weapons that fuel conflicts, especially in unsta-
ble and very corrupt emerging countries. In general, however, they have multiplier effects 
on the local economy, help improve education and healthcare, and allow more prudent 
families to accumulate some capital which they can invest (Castles and Miller 2009, 59f; 
World Bank 2006, 88f).  
2. The second thing which is receiving increasing attention is social remittances, that is, the 
transfer of attitudes and capabilities by migrants when they visit and return to the country 
of origin. Some of these attitudes and capabilities are indeed conducive to development 
(e.g. saving, investing in business ventures and the education of children, incorporation of 
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information technology into one´s lifestyle) though there are negative effects in the process: 
some critics see this as a new form of cultural colonization, and the “cool and comfortable” 
lifestyle of returnees may transform the migratory process into an unavoidable “rite of pas-
sage” for most young adults in certain regions (Castles and Miller 2009, 62–3).  
3. Economists and international agencies are also reconsidering previous estimates of the neg-
ative effects of “brain drain”, especially in countries with education systems which are not 
too weak. A good percentage of migrants do return at some point (especially if remittances 
help the country to develop and increase work opportunities for the highly-skilled), so there 
is also “brain circulation” and “brain gain”. Furthermore, many skilled people have good 
reasons not to migrate (especially if they earn decent salaries) and actually do not. Remit-
tances from highly skilled migrants are often spent on the education of their families (and 
have a multiplier effect on education systems), and the prospect of a high-earning job 
abroad provides a good incentive for families to invest in the education of children. Of 
course, much depends on the level of development of the sending country and its educa-
tional system94; some authors insist that we need to evaluate the issue according to the 
country in question. We know all too well that developed-country governments want to re-
tain the highly skilled migrants and want low-skilled to return home permanently, yet the 
best policy for emerging countries is probably the opposite, i.e. sending back skilled mi-
grants, and not the low-skilled (Castles and Miller 2009, 63f). In any case, there is little 
94 The institutions of some countries are so poor and weak that they cannot afford any amount of “brain 
drain”, which renders these institution even weaker (especially the loss of skilled medical personnel, in coun-
tries with low densities of skilled professionals). However, certain countries have regimes so corrupt, repres-
sive and incompetent that they force their best minds to flee, even when these would rather stay. 
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chance coercion could work to stop brain-drain in a globalising world economy; even if one 
rich country forces a skilled worker to return home at the end of her contract, another 
country will surely take her in. The challenge for emerging nations is to turn this reality into 
a development opportunity, and to reform one´s institutions to retain a healthy number of 
skilled workers. 
4. Migration is also beneficial to poorer nations due to a phenomenon which has received little 
attention by economists until recently (Pritchett 2006, 44), which can be called the ghost-
zombie phenomenon. “Ghost-enabled” countries/regions allow people to move out in a 
time of economic decline, and seek new economic possibilities by migrating to other coun-
tries/regions experiencing economic expansion, just like the famous ghost towns in Ameri-
can history and films95. “Forced-Zombie” countries/regions are those from which people 
cannot freely emigrate in time of economic hardship and downsizing, especially when a 
dwindling economy is expected to provide for the needs of a growing population. At any 
given time, large countries with diversified economies, like the US or (more recently) bor-
der-free regions like the most of the EU, have zones which need workers and others which 
are shedding them, cities which are growing and others which are shrinking; movement is 
relatively easy and prevents concentrations of unemployed people and localized pauperiza-
95 Pritchett himself grew up near Idaho City which was once a booming frontier town and a magnet for gold 
prospectors and today has a population of less than 500. There were whole regions in the US which became 
“ghosts” when mining declined or agriculture became mechanized and required less labourers. What hap-
pened with those people? Most of them moved to other cities or regions of the US. 
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tion96. However, Westphalian sovereignty also creates “zombies”, that is, cities, regions and 
countries which are relatively small, have excess population and yet, in the case of an eco-
nomic collapse, cannot become “ghosts” because of impermeable international borders and 
immigration restriction in most other countries which could offer employment to their citi-
zens97. Migration helps to prevent the formation of zombie regions and nations, and in this 
way helps countries to develop. 
As can be seen from the nuances above, the link between development and migration is complex 
(Appleyard 1989), though most evidence points in the direction of considering migration as an im-
portant tool for development. In most cases, emigration does seem to aid development of poorer 
countries, if institutions can adapt to the pressures and changes that emigration provokes. Similar-
ly, immigration is economically beneficial to receiving countries, especially if leaders are courageous 
96 Similarly, one hundred years ago, many developing European countries were allowed to become “ghosts” 
when their economies collapsed (e.g. the Irish potato famine), since there were nations such as the US which 
readily welcomed their unemployed and impoverished population as immigrants to populate their booming 
cities and rural towns. 
97 For instance, fifty years ago, Zambia could sustain a relatively large population due to its copper mines, but 
when the price of copper fell and the country´s economy could not sustain such a large population, people 
could not move out. Rather, the population continued to grow, meaning that most people simply became 
poorer and poorer, and Zambia became an economic “zombie” (Pritchett 2006, 58). To be sure, the pressure 
on the people of Zambia to emigrate is enormous. In a theoretical “United States of Africa” with a diversified 
economy, Zambian miners could simply move to a factory job in, say, Ivory Coast, or find work in the tourist 
hot-spots of Mozambique. In the real world, they have rarely done so until very recently, because of the cul-
tural and language differences, and the international borders, but also because the economy of Africa is not 
very diversified (the colonial powers did little to promote industry and services in Africa; at times they chose 
to destroy local artisan traditions to make the booming factories in Britain or France more profitable). 
Though Labour mobility between African states has nonetheless increased in recent years (cf. Kunz and Lei-
nonen 2007; Peberdy and Crush 2007), most sub-Saharan Africans are not very keen to move to an agricul-
tural or mining job in another African country impoverished by demographic expansion and by falling prices 
on the (oft manipulated) international markets. Rather, the African migrant is pushed to move to a first-
world economy where he can often earn five times as much (or more) in real terms than in his homeland 
and where jobs are relatively easy to find for those willing to work hard (except, maybe, in times of global 
economic recession). 
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enough to confront xenophobia, wise enough to effectively relieve social tensions and to ease the 
pressure on social and educational institutions in poor neighbourhoods and regions, and far-sighted 
enough to ensure proper integration (especially of “irregular migrants” who, at some point, 
can/should no longer be threatened with removal) and clamp down on discrimination. While many 
economists are realizing this, some remain cautious and sceptical (Borjas 2001).  
Most experts, however, believe that nothing short of “totalitarian-style” control and repression can 
effectively stop or restrict emigration or immigration in today´s world, and if the movement cannot 
be prevented, one cannot but aim to somehow control it and maximize the benefits (Harris 2007). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the “development or migration” doctrine is also wrong in 
another sense. Whether or not migration contributes to development, development — at least in 
the short to medium term — surely contributes to migration. Economic and human development 
increases people’s capabilities and aspirations, and so, their tendency to move and look for better 
opportunities in other regions or countries increases (de Haas 2006). 
In conclusion, it is important to remind the reader that the above reflections do not entail that 
more liberal immigration policies alone can solve all development problems of emerging countries. 
Wealthy nations can do much to help poor countries develop and reduce “unwanted” immigration 
by reforming trade (to give emerging countries fairer access to global markets), stopping arms ex-
ports to conflict hotspots, and including strong incentives to improve human rights in their aid and 
trade agreements with poorer nations (Castles and Miller 2009, 77). Emerging countries too must 
avoid becoming excessively reliant on remittances to fund development, since these could lead to 
inflation and greater inequalities unless accompanied by political and economic reform  that should 
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include improvements in governance, institution building, investments in timely and useful infra-
structure, creation of investment-friendly political and legal regimes (cf. World Bank 2006, 104f). 3.1.3 ECOLOGICAL LINKS BETWEEN SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES 
In 1998, a devastating hurricane made 2.5 million Hondurans homeless. Though there was no pre-
vious tradition of mass Honduran emigration towards the US, this event, coupled with chronic eco-
nomic and political problems in the country (which aggravate and are aggravated by such natural 
disasters) started a flow that is still going strong today. In summer 2012, I travelled part of the mi-
gration corridor from Central America to the US; over 75% of the people I met in the immigrants´ 
shelters were from Honduras. Many scientists link an increase in hurricane intensity over the last 
decades to human-induced global warming, though others dispute this (Anthes et al. 2006; Union 
of Concerned Scientists 2006).  
Much less disputed is the fact that the depletion and near-collapse of fish stocks, such as those on 
the west coast of Africa, is due to intensive industrial fishing (J. B. C. Jackson et al. 2001). Marine 
biologists and fisheries experts have been sounding the alarm bell as increasing numbers of trawl-
ers from the European Union, China, Russia and other countries join local African fishing fleets to 
scour the ocean off northwest Africa (Chavance et al. 2005; cf. Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations 2012, 57, 199f). The effects of such practices — whereby government-
subsidized and politically-backed private interests from wealthier nations exploit the political 
weakness and lack of effective management of natural resources in poorer countries (Ndiaye 2011) 
— go well beyond the patent decimation of fish populations and impoverishment of coastal com-
munities. Brashares et al. (2004) have linked poor fish supply in recent years to increased bushmeat 
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hunting in West Africa, showing that ecosystems and economies further inland are being heavily 
impacted, thus compounding other ecological problems such as desertification and deforestation. 
As the growing populations in West Africa lose their sources of food and income, it is no wonder 
that many young people from these nations choose to migrate North, smuggling themselves into 
those same countries whose fleets are plundering their traditional fishing grounds (Lafraniere 
2008). A UN Environment Programme (2011, 7) Report on Livelihood Security in the Sahel concludes 
that 
Changes in the regional climate are impacting issues linked to the availability of natural resources es-
sential to livelihoods in the region, as well as food insecurity. Along with important social, economic 
and political factors, this can lead to migration, conflict or a combination of the two. 
In 1995, there were an estimated 25 million “environmental migrants”, and numbers have been 
steadily increasing (Myers 2002). Scholarship in this fairly new area of environmental migration is 
gradually developing, and some of the projections are tentative, but the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme claims that environmental degradation — especially deforestation — and rising 
sea levels due to global warming may cause 200 million people to become refugees by 2050 (UNEP, 
cited in APA 2012, 16). At the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (Copenhagen Sum-
mit), the delegates failed to agree to legally binding commitments for reducing CO2 emissions, and 
the Copenhagen Accord, establishing that actions should be taken to keep any temperature in-
creases to below 2°C, was not adopted but simply “taken note of”. Time is running out for mitiga-
tion; many countries will simply have to accept that they will be suffering from the negative effects 
of climate change in the coming years, and will have to adapt —one of the major adaptation strate-
gies, obviously, is migration (Castles 2010, 239f). Not taking a decision is itself a decision: by refus-
ing to adopt mitigation strategies and leaving adaptation as the only alternative, wealthy nations 
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have decided they want people to move around the world seeking land and jobs. Instead of asking 
industry and business to cut emissions, they have tacitly accepted the moral duty to provide jobs 
and welfare for environmental migrants, both at home and in emerging countries. There will prob-
ably be even more Convention refugees in the coming years, since environmentally-induced migra-
tion and human displacement is also known to destabilize certain regions in poorer countries and 
fuel conflicts. 
To be sure, many environmentalists have exaggerated the implications of global warming and the 
numbers of displaced persons in an effort to prod governments and voters into meaningful action; 
their strategy seems to have backfired (Castles 2010, 242). Their use of the term “environmental 
refugees” irked those who refuse any dilution of the Convention definition of refugee, fearing re-
strictions in protection; their tendency to postulate environmental mono-causality for the migra-
tion of millions of people made them clash with migration scholars who like to underline the multi-
causality of migration decisions. In many cases, displacement of people will be local or regional, and 
may simply “disappear” in urbanization statistics. However, terminological qualms, multi-causality 
and invisibility do not make the underlying problems go away. Certain states in the Pacific Ocean 
have good reason to be worried that they may eventually disappear underwater, with their citizens 
becoming stateless persons (Moore and Smith 1995). Kiribati is trying to buy land on Fiji’s main is-
land, Viti Levu, to relocate its population, while the former president of the low-lying Maldives, 
Mohamed Nasheed, became world-famous for his efforts to make the international community 
more aware of the vulnerability of countries like his. Indeed, one may say that the Westphalian sys-
tem is ill-equipped to deal with a world of disappearing landmasses and nation-states. 
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 3.1.4 EXCURSUS: THEORIES OF MIGRATION  
I have just discussed two reasons for the recent increase in the volume of migrants: ecology and 
economics. I have shown how they are linked to each other, and to conflicts which generate refu-
gees. Though I have sought to underline the complexity of the inter-related factors which drive 
mass migration, the account is still incomplete and partial. So as to better understand why people 
migrate, I will here present the major theories of migration discussed and used in recent literature, 
following the classification of Massey et al. (1999, chap. 1–2) and Castles and Miller (2009, chap. 2). 
Labour is a major factor driving migration, and many classical theories focus on this aspect. The Ne-
oclassical Theory of Migration (NTM, which links push and pull factors to supply and demand on a 
relatively free labour market) has its origins in the models of Ernst Georg Ravenstein in the 1880s, 
and has captured the imagination of many scholars and politicians. However, most economists and 
demographers consider it too crude and faulty to apply it as such today. In certain situations, peo-
ple refuse to emigrate even when the “push” is considerable, and most migrants do not move to or 
even settle in the countries with the greatest “pull”. Labour is a very peculiar market and it cannot 
be considered “relatively free”. This is why, since the 1960s, other theories have been proposed 
which amend, enrich or even replace the neoclassical theory. These include the application of the 
Segmented Labour Market Theory (SLM) to migration studies (in the works of scholars such as Mi-
chael Piore, Saskia Sassen and Alejandro Portes) — which allows a shift to the study of the behav-
iours of the actors in the processes of migration (Gordon 1995) and focusses on the demand side — 
and the New Economics of Labour Migration (NEL) approach (J. Edward Taylor) — which focuses 
attention on the migratory decision-making of social groups, rather than individuals, and hence on 
the supply side. 
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Labour, however, is but one reason (though admittedly a very important one) why people migrate 
and states admit immigrants. This is why some scholars have developed other approaches to the 
phenomenon of human migration which bracket, to some extent, the state of international labour 
markets today, and focus on history and international relations (which may or may not indirectly 
include economic considerations). One such approach is the Historical-Institutional Approach (HIA, 
developed by authors such as Stephen Castles, Robin Cohen and also Saskia Sassen) which argues 
that the unequal distribution of economic and political power in the international economy has led 
to a “patchwork” globalisation where certain regions and polities could be locked into an “econom-
ic underdog” state for many decades and reduced to producing migrant labour for more politically 
powerful and economically dynamic regions and polities. This approach is based on political econ-
omy theories such as Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory which underline the im-
portance of past wars, colonization, market hegemonies and Cold-War political and economic inter-
ference in explaining the economic situation in the world today (Castles and Miller 2009, 26f).  
Given the partiality of HIA and economic approaches such as NTM, other theories have been devel-
oped in recent years, such as Migration Systems Theory (MST, with roots in geography), Migration 
Networks Theory (MNT, with roots in sociology and anthropology) and Transnational Theory (TNT). 
All of these theories seek to reflect the fact that migration tends to build dynamic bridges between 
countries: diasporas and expatriate communities bring in or send back migrants to the countries of 
origin, depending on the circumstances. These approaches tend to incorporate the ones mentioned 
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above, and reflect on micro-, meso- and macro-structures98 that interact to make migration a self-
sustaining process, once started. These more recent theories also help us to better understand why 
“temporary worker schemes” or “guestworker programmes” inevitably open the door to settle-
ment, since labourers are not simple commodities which could be exported and imported at will: 
The migratory process has certain internal dynamics based on the social networks which are at its core. 
These dynamics can lead to developments not initially intended either by the migrants themselves or 
by the states concerned. The most common outcome of migratory movement, whatever its initial 
character, is settlement of a significant proportion of the migrants, and formation of ethnic communi-
ties of minorities in the new country. Thus the emergence of societies which are more ethnically and 
culturally diverse must be seen as an inevitable result of initial decisions to recruit foreign workers, or 
to permit immigration (Castles and Miller 2009, 47). 
One may be skeptical about the explanatory power of some of the above theories, but the trend in 
migration scholarship today is to underscore the complexity and multi-causality of migration deci-
sions. The economic motives (the search for jobs, for a better standard of living) which were central 
to the earlier theories (and which made movements seem mostly “voluntary” and “free”) are now 
linked to more complex causes; such causes, when compounded as in the case of poor migrants 
from emerging countries, make the decision seem — at least in part — “necessary” and “forced” 
upon the migrant by the situation she is living in. As we have hinted above, the proximal reason ex-
plaining the decision of poor immigrants to migrate today is often pauperization and socio-political 
disenfranchisement, but the distal reasons may be varied: environmental degradation, conflict and 
violence, economic collapse, natural disasters (which in the absence of effective institutions make 
the situation unliveable), and so forth. Receiving countries may have a lot to do with the causes of 
these phenomena, and hence with what ultimately drives much international migration. 
98 These structures go from small social networks, which make migration safer and information accessible to 
migrant families, to the huge machinery that drives the world economy and international relations. 
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 3.1.5 CONCLUSION: THE CHANGES DO NOT WARRANT IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION 
The discussion of the different theories of migration indicates that we need to explore other rea-
sons for the recent increase in the volume of international migration, but our discussion on eco-
nomics and ecology allows us to sketch a provisional conclusion at this point. The economics show 
that, in general, there is no real “global immigration crisis” that could justify denying the right to 
immigrate of all potential immigrants, or to increase immigration restriction measures. The flows 
reflect (a) increased integration of regional and international economies, (b) flawed development 
policies imposed by the West on developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and (c) the “ecologi-
cal crisis”, which is the real crisis relevant to our discussion here. All these reasons point to the need 
of allowing greater freedom of movement and freedom of contract, and of reducing restrictions on 
immigration.  
3.2 Globalisation: Technologies Have Changed 
A second argument in favour of reducing immigration flows, and adopting harsher immigration re-
striction measures, is based on the thesis that “globalisation” must be tamed, and national sover-
eignty reinforced against neo-colonialist attacks. New technologies have made it easier to travel 
today, but the fact that mass migration has been made possible does not imply that it is desirable 
or that the technology makes integration any easier. Let us briefly explore the phenomenon of 
“globalisation” and its impact on international migration. 
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 3.2.1 WHAT IS “GLOBALISATION”? 
The word “globalisation” is used and abused by many people in everyday language, but what it real-
ly denotes is the subject of intense debates. Held et al. (1999, 2f) distinguish three groups of ana-
lysts: hyperglobalisers, sceptics and transformationalists.  
1. Hyperglobalisers like Kenichi Ohmae (e.g. 1996) claim that in these last few decades have 
entered a new era where the dynamics and rules of a truly global marketplace dominate in-
ternational trade and relations, eroding the power of national governments and creating a 
global civil society.  
2. Sceptics like Hirst et al. (2009) reply that “globalisation” is mostly a myth that wants to give 
the impression that the inter-national economy has now become ultra-national and entered 
a phase where nobody is truly in control, and so cannot be rationally governed or ordered 
ethically toward some good through a political project. Obscure market dynamics are the 
new Moiras which will henceforth bear the blame and merit the praise for the ills and bene-
fits of a “fully integrated” global economy. Certain globalisation sceptics (e.g. Petras and 
Veltmeyer 2000; 2001) argue that the world today is actually less interdependent than in 
1890, that nation states are still very powerful and that the new jargon simply serves as a 
smokescreen for imperialism. Other sceptics underline the power of nation states today, but 
observe that governments are more and more afraid to use their power to redress the huge 
differences in wealth and development between regions and even within their own coun-
tries. They are afraid that short-term instability on the world markets or change in credit rat-
ings would wreak chaos and make politicians unpopular at home.  
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3. Transformationalists like Anthony Giddens (2002) place the accent on the increasing level of 
technology-driven interconnectedness among individuals and peoples and the changes this 
brings to politics and economics: it opens up new and exciting possibilities but also causes 
upheavals, uncertainty and fear, as people and institutions struggle to adapt to the change.  
Some authors, while accepting the globalisation theory in general, caution that “for most poor 
countries “globalisation” is a much less primary phenomenon than sovereignty, and even the most 
aggressively liberalizing countries have yet to overcome the disintegration consequences of sover-
eignty” (Pritchett 2010, 285). Thus, when dealing with emigration from such countries, we need to 
be careful not to place excessive importance on the globalisation hypothesis99. In this dissertation, I 
adopt a position somewhere between those of the sceptic and the transformationalist. I find the 
position of Hirst et al. (2009) generally convincing and helpful, since it places the current age in a 
larger historical perspective, though I do not share some of the pessimism of this view and would 
not like to dismiss too quickly the impact of the changes and transformations happening in our 
world.  
In itself, the interconnectedness of peoples is by no means a recent phenomenon; in our age it has 
been spurred on by technology but also hindered by uncertainty and new forms of fear of the oth-
99 Pritchett (2010, 263) quotes J. M. Keynes´ famous description of the world as seen from upper and middle-
class London in 1914, just before World War I destroyed that first experience of “globalisation”: “What an 
extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August 1914! 
…in[to] the middle and upper classes, for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conven-
iences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other 
ages. The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various prod-
ucts of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon 
his doorstep”. Then, as today, such “globalisation” was an experience of the interconnectedness of the world 
which not everyone had access to. 
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er. This interconnectedness has always been intricately linked with mass migrations. Before moder-
nity, as empires rose and fell in the course of history linking peoples and territories, goods flowed 
from one area to another of Eurasia, and there were times of great population movements as peo-
ple escaped persecution, sought economic opportunities in new imperial capitals and centres of 
trade, escaped ecological and other disasters that caused crops to fail (volcano eruptions, earth-
quakes, mini ice-ages in Northern Europe, locust invasions, blight infestations) and repopulated ar-
eas previously devastated by famines, plagues, and so on. Let us delve a bit deeper into the history 
of human mobility and interconnectedness to place the “novelty” of globalisation in historical per-
spective. 3.2.2 SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONALIZATION IN THE 2ND MILLENNIUM CE 
3.2.2.1 Mass Migration before Westphalia 
Most citizens of the US (but also of Canada, Australia, Chile and Argentina) willingly admit that they 
are the descendants of immigrants. Many would also admit that these modern states were built on 
mass migration which displaced the natives, and at times exterminated local tribes through the 
spread of disease and through massacre campaigns, thinly disguised in old history books as heroic 
“self-defence” battles against “hostile” Indians or aboriginals. Europeans would similarly admit that 
the Western Roman Empire collapsed due to mass migrations from Northern and Eastern Europe. 
What most seem to ignore, however, is that this displacement of peoples has been happening all 
over the world throughout human history, such that there is no country in the world today that was 
not “built on migration”. Scientists such as Jared Diamond (e.g. 2005, chap. 17) combine data from 
Linguistics and Language Distribution Analysis, Archaeology, Paleobiology, Genetics and other disci-
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plines to explain why even the remotest islands in the Pacific have experienced population dis-
placement, even before the arrival of the Europeans, during migration eras such as the Austrone-
sian expansion. 
Historians studying documents from the second millennium CE help us to see how even this last 
millennium of human history has been a time of great human mobility, and that circuits of trade 
and human population movements were the norm, rather the exception, before the modern notion 
of state sovereignty was crafted at Westphalia. Dirk Hoerder (2002) provides a fascinating account 
of how cultures and civilizations have not been only in conflict, but also in contact, over the last 
centuries. In the 13th-century world system, for instance, the Normans had linked up Sicily with 
Britain and Scandinavia, the Mongols had connected Constantinople to Beijing, the Italian Maritime 
Republics linked Crimea, Alexandria and the western Mediterranean, and various groups of Arab 
and Chinese traders linked the Arabian Peninsula to East Africa, India, China and South East Asia 
through a number of trade and migration circuits. The Hanseatic League was also taking shape, as 
well as a trade circuit in the Sahel region of Africa; furthermore, all of these systems were intercon-
nected. Santiago de Compostela, Rome, Jerusalem and Mecca commanded vast and relatively safe 
road networks travelled by pilgrims, traders and armies alike. Then, a mini ice-age in the 14th centu-
ry led to crop failures, economic depression and famine in many countries in the Northern hemi-
sphere and crippled the world economy. Forced migration and political destabilization made hun-
dreds of thousands of people more vulnerable, and hence easy vectors for the spread of various 
diseases and plague epidemics. This lead to a great decline in the population of western Europe, 
and by the end of the 14th century, as the situation stabilized, the most fertile regions of the conti-
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nent and the big commercial centres needed labour, and began attracting fugitive serfs from the 
south and the east (Hoerder 2002, 71f).  
In this context, feudal lords in many countries enacted anti-migration ordinances, seeking to reduce 
the flow of people out of their dominions, and hoping to avoid having to pay higher wages to keep 
their servants working for them; even so, the migrations were hard to stop and eventually weak-
ened the power of the feudal lords and led to the consolidation of monarchies and cities through 
urbanization. The movements were not limited to agricultural workers. Peddler-merchants, travel-
ling journeymen, skilled craftsmen (e.g. masons and miners) and mercenaries travelled long dis-
tances to offer their services the highest bidder; they had children (and mistresses) in distant cities 
and carried new brides with them across Europe after their first wives died in labour. Maids, ap-
prentices, pilgrims, clerics, religious missionaries and slaves, too, were highly mobile, especially in 
the Mediterranean region. In the south of Europe, Jews and Muslims were among the migrants, 
and Orthodox Christians from eastern Europe moved west as the Ottoman Empire expanded. Major 
European cities thus became multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious, while states such as 
Venice which stretched from Italy to the eastern Mediterranean brought together Italian, Dalma-
tian, Albanian, Greek, Persian and Turkic peoples, to name a few (Hoerder 2002, 80f).  
Starting in the late 15th century, however, things started to change in Europe. While the Ottoman 
Empire expanded and became relatively multi-ethnic and multi-religious through the millet system, 
and promoted state-managed migration systems to stimulate economic development, Western Eu-
ropean nations sought to forge national identities through exclusion. Decades of expulsions and 
forced conversions of Jews and Muslims in the south were paralleled by the adoption (or rejection) 
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of the various Christian doctrines of the Reformers in northern and central Europe by princes and 
monarchs seeking autonomy (or protection) from the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. In the 
process, European borders became less and less porous, and national identities started taking 
shape as rulers forced religious minorities to convert or migrate. Cultural and religious diversity 
started to be considered as problematic. Labour migration circuits in Europe broke down and re-
gional economies were devastated by marauding armies, as people were forced to choose where to 
live according to their religion, and the cultures prevalent in the centres of power became “nation-
al” and hegemonic. This process, however, also generated religious migration and eventually rein-
forced a nascent migration to the Americas (Hoerder 2002, chap. 4–5). Hoerder´s book follows 
mass migration movements as the European colonies spread and grew: slave migration from Africa, 
movements of people in the Indian Ocean during colonial times, resettlement of Latin America by 
Iberian peoples after the population collapse of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, the settle-
ment of Australia and the African Cape, the Fur Empires and subsequent agricultural settlement of 
North America and Siberia.  
The peace of Westphalia (1648) defined borders and consolidated national identities in Europe. It 
did not, however, seal the frontiers of Europe and the old world. In fact, as prosperity and econom-
ic development returned to certain regions of Europe, labour migration flourished once again in the 
continent, starting with mass migration and circular migration to the newly-independent and nomi-
nally Calvinist Netherlands, which promoted toleration and welcomed Jews, Lutherans, Anabaptists 
and Catholics, as well as French Huguenot refugees (especially after the Edict of Fontainebleau in 
1685), and rapidly became one of the wealthiest nations in the world, dominating trade in the Far 
East, the North Sea, even in most of the Atlantic Ocean. The Dutch East India Company, the first 
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multinational corporation, monopolized trade in Asia for two centuries and moved goods and peo-
ple around the globe as it established an extraordinarily diverse system of colonies and trading 
posts. Other European nations, starting with Britain, sought to compete with the tiny Dutch nation, 
and emulate its economic model. Mercantilism quickly came to shape policymaking in many Euro-
pean courts: following this economic doctrine, competing sovereign nations scrambled to hoard all 
the resources they could lay their hands on, luring skilled labour from other European countries, 
and accumulating unskilled labour by large-scale colonization of Asia and the Americas, and by im-
porting slave labour from Africa and elsewhere to the colonies. Historians like Klaus Bade (2003) 
trace migration patterns in modern European history, from the independence of the Netherlands to 
the 1990s, following movements within Europe, early emigration to the colonies, the mass migra-
tion to the Americas, Australia, the Cape and North Africa in the 19th Century, and immigration into 
Europe in the 20th century. The later chapters of Hoerder´s book seek to do the same, not only for 
Europe but for the whole world.  
Mercantilist territorial units eventually gave rise to nation-states, as Westphalian notions of sover-
eignty spread through Europe and the Americas in the late 18th and early 19th century, and through 
Africa and Asia in the 20th century. The Westphalian system of nation states constitutes one of the 
big paradoxes in human history: while constructing self-contained national states that feel threat-
ened by the prospect of mass migration, it laid the economic and technical basis for massive human 
population movements and even stimulated these movements, especially since the mid-19th centu-
ry with the Industrial Revolution and early capitalism. However, its drive towards cultural homoge-
nization and the separation of peoples generated pogroms and death camps, and a host of nation-
alistic movements that led to decolonization, especially in the 1960s. Decolonization meant new 
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pogroms and death camps as the newly independent countries sought homogeneity and internal 
regions sought independence.  
3.2.2.2 The Legacy of Westphalia 
The dangerous nationalistic ideologies fed by the Westphalian political construct have made us see 
the global political reality through a severely distorted lens. The French Directory and Napoleon de-
fied Westphalia and promoted a politically violent, culturally hegemonic and economically fragile 
form of cosmopolitanism that was first cheered by intellectuals and then made an object of a pan-
European damnatio memoriae. Thus, during the Napoleonic Wars and especially after the 1815 
Congress of Vienna, national myths and histories were fabricated by Romanticist intellectuals by 
piecing together bits of local folklore; in a strong reaction to the cosmopolitanism of the French 
Revolution, these state-sponsored “historians” sought to give strong identities to the new European 
states so as to preserve the “balance of power” and ensure the loyalty of the citizens to their new 
or re-established rulers. The strategy, first invented by German philologists, but soon copied all 
over Europe, was to paint over centuries of population movements by the supposedly “scientific” 
establishment of legitimate (or de facto) “moments of primary acquisition” and linking those “legit-
imate conquerors” to the main ethnic and cultural groups present within the land in the 19th centu-
ry, and hence create the illusion of a continuous nation of stable inhabitants over many centuries 
(Geary 2003, 12f). French intellectuals too copied this with a vengeance, and contemporary histori-
ans like Noiriel (1996) have shown how even great historians like Fernand Braudel were engulfed by 
the esprit du temps. 
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Centuries of migration, racial hybridization and cultural heterogeneity in Europe were thus oblite-
rated from the collective memory as children were made to believe that they were the direct de-
scendants of the companions of Alaric, Clovis, Alboin or Theodoric, and or even the extended family 
of the Viking chieftains, Vercingetorix, William Tell, Romulus and Remus or the German folk heroes. 
As ethno-cultural nationalism100 with its myth of common ancestry spread throughout the world, 
people came to believe that migration is a marginal phenomenon in human history, that intercon-
nectedness between peoples is something very recent and that the mass movements of people due 
to “internationalisation” (and more recently, “globalisation”) is unprecedented. Nationalism cou-
pled with the construction of national “races” and “cultures” spread like wildfire. By the end of the 
19th century, a brand of ethno-cultural nationalism became popular even in such a patently diverse 
country as United States, and some American intellectuals were mythologizing the Pilgrim Fathers 
and advocating migration restriction policies, in spite of the growing labour demand of American 
industry. They quickly succeeded in banning immigration from China (Chinese Exclusion Act, 1882) 
but had to wait until the 1920s (Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and Immigration Act of 1924) for 
100 Many authors seek to distinguish ethno-cultural nationalism (based on the myth of common ancestry, 
which produces ethnic and nativist patriotism) from civic nationalism (based on the myth of a shared com-
mitment to a common residential homeland and the common act of popular sovereignty that constituted 
the body politic, which produces “constitutional patriotism”), cf. Brown (2000) and Guibernau (1996). In his 
classic text, Man and the State, Jacques Maritain (1998, chap. 1) makes a similar distinction between na-
tion/national community and body politic/political society (which includes the state); the former is based on 
(hypothetical) blood relations (an act of nature), while the latter is based on an act of reason (entailing tacit 
consent to relationships of justice and civic friendship which serve that good which is common to a well-
defined political group). Often, however, these two types of nationalism coexist in tension or complement 
each other. Noah Pickus (2007) and Rogers Smith (1997) show how even in the history of a country like the 
US, which is patently built on immigration, two nationalisms are present: one assumes that there is an exclu-
sive list of “acceptable” races, creeds and cultures that separates “true” American citizens and acceptable 
migrants from the rest, the other assumes that being “American” means subscribing wholeheartedly to the 
US Constitution and its civic ideals. Both forms of nationalism have shaped the complex history of immigra-
tion policy in the US and its formidable deportation machine (Kanstroom 2010; Rocha 2010). 
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immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe to be drastically restricted by law (cf. R. M. Smith 
1997, chap. 11).  
3.2.2.3 Westphalian Sovereignty Challenged by the Return of Mass Migration 
The above discussion shows how, a century ago, in the age of steamships, railways and global em-
pires, people in the West were made to think that mass migration and internationalization were 
“new” and “potentially dangerous” developments in world history, in spite of the fact that there 
were countries like Italy with a fifth of their population living abroad, and others like the US which 
were absorbing huge amounts of immigrants compared to their population size101. These ideas 
slowly sank in. Nationalisms and xenophobia led to the craziness of World War I and of the Treaty 
of Versailles which ended it: mistrust of the other after the “Great War” crippled world trade, halt-
ed economic growth and labour migration, and led to even more radical forms of nationalism and 
xenophobia in the 1930s. Today, in the age of the internet, cheap air tickets, multi-national compa-
nies and free trade agreements, many of our contemporaries are once again tempted to think that 
“globalisation of labour” and mass migration are new and potentially dangerous phenomena. It has 
become hard even for intellectuals to adopt a critical historical perspective, and realize that it is ra-
ther the sovereign nation-state — with fixed borders, a stable body politic and a simplified system 
of authorities and laws (that are hegemonic within that territory) — which is a relatively new con-
101 In 1910, the US had a population of 92,228,496 and granted Legal Permanent Resident status to 
1,041,570 persons; that is about the same as in 2010 (1,042,625 persons) when the resident population was 
308,745,538. This means that, proportionally, the US was integrating three times as many legal immigrants 
per capita in 1910 as in 2010. (Cf. U.S. Census Bureau 2010; Department of Homeland Security 2010.) 
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cept and reality (Carlson and Owens 2003, 11–19), fraught with its own dangers and horrors, as the 
events of these last two centuries amply demonstrate.  
The idea that one could carve out a space on the surface of the planet which is mono-cultural, 
mono-linguistic, mono-racial, autarkic, free from external influences and unified by one religion un-
der one “absolute” ruler was inconceivable before the European Wars of Religion and Westphalia; 
once it was born, however, it grew into a very powerful and seductive idea that has shaped world 
history (Philpott 2001). Cities and states which have had some significance in human history were 
never monolithic in the way that absolute sovereignty posits them, nor did they ever aspire to be 
so, except during certain fits of violent xenophobia (e.g. Muslim and Protestant iconoclasms, St. 
Bartholemew´s Day massacres, anti-Jewish pogroms, the Boxer Rebellion, the Momoyama Period) 
that marked times of political transition, economic hardship or religious intolerance. And while ab-
solute national sovereignty is a chimeric idea which no sensible politician today (except maybe in 
North Korea) believes is possible or even truly desirable, the aspirations of autarchy it creates are 
still powerful, and many political and juridical structures are still based on the narrative (in part a 
fictio juris) that modern states are absolutely sovereign.  
It is this chimera that is conjured up when we speak of borders and immigration. Yet, not only is 
political sovereignty a “relative” thing, but has been seriously challenged in recent years. Authors 
like John Kelsay (2003) argue that state sovereignty is being challenged today from “below” (e.g. by 
cross-border or international fundamentalist and ideological groups, multinational corporations 
formally based in the state, regions demanding more autonomy but not independence), from 
“above” (e.g. by certain decisions to intervene in cases of conflict backed by the UN General As-
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sembly or Security Council, by the growing clout of international institutions such as the WTO), and 
from “alongside” (especially with the development, in recent years, of the doctrine of the “Respon-
sibility to Protect”). The latter development is especially significant from a legal point of view; as 
Seyla Benhabib (2004, 10) argues, “state sovereignty is no longer the ultimate arbiter of the fate of 
citizens or residents. The exercise of state sovereignty even within domestic borders is increasingly 
subject to internationally recognized norms which prohibit genocide, ethnocide, mass expulsions, 
enslavement, rape, and forced labor”.  
In sum, the central aspect of what we call “globalisation” is this series of challenges to Westphali-
an sovereignty. In this context, international migration, too, is a feature of a “globalising” world, 
since it has become yet another component in a growing list of challenges to Westphalian state 
sovereignty. The massive movements of people in the 19th and early 20th century, and the transpor-
tation technologies which facilitated these movements, are not included in the term “globalisation” 
since they mostly happened within global empires and did not pose a great challenge to Westphali-
an sovereignty.   3.2.3 POLITICO-MILITARY AND CULTURAL LINKS BETWEEN SENDING AND RECEIVING COUN-TRIES 
The fragmentation of global empires and the multiplication of international borders between na-
tions, borders which have become increasingly difficult to cross (for some people, at least) clashes 
with the reality of a world which has always consisted of interconnected and interdependent peo-
ples. We have discussed above some of the ecological and economic links between countries, 
which have made the world more interdependent in recent years, and hence challenge absolutist 
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notions of sovereignty. We can mention two further kinds of links between sending and receiving 
countries that affect the phenomenon of migration: (a) political and military issues and (b) cultural 
ties. These links show that decades and centuries of interdependence between peoples, for better 
and for worse, cannot be swept away by the drawing of a new international border, and the adop-
tion of a new immigration restriction policy. Globalisation is, in many ways, a continuation and an 
expansion of links between peoples which may have been put into question by independent 
movements in the 20th century, given the injustice inherent in colonialist forms of interdependence, 
but which need to be recognised and re-established (hopefully in ways which are far more just) in 
the 21st century. 
3.2.3.1 Political and Military Issues 
First, let us start with the political and military issues that foment fear and poverty, and influence 
migration decisions. A quick look at the UNHCR annual Statistical Reports, or at a history of US mili-
tary involvement in Asia, is sufficient for anyone to realize that practically every war is accompanied 
by subsequent movements of people (Rumbaut 2005). Many such persons are not directly perse-
cuted, but they may feel personally threatened by the violence. Often, they resist moving since they 
do not know where to go, or hope that the worst is over, until the situation is compounded by eco-
nomic and other factors which eventually force them to leave.  
The US and the Soviet Union fought many proxy wars all over the world during the Cold War period, 
claiming to “protect freedom” or “fight imperialism”. Following the Truman and the Monroe Doc-
trines, the US supported military juntas in Latin America in the 1970s, offering training and equip-
ment to oppressive security forces that fought “dirty wars”; after democratization in the 1980s and 
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1990s, and the devastating effects of Washington Consensus policies, former soldiers and rebels 
joined criminal syndicates which perpetuate the terrorist tactics and violence of the 1970s in novel 
forms and for novel reasons. Similarly, many contemporary conflicts in Africa and Asia have roots in 
colonial-era policies, and have been fuelled by foreign military aid given to oppressive regimes or to 
rebels, in view of protecting the trade and investment privileges wielded by certain wealthy nations 
in these countries; the participation of developed countries in these conflicts today is often justified 
as actions “in support of freedom and democracy”, “in support of security and stability”, “in the 
context of a global war against terrorism”. Throughout this period, the US (aided, at times, by its 
Western allies) also fought direct wars, many for ethically dubious or unacceptable reasons, and 
some for reasons which may be justified by a modern jus ad bellum theory such as that of Waltzer 
(2000). 
In all these cases — and especially in the cases where wealthy and powerful countries violated the 
borders of weaker nations simply to promote their own interests or to appear to be “doing some-
thing” about international communism or terrorism — there is an ethical responsibility to help the 
regions and persons affected by the conflict to return to situations of sustainable peace, functioning 
institutions and stable economy. Furthermore, a proper understanding of jus post bellum (cf. Bass 
2004) cannot absolve the victor from taking some responsibility for the migrations generated by the 
conflict, during economic reconstruction and as part of reconstruction itself. Even “ethical” military 
interventions to enforce UN sanctions (under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect) cause the 
displacement of people and generate refugees and migrants, and the international community can-
not simply ignore the plight of these persons.  
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Political and military links between countries, of course, are not limited to conflicts and wars. For 
instance, this type of link between France and its colonies has generated a history of migration 
from France to the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa both during the colonial period and after de-
colonization (as settlers, investors, experts, aid workers, retirees, and so forth) , and from these re-
gions to France during World War II and the post-war reconstruction (mainly as agricultural and in-
dustrial labourers)102.  
3.2.3.2 Cultural Ties 
Secondly, let us say a word about cultural linkages between nations which generate migratory 
movements. Most prospective “economic” emigrants (and their families) do not decide where to go 
by consulting statistics which tell them which country will pay them most for their work. They seek 
to go to countries where the language is familiar, where laws are similar, where qualifications are 
recognised, or exams for recertification are similar to the ones at home (Castles and Miller 2009, 
96–124). They are attracted to the places where the favourite soccer teams are based, and espe-
cially to cities which have a thriving community of compatriots and possibly relatives (Del Grande 
2008, 83–95). Most of these cultural linkages were not started by people from poor countries. Dur-
ing colonial times, children in Africa and Asia were taught at school that their nation was now part 
102 Some local church documents have made valuable reflections on these links: “Many countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and the Maghreb have given much to France, defending its freedom and helping its recon-
struction. This country owes a historical debt to all those who shed their blood and gave their strength for its 
well-being. However, France maintains a policy of ambiguous military cooperation with its former African 
colonies. It has supported dictators to defend its geopolitical, economic, and commercial interests, instead of 
helping transitions to democracy desired by the people of those former colonies. Migrational mobility is to-
day necessary to maintain the economic, cultural and political ties between the countries associated with 
the history of France” (Comité épiscopal des migrations et des gens du voyage de la Conférence des évêques 
de France 2004, A:1). 
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of the great British, French, Dutch, German, Belgian, Italian, Spanish or Portuguese civilization, that 
such or such a language and literature was the “civilized” language and “true” literature. National 
curricula, even after independence, were based on books and educational practices of Cold War 
“big brother” countries, like the US or the Soviet Union, or former colonial powers103.  3.2.4 TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSNATIONALISM 
Political, military, and especially cultural links between peoples facilitate tourism, investment and 
all forms of bi-national cooperation between developed and emerging countries. They even allow 
the citizens of wealthy nations to be more mobile and “transnational” today than during colonial 
times, if they so wish. They also allow some citizens of poorer nations to travel, adapt to life in de-
veloped nations with a certain ease, and maintain sustained and significant links in two or more 
places, thus forming transnational communities which live across borders. Of course, advances in 
transport and communications technology, and the diffusion of cross-cultural values — some of the 
marks of contemporary “globalisation”— enhance this process. Migration scholars believe that 
“transnational communities currently embrace only a minority of migrants, but may on the long run 
have enormous consequences for social identity and political institutions in both receiving countries 
and countries of origin” (Castles and Miller 2009, 48). 
103 For instance, twenty-five years after Maltese independence, most of my school books were still those 
used by students in Great Britain (I had to memorize British history and geography, struggle with math prob-
lems that assumed knowledge of cricket and British railways, learn Italian and French pronunciation from 
material designed for British children, etc.), and public exams in Malta were still being set by the University 
of London, Cambridge or Oxford. For decades after independence, everything “modern” in Maltese culture 
pointed to Great Britain; this was obviously not a choice made by the Maltese people: there are links built in 
history which are too hard to break, and which no reasonable administrator would dare to break, expect 
some fanatical nationalist. 
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While migrants and refugees with a high level of education are the best equipped to inhabit more 
than one cultural world, even poorer migrants with little formal education find ways to adapt and 
adjust to new cultures. Their access to the culture of a receiving country is often mediated by their 
traditional life-world, with its religious beliefs and practices. Valuable research conducted among 
Somali women in Melbourne, Australia, shows how their Muslim faith helps them to find their bear-
ing in a very Westernized cultural milieu. “Islam is articulated through women´s use and construc-
tion of space, daily practices, forms of interaction, and modes of thinking about their lives. Further, 
Islam offers a meaningful framework of practice and ideology that sustains women during the hard-
ships of exile, displacement, and resettlement and in times of emotional distress” (McMichael 
2002, 171). 3.2.5 CONCLUSION: THE CHANGES DO NOT WARRANT IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION 
Globalisation challenges sovereignty. It forces us to recognise the interdependence among peoples, 
and question a pervasive system of international borders which compartmentalize the human race. 
Of course, if not shaped politically and morally, globalisation could lead to the re-establishment or 
perpetuation of unjust relations of interdependence, such as those referred to as “neo-colonialist” 
and denounced by the Anti-Globalisation movement. Yet, the solution cannot be found at the level 
of the nation-state. We cannot expect national governments to “tame” globalisation by imposing 
unilateral restrictions on the movement of money, ideas, culture, goods (including contraband arms 
and drugs), pollution or epidemics. Similarly, we cannot expect unilateral restrictions on the move-
ment of human persons to produce effective and desirable forms of migration management (Ghosh 
2007).  
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Globalisation pushes us to question claustrophobic forms of nationalism which engender xenopho-
bia, and to take a new look at world history and see it as a history of interconnectedness between 
peoples. It is time to overcome the Romanticist nostalgia of some non-existent golden age of abso-
lute sovereignty, which makes people see mass migration as unprecedented and troubling, as an 
emergency requiring draconian measures of border control which can easily dispense with human 
rights protections and other “moral qualms”.  
3.3 Irregular Migration: The Mode of Entry and Sojourn Have Changed 
For many people, especially in countries “built on immigration”, what has changed in recent dec-
ades is that, whereas past generations of poor migrants entered the country legally, many immi-
grants today enter illegally, sometimes using the services of smugglers and traffickers. Globalisation 
and the technologies it provides have also facilitated global terrorism, sometimes linked to immi-
grants. Consequently, in the minds of the “native” population, immigration has become linked to 
crime, in what has been called “crimmigration” (Stumpf 2006), and this link has become a major 
argument in favour of immigration restriction (Heyer 2012, 134–139). To understand better the re-
ality of irregular migration, we here present some legal aspects of contemporary migration and law 
enforcement in developed countries. We discuss international terrorism further in section 3.5.1. 3.3.1 CONVENTION REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRANTS 
3.3.1.1 Modern Legal Definitions of “Refugee” 
Many of the persons who enter Europe “illegally” request asylum. Yet, according to international 
law, refugees have a right to enter a foreign country to seek asylum. Let us start with this group of 
migrants: can we call them “illegals” and associate them with criminals? Following the definition in 
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Article 1 of the 1952 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a “classical” convention ref-
ugee is a person who (1) has well-founded fear of being persecuted on the basis of the following 5 
grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; (2) 
is outside the country of his nationality (i.e. has crossed an international border); and (3) is unable 
to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or return 
there because there is a fear of persecution. Furthermore, (4) the perpetrator of this persecution is 
usually assumed to be a state or political institution (to avoid having people threatened by simple 
criminals from applying for refugee status)104. (5) Finally, the individual needs to show that the per-
secution is somehow targeting them directly; a villager whose family is killed as “collateral damage” 
in a government bombing campaign targeting random villages “which might be harbouring terror-
ists” is not entitled to protection according to international law105. The limitations do not end there. 
In the original text of the UN Convention, the term “refugee” was limited to people displaced by 
events that happened in Europe and before the 1st January 1951106.  
104 In some countries, such as the UK, non-state actors (such as guerrillas, insurgents, terrorist organizations 
and crime syndicates) are taken into account only when certain conditions obtain, such as when there is a 
deliberate or culpable failure, on the part of the state, to provide adequate protection to their citizens from 
dangerous non-state actors (cf. Hathaway and Foster 2003; Wilsher 2003). 
105 For this reason, authors like Gunning (1989) argue that the definition of refugee should be expanded, at 
least to be made to coincide with that provided in the Organization of African Unity's 1969 Convention Gov-
erning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (see below).  
106 Asylum seekers displaced by more recent events or from countries on other continents could not apply 
for the status of “Convention refugees”, but only for protection afforded by particular countries with a 
broader definition of the persons eligible for sanctuary. The 1967 Protocol removed these temporal and ge-
ographical limitations from the definition of refugee, but allowed signatory countries to maintain a geograph-
ical limitation when granting asylum in the country. 
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All of these legal limitations entail that a refugee is a very particular kind of “migrant”; in fact, in-
ternational law seeks to make a clear distinction between a “Convention refugee” and other types 
of migrants that is historically and politically prudent, even if not always sociologically or ethically 
sound. Yet when first proposed in the late 1940s, this distinction was heavily encumbered with the 
unbearable lightness of the ghosts of refugees (and of political opportunism) past, present and yet 
to come.  
1. Refugees past: In the 1930s and 1940s, in spite of much political rhetoric in their favour, 
Jews and others persecuted by the Nazi regime found it very hard to enter and reside legally 
in Western countries because the draconian migration restriction policies implemented dur-
ing the Depression years made no exceptions for these kinds of “migrants”107. The drafters 
of the 1952 UN Convention knew that their countries had seriously failed these persons, and 
had them in mind when trying to define a “refugee”.  
2. Refugees yet to come: As noted above, when signed, the Convention did not offer an inter-
national law framework to cater for future (or “non-European-event-related”) refugees, but 
it was hoped that the definition of “refugee” established by the Convention would be en-
shrined in national legislation that concerned the admission of aliens in the future. Drafters 
hoped that in the ratification process, national legislators would create a firewall that would 
keep their country´s borders permanently open to asylum seekers, especially in times of 
107 At the 1938 international meeting in Evian, France, which sought to resettle some 300,000 Jewish refu-
gees recently pushed out of Nazi Germany, the only country that made a serious offer was the Dominican 
Republic, which accepted to settle 100,000 refugees as farm labourers. Nations like the US or the UK made 
vague promises, but did not change their restrictive immigration laws which allowed in only “Jews with 
means”, and refused entry to “anyone likely to become a public charge” (Marfleet 2005, chap. 6).  
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immigration restriction. In particular, the most powerful delegations behind the 1952 Con-
vention — France, the US and Britain — were expecting future Cold War “refugees” from 
the Eastern Bloc, mostly persecuted intellectuals and protest leaders (in relatively small 
numbers) which could staff their universities and oil their anti-Soviet propaganda machines. 
This meant a definition of “refugee” that was wide enough to cater for these desired mi-
grants, and hence included more than the victims of pogroms and state-sponsored genocide 
(which constituted most of the “refugees past”).  
3. Refugees present: In 1952 there were many people who were being persecuted or who 
risked persecution, as well as stateless and destitute people who had been moved around 
during the war. In practice, the Convention had little to offer to the bulk of these people. 
There were “counter-revolutionaries” being hunted down in countries like China, but these 
people were excluded by the geographical limitation of the Convention. There were Soviet 
gulags holding thousands of people considered “Nazi collaborators” and other political dis-
senters; the Convention was not intended to provide these people a path to freedom. In 
fact, many of the people in the “Gulag Archipelago” were Russians forcibly deported by the 
US and UK after the Yalta convention in 1945; by the time any of these prisoners could reach 
the West and file an asylum claim, the gulag system had been wound down and eventually 
dissolved. Hence, technically, soon after the convention was ratified in many countries, the 
“source of persecution” had ceased and unwanted gulag refugees could be deported once 
again to the USSR. 
The archetype of the “refugee”, in the minds of the French and American drafters of the convention 
and of the legislators ratifying it, was therefore the German Jew on his way to Auschwitz, and the 
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Eastern-European dissident journalist being hunted down by the Soviet NKVD. This is a very restric-
tive and peculiar delimitation of the world of forced migration, which, ironically, seems dictated by 
the self-same political opportunism that provoked the Jewish refugee pushback crisis in the 1930s 
which the Convention was seeking to remedy. Roughly, a person is a “refugee” only if they can ar-
gue that their displacement has been clearly and directly causally linked to (state-sponsored) acts of 
persecution, actually experienced or perceived as imminent. In 1952, well before “crimes against 
humanity” resurfaced in a strong way in Asia and Africa later on in the 20th century, this definition 
of refugee seems ultimately to cater for a particular class of migrants: middle-class deemed quite 
desirable by Western governments. Indeed, it conveniently offers a whole series of caveats by 
which a bureaucrat could easily refuse the asylum application of unwanted (especially poor or un-
educated) migrants. A poor refugee who could not afford to escape persecution promptly or an un-
educated refugee who could not prove direct persecution could thus be easily rebranded as an 
“economic migrant” or “bogus asylum seeker”.  
Let us however consider two other definitions of “refugee”. According to the Organization of Afri-
can Unity's 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, a refugee 
is “every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seri-
ously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is 
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nationality”. According to the 1984 Cartagena Declaration Relating to Refu-
gees (signed and ratified my most countries in Latin America), refugees are “persons who flee their 
countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, for-
eign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which 
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have seriously disturbed public order”. These definitions are much wider and capture better the 
reality of refugees — old and new. Yet they all share the notion of persecution or threat caused by 
human violence. They therefore embody a separation between so-called “negative” and “positive” 
human rights, or between the 1st and 2nd generations of human rights. Refugees, according to these 
contemporary definitions, are people whose political and personal freedoms have been severely 
threatened through violence caused by specific groups of humans, but not people seriously de-
prived of their socio-economic rights through poverty caused by generic human action or inaction 
(cf. Marfleet 2005, 144–7).  
3.3.1.2 A Contemporary Distortion of the Notion of Refugee 
The above legal definitions constitute a contemporary distortion of the notion of refugee, owing 
much to US scepticism on socio-economic rights in the post-war period. It is a distortion, since, from 
an ethical point of view, it is not entirely clear why a person fleeing famine or an ecological disaster 
is less entitled to international protection than someone who discovers his house has been bugged 
by the Stasi or whose hometown has been raided by rebels or government forces (but who could 
find relative safety in some other part of his country). It is contemporary, since, before 1952, people 
fleeing a natural disaster or leaving cities bombed during the war were also called “refugees”, even 
though the terms “asylum” and “sanctuary” are more evocative of voluntary persecution (Gunning 
1989, 41; Marfleet 2005, 97f)108. 
108 The “classic” reference of the term “refugees” (from the French “réfugiés”) were the Huguenots fleeing 
France in the 17th century due to direct persecution, limits on economic freedoms, land expropriation and 
political disenfranchisement. British authorities championed their cause while, at the same time, adopting 
similar repressive policies against Catholics in Ireland; inspired by “progressive” ideas such as those of John 
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My point here is not to question the Convention´s remit to protect those “hard-core refugees” tar-
geted by the modern-day pogroms, genocides, and forced labour camps which have returned to 
haunt humanity, especially since the 1970s, in countries often destabilized by poverty or external 
interference. These people obviously need protection, and most of them usually find it by moving 
to a neighbouring region in the same country, or to a neighbouring country. Unlike the European 
states in the 1930s, many states in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East today, in spite of their 
lack of means, have opened their doors to people persecuted in neighbouring countries and are ef-
fectively keeping them out of harm´s way. If these are the only “refugees” we really should care 
about, wealthy nations should be sending billions of dollars to assist the countries hosting these 
people. Only a trickle of these refugees actually makes it to Europe, North America, or Australia, 
and files an asylum claim in these countries. Some even argue that a good number of the people 
who actually do make it so far are mostly escaping the poverty, marginalisation and discrimination 
in what we may call “relatively safe third countries”, rather than the original source of persecution 
in their home country which is usually quite far behind. In reality, I believe that the situation of 
Locke´s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” (originally published in 1689), the Anglican Crown was willing to 
grant religious freedom to foreign Calvinists, while insisting, with Locke, that local Catholicism should not be 
tolerated. Ultimately, the British government sought to attract skilled Huguenot labourers, wealthy mer-
chants and aristocrats from across the Channel to outcompete France economically (Marfleet 2005, 102f), 
while both neighbours vied for world dominance. Knowing that British workers would resent this mass im-
migration of labourers and artisans from France, the British crown and the Anglican church set in motion 
their well-oiled anti-Catholic propaganda machine to evoke pity for these “persecuted Protestant brethren” 
and, at the same time, to insist on how economically profitable this immigration was, at least by mercantilist 
standards. What should probably be lauded in this whole affair is that the British authorities at the time did 
not try to distinguish those attacked by non-state and state-inspired dragonnade attacks, and the “phony 
asylum seekers” seeking better economic opportunities up north, and that they had the honesty and cour-
age to admit that their hospitality was (at least in part) economically motivated, and to use all the means 
available to address the popular apprehension regarding these “French invaders” (ibid.). 
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these people is far more vulnerable than what such cynical commentators would ever admit, but 
this objection points to some very serious shortcomings of the current system.  
Experts today speak of “mixed flows” of people heading towards Europe, Australia or North Ameri-
ca, people who cross borders irregularly because they would never be given a “tourist” or other visa 
to travel to a wealthy nation. Such flows are considered to be “mixed”, in the sense of comprising 
classical convention refugees, forced migrants, “forced economic migrants”, “empowered econom-
ic migrants”109, people seeking to join their families in destination countries and seasonal labourers. 
Yet, in reality, if migrations are “mixed”, the motives of the migrants (and asylum seekers) are even 
more mixed and complex. For many migrants and refugees, stable middle-income countries like 
Mexico, Egypt, Libya or Malaysia are originally seen as possible destination countries. They later be-
come transit countries for those few who decide to move on toward a high-income country, be-
cause of insecurity, xenophobia, discrimination, ill treatment by security forces and lack of oppor-
tunity in these countries. Though refugees have a right to file an asylum claim wherever and when-
ever they want, and often refuse to do so in middle-income countries, one could argue that a per-
son, persecuted in her own country, who spent several years working in Mexico or Libya and sud-
denly decided to move to the US or to Italy — mainly because these countries offered better em-
ployment opportunities and human rights protections — is moving primarily as a migrant, not as a 
refugee. The person may have been originally fleeing persecution, but de facto, she did find protec-
tion of some sort in the middle-income country, and her more recent displacement was not really 
due to the original persecution.  
109 See sections 3.3.2 and 5.3.3.2 below. 
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3.3.1.3 Should We Reframe the Issue in Terms of “Forced” Migration? 
To be sure, some people living in these middle-income countries really suffer from persecution at 
the hands of criminal gangs and oppressive police squads which target immigrants (and in this 
sense, such countries are not truly “safe third countries”); irrespective of their original reason for 
moving to Mexico or Libya, these persons have become forced migrants in those countries. Yet, a 
person from Somalia and a person from Ghana who were both seriously ill treated or persecuted in 
Libya would not be treated equally in Europe: the Somali would be recognised as a refugee since 
she cannot return to safety in her country, while the Ghanaian would not. 
This situation explains why many people in wealthy nations think that most “asylum seekers” are 
“fake”, or, if their story of persecution is true, they did not really have to come this far to seek pro-
tection. They argue that these people come to Europe, North America or Australia not because they 
couldn´t find protection closer to home, but because they want protection in a country that offers 
access to a whole range of human rights, and especially those socio-economic rights which the Con-
vention seems to disregard. From this, some will conclude: “if we don´t want to let other “economic 
migrants” in, why should we let such “refugees” in? Why should we not rather send them to some 
safe refugee camp or city, say in Kenya, and pay the Kenyans to keep them fed, educated and occu-
pied (at a much lower cost) until the situation in their country changes and they can return home?”  
In a sense, such a line of thought is not entirely wrong, since the Convention does not give refugees 
the right to decide where they will be relocated and offered protection: the country deciding an 
asylum claim may send the refugee to another safe country and “subcontract” the protection re-
gime. Authors like Hathaway (2011b) argue that this “solution”, if well implemented, could be 
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cheaper, benefit far more refugees (and not only those with the means to reach wealthy nations), 
avoid the many social problems related to integration and prove less politically challenging to im-
plement; adopting it may actually help us “save international refugee law” at a time of mounting 
rejections of asylum due to political populism and xenophobia110.  
Many others would, of course, reject such a “solution”. The governments of wealthy nations are 
already very reluctant to help refugees, in spite of seeing them on their streets and sometimes 
seeking their votes in elections; as noted above, they have, for many decades, been letting poor 
nations carry most of the burden of hosting refugees. How much less caring would they be should 
the refugee problem become “invisible” and protection be farmed out to poorer countries? Fur-
thermore, as we shall see below, the economies of wealthy nations — whether they admit it or not 
— are dependent on migrant labour, while the economies of poorer nations are overburdened with 
excessive labour supply. So why should the labour markets of poorer nations be forced to integrate 
these persons, or why should refugees be corralled in camps with closed and stagnant economies 
and made to depend on aid for years and years, when wealthier nations could actually benefit eco-
nomically from taking them in and integrating them? From this perspective, the solution would ra-
ther be the following: “We obviously should let these people in, but then, we should also extend 
our offer of hospitality (and possibly membership) to at least some of those other migrants who are 
110 “While international law allows each individual to determine for herself where to engage the protection 
process (based on accessibility, an assessment of safety, or simply personal preference), state parties are 
entitled to share-out among themselves the duty to provide protection” (Hathaway 2011a). Lawful transfers 
are however limited to situations in which it is "established that the third country will treat the asylum-
seeker (asylum-seekers) in accordance with international standards, will ensure protection against re-
foulement, and will provide the asylum-seeker (asylum-seekers) with the possibility to seek and enjoy asy-
lum" (UNHCR - Executive Committee 1998). 
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being denied access to basic socio-economic rights in their home countries, or are fleeing ecological 
disasters”. In other words, we should expand the notion of “refugee” to what it was in popular lan-
guage before the Convention, and so include forced migrants of other sorts and not only those con-
sidered “refugees” in the very strict sense that the very influential American and French delegations 
adopted when drafting the 1952 Convention.  
Should we therefore consider all “forced migrants” as refugees? Some authors, such as Hathaway 
(2007), insist that we should not conflate the two. Others, like (Betts 2010) suggest a “soft law” 
framework to include more categories of forced migrants (for instance, those fleeing ecological cri-
ses and natural disasters). Many refugee law experts involved in the defence of human rights, such 
as Katrine Camilleri111, believe that, ideally, we should revise the 1951 convention and its definition 
while, recognising that, in practice, given the current international political climate which is not 
conducive to a broader definition, any attempt to modify the 1951 Convention through diplomatic 
means may actually backfire and yield an even more restricted definition112. The UNHCR has called 
for new international instruments to fill in the gaps in protection of certain forced migrants, but 
doubts that the call will be heeded: 
A broader international framework providing guidance for the protection of those displaced across na-
tional borders for environmental reasons could help states to understand and meet their responsibili-
ties in this area. At present, there is little political support for a new binding international instrument, 
but UNHCR has indicated that it would be prepared to work with states and other actors to develop a 
guiding framework or instrument to apply to situations of external displacement outside those covered 
111 Dr Camilleri is the current director of JRS Malta and recipient of the 2008 Nansen Refugee Award by the 
UNHCR. She discussed her position on the matter with me in an interview in July 2012. 
112 Fortunately, the sensu stricto definition has been somewhat expanded in recent years through legal in-
terpretation in national and regional human rights courts, and some regional blocks, such as the EU, have 
instituted limited “humanitarian protection” regimes.  
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by the 1951 Convention, and in particular to displacement resulting from climate change and natural 
disasters (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2012, 28). 
The conclusion is that, while the status quo in international law is eminently problematic, most hu-
man rights advocates would not want to tamper with it. Admittedly, great advances in international 
human rights legislation have occurred in other areas in the past 60 years as ethical reflection and 
public awareness chiselled against past realpolitik stances, but reflection and awareness concerning 
forced migration has not advanced greatly after being jolted forward by the guilt feelings of the 
1940s and 1950s. 3.3.2 “FORCED” AND “EMPOWERED” ECONOMIC MIGRANTS 
3.3.2.1 International Law and Immigration 
“Migration”, whether “forced” or not, is a scary word in international forums and new legal instru-
ments related to this important phenomenon, other than those intended to restrict it, are typically 
shunned by wealthy and powerful migrant-receiving countries. For instance, more than twenty 
years have passed since the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families was adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 45/158 on 
the 18th December 1990, but it has not been ratified by any of the major prosperous receiving 
countries. Some would justify this attitude by referring to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, saying that in this document, asylum is a human right (art. 14.1), exit migration is a human 
right (art. 13.2) but, apart from refugees, nobody has any right by international law to enter a for-
eign country. On the basis of such legal observations (rather than rigorous ethical argumentation) 
most politicians or international lawyers today do not see their country as morally bound to admit 
anyone but refugees in the strictest sense of the term; other migrants, forced or not, may be admit-
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ted out of supererogatory charity or enlightened self-interest, or simply left on the other side of the 
border if the country so wishes. 
The only new international instruments in the field of immigration which have been widely adopted 
are the Palermo Protocols regarding Trafficking and Smuggling113, which supplements the United 
Nations´ Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolu-
tion 55/25 of 15 November 2000. Modern slaves traded by traffickers are indeed forced migrants, 
but are not considered refugees; some countries like the US have recently issued “trafficking” visas 
to encourage victims to report their captors and testify against the traffickers, instead of threaten-
ing them with deportation as “irregular immigrants”. However, the Trafficking Convention, accord-
ing to several experts in international law, lacks the instruments to effectively combat modern slav-
ery; rather, it seems designed to provide the perfect ethical warrant for wealthy nations to employ 
draconian measures of border control, which often target less harmful human smugglers (rather 
than brutal and well-organized trafficking cartels) and the clients of these smugglers, many of 
whom are refugees or forced migrants (Hathaway 2008).  
In the best of cases, a smuggler may offer a “professional” service, and truly earn the fee or other 
form of remuneration she asks for when helping a person cross a border clandestinely114, given the 
113 The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, was 
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 and entered into force on the 25th De-
cember 2003. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, adopted by the same 
resolution, entered into force on the 28th January 2004. 
114 Some persons and organizations even smuggle refugees or migrant “friends” across borders for free; this 
has created problems for European lawmakers who did not feel such people are truly smugglers, or that they 
should be considered criminals (Gortázar Rotaeche 2006, 231). In some countries, like Mexico, directors of 
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risks the smuggler takes to help a possible refugee enter a country to seek protection. In the worst 
of cases, a trafficker could be a brutal slave-driver who forces people across borders and sells them 
to criminals to staff brothels and underground sweatshops, or leaves them stranded in the middle 
of a desert once he gets his money. On the ground, the distinction between these two extremes is 
not always so crisp, but blanket criminalization generally serves to shut down less-organized smug-
gling networks run by fishermen and small families (which are easy targets for law enforcement 
agents pressured by politicians to produce quick “results”) and force more and more vulnerable 
people into the hands of trafficker networks, run by crime syndicates and drug cartels. In this way, 
the new Convention and its transposition into the criminal laws of most countries have become in-
struments serving powerful anti-immigration lobbies, instead of tools to protect vulnerable victims 
(Gortázar Rotaeche 2006, 231). The Convention does little to deal with the modern slave trade, and 
instead of effectively providing protection to a new class of forced migrants, it is being used to deny 
protection to poor “classical” refugees by making it almost impossible for them to reach a safe 
country in the developed world.  
3.3.2.2 The Complex Causality of “Forced” Migration 
The reluctance to adopt international legal instruments that effectively promote the rights of 
forced migrants by allowing them to enter another country where they can make a living and pro-
vide for their families probably comes from the fact that developing a solid and coherent definition 
of “forced migrant” (and of their rights) necessarily entails putting into question the notion of “eco-
Christian charities have been accused of “smuggling” and imprisoned in the past, simply for offering food, 
water or lodging to clandestine migrants. 
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nomic migrant”. The causal nexus between persecution on the basis of the classical “Convention 
grounds” and the actual act of leaving one´s country may be more or less direct and can generally 
be framed with relative ease in a narrative that avoids mention of economic gains and losses. How-
ever, the nexus between causes like environmental degradation, slow-acting ecological disasters, 
generalized civil war, institutional collapse, economic meltdowns and some natural disasters, and 
the effect of finding oneself forced to migrate usually is mediated very clearly by an economic pro-
cess of pauperization and by the desire to escape poverty when a person decides it has become 
unbearable. In other words, at the borders of a wealthy nation, a forced migrant (who has transit-
ed a middle-income country and is not escaping genocide) is inevitably seen as a forced economic 
migrant. 
Let us take the hypothetical case of a woman who enters Europe or the US illegally and, who, after 
many years of training in migration studies, is asked to give the reasons behind her original decision 
to migrate, with relative weights. She might say that she left her home region “30% because of the 
effects of overfishing, 15% because of the effects of desertification, 10% because of the decrease in 
potable water supply and incipient drought conditions, 10% because of persistent threats by crimi-
nal gangs, 20% because of the effects of civil war in a neighbouring region and 15% because her 
children are not receiving any decent schooling and risk joining gangs, militias or fundamentalist 
groups”115. Of course it is very unlikely that a real migrant would say such a thing to a journalist or 
case officer a few days after the harrowing ordeal of travelling and entering a Western country ir-
115 Though these weights have been invented for the sake of the argument, several authors such as Castles 
and Miller (2009) and Marfleet (2005) document the complexity of causes behind people´s decisions to mi-
grate. 
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regularly. Though, upon analysis, all of these complex causes are forcing her to migrate, she will 
probably say that she could no longer afford to buy fish, vegetables and clean water at the market, 
to pay the extortion rate imposed on her little peddling business, or to send her kids to a private 
school where they can learn something and be safe.  
Yet, the developed country she may have entered irregularly may be partly responsible for the en-
vironmental degradation (due to the massive amounts of greenhouse gases it produces which con-
tribute to global warming), the gang violence (having deported violent criminals to a country with-
out the institutions to deal with organized crime, and giving the gangs easy access to sophisticated 
weaponry), the civil war (having allowed its mining corporations to arm different sides of the con-
flict; having used divide-and-rule politics as a colonizer of the country in the past) and the lack of a 
decent public education system (having forced the country to accept a structural adjustment pro-
gramme that was unduly harsh and implied drastic cuts in the education budget).  
The distinction we need to focus on, therefore, is not the one between a “forced” and an “econom-
ic” migrant. The relevant distinctions that fair law-making would seek are those between (1) a 
“forced economic migrant” and what I call an “empowered economic migrant”, on the one hand, 
and between (2) a forced migrant knocking at the door of a country which is partly responsible for 
his plight, and a forced economic migrant who is looking for better economic opportunities and a 
higher standard of living in a country which has little or nothing to do with the causes of his desire 
to migrate, on the other hand. The second distinction is based on history and bilateral relations and 
points to the fact that the fairness of domestic immigration policies needs to be evaluated in par-
ticular local and historical contexts rather than simply deduced from blanket cosmopolitan rights 
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and norms. The first distinction seeks to take into account the idea that not everyone has a funda-
mental right to enter and stay in another country, not everyone is “forced” by persecution, poverty, 
environmental and other factors to seek basic personal and economic freedoms in a foreign coun-
try. Some immigrants are already sufficiently “empowered” in their home country to live a dignified 
life there; hence, in certain cases, receiving countries may refuse entry to such immigrants. The dis-
tinction is not merely economical; it is based on ethical considerations regarding what a dignified 
life entails, and what it means to be “forced” to migrate or to be “empowered” at home and hence 
considerably “free” to migrate or to stay.  
We will need to refine this distinction in future chapters, using philosophical and other ethical ar-
guments. For the purposes of this chapter, the notion of “basic sustenance” (linked, by authors like 
Til (2007), to incomes of less than $2 per day, with some adjustment for Purchasing Power Parity) 
gives us a rough and ready guide to distinguish those who actually finds themselves forced to emi-
grate for “economic” purposes (which are usually the epiphenomena of more serious underlying 
causes of emigration), from those who are not so forced by their circumstances to migrate but are 
rather empowered (via capital and skills) to seek a better life in a more prosperous country. Several 
authors would agree (as we shall see in the following chapters) that all nations have some duties 
concerning the well-being of the former, even if they are not members or citizens. This duty, of 
course, becomes much more acute when the receiving country is somehow involved in and respon-
sible for some of the poverty and deprivation being suffered by the migrant.  
I do not elaborate this ethical reflection further at this point, but before proceeding to discuss what 
many people call “illegal immigration”, I would like to point out that a fair discussion of the illegal or 
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irregular acts of immigrants cannot be so easily separated from a discussion of the moral standing 
of civil law itself. Most legal systems in Western nations know how to deal with convention refu-
gees and with “empowered” economic migrants, but risk construing most non-refugee claims as 
cases of the latter kind; in this way, wealthy nations come to consider themselves legally and moral-
ly entitled to keep all these immigrants out, if they so wish. Following this reasoning, they adopt 
migration restriction legislation that leaves forced migrants and refugees few options other than 
irregular entry. And this problem brings us to the crux of the legal conundrum of irregular immigra-
tion. 3.3.3 IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND POSITIVE LAW116 
3.3.3.1 Irregular Migrants: A “Band of Invaders and Conquerors”? 
Why do so many poor forced migrants and “classical” refugees today contract the services of peo-
ple smugglers to get into a country to request asylum or humanitarian protection? First of all, legal 
entry is not an option for most of these people; being poor people from poor countries, they would 
never be given a visa to enter a safe country in the developed world “legally”. “Asylum” or “Protec-
tion” visas for possible refugees do not exist; tourist visas in poor countries are issued only to those 
who can show they can afford the luxury of a vacation; migrant worker visas are extremely hard to 
come by, especially if you don´t have a sponsor who offers to employ you in the receiving country 
(which is not the case for most forced migrants). Secondly, given the beefed up border control re-
116 I use “irregular migrant” to designate three major categories of persons intending to live outside their 
home country indefinitely or for a long period of time: (a) those who enter a country clandestinely, (b) over-
stayers and those who violate visa conditions, and (c) children born to parents in the two previous situations. 
Things are actually much more complex than this; cf. Düvell (2008) for a more complete classification and an 
insightful analysis of the concepts and terminology used. 
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gimes, forced migrants have little chance of making it alive across the Mediterranean, the Sonora 
desert, the Indian or Pacific Ocean today without help from the “professionals”.  
Of course, not all irregular migrants are refugees or forced migrants, but some are, and they have a 
moral — and sometimes legal — right to cross the border to safety. Yet, in many countries, “irregu-
lar immigrants” are automatically classified as “unwanted immigrants”, and met with hostility ra-
ther than recognition and compassion. In Israel, for instance, the sons and daughters of irregular 
migrants build monuments to the clandestine migration of their grandparents117 while having little 
sympathy for the “new illegals” from Africa118. Israeli law is extremely strict on immigration and 
classifies migrants from Eritrea (whom most Western countries recognise as refugees) as “infiltra-
tors”119. In 2008, Israel granted asylum to just one refugee, and in 2009 to only two. A historian 
would note that Israelis may have good reason to be suspicious of refugees. The history of Palestine 
shows how the unchecked immigration of destitute refugees could become a movement of con-
quest, whereby former natives were reduced to a social underclass or became refugees them-
selves.  
To be sure, the Jews flocking to Palestine after World War II had few other options; one can under-
stand their desire to claim and control a nation-state of their own after hundreds of years of perse-
117 At the entrance to the Clandestine Immigration and Naval Museum in Haifa, Israel, “illegals” are celebrat-
ed with a monument called “Kesher Hadorot”. Similar monuments can be found in Ashdod (Monument to 
the “Struma” and “Mefkura”), Tel Aviv and Tel Achziv (Ha ‘apala Monuments). Inspired by the writings of 
Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau, Jews from all over the world started pouring into Mandatory Palestine in 
the first half of the 20th century, often clandestinely, and eventually claimed the territory as theirs. 
118 Israeli mobs have attacked African neighbourhoods in Tel Aviv (for instance, on the 24th May, 2012) asking 
for swift deportation of Black immigrants. 
119 In 2010, the Interior Minister Eli Yishai claimed that irregular migrants pose an existential threat to Israel 
(Weiler-Polak 2010). 
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cutions as “minority nation” in “foreign” lands. Yet, illegal immigration as a strategy for conquest 
has been used in the past by many powerful nations who had little reason to snatch someone else´s 
territory. Nobody dares ask today whether the migration of thousands of European colonists to the 
Americas, South Africa and Australia was done respecting the law of the (colonized) land. After in-
dependence from Europe, the land-grab mentality did not disappear in these new nation-states. 
The United States, in particular, indulged in irregular migration to expand its borders, and not only 
into Amerindian territory120. Many of the Western politicians who today evoke images of “invasion” 
and “conquest” when speaking of irregular immigration will find very few or no cases that could 
illustrate this link today, but can amply demonstrate this possibility by referring to the acts of en-
croachment of their ancestors.  
3.3.3.2 Irregular Migrants: A “Bunch of Criminals”? 
Indeed, the irregular immigration which is the object of fear-mongering and heated political de-
bates in many developed countries today is much more benign than that which contributed to en-
rich these very nations or create these polities in the past. Of course, people who, in their lives, 
have never really needed to cross a border, or were never refused a visa, may quickly conclude that 
“irregular” immigrants are “bad” or “dangerous” people, people who supposedly “broke the law”. 
120 Before the Louisiana Purchase (which was itself an unexpected and highly “irregular” transaction – cf. 
Nugent (2009, 65f)), Jefferson planned to annexe territory to the west bit by bit, by encouraging Americans 
to settle there, revolt, secede and join the Union (Herring 2008, 103). That strategy was eventually used 
against Mexico: Americans settled in Texas ignoring the conditions of settlement and refusing to pay taxes; 
when Mexico closed the border, the settlers brought in hundreds of clandestine migrants, revolted, declared 
independence, and joined the Union. When Mexico tried to get back its territory, US used its military might 
to quash the Mexican army and annexe one half of the territory of Mexico in 1848, including the “Bear Flag 
Republic” declared by 33 American settler families (and some other “migrant workers”) in Alta California. 
Hawaii was annexed in a similar way later on in the 19th century. 
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As mentioned above, there has been a tendency in recent years to conflate immigration law and 
criminal law, with a purpose to exclude people, in what has been called the “crimmigration” crisis 
(Stumpf 2006). Some authors insist today that we should never call these migrants “illegals”: per-
sons cannot be “illegal”, though their actions may be. Others take one step further and call into 
question the supposed “illegality” of the act. In fact, clandestine entry to claim asylum by those en-
titled to protection is today tacitly assumed to be an unavoidable part of the process of seeking asy-
lum, the legality of which is recognised by the Refugee Convention, especially when legal entry is 
rendered impossible by severe carrier sanctions and border controls. If a national border regime 
blocks the access to a fundamental right guaranteed by international law, it is the border regime 
which is at fault, not the asylum seeker121. Of course, an irregular border-crosser exercises agency 
when she violates flawed and unjust immigration laws: she is not unaware of the formal “illegality” 
or her action, and (except in the case of human trafficking) nobody is physically forcing her to cross 
the border. This is why authors like Rocha (2010, 276–285) frame certain illegal entries and visa 
overstays as legitimate acts of civil disobedience. 
Analogously, in many countries, one may say that irregular labour migration is tacitly sanctioned by 
lawmakers who enact migration restriction laws and quotas in recession years and then refuse to 
relax or enforce these laws when the economy improves and requires migrant workers. In this way, 
they consciously create, through a legal contraption, a pool of disposable, exploitable, cheap and 
compliant labour shaded from the protection of the law, which benefits the employers who finance 
121 As we noted above, given that there is no visa category which allows poor forced migrants to enter a 
country to apply for asylum, international law assumes today that asylum seekers will cross the border irreg-
ularly, forge documents or file an incorrect visa application: in this case the “illegality” is tacitly sanctioned 
by international law (Hathaway 2008, 35f). 
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their political campaigns (Marfleet 2005, 170–175). At the same time, by refusing to relax immigra-
tion laws and allowing in as many migrant workers as are actually needed by the economy, these 
lawmakers may personally exploit the situation. On the one hand, they can portray themselves as 
“tough on illegal immigration” by enacting stricter (but not necessarily enforceable) border laws, 
spending more money on border control (without effectively “sealing” the border) and ostensibly 
harassing migrants, so as to win votes from the native-born working classes. On the other hand, 
they might even be receiving campaign financing from employers who benefit from irregular immi-
gration and lobby against effective enforcement (e.g. via employer sanctions that actually work); 
this lobbying ensures that strict immigration restriction rules are not enforced in ways that deprive 
the economy of the immigrant labour it needs.  
In this situation, the legislative apparatus is perverted, and becomes a tool with which to violate the 
human rights of immigrant workers needed by the economy. It is surprising that so few people real-
ize that the really “dangerous” persons, here, are these lawmakers and politicians, rather than the 
immigrants. They can afford to draft policies that entail the detention and deportation of hundreds 
of thousands of irregular immigrants, causing great suffering, simply because they assume others 
will come and take their places, and so, local industry and business will continue to run as usual. 
They can afford to allow tens of thousands to drown or die in the desert because they assume there 
will be enough migrants who will manage to cross, all the same. No wonder some critics claim that 
the “irregularity” (or “illegality”) in irregular migration is the brilliant new feature of yet another 
immigration regime instituted and intended by the law, and mainly serving the purpose of creating 
scapegoats, artificially selecting those migrants who are more “smart” and “fit”, and facilitating 
post-entry social control (cf. Kanstroom 2000). 
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3.3.3.3 Irregular Immigration in the US: Another Exploitative Immigration Regime?  
Aristide Zolberg´s book, A Nation by Design (2008), argues that “irregular migration” in the US is 
simply the newest immigration instrument of a series of exploitative immigration regimes devised 
by US Law as a “mixed settlement” that seeks to mediate between employers´ and economic plan-
ners´ demands for foreign labour (to keep wages low and to develop a huge and under-populated 
country) and native workers´ staunch refusal to open the border any wider. Zolberg lists four such 
regimes in the history of the US: (1) African Slavery and German Bonded Labour (from colonial 
times until the 1860s), (2) Chinese Bonded Labour (from the Civil War until the 1920s), (3) “Bracero” 
guest worker programs with Mexico (from the end of World War I until the 1960s), and (4) Undoc-
umented Migration (1965 until the present day).  
US Immigration Law has a complex history (Pickus 2007). In the past, racial and cultural constructs 
of the excluded other served unabashedly as the discriminating factor between different types of 
immigrants. Sometimes these policies were even rationalized by “race science” (Rocha 2010, chap. 
2–3), for instance Samuel George Morton´s craniometry and polygenism. Hence, certain immigrants 
were excluded from becoming true citizens on the basis of race (African-Americans), while others 
were kept out of the country through draconian immigration restriction measures also on the basis 
of race (Chinese, Southern and Eastern Europeans). When racial arguments became taboo, a geo-
metrically proportional and “colour-blind” preference system with restrictive ceilings — one which 
did not reflect the history and economic reality of migratory movements in the Americas — was 
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devised and maintained for half a century, until the present122. The system placed immigrants from 
Mexico and Central America and the Philippines, as well as those from populous countries such as 
India and China, on the same level as immigrants from other lands which have had little or no polit-
ical, economic, historical, cultural or migratory ties with the US This can be read as an ingenious yet 
unrealistic attempt to exclude the former, which ended up forcing millions of people to enter the 
US illegally. This clever contraption allowed American politicians and voters to say that the problem 
with most immigrants from Mexico and Central America is their “illegal status” rather than their 
“race”, and hence construct a massive deportation machine (cf. Kanstroom 2010; Kanstroom 2012; 
Rocha 2010) while, for many decades, avoiding any effective curbs on the flow (such as effective 
employer sanctions) that could create labour shortages and thus force a comprehensive overhaul of 
the current system. 
122 Although the 1965 immigration reform changed the preferences of The Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952, (Title 8 US Code, “McCarran–Walter Act”) substantially, the 1952 Act still provides the current re-
gime with its legal framework. Currently, the Act provides a global allotment of 675,000 “green cards” (i.e. 
immigrant visas for non-refugees) per fiscal year (485,000 for family-sponsored immigrants, 140,000 for em-
ployer-sponsored migrants and 50,000 so-called “diversity” visas). Furthermore, officials may not distribute 
more than seven percent of those among applicants from a single country (cf. § 202, § 203, § 204 of the 
Act.). That means that, according to the Act, Mexico can get a maximum of 9,800 worker-sponsored green 
cards per year, as can a tiny country with no tradition of labour migration to the US (cf. Carmona 2012). Ob-
viously, these figures seem ridiculous compared to the present need for labour from Mexico and Central 
America, and to the current number of applications for family reunification. In spite of some changes in the 
law to allow in more family-sponsored immigration, the backlog for countries like Mexico and the Philippines 
is quite impressive. For instance, in January 2012, US Embassy in Manila started accepting interviews of Fili-
pinos to adjudicate petitions to grant immigrant visas to adult siblings of US citizens submitted on or before 
October 8, 1988. Since the 1965 reform, US legislation has sought to satisfy some of the huge demand for 
foreign labour by granting temporary (non-immigrant) worker visas, thus repackaging previous guestworker 
initiatives such as the “Bracero Program”. To date, the H-1B system has an annual cap of 85,000 (of which 
20,000 must have advanced university degrees); the H-2B system (non-agricultural) is capped at 66,000. The 
uncapped H2A (agricultural) and TN1 (Professionals from Canada and Mexico) too are limited by require-
ments and bureaucracy: only 55,384 of the former and 4,971 of the latter were issued in 2011 (U.S. Depart-
ment of State 2012). This last figure is emblematic of how little NAFTA means in terms of freedom of move-
ment of persons. 
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When faced by this history, one realizes that irregular immigration from Mexico and Central Ameri-
ca comes as no surprise. Temporary labour migration between the US and Mexico has been going 
on for centuries (one third of the area of the lower 49 states was, in fact, part of Mexico until 1848). 
During World War II, the US promoted this migration through the Bracero Program that established 
migration chains between the two countries. These chains were very difficult to sever when the 
programme was halted in the 1960s, in preparation for a major legal overhaul that allowed a great 
increase in immigration from most countries while restricting immigration from Mexico (Calavita 
2010). Analysts project that had the 1965 restrictions on immigration from Mexico been effectively 
enforced in subsequent years, many US agribusinesses and industries which depended heavily on 
cheap seasonal labour from Mexico and Central America would have gone bankrupt or moved 
south of the border, thus giving a boost to the Mexican economy while crippling the economy of 
many Southern US states. That would have quickly created a strong lobby to reinstate the Bracero 
Program or relax the restrictions on immigration from Mexico. Rather, US politicians opted not to 
enforce the laws, while not legally allowing in more permanent immigrants from Mexico and not re-
establishing an effective and realistic temporary migration scheme for Americans living south of the 
Rio Grande. For many decades, the message sent to Mexican labourers was clear (and it was explic-
itly stated by US employers who, until the 1980s, could not be penalised for employing irregular 
migrants): “ignore the law, it´s just a political game: we need your labour and the government has 
no real intention of deporting you” (cf. Calavita 1994, 145f).  
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The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) introduced employer sanctions and other 
measures, which on paper, were supposed to reduce irregular immigration123. Further measures 
against irregular migration were incorporated into the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Removals of unauthorized immigrants and residents rose gradu-
ally from 18,013 in 1980, to 30,039 in 1990, to 188,467 in 2000 (Department of Homeland Security 
2010), while arrivals rose from 130,000 per year (1980s), to 450,000 per year (1990-94), to 750,000 
per year (1995-99), and then decreased to 700,000 per year (2000-2004) - (Passel 2005). This shows 
that, until the terrorist attacks of the 11th September, 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) did little to restrict the flow of irregular immigrants into the US Then “irregular immi-
grants” suddenly became conflated with “terrorists” (most of whom had actually entered the US 
legally!), and the successor agency to the INS, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, created 
in 2002) embarked on a programme of mass deportation. While the House and Senate debated and 
shot down one immigration reform bill after the other (cf. Hing 2006, 28f; LeMay 2006, 117f; 169f), 
removals rose to 246,431 per year in 2006, under the Bush administration, and to 395,165 in 2009 
under the Obama administration (Department of Homeland Security 2010)124. Meanwhile, net mi-
123 In general, employer sanctions are rarely enforced. Instead, US employers have become accustomed to 
report to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) those workers who assert labour and employment 
rights, to “get rid of them”, after knowingly employing these workers with obviously counterfeit immigration 
documents (and being informed by Social Security that the names and Social Security card numbers of the 
employees, as registered upon employment, do not match). In these cases, instead of punishing employers 
for breaking the law, the DHS rewards them by removing the “troublesome” workers (Lee 2009). 
124 The DHS´s immigration enforcement programme, Secure Communities, has been greatly expanded under 
the Obama administration and allowed most of this increase in deportations. Several states and counties 
(including Washington, D.C.) have nonetheless resisted the introduction of the programme, arguing that it 
interferes with local policing and inevitably leads to racial profiling (Center for American Progress Immigra-
tion Team 2012, 5). 
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gration from Mexico fell to zero or less (due to return migration), according to a recent Pew Hispan-
ic Center report (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012)125. 
President Obama´s first term in office coincided with beefed-up enforcement or “deportation on 
steroids”. It may have been an effort to appease moderate Republicans and build bi-partisan sup-
port for a comprehensive immigration reform bill to allow these migrants in regularly. At the time, 
certain states like Georgia sought to outdo the federal government and have tried their own ver-
sion of “enforcement on steroids” with tough new immigration laws which are seriously hurting 
their economies (cf. Baxter 2011); others like Mississippi (in April 2012) tried to pass similar laws 
but failed, in part due to intense lobbying from businesses that noted the devastating effects of 
Georgia´s new law and did not want the experiment to be repeated in their state. In fact, the en-
forcement binge started to vanish as the economy gathered steam and in June 2012, the Obama 
administration decided to stop some of the removals, in particular, of young irregular migrants126. A 
new comprehensive immigration reform bill passed the US Senate on the 27th June 2013, at the 
time of writing, but may be stalled in the House of Representatives. 
125 “The standstill appears to be the result of many factors, including the weakened US job and housing con-
struction markets, heightened border enforcement, a rise in deportations, the growing dangers associated 
with illegal border crossings, the long-term decline in Mexico’s birth rates and broader economic conditions 
in Mexico” (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012, 6).  
126 A new directive from President Obama, signed on the 15th June 2012, allows certain undocumented im-
migrants — those who can prove they came to the country under the age of 16 and have already lived in the 
US for at least five consecutive years — to stay in the country without fear of being deported (Foley 2012; 
2013). The young people who might be allowed to stay cannot be older than 30 and must be either still in 
school or graduated from high school or obtained a general education development (GED) certificate. Obvi-
ously, this is not a law, and can be repealed by Obama or his successor whenever they wish; furthermore it 
does not offer a true legal status, applies to relatively few people, and only highlights the urgent need of 
comprehensive immigration reform legislation. 
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 3.3.4 EUROPEAN POLICYMAKING 
3.3.4.1 The Push towards a Common Asylum and Immigration Policy 
If irregular migration can be seen as a new and exploitative immigration regime, where immigration 
restriction laws do not really keep people out but serve mainly to make people vulnerable, what 
could be an alternative system? How could wealthy nations allow immigrants in legally and respect 
their basic rights? European policymaking, with its multilateral approach, can shed a light on this, at 
least in certain proposals and aspirations which exist much more in theory than in practice. On the 
ground, many of the immigration laws in European countries today are so restrictive that most ref-
ugees and low-skilled economic migrants are forced to enter Europe irregularly and go through the 
asylum system to be granted “humanitarian” and “subsidiary” protection (and, in very few cases, 
“refugee status”). This flow of immigrants is then expected to fill in the job vacancies in Western 
Europe which citizens of the new EU member states stopped filling few years after accession. 
Only since the Amsterdam Treaty (1997, in force since 1999) has the Council of the EU been 
equipped to legislate (at the “Community” level) on the issues of migration and asylum, and in spite 
of being asked to do so in earnest, particularly in the Tampere Summit (1999), progress was very 
slow until the changes in voting rules in the Nice Treaty (2001, in force since 2003) and the adop-
tion of the Hague Programme (2004). Since the Lisbon Treaty (2007, in force since 2009), migration, 
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asylum and border control issues can be decided through the qualified majority voting procedure, 
and do not require unanimity127.  
Most of the regulations and directives coming from the Council of the EU in these last few years 
deal with border control, asylum and irregular migration. Legislation on labour migration and on 
the reception of third-country nationals fleeing natural disasters and ecological crises is being pro-
posed only very recently. The Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU), for instance, is one of the first 
major European legal instruments allowing third-country nationals working legally within the EU to 
enjoy common rights and obtain work and residence permits via a single procedure. It had been 
proposed by the European Commission back in 2007 and took five years of gruelling diplomacy to 
adopt (Pascouau and McLaughlin 2012); member states still have until December 2013 to transpose 
the Directive into national legislation.  
For decades, labour migration in Europe came mostly from neighbouring countries, and the typical 
way of “regulating” it was first to help the neighbouring country build its institutions and develop 
economically, hence reducing migration pressure on its citizens, then allow the country to join the 
European Community, and eventually removing border restrictions. When ten new Eastern Europe-
an and Mediterranean countries joined the bloc in 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, some 
feared that Western Europe would be “invaded” by migrant workers from these new members, yet 
127 The Treaty of Lisbon also gave legal teeth to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights; one of the 
fruits of this is the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC). Cf. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(2010, 20). 
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this did not happen128: these countries, stimulated by well-channelled aid and prospects of EU 
membership, developed rapidly and were able to provide decent employment and standard of liv-
ing to their citizens, who then felt less need to emigrate to other European countries after acces-
sion. Rather, it was these countries at the periphery of the bloc which have had to deal with prob-
lems of labour and asylum migration from outside.  
3.3.4.2 The Dublin Regulation and Fortress Europe 
In the early 2000s, EU-15 countries thought that they would have more than enough labour migra-
tion to meet their needs coming from the new members, and started a process to secure the exter-
nal borders of the Union against economic migrants from the outside, creating what is often re-
ferred to as “Fortress Europe” even before the 12 new countries joined; the rise of populist xeno-
phobic political parties in a number of EU-15 countries, international terrorism and noticeable in-
creases in arrivals of asylum seekers and clandestine immigrants (accompanied by media hype) 
spurred a host of policies and initiatives intended to drastically reduce immigration of third-country 
nationals (Lahav 2004).  
By the late 2000s, the new EU member states, forced to deal with irregular migration and asylum 
via the Dublin II regulation (approved just before their accession, and imposed on them by the EU-
15 as part of the Acquis), became the biggest champions of “Fortress Europe”. Furthermore, with 
the lingering Long Recession since 2008 and the massive unemployment resulting from the austeri-
ty measures imposed to reign in deficits and calm the markets after the recession, the old member 
128 In 2006, nationals of the new EU member states represented less than 1% of the labour force in the EU-15 
countries (Kunz and Leinonen 2007, 143). 
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states have not seen much need to press for new legislation to encourage and regulate labour mi-
gration from outside the EU. However, given that the EU cannot continue to expand indefinitely, 
and in the long run needs labour migrants to grow economically, maintain its welfare state and deal 
with demographic decline (Kunz and Leinonen 2007), it will need effective community-level legisla-
tion and institutions to deal with “economic” and “environmental” migrants from third-countries. 
Over the last few years, a number of partnership agreements have been signed with individual 
countries and regional groups (namely EU-Africa, Eastern Partnership, EuroMed Partnership) and it 
is thought that as the partnerships develop, the EU will have to allow some freedom of movement 
to citizens from these countries. 
In this context, one must recognise that common policies on asylum (e.g. regarding minimum 
standards of reception, family reunification, rights of third-country nationals), enforcement by the 
European Commission, rulings by the European Court of Human Rights and targeted disbursement 
of EU funds have indeed coerced and cajoled countries like Greece to make some improvements to 
their oppressive asylum laws and seriously inadequate reception structures129. However, humane 
and forward-looking directives on these common policies proposed by the European Commission 
were time and again watered down and made more restrictive and less effective as they went 
through the Council. The evolution of the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) and the Sin-
gle Permit Directive (2011/98/EU) are prime examples of this (Pascouau and McLaughlin 2012; 
129 In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the conditions of detention in Greece amounted 
to degrading treatment and thus violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; this was a 
blow to European politicians seeking to push back and corral asylum seekers in “safe third countries” on the 
margins of the EU (such as Libya) since, in some cases, even EU countries (such as Greece) cannot be consid-
ered truly “safe” (cf. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 2010, 127). 
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Gortázar Rotaeche 2006, 226f; Comité épiscopal des migrations et des gens du voyage de la Confé-
rence des évêques de France 2004, B3). Furthermore, Europe also adopted “non-arrival measures”, 
such as the Carrier Sanctions Directive (2001/51/EC), which are clearly intended to prevent people 
from applying for asylum (Gibney 2005). 
3.3.4.3 Immigration Restriction Laws Enacted at the National Level 
In the meanwhile, given the current political climate, national migration policies have become more 
and more restrictive (Lahav 2004), as the EU institutions (pushed by the governments of Chirac, 
Sarkozy, Berlusconi and others) forced and cajoled member states to criminalize people-smugglers 
along with traffickers (2002/90/EC), penalize those who employ irregular immigrants (2009/52/EC) 
and enforce a strict returns policy (i.e. deportation regime – 2008/115/EC). To complement this, 
between 2001 and June 2008 the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers (JHA) has author-
ized the Commission to negotiate Readmission Agreements with sixteen countries.130 Development 
aid is often tied to the signature and implementation of such agreements (cf. 1905/2006/EC). While 
recent policy proposals, such as the GAMM (Global Approach to Migration and Mobility) have 
pointed towards facilitating regular immigration from partner countries, member states are reluc-
130 These are: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Hong Kong, Macao, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine. 
On paper, the Readmission Agreements must comply with the 1951 Geneva Convention and with the EU’s 
other human rights commitments. This means no illegal immigrant can be removed, expelled or extradited 
to a country where there is a serious risk that he/she could be subjected to the death penalty, torture or 
other inhumane or degrading treatment. It is however well known that many of these countries have dismal 
human rights records as can be seen from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports. Journal-
ists like Gabriele Del Grande (2008; 2009a) have regularly documented cases of returnees being tortured, 
beaten up and left to die in the desert by the security forces of some of these countries. 
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tant to move in this direction, and the EU seems to be confined for the near future by its Byzantine 
system of national immigration regimes.  
Most Western European countries, in fact, have moved from easy migration promotion (during 
World War II, the post-war boom years, the 1980s boom in Italy, the 1990s boom in Spain) to ex-
cessive migration restriction (during recessions) and then, after failing to ease migration policies 
during times of growth, have become reliant on irregular immigration employed in the under-
ground economy, coupled with periodic “amnesties” to allow the integration of these immigrants 
into the mainstream economy and society. Some countries had very well-organized and efficient 
systems to manage temporary workers (e.g. Germany´s Gastarbeiter system) which were abruptly 
written off when, in recession years, politicians “discovered” the obvious: that human beings are 
not quite like cargo trains which can be moved across borders at the push of a button131. One won-
ders how brilliant German experts could meticulously design and implement an efficient guest-
worker scheme, while ignoring history and sociology to the point of conning themselves into think-
131 Britain, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden had significant guestworker programmes after 
World War II, but the case which is most discussed in the literature is the (West) German Gastarbeiter sys-
tem, which in 1973 was catering for 2.6 million workers in the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) through 
bilateral agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia (Castles 
and Miller 2009, 100). Workers were employed on 12-month contracts, accommodated in hostels or dormi-
tories, and treated as a disposable commodity. Most went back “home” at the end of their contract, but 
some formed bonds with employers and neighbours and started to call Germany “home”; the BRD govern-
ment could not resort to the sort of coercion used by the World War II Nazi foreign worker programme. The 
German-born and German-educated children of Turkish guestworkers could not easily be “sent back” to Tur-
key during the 1973 recession and the resulting Anwerbestopp; nor would German employers let their dedi-
cated and skilled Turkish employees and friends go back home when the authorities blew the whistle (cf. 
Castles and Miller 2009, 176f). Germany had to eventually reform its laws to give these unexpected settlers 
the right to permanent residence, and eventually give up its jus sanguinis system to allow their children and 
grandchildren access to citizenship. During the Anwerbestopp and after, migration continued, mostly in the 
form of family reunification. 
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ing that none of the “guests” were there to stay, and that the complex reality of human mobility 
could be completely tamed by efficient bureaucracy.  
Other countries did the very opposite, and put very little effort into managing migration until the 
2000s: Italy has a history of doing little or nothing to allow migrant labour in regularly, not enforc-
ing deportation laws, and resorting to amnesties when the amount of undocumented migrants be-
came a concern.132 In 1998, it finally adopted a “functioning” system of yearly labour immigration 
quotas133, but the slots are usually taken up by immigrants already in the country irregularly, and 
employers are not used to hire “people they don’t know” from abroad, such that it is virtually im-
possible for a person from a poor non-EU country to find a slot and a sponsor to migrate legally to 
Italy from the outside. Italian migration policy, in practice, works this way: if you want to get the 
documents to “immigrate” legally into Italy, you first have to get there without the documents: you 
132 Before the 1998 “Turco-Napolitano Law” (40/1998), Italy simply accepted its porous coastal borders as a 
fact. Upon apprehension by law-enforcement agents, most irregular immigrants were simply given a paper 
which ordered them to self-deport within 15 days (cf. “Martelli Law” 39/1990). The 1998 law then provided 
for deportation, but many irregular migrants appealed deportation and went underground during the ap-
peal. In July 2002, a strict law on deportation, the “Bossi-Fini Law” (189/2002) was introduced requiring that 
illegal immigrants be ordered to leave the country within five days, during which time they are to be kept in 
Italian custody. Nonetheless, the authorities on the ground find the law too harsh and demanding to imple-
ment, and do not strictly follow the detention and deportation procedure (only around 38% are actually de-
ported). Given the problems caused by such a huge undocumented population living and working under-
ground, between 1986 and 1998 the Italian government held 4 amnesties, granting citizenship to about 
700,000 people (cf. Gramaglia 2008). More recently, the Berlusconi government rejected amnesties and por-
trayed itself as an anti-immigration champion valiantly fighting the smugglers and traffickers on the high 
seas; in fact, while labour migration dwindled (mostly due to economic decline), the number of legal immi-
grants continued to increase through family reunification and the granting of asylum and humanitarian pro-
tection while little was done to improve integration. Furthermore, among the newly-arrived irregular immi-
grants, 63% are overstayers, 24% have entered Italy via its European neighbours, and only 13% have crossed 
clandestinely from Africa (Del Grande 2008, 124). 
133 The 1990 “Martelli Law” (39/1990) did provide for quotas, but until 1998, governments used to set ridicu-
lously low quotas year after year, and make the permits available in the very last days of the same year they 
were supposed to cover (Sciortino 2009, 4). 
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need to enter clandestinely or overstay your tourist visa, find an employer, get a job, and only then 
fill in the documents, while pretending you have just come in regularly from the outside (cf. Sciorti-
no 2009, 11).  
3.3.4.4 Conclusion: A European Migration Management System? 
In conclusion, I believe that Europe’s efforts towards common legislation in matters of immigration 
and asylum, protection of rights of third-country nationals, helping its neighbours to develop (eco-
nomically, democratically, in the respect of human rights) and seeking to manage labour migration 
through partnership agreements are laudable. They provide — at least on paper — concrete means 
to improve the reception conditions and the accountability of certain European nations and an al-
ternative model of international relations that could eventually replace past paternalism and self-
interested arm-twisting.  Furthermore, Europe´s traditional expansion policy, which links free trade 
with free movement of persons and institution building, is certainly more ethically commendable 
than the one used in other economic blocks, such as NAFTA. The European Common Market has 
indeed helped poorer neighbours develop rapidly, become members and rise to be the political 
peers of the more powerful and wealthy European nations; this model could be emulated, mutatis 
mutandis, by other continents to overcome the moral and political limitations of the Westphalian 
model of sovereignty. Since expansion of the Union beyond geographical Europe and the historical 
bounds of Christendom seems unlikely, the EU will now have to find a way to turn its external 
neighbours — especially in Asia and Africa — into true partners and equals: this will doubtlessly be 
a big challenge. Surely, the freedom of movement of persons will have to be an important part of 
that project, if Europe wants to hold on to the egalitarian beliefs of its founders. 
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In the meanwhile and for the foreseeable future, Europe’s image and its economy (especially in 
times of growth) will continue to lure many more immigrants than its restrictive common and na-
tional laws will ever allow (Gortázar Rotaeche 2006, 223f). This, of course, implies irregular migra-
tion. While the largest contingent of irregular immigrants, by far, will be visa overstayers (which 
cannot be targeted by fortifying borders and persecuting people smugglers), the poorest and most 
vulnerable migrants and refugees will have to resort to ruthless criminal traffickers to get into Eu-
rope, or attempt routes that are ever more dangerous and fatal, as billions of Euros are pumped 
into fortifying land and sea borders against the entry of these unwanted few. In this political con-
text, Europe´s right-wing parties will continue to present an anti-immigration agenda on the sur-
face, to attract voters, but will be unwilling to do anything that could starve businesses of the com-
pliant, flexible and cheap immigrant labour they need. Hence, they will tend to combat irregular 
migration in ways which are mostly symbolic or extremely harsh for the visible few, but not effec-
tual for the whole. Europe´s left-wing parties, concerned with labour discrimination and wage de-
pression, may be willing to take more effective measures to reduce irregular immigration and to 
replace it with regular immigration. If the second part of this agenda fails due to resistance from 
voters and coalition partners, they will be tempted to abandon the former.  
On the European level, the more cosmopolitan and transnationalist European Parliament and 
Commission will push for more balanced, equitable and forward-looking common migration laws, 
but the more nationalist Council of Ministers will resist or water down these proposals in the name 
of local or national interest. Hence, for the coming years, irregular migration will continue to pro-
vide Europe with an exploitable labour force which will help it become more “competitive” and 
“business friendly” by weakening trade unions, and thus allowing politicians to water down laws 
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that protect workers´ rights, a process which is hard to resist in a globalising world. We may have to 
wait a number of decades until population growth in the global South stabilizes and labour over-
supply on world markets dwindles; when that happens, maybe, Europe will be much less concerned 
with combatting irregular migration and more focussed on attracting foreign workers and protect-
ing their rights. Yet, this sombre horizon does not belie the urgent need of an ethical critique of Eu-
ropean border policies, nor should it weary the hope that there will be ears and hearts ready to 
welcome this critique, both in the streets of Europe and in the corridors of Brussels.  3.3.5 CONCLUSION: IRREGULAR FLOWS AND IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION 
In this section, we have argued that the “illegality” or “irregularity” or “clandestinity” of the migra-
tion of many persons today is a recent social construct (Düvell 2008), whereby “undesired desirable 
immigrants” (a phenomenon that has existed for centuries, and certainly predates border laws and 
identity papers) become objects of laws which try to satisfy two conflicting publics. Lawmakers seek 
to appease, at the same time, those persons who find these migrants undesirable (due to xenopho-
bia, concerns for the social and political order, fears of wage and resource competition, and re-
sistance to wider processes of social transformation), and those who find them desirable (for eco-
nomic, moral, cultural and other reasons). We could somehow compare these immigrants to alco-
hol during Prohibition134. Their “illegality” is the perverse effect of an unenforceable and morally 
134 During Prohibition, alcohol was a good desired by many; its undesirable effects needed to be addressed 
by regulation, education, social change, and flexible local solutions; the Anti-Saloon league was noisy and 
intransigent and wanted a “simple” solution which did not exist; lawmakers gave the dries what they want-
ed, on paper, but the Prohibition laws were either not enforceable or not enforced; the whole system was 
hypocritical and seriously detrimental to the enforcement of reasonable laws targeting serious criminal and 
civil offenses. 
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unacceptable law. In itself, the irregular status of many migrants today does not entail that they are 
“criminals” and have no right to immigrate.  
This is not to say that, in the case of immigration, borders should be simply left “open” and that the 
“unregulated” labour market should be tasked with automatically managing the flow. Sovereign 
nations may, to some extent, limit the entry of “empowered” economic migrants, and of some 
“forced” economic migrants whose plight owes little or nothing to the actions or inaction of the re-
ceiving country. Theoretically, there might even be a limit to how many immigrants a country can 
integrate at a time; even though most developed countries seem to be nowhere near that limit, 
regulation (i.e. immigration management, rather than immigration restriction) is essential. Flexible, 
reasonable, fair, and non-hypocritical immigration laws — which, at least, offer as many “green 
cards” and “temporary immigration visas” as the number of immigrant workers the labour market 
is actually absorbing, and set family reunification quotas in a way to ensure prompt reunification 
with members of the nuclear family — will already help resolve a good part of the problem, without 
even touching on the ethical issue of a wealthy nation´s duties with regards to non-citizens living 
within its borders and to poor persons abroad who have been negatively affected by its policies. Of 
course, the problem of immigration may be bigger than what the central planning and bureaucracy 
of a single nation can handle on its own. Multi-lateral migration management regimes, such as 
those envisaged by some European policymakers, could thus be a good way forward, if they can 
overcome local xenophobia and political opportunism. 
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3.4 New Receiving Countries: Destinations Have Changed 
The tensions in European policymaking signal another change in the phenomenon of human mobili-
ty. For many centuries, countries in Northern Europe were mostly immigrant-sending countries. 
Then, during World War II and in the post-war boom, they started receiving immigrants from 
Southern and Eastern Europe, and from former colonies, while insisting that these persons were 
only temporary labourers and that Northern European countries were not “countries of immigra-
tion”, like the US, Canada, Argentina or Australia. In the 1980s and 1990s, these Northern European 
countries realised that they had actually become “countries of immigration”: given the immigra-
tion-restriction measures taken in the 1970, many “temporary” workers decided to stay and bring 
their families along. In the meanwhile, countries in the South of Europe started to receive large 
quantities of immigrants themselves. More recently, Eastern European countries too seem to have 
become important receiving countries. In some cases, the change from being a net immigrant-
sending country to being a net immigrant-receiving country has happened very rapidly, and has be-
come another major argument in favour of immigration restriction.  3.4.1 “WIR SIND KEIN EINWANDERUNGSLAND” (WE ARE NOT A COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION) 
Washington DC is the capital of a nation built on immigration. The idea that immigration in itself is 
problematic, abnormal or incompatible with the process of nation-building would be a hard sell in 
the United States. Rather, American “anti-immigration” politicians have always argued that there 
are desirable and less desirable immigrants, and that the latter should be let in only if needed by 
the economy, and not offered full integration as citizens (cf. R. M. Smith 1997). We have seen how 
this theory was put into practice via a series of “immigration regimes” in the US (section 3.3.3.3, 
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above). Even so, the US legally admits a large number of migrants and refugees every year and ef-
fectively integrates many of these foreigners in spite of its limited welfare state. It considers the 
influx a normal process that has been going on since early colonial times, and prides itself on being 
able to build one people out of the many, e pluribus unum.  
In contrast, most other countries in the world are struggling with the very idea of immigration and 
the issues of cultural and religious diversity that it implies. Until 1989, German politicians of all col-
ours had for many years insisted that Germany is not a country of immigration (Wir sind kein Ein-
wanderungsland); now, unable to deny the obvious, most limit themselves to coded expressions 
such as “the boat is full” or “multiculturalism has failed”. At the same time, right-wing parties all 
around Europe, while grudgingly accepting the freedom of movement of Europeans within the Un-
ion, insist that, unlike the Americas, Europe is not a continent of immigration. For many people, this 
thesis sounds plausible; history, as we have seen in section 3.2.2, tells a different story. All the con-
tinents were built on migration and the illusion that most modern states (in the “old worlds” of 
Eurasia and Africa) were built from long-established native “nations” is mostly a Romanticist myth 
created to counter the universalism of the French Revolution. We explore this further in Chapter 4, 
and show that even Malta, one of the most “recent” immigrant-receiving countries, has a history 
which alternates periods of emigration and periods of immigration. 
It is true that countries which start to receive immigrants after sending emigrants for many decades 
or centuries need time to adapt, build their capacity to integrate new arrivals, reflect on their na-
tional identity and recast their national narrative, so as to be able to truly include the other. Yet, as 
we shall see in the Maltese case, certain countries may spend decades trying to convince them-
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selves that immigrants are only sojourners: they will not stay for long and so need not be integrat-
ed. Often, what lies behind the Wir sind kein Einwanderungsland narrative, and the reluctance to 
consider the possibility of integration of immigrants, is a political climate hostile to people consid-
ered “different”. There is usually no problem with accepting and integrating educated white EU citi-
zens of European descent who decide to move to new “receiving countries” in Europe. Low-skilled 
Arab and Asian immigrants, Blacks, and Muslims, however, are deemed “problematic” (see section 
3.5). 3.4.2 THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN RECEIVING COUNTRIES AND NATURALISATION OF IMMI-GRANTS 
Even if we were to bracket the effects of international terrorism after the “9/11” attacks, xenopho-
bia and Islamophobia in many developed countries are grafted onto deep-seated identity crises, 
especially after decades of secularization, social re-composition of the concept of “family”, growing 
mistrust in traditional institutions and increasing isolation of the self, in what has been called 
“postmodernity” or “second modernity” (Betz 1993). In the search for narratives which bestow a 
strong sense of identity, the affirmation of one´s ethnicity, religion and culture in opposition to that 
of the “other” becomes a very tempting game (Maalouf 2012). In this context, many European 
countries have problems dealing with diversity and pluralism even within their own history and ge-
ographical space; most are still seeking a national identity which provides unity to the body politic 
while not wanting to impose (or designate) one culture, language, religion as part of the “national 
identity” as past “authoritarian”, “totalitarian” or “cultural supremacist” governments have done, 
though some have not abandoned past monolithic constructs of national identity (P. Simon 2012).  
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When civil authorities and civil society in Spain, Italy or Belgium are asked by immigrants what it 
means to be “Spanish”, “Italian” or “Belgian”, their reflection is already encumbered by a 
longstanding debate with separatists in “Catalonia”, “Padania” or “Flanders” who argue that the so-
called “national” culture is just another regional culture being unfairly imposed on everyone. When 
Muslim communities in Britain seek to build schools and mosques and express their faith and cul-
ture in the streets of Bradford and Birmingham, Downing Street is promoting devolution and cul-
tural rights for the Scots, Cornish and Welsh. Furthermore, in Europe, national identity is challenged 
from above as mobile and well-educated people become more “European” and favour the promo-
tion of a “European” identity the contours of which are hard to define, especially if — in the ab-
sence of a European Constitution — one wants to avoid associating “European” too closely with 
markers like “whiteness”, “Christian heritage”, “sophisticated civilization”, and resorting to mytho-
logical constructs typical of 19th century nationalism and 20th century fascism.  
Even “younger” polities with a less complex national history struggle with forms of nativism. School 
textbooks in Texas are willing to makes space for non-scientific theories of the origins of creation 
and humankind, but less willing to make space for “non-WASP” theories claiming polygenic political 
and cultural origins of the United States (McKinley 2010). Certain lawmakers in Arizona, Georgia 
and Alabama find nothing strange in anti-immigration laws that inevitably entail the racial profiling 
of Hispanic citizens (I. D. Williams 2011). Nativist movements, such as the Tea Party, can influence 
the policies of the major political parties both locally and on a national level. Similarly, Australia´s 
administrative detention system targeting boat people from Asia is the perfect cultural antithesis of 
the relaxed and easy-going coolness usually associated with the word “Australian” (Welch 2012), 
and occasional surges in the popularity of nativist politicians, such as Pauline Hanson in the 1990s, 
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indicate that the fear of Asia and its cultures, which was the cornerstone of the “White Australia” 
policy in past years, has not been buried too deep. 
Nativism presents itself on the political scene in two ways. Nativists may form political parties 
which attempt to join and manipulate weak coalition governments or force mainstream parties to 
adopt their policies to avoid losing nativist “protest” votes to their traditional mainstream oppo-
nents (Statham 2003; Saggar 2003). They may also form non-party groups and movements which 
seem to influence public opinion, debates within mainstream political parties, and government pol-
icies. Non-party movements are important in Central and Eastern Europe (going from academic an-
ti-immigration “think-tanks” to neo-Nazis and extreme-right skinhead gangs) and also in the United 
States and Canada (Mudde 2012). The adoption of restrictive immigration policies is not always the 
only or main part of the nativist agenda; for instance in countries where immigration is relatively 
low (e.g. Central and Eastern Europe) radical-right parties and groups tend to focus on longstanding 
minority groups (e.g. the Roma); in Western Europe, where immigration is important, anti-
immigrant scaremongering fits into more general discourses about crime and corruption (Mudde 
2012, 1). 
Besides trying to block the entry of new immigrants, nativism rejects the integration of immigrants 
already present in the country, insisting that they do not belong there and should not be encour-
aged to stay. Nativists are especially adamant about not giving legal status and citizenship rights to 
irregular immigrants, even when experts agree that the country may reap huge benefits by doing 
so. For instance, studies indicate that if all undocumented immigrants currently living in the United 
States were legalized, $4.5 billion to $5.4 billion in additional net tax revenue would be collected by 
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the federal government over three years, and $1.5 trillion would be added the US GDP over a ten 
year period (Hinojosa-Ojeda, 2010).  
Of course, there is some punch in the argument that offering regularization and, eventually, natu-
ralisation, to irregular migrants seems to reward people for breaking the law, and is unfair towards 
prospective immigrants who are waiting in line to enter the country or apply for citizenship in the 
regular manner. Yet, when a civil society implicitly allows certain people to participate in practically 
all aspects of public life, and for many years accepts their labour, which contributes to the building 
of the nation, when membership in a society is a social reality denied only by legal technicalities 
and bureaucratic hurdles, these supposedly “ethical” arguments become rationalizations for ideo-
logies of exclusion (Stumpf 2006).  3.4.3 FUTURE CITIZENS, OR A PERMANENT UNDERCLASS? 
In democratic polities with a modicum of belief in equality, there is a point in the integration pro-
cess where the administrative misdemeanour offense of irregular entry can no longer justify poli-
cies which keep a caste of people who have become part of the very fabric of society in the position 
of an underclass permanently cut off from the rights of membership. Of course, one could emulate 
some countries in the Middle East which seem to have little problem with exclusion and inequality. 
For instance 50% of the population of the United Arab Emirates is made up of non-citizens (R. Co-
hen 1991, 17); in such contexts citizenship becomes the pedigree of a new nativist aristocracy and 
the “democratic process”, available only to such citizens, becomes a new form of minority rule. 
Western nations, however, cannot simply tolerate exclusion and institutionalized inequality forev-
er. Though traditional parties (especially in classical ius sanguinis nations) may be at first reluctant 
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to offer naturalisation and voting rights to migrants, it is very hard in modern democracies to ex-
clude people with immigrant backgrounds from political participation (especially after the second 
generation): human rights decisions by the courts eventually push citizenship laws towards some 
form of ius domicilii, where prolonged residence becomes a title for citizenship (cf. Benhabib 2004, 
202–212).  
To be sure, offering naturalisation to citizens who are not socially well integrated can be tricky. New 
citizens can shift from being the excluded other to being the political kingmakers who may them-
selves support policies of exclusion and staunchly oppose the naturalisation of other immigrants. 
Soviet Jewish immigrants in Israel, Turkish Germans, Pied-noirs in France and immigrants in Québec 
have clearly influenced the outcomes of recent elections and referenda, sometimes supporting the 
agendas of nativist, far-right or xenophobic politicians. Local politicians and presidential candidates 
in the US are becoming more and more concerned with luring the Hispanic vote (Castles and Miller 
2009, 287f) but this does not necessarily entail that free movement of persons across the US-
Mexican border will soon become a reality: rather, some politicians suddenly feel the need of 
spending huge amounts of money to convince Hispanic voters that those very policies that force 
their cousins and compatriots to risk their lives crossing the Sonora desert are necessary to protect 
their jobs and keep their children safe.  
Modern democracies sorely need intelligent, informed and tolerant voters who can see beyond 
self-interest and the interests of their clans, and are truly concerned with the common good. They 
thrive when peopled by active citizens who participate positively in civil society. When the inevita-
ble moment comes when a democracy feels obliged by its own fundamental values to offer mem-
C h a p t e r :  3  — P a g e :  183 
 
bership to yet another group of immigrants, the fruits of clever past integration policies or lack 
thereof return to nourish or haunt it. Marginalised, under-educated, fundamentalist or frustrated, 
yet powerful, swing-voters do not make very good “new citizens”. Yet it is refreshing to have well-
informed, bicultural, enthusiastic and often staunchly patriotic new citizens bringing fresh blood 
and ideas into traditional political parties and helping to overcome longstanding political gridlocks. 3.4.4 CONCLUSION: BEING ALWAYS READY TO RECEIVE THE “OTHER” 
Assuming that the “other” can and wants to be integrated socially, culturally and politically (see 3.5, 
below), and that the “other” is there and will remain there, all countries — and especially democra-
cies — need to quickly overcome xenophobia, negative forms of nationalism or nativism, and find 
ways of overcoming crises in national identity and definitions of the self which are unjustly exclu-
sive. Whether the “other” is an economic migrant, a convention refugee, a regional nationalist 
(seeking greater autonomy for her region), or a member of a marginalised minority group or social 
class, is not all that important: all need to be “integrated”, even in countries with no significant im-
migrant flows. This is why the real distinction is not a historical distinction between migrant-
sending and migrant-receiving countries, but a moral and political one, between polities which, 
when faced with the reality of otherness and pluralism, seek to ignore it or violently eradicate it, 
and ones which seek to deal with it justly. In Chapter 7, we will discuss civic hospitality and civic kin-
ship, and show how countries can be always ready to receive the “other”, in an age when popula-
tion movements can reverse direction in a matter of years, rather than centuries. 
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3.5 Scepticism on Integration: The Immigrants Have Changed 
The above reflections on the political climate in receiving countries point to another theory regard-
ing the “new migration” in recent decades. Some believe that the new generation of immigrants 
cannot be truly integrated, since they are very different from previous generations of immigrants in 
terms of culture and religion (cf. Huntington 2004). The problem, according to this thesis, is that we 
have an “integration crisis”. This thesis, of course, existed in the past and generally referred to 
Catholics in Protestant-majority countries; the history of the integration of Irish and Italian immi-
grants in the US shows that integration takes time, especially if a particular group of immigrants is 
marginalised and treated with hostility. Nowadays, the immigrants who supposedly “cannot” or “do 
not want to” be integrated are generally Muslim, though Christian Hispanic immigrants in the US 
are sometimes included in this category. 3.5.1 “MUSLIMS CANNOT BE INTEGRATED” 
3.5.1.1 “Nativist” Violence Targeting Minorities  
Xenophobia, and Islamophobia in particular, have been on the increase in Western countries since 
the late 1970s, and recent reports by groups which monitor xenophobic attitudes and behaviours, 
such as the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2010) and the Brookings Institute (Cox et al. 
2011), are troubling. This is part of a trend of violence targeting minority groups considered racially, 
culturally or religiously “different”, often perpetrated by people at the margins of society who feel 
that these people are somehow responsible for their situation of social exclusion.  
Some authors have linked this xenophobia to growing insecurity felt by many people, and ultimate-
ly resulting from rapid economic and social change (Castles and Miller 2009, 263–8). Pockets of 
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marginalisation within the “First World” — often referred to as the “Fourth World” in France and 
“inner-city ghettos” in the US — which concentrate social problems in neighbourhoods with under-
funded, understaffed, demotivated and poorly-trained administrations and ineffective social insti-
tutions (Castells 2000, 142) — are the least suitable places to welcome and integrate refugees and 
migrants, whose perceived difference makes them easy scapegoats (Huysmans 1995; Snyder 2007, 
357). Xenophobic populist political parties have exploited and spurred this trend in several Western 
countries135. 
Many people would deny they are Islamophobes and claim that they are simply wary of potential 
“terrorists” and concerned about “security”. We have seen above how governments have used 
such security arguments to justify spending billions of dollars securing borders against clandestine 
entry by poor migrants and refugees, when it is obvious that trained international terrorists sup-
ported by big financial networks can afford to cross borders legally, and would not risk their lives 
hiking in the middle of the Sonora desert or drifting in a rickety boat off Malta. Terrorism — the use 
of violence against non-combatants to intimidate or coerce, especially for political purposes — has 
a long history, and it became more spectacular and international as the second half of the 20th cen-
tury unfolded. Yet, after the 11th September 2001 attacks in the US, the 11th March 2004 attacks in 
135 Eytan Myers (2004, 2) gives a good summary of the developments in Europe in the late 1990s and 2000s: 
“The host of the EU 2002 summit in Seville, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, said that reducing ille-
gal immigration was ‘the most important question in European politics at the moment.’ His comment was 
largely in response to xenophobic tensions, anti-immigrant violence, and extreme-right anti-immigrant par-
ties that have spread throughout Europe. In France, Le Pen reached the second round of the 2002 presiden-
tial elections, where he won 18 percent of the vote. The Pim Fortuyn party received 18 percent of the vote in 
the May 2002 Dutch elections, and became the second largest party in Parliament. In Austria, Haider’s Free-
dom Party won 26.9 percent of the vote in the October 1999 national elections, and joined the ruling coali-
tion. And the Swiss People’s Party (UDC), headed by Christopher Blocker, gained 22.5 percent of the vote in 
the October 1999 Swiss national elections.” 
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Madrid and the 7th July 2005 London bombings, terrorism has become associated with religion and 
with Islam in particular. In this way, it has fed into a tradition of Islamophobia which, in some coun-
tries, has a long history, going back to the Middle Ages.  
3.5.1.2 Violence in Islam and International Terrorism 
The causes of violence considered by many people as “extreme” and “irrational” are multiple and 
complex. In the 1950s and 1960s most local and international terrorist movements, bred in situa-
tions of marginalisation and oppression, were quickly categorized by journalists as “communist” or 
“nationalist” or “tribal”. Since the 1970s, sociologists have started to observe the resurgence of po-
litically assertive forms of religion (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011), and “religious violence” or “in-
compatible civilizations” have become easy labels to explain away some of the most complex con-
flicts in the world, following simplistic yet seductive theories such as that expounded by Samuel 
Huntington. Indeed, Islam´s new role in politics has been particularly noticeable since the beginning 
of the 14th century of the Hegira, the growing social divide in many oil-producing majority-Muslim 
countries since the 1973 crisis, the pauperization of indebted majority-Muslim countries in the af-
termath of the crisis, and the increasing frustration with corrupt secular governments in these 
countries (Castells 2009, 13f).  
In such a context, psychologically and sociologically problematic but relatively benign forms of “re-
ligious fundamentalism” — that invite believers to go to the roots or foundations of religious tradi-
tion to define one´s own identity and to find ethical inspiration for the reform of politics and public 
mores — are easily confused with dangerous and criminal behaviours of some extremist revolu-
tionary leaders and groups which opt for terrorism to pursue their own political purposes. Such 
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leaders and groups need an ideological framework to rationalize their actions and recruit followers; 
Marxism, nationalism and other worldviews were used for this purpose in the past, but the best 
strategy today in most developing countries is to join the religious bandwagon and flaunt one´s pie-
ty. Many people in receiving countries, however, do not know enough history, sociology, political 
science and religious culture to avoid linking the average decent, pious, and bearded Muslim man 
to media images of Al Qaeda or the Taliban, unless they take the risk to have meaningful conversa-
tions with Muslims, or at least take the time to form a nuanced and well-read appraisal of contem-
porary Islamic religions and movements — which is probably even less likely.  
To be sure, besides the rare and spectacular acts of terrorism that occasionally shock the Western 
World, often perpetrated by Westernized “Muslims” or “Christians” with tortuous personal histo-
ries and personalities136 (considered despicable by most persons deeply rooted in those religious 
traditions), there are more ordinary forms of violence between Muslim and Christian groups, espe-
cially along the “tenth parallel” (Nigeria, Sudan/South Sudan, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Somalia, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines). News stories from these countries and regions are often used to illus-
trate that “Islam is violent and dangerous”, and “this is just a statement of fact, not Islamophobia”. 
136 Juergensmeyer (2003) tries to look, as it were, into the minds of famous terrorists who claimed to be mo-
tivated by religion, and provides some interesting insights to understand their psychology and motivations. 
Nonetheless, his thesis linking these persons to “cultures of violence” and such cultures to religion is not 
very convincing, since he does not distinguish mainstream religious groups (which have internal structures to 
contain violence and destructive behaviours, and to vet certain noxious interpretations of religious texts) 
from sects and smaller religious groups without such structures. Furthermore, he does not make a distinc-
tion between a pre-modern “respect for tradition” (which has a complex approach to tradition requiring 
mediation by a series of authorities and experts) and a post-modern “traditionalism” which simplifies, legal-
izes, dogmatizes, and democratizes tradition as a set of immediately-accessible, absolute, immutable and 
quasi-scientific truths not open to debate or interpretation. I believe that such distinctions are necessary to 
understand the phenomenon of so-called “religiously-motivated” extreme violence. 
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Authors like Eliza Griswold (2010) have carefully investigated the sources of this violence, and con-
cluded that the conflicts conducted under religious insignia are also conflicts about land, water, oil 
and other resources, and many are rooted in local and tribal tensions which predate the arrival of 
Muslim and Christian missionaries and armies, and shaped the alliances they forged.  
3.5.1.3 Religion as an Excuse for Discrimination 
While admitting that spectacularly horrific events like those of the 11th September 2001 in the US, 
have made it harder for Muslims and their faith to appear “acceptable” in the eyes of their neigh-
bours in Western countries, it is also fair and honest to say that religion has, since time immemori-
al, been one of the most common grounds used to corral groups for discrimination and disenfran-
chisement. It may be reasonable for Western countries to ask prospective Muslim residents and 
citizens to subscribe to certain “Western values” if they want to be part of “modern, tolerant socie-
ties”; the problem, however, is in defining what those values are (Erlanger 2011).  
Supporters of those far-right parties who are most adamant on imposing “Western values” on im-
migrants are themselves not always very keen on the secularist and liberal underpinnings that 
these values tend to evoke. I am sure that many Tea-party supporters in the US, and many pious 
Christians in Europe, would find the images of gay men kissing and topless women on the beach — 
which Dutch immigration officials routinely show to prospective migrants so as to gauge their 
commitment to “toleration” (Corbett 2006) — about as unpalatable or as offensive as most Mus-
lims do. That doesn´t however mean that these “conservative” Americans or Europeans are unfit to 
live in a Western society. Thus, conservative Westerners typically claim that the real problem with 
Islam (distinguished from other religions) is its incompatibility with democracy (rather than with 
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liberal or secular values). When they attempt to illustrate their point by mentioning some dictators 
in Arab and African countries — most of whom have a history of being propped up by Western 
governments and of “investing” considerable amounts of money in Western election campaigns — 
one is tempted to suggest that the problem with the democratization of many such emerging coun-
tries may actually lie closer to home.  
3.5.1.4 Dialogue with Muslims 
To be sure, in Western countries, Muslims may need to be challenged — through respectful and 
serious dialogue — on their ideas regarding women´s rights and social roles, the rightful place of 
religion in a pluralistic public sphere, and on the person´s freedom to choose or abandon their reli-
gion. Some Muslim scholars are indeed working to better understand and present the Muslim tradi-
tion on these ethical issues (cf. Hashmi 2002) and to establish the basis for such a debate. We 
should note that Muslims are not the only people struggling with these “values” ; indeed, many mi-
nority populations in Western countries — including ones which have been European or “Western” 
for many centuries — resist the “modern” consensus on these issues, so it is almost as misleading 
to pit Islam against the West on the basis of these beliefs, as on the basis of tolerance of racy films 
or support for dictators. In fact, majority populations should reflect on how all minorities can be 
effectively empowered to participate in a rich dialogue on shared values and norms in a plural soci-
ety. Religious and cultural minorities, liberal secularists, mainstream religious groups and right-wing 
nationalists may all learn something from such a dialogue. I believe that authors like Appiah (2007, 
71f) are right to insist that moral disagreement between persons with different traditions and 
worldviews does not make it impossible to build a cosmopolitan society together; we can agree on 
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the “right” and even on some sense of “the good life in the polis” without sharing the same 
worldviews that tell different communities why such and such practice or value is right and good. 
To be sure, majority or dominant groups in modern democracies can only summon the dialogue 
partners that their integration policies beget: it is hard to imagine a fruitful dialogue with angry 
people who are constantly treated as second-class residents or citizens, confined to problematic 
neighbourhoods and offered poor quality education, low-paying jobs and no social mobility. Even 
so, I believe that such dialogue is possible, and is already happening in many communities and 
countries, even though it will never compete for the headlines with those acts of terror and vio-
lence that sometimes inflame public opinion and dictate knee-jerk policy reactions. Yet, it should 
occur to many that a frustrated, violent or mentally-unstable Muslim person who threatens or even 
kills a provocative journalist for “insulting Islam” is not more representative of the general Muslim 
population than that journalist is of intelligent and culturally-sensitive professional journalism. 3.5.2 “TODAY´S SECOND AND THIRD GENERATIONS CANNOT BE INTEGRATED” 
3.5.2.1 Acculturation, Education and the Immigrant Health Paradox 
Another version of the thesis that today´s immigrants cannot be integrated is sometimes applied to 
second- and third-generation immigrants who grow up in troubled neighbourhoods and find it hard 
to escape marginalisation. One may excuse the first-generation immigrants who never manage to 
speak good German, or think like French people do: they try hard to establish themselves in the 
new country, and generally succeed. Their children, however, do not always have the same energy, 
courage and determination as their parents and may adopt behaviours that lead to marginalisation. 
C h a p t e r :  3  — P a g e :  191 
 
To understand this phenomenon better, let us examine some of the literature in social psychology. 
First-generation immigrant populations are usually very resilient, especially labour migrants who 
have the courage to face a new culture and refugees who are resourceful and determined enough 
to make it to wealthy countries; migration often implies a “selection of the fittest”. The American 
Psychological Association´s Presidential Taskforce on Immigration (APA 2012, 1–2), referring to nu-
merous studies conducted in the US, concludes that first-generation immigrants “demonstrate the 
best performance on a variety of physical health, behavioral health, and some educational out-
comes, followed by a decline in subsequent generations”; this finding is sometimes referred to as 
the “immigrant health paradox”. However, the full picture is more complex; some immigrants are 
psychologically vulnerable, having undergone trauma in the home country and during the process 
of migration, and having constantly to face discrimination and xenophobia in transit and receiving 
countries. Immigrant children may face difficulties integrating themselves in the school system and 
then risk marginalisation later on in a knowledge-intensive economy: many of these children are or 
will someday become citizens or permanent residents of the receiving country, and policies which 
reduce their educational opportunities are short-sighted, costly and dangerous in the long term. 
Several political exiles as well as writers and poets living in “strange lands” have eloquently ex-
pressed their grief, nostalgia, their sense of alienation and their struggles with new cultures. Immi-
grants with less formal education are often those who suffer most, and this does at times affect 
their mental health (Sayed-Ahmad Beiruti 2010, 269f). Besides the social class of origin of the mi-
grant, the other major factor influencing her psychology and her integration into the new society is 
the context of reception. Various studies concur in the following principle: if newcomers are mar-
ginalised, discriminated against, exploited or treated with disrespect, the stressful, insecure and 
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hostile environment creates serious psychosocial obstacles to acculturation; if, on the other hand, 
they are placed in receptive contexts (in which governments, local and immigrant communities are 
proactive in facilitating the integration of immigrants), the outcomes are significantly improved for 
both the immigrants and the receiving community (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, 201f). Melero and 
Dié (2010, 81f) discuss the importance of the social, cultural and spiritual needs of immigrants, as 
well as their need to express themselves, be able to do certain things autonomously, belong and 
have a stable identity, and so forth. Many of these needs are hard to satisfy in a new country and 
culture, with a minimal social network especially for those with little formal education. Some immi-
grants have to beg friends and cajole children to help them communicate with others and perform 
many simple tasks and errands. In an unfamiliar environment, even cooking a tasty meal or fixing a 
leak could become dauntingly complex tasks which could make the immigrant feel helpless, putting 
into question those skills which were previously an important source of pride and self-esteem.  
3.5.2.2 Different Types of Acculturation 
Oft-cited studies by John W. Berry (e.g. 1992; 1997; 2005) distinguish different types of accultura-
tion based on two variables137: whether one maintains or not the culture of origin and whether one 
acquires or not the culture of the larger group in the receiving society. Acculturation is a dual pro-
cess depending on the two cultural groups which may support or hinder persons and families in the 
process; the worst outcome is when one rejects or slowly loses contact with the culture of origin 
137 The combination of the two variables yields four “Berry boxes” which most scholars of intercultural rela-
tions generally refer to in their works, though some have tried to “think outside the Berry boxes” so as to 
conceptualize some of the complex relations between cultural groups which cannot be fully represented in 
this intuitive scheme (cf. Ward 2008; de la Mata Benítez et al. 2010). 
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while not adopting (or, due to stereotypes and xenophobia, not being allowed to identify with) the 
new culture — this is called marginalisation. Acculturation works best when immigrants can func-
tion with ease within, and identify with, both the culture of origin and the new culture — this is 
called integration. Assimilation results when one loses the cultural identity of one´s parents and 
family in the sending country and fully adopts that of the main social group in the receiving society; 
segregation is the opposite — when persons form (or are obliged to form) a minority group that 
maintains the cultural identity of their forebears while avoiding the type of contact with the larger 
group that would require building cultural bridges and adopting significant elements of the new cul-
ture. If poorly implemented, “multiculturalism”, the ideological alternative to assimilationism, can 
become segregationist, if cultures are simply juxtaposed and compartmentalized, leading to claims 
that “multiculturalism has failed” (Falloon 2011). Nonetheless, multiculturalism could also lead to 
true integration if residents and citizens with migrant backgrounds are helped to acquire the best of 
both cultures, while retaining a critical attitude towards both and an ability to resolve cultural ten-
sions within themselves, and if people from the dominant culture are ready to make space for, and 
adapt to, the culture of the newcomers, or at least some of its forms of expression (Carpenter, Zá-
rate, and Garza 2007; Zárate et al. 2012). True integration and multiculturalism is difficult to 
achieve and requires daring, consistent and long-term policymaking. Natives and immigrants, espe-
cially in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, resist cultural change and may find it hard to manage mul-
tiple identities; true biculturalism can be developed only in healthy psychosocial contexts and 
through serious investments in education. 
Even so, the advantages of true bilingualism and biculturalism have long been appreciated and 
sought by the upper classes for their children; hence, when those same persons insist that immi-
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grant children should do away with the language and culture of their parents, the inconsistency 
should be obvious, and does not need to be demonstrated time and again with studies and statis-
tics such as those discussed by Portes and Rumbaut (2006, chap. 7). Today, as in the past, almost all 
second-generation children in the US who speak a foreign language at home are proficient in Eng-
lish (though their own children, unfortunately, tend to become monolingual), so the “threat” posed 
by immigration to the language of the receiving country is mostly fictional (APA 2012, 3). Further-
more, the ability to fluently manage two language systems and mediate between two cultures is 
often linked with better performance in other academic subjects (e.g. mathematics in primary 
school, and many academic subjects in higher education, where fluent bilinguals generally outper-
form monolinguals)138.  
To conclude, acculturation is a mixed good; it is important for the unity and healthy functioning of a 
nation and the well-being of all its residents, but often, it also means that immigrant children lose 
their parents” optimism and drive to succeed, let themselves be more conditioned by real or per-
ceived discrimination, and often adopt habits from poor or marginalised natives in their neighbour-
hoods (concerning the use of money, work practices, eating and drinking, leisure, love relation-
ships, etc.) which are detrimental to their long-term well-being and social outcomes. In Western 
countries, those who do not fully assimilate but retain some of their parents’ culture and habits 
138 A report by the American Psychological Association cites various studies which underscore some of the 
advantages of bilingualism and biculturalism (APA 2012, 55f; 27f) while mentioning some of their limitations. 
It insists that any serious attempt to compare monolinguals and bilinguals should take into account the so-
cial context, and should be aware that most timed standardized tests used today in education and develop-
mental psychology are culturally and linguistically biased and misrepresent the abilities of first- and second-
generation immigrants (ibid., 47f). For a discussion of the issues involved in the education of second-
generation immigrant children in the context of Southern Europe, see Rodríguez Izquierdo (2010). 
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generally navigate better those particular, complex, pluralistic and fragile milieus where they are 
usually exposed to the “culture” of the “majority group”  (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, chap. 5; cf. 
APA 2012, 27).  3.5.3 “REFUGEES CANNOT BE INTEGRATED” 
3.5.3.1 Trauma and Experiences of Persecution 
Yet another version of the thesis that today’s immigrants cannot be integrated is sometimes ap-
plied to refugees, given the trauma they have experienced in the past. Refugees and refugee chil-
dren are a particular group of migrants (APA 2010, 10f); the experience of surviving in war zones, 
living precariously and being displaced often entails that such persons endure a great amount of 
trauma, stress and adversity; this can be detrimental to their functioning as persons and — espe-
cially in the case of children — to their psychosocial development (APA 2010, 17). Some of these 
persons may have witnessed, suffered or been involved in atrocities (which may have included fam-
ily and friends), been victims of rape or sex slavery, and been drafted or sold as child-soldiers; dur-
ing the journey and the time spent in transit countries they may have had to face extreme suffering 
and deprivation (e.g. abandoned in deserts or drifting for days without freshwater in the open sea), 
close encounters with death (attacks by wild animals, marauding militias, shipwreck…), and many 
months of malnutrition, persecution, dangerous and unhealthy living conditions, torture, violence 
and abuse.  
Though some refugees and refugee children demonstrate high rates of resilience to repeated trau-
mas, various studies have identified a high incidence of symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), depression, anxiety, somatic complaints, sleep problems and behavioural problems among 
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this group of immigrants (APA 2010, 26). Detention of trauma victims in prison-like conditions (e.g. 
when caught entering a country illegally) has been shown to make the symptoms worse (Lawrence 
2004; Steel et al. 2006; Silove, Austin, and Steel 2007), and is very socially costly after release. 
3.5.3.2 Traumatized Refugees Are Not an Easy Substitute for Labour Migration 
In a discussion of ethical border policies, it is important to note these psychosocial realities, espe-
cially when facing the political rhetoric on “true” and “phony” asylum seekers. The so called “eco-
nomic migrants” who often enter and stay in wealthy countries illegally are clearly more beneficial 
for the receiving country from an economic point of view: they generally work hard, are resourceful 
and psychologically healthy, keep out of trouble, and often give more to the community than what 
they receive. Refugees, on the other hand, frequently need considerable support from the commu-
nity to integrate themselves and may take many years before they become economically produc-
tive.  
Welcoming victims of war and persecution is primarily a humanitarian gesture demanded by a 
country´s international commitments, not a self-interested strategy to recruit productive labour 
from abroad. The presence of such immigrants in Western countries is often legal or relatively easy 
to legalize, yet the behavioural problems stemming from their past traumas may make it to the 
crime columns of newspapers and sensationalistic reports on television, and oftentimes these be-
haviours are easily and erroneously pinned on clandestine labour migrants, in a typical conflation of 
“illegal entry” with “criminal behaviour”. A country which prides itself on welcoming traumatized 
refugees should be willing to spend the money to provide them with care and help them integrate. 
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A country which merely wants migrant labourers is better served by opening its doors to “economic 
migrants”.  
Psychologists today recognise that many of the current practices and methods in Psychology, de-
veloped to serve middle-class clients in Western or Westernized countries, may not be effective in 
treating immigrants who come from different environments and cultures. Immigration thus chal-
lenges the whole discipline of Psychology to adapt, try novel “ecological” approaches which defy 
conventional wisdom and tried-and-tested protocols (APA 2010, 7f; 2012, 78f). Comprehensive and 
flexible forms of treatment which involve the community, are sensitive to the culture, and recog-
nise the role of ritual and religious symbols are slowly emerging (APA 2010, 44f; Betancourt and 
Khan 2008; K. E. Miller, Kulkarni, and Kushner 2006; Melero Valdés and Dié Olmos 2010). 3.5.4 CONCLUSION: INTEGRATION CRISES HAPPEN IF WE WANT THEM TO 
Muslims, Hispanics, Blacks, Asians can be integrated. So can today´s second and third generations, 
and most traumatized refugees. History however shows us that integration takes time, and hap-
pens over a number of generations but many people today expect policies to give results within the 
span of one term in public office. Of course, it may be challenging to integrate certain groups of 
immigrants, and social sciences help to understand why and what to do about it, even if no policy is 
perfect. When a country does not really try to, but lets a dynamic of fear dominate and drive cer-
tain vulnerable groups of immigrants into marginalisation, it simply makes “integration crises” more 
likely. Ensuring, by clever legislation, that immigrants do not end up in impoverished and dysfunc-
tional neighbourhoods, that the 1.5 and second generation are provided with good educational op-
portunities, and that immigrants’ families remain strong (Parkinson 2011) certainly makes more 
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sense than adopting ineffective and unjustified immigration restriction policies. To be sure, civil so-
ciety organizations and religious charities alone cannot provide all that is necessary for the integra-
tion of immigrants, especially in the case of Muslims who do not have powerful and wealthy reli-
gious networks and institutions to support their integration (as certain Christian groups have). Part 
of the solution, therefore, concerns the welfare state.  
3.6 A Shrinking Welfare State: The Burden of Integration Is Shifting 
Another argument in favour of immigration restriction is based on the observation that, in many 
receiving countries, the welfare state has shrunk in recent years. The idea is that, so as to protect 
what is left of the welfare state (and the poor people who need it, including second generation im-
migrant children), borders should be closed to poor immigrants bent on “welfare shopping”.   3.6.1 A SHRINKING WELFARE STATE 
Welfare states have been retrenched in many developed countries around the world in recent dec-
ades, following Reagan and Thatcher´s policies in the 1980s (Lightman 1991), even though not all 
areas were affected (Henderson and White 2004). Some have justified this retrenchment as a con-
sequence of necessary tax cuts to boost competitiveness in the global market. However, many Eu-
ropean countries resisted the trend until recently, and some authors concluded that there was no 
“race to the bottom” among the European welfare states caused by globalisation, though “the real 
constraints for policy-makers come from domestic challenges, primarily demographic changes” 
(Gizelis 2005). The recent “Great Recession”, however, has meant deeper cuts in social protection, 
in many European countries as well, even though certain forms of welfare provision (especially un-
employment insurance benefits and minimum income support), have significantly dampened the 
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impact of the crisis for millions of people (Hemerijck et al. 2012). Studies in Canada link this re-
trenchment to a weaker civil society: “the policy capacity of civil society organisations has been so 
diminished that the politics is as adrift as policy itself, at least on the federal scene. Consequently, 
there are few drivers for change” (Phillips 2012).  3.6.2 THE WELFARE STATE AND IMMIGRATION 
Some have argued that social protection requires immigration restriction, but the welfare state and 
porous borders are not incompatible per se139. It is true that countries with “generous” welfare 
states which allow all immigrants immediate access to most or all of the benefits are likely to act as 
“welfare magnets”, however the impact of immigration on the welfare state is quantitatively mod-
est in most European countries (Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick 2002, 89). Some authors argue that 
“a welfare state is more likely to cope successfully with immigration if migrants are economically 
advantageous and if the established population develops a sufficient degree of solidarity with the 
newcomers” (Entzinger 2007). Given that Europe seems to attract less “economically advanta-
geous” migrants and has not been as successful as the US in building non-governmental networks 
of solidarity to support newcomers, most authors agree that European welfare states might be put 
under pressure by increased immigration and need to adapt. To be sure, immigrants who are typi-
cally economically active young adults, also help finance parts of the welfare system, such as pen-
sion schemes, and immigrant labour keeps healthcare affordable in many states. Immigrants also 
139 “Milton Friedman himself proclaimed that the welfare state and open migration are incompatible. As a 
general proposition this is obviously refuted by Kuwait (and other Gulf States and Singapore) all of which, for 
their citizens, have an amazing cradle to grave set of social welfare programs, often even beyond most Euro-
pean states. What Milton Friedman meant was that social welfare states and open migration are incompati-
ble if migrants acquire immediate and full claims on these benefits” (Pritchett 2010). 
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tend to have more children than natives do, and help prevent population ageing, making welfare 
states sustainable in the long run. 
Entzinger (2007, 129–133) proposes four ways whereby porous borders and the welfare state can 
be made compatible. Enhancing integration (to ensure most immigrants become productive citi-
zens — as in countries like Canada — rather than outcasts dependent on welfare) is probably the 
best solution, though politically and economically costly in the short term. A second option could be 
limiting state entitlements for native-born and immigrants alike; this preserves the principle of 
equality but may be very unpopular with citizens. A third option could be a differentiation of enti-
tlements (the “American solution”), that entails limiting access to citizenship and to most welfare 
provisions (temporarily or permanently) to irregular and/or first-generation immigrants. This will 
not wipe out irregular migration but places more pressure on all immigrants to find a job and inte-
grate themselves via the labour market (ibid.)140. One could also envision a fourth option, deterrito-
rialization of entitlements, whereby immigrants may enjoy healthcare and pension benefit schemes 
in their home country after many years working abroad.  3.6.3 CONCLUSION 
The debate on welfare and immigration is a complex one. From a social sciences perspective, I be-
lieve we should keep in mind two things. Firstly, it is important to remember that it is traumatized 
140 Spain had set up an effective firewall between social security and immigration (through the Padrón sys-
tem) that was very laudable from a human rights standpoint, but has recently moved to adopt the “Ameri-
can” strategy. On the 1st September 2012, the Rajoy government blocked access to free health care to the 
153,000 or so irregular immigrants residing in the country (Europa Press 2012). Reducing welfare expendi-
ture may indeed help Spain pay some tiny percentage of its public debts at a time of crisis, but this strategy, 
in a situation of high unemployment, leaves few tools for irregular immigrants to integrate themselves effec-
tively into Spanish society and may have disastrous consequences in the future. 
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asylum seekers — not irregular economic migrants — who are the most costly to countries with 
generous welfare states. Speaking of welfare shopping in their case is very cynical. Secondly, the 
welfare states of many European countries are under threat of being diminished primarily because 
of ageing and because of competition in international markets, not because of “welfare shopping” 
by immigrants. The resistance of some European countries to reform their welfare states to make 
them more efficient and sustainable in a more globalised world is the real issue in most cases; the 
impact of immigration on welfare provisions is an epiphenomenon which is a convenient subter-
fuge to avoid hard talk and difficult decisions on the welfare state in general (Geddes 2003). Hence 
the solution, here again, is not immigration restriction, but intelligent and effective welfare provi-
sion that complements and boosts the efforts of non-governmental groups in civil society to lift 
people out of poverty and marginalisation, while encouraging (and providing the skills) to both na-
tives and migrants to work productively and hence keep adequate welfare provision financially sus-
tainable in the long term. 
Furthermore, from a moral perspective, it is true that some reflections made by theologians and 
philosophers in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were influenced by the optimism of the boom years 
with its illusion of a world of unlimited resources, continuous economic expansion and endless so-
cial progress. Ethical reflection since the 1980s has made us more modest; while reaffirming the 
great principles proclaimed in the past (e.g. human rights) we are now more attentive to material 
limits and conflicting claims. The tension between welfare provision and the right to immigrate 
points to the need of concrete principles and priority rules to adjudicate among such conflicting 
claims, and this is precisely the approach which we follow in this dissertation. 
C h a p t e r :  3  — P a g e :  202 
 
3.7 Conclusion: What is New about International Migration Since the 
1980´s? 
Let us now draw a general conclusion from the many facts and interpretations concerning the hu-
man mobility phenomenon in recent years. In the following paragraphs, we shall try to list some of 
the major changes, and note whether their ethical relevance is such that we need to rethink the 
principles proposed by Catholic Social Thought between the 1950s and the 1970s.  
• [3/1] CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS. Fact: Absolute numbers of migrants have increased world-
wide. More people are on the move from more countries, given pauperization and conflict 
in some regions since the 1970s, the effects of climate change, coupled with the technolo-
gies of globalisation (see 2/2). However, many wealthy nations are receiving far less immi-
grants per capita or per unit of GDP than in past periods of “mass immigration” and there is 
no indication that any developed country is reaching a “saturation” point where it cannot 
take in or integrate any more immigrants or refugees. Ethical Relevance: Emerging coun-
tries (and small countries on the borders of the “developed” world) need help to receive 
refugees and poorer migrants; wealthier nations should share more of the burdens of re-
ceiving these persons, rather than simply select whom to admit and reap the benefits. Im-
migrant-sending countries need to be helped effectively to develop, such that forced “eco-
nomic” migration from these countries may be reduced. By themselves, these issues existed 
well before the 1980s, and do not call for some radically new ethical approach. 
• [3/2] TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN GLOBALISATION AND POST-WESTPHALIAN SOVEREIGNTY. Fact: Advances in 
transport and communication technologies, and better education in certain regions, permit 
people to travel widely and to inhabit more than one country and culture. In this context, 
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Westphalian — and particularly “absolutist” — notions of state sovereignty are being se-
verely challenged from “above”, “below” and “alongside” the modern state. This fact has 
become more pronounced with the development of modern doctrines of intervention and 
the Responsibility to Protect, and the debates on contemporary human mobility. Ethical 
Relevance: The technology-driven changes in human mobility are part of long term on-going 
human processes. It is far from obvious that “globalisation” entails huge qualitative changes 
in these processes and radical transformations of the human condition that require new 
ethical approaches to issues like immigration in the 21st century. The change in the concept 
of political sovereignty, however, is possibly the most important “change”, though it has 
been in the making for many decades. While the horrors of World War II showed us some of 
the limitations of the Westphalian model and allowed us to expand international law and in-
stitutions, new nationalist movements during decolonization championed absolutist sover-
eignty. International events, especially since the 1980s, have made us acutely aware of the 
problems in the current system, and though there is no radically different alternative on the 
horizon, it has become quite clear that a more “concrete” reflection on the ethics of border 
and integration policies today cannot avoid engaging this difficult issue. 
• [3/3] IRREGULAR MIGRATION. Fact: In immigrant-receiving countries, the technologies of “glob-
alisation” have allowed multinational companies to move jobs abroad and depress wages. 
The result has been an increase in hostility towards immigrants (especially irregular mi-
grants), draconian border control measures and immigration restriction. All of this has made 
entry and integration increasingly difficult for most immigrants. The increased security 
measures and reluctance to reintroduce fair and realistic guestworker and immigrant work-
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er schemes has resulted in a huge increase in irregular labour migration to Western nations, 
often driven by demand in these countries. The current situation has benefitted mostly traf-
fickers and smugglers, exploitative employers and far-right politicians. Ethical Relevance: 
“Economic migration” debates and laws seem to echo similar ones from a century ago; “asy-
lum migration” and “ecological migration” debates also seem to mirror ethical reflection on 
the topic of “sanctuary” going back at least to the Middle Ages. Technology works on both 
sides of the equation and always has – it helps people to cross borders and helps authorities 
to close borders. The ethical questions of how open or how closed those borders should be 
are much older and tend to transcend contingent movement surges, new causes and local 
political nativism.  
• [3/4] NEW RECEIVING COUNTRIES. Fact: Some countries (especially in Europe) have developed 
considerably in recent years and shifted very rapidly from being “sending” to “transit” and 
to “receiving” countries. Effective integration entails cultural and political shifts in these new 
immigration countries; this also means reshaping national narratives, adapting to pluralism, 
countering xenophobia and marginalisation of immigrants, and developing effective integra-
tion policies. Ethical Relevance: These countries are experiencing what other countries ex-
perienced in the past; the adaptation process is difficult and has always been so. Good lead-
ership and sound moral principles are sorely needed at a time of transition. This is also an 
occasion to learn from past experiences of other countries. Yet, one should resist the temp-
tation of construing one´s local circumstances as “extraordinary” and “wholly novel”, and on 
this basis bracketing sound moral principles adopted in the past. Rather, receiving and inte-
grating immigrants and refugees is ultimately a question of welcoming the “other” and 
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building a kinship relationship with her, a challenge which presents itself to all democratic 
polities in the course of their history, in one way or another.  
• [3/5] SCEPTICISM CONCERNING INTEGRATION. Fact: Various countries (especially in Europe) have 
tried (often half-heartedly) different integration strategies ranging from “coercive assimila-
tionism” to “everything-goes multiculturalism”. No country has achieved a very satisfactory 
integration of immigrants in the span of a generation or two, and many have insisted that 
the new migrants — unlike those who arrived before the 1980s — are too “culturally” dif-
ferent to be effectively integrated. This has been a cause of concern for many, especially 
with the rise of international terrorism. Ethical Relevance: Much of the difference is “per-
ceived”, and not “real”; this creates discrimination and xenophobia that isolate minorities 
and force them to be “really” different as a reaction or survival strategy. Many centuries 
ago, the Westphalian nation-state system sought to solve the supposedly “huge” differences 
between European neighbours who felt they could no longer live together; yet ever since its 
inception, this system has found it very hard to integrate minorities and offer them ade-
quate political and social spaces. Past moral condemnations of xenophobia, racism and dis-
crimination are all the more true today; furthermore, marginalisation and disenfranchise-
ment breed communities tempted by fundamentalism and terrorism. Finally, in the past it 
was assumed that two generations were not enough for most immigrants to integrate fully. 
If we want to improve on that in the 21st century, we need learn from the past and from the 
best practices of others. 
• [3/6] SHRINKING WELFARE STATE. Fact: Since the economic crises of the 1970s, many wealthy 
nations started to doubt whether they could afford a generous welfare state. Globalisation 
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has also meant an intense competition for investments, tax cuts and incentives to attract (or 
avoid the loss of) private investment and jobs and lower state revenues. In this context, im-
migrants are increasingly seen as competitors for limited and shrinking welfare resources. 
An increasing number of countries, thus, are making welfare inaccessible to immigrants 
(even regular immigrants) and are tempted to deny them basic rights (e.g. education for 
children, emergency medical attention); even Europe feels tempted to follow this “American 
solution” when dealing with third-country nationals. All of this means that social inequalities 
will take much longer to bridge and integration may become more and more difficult in the 
future. Yet, immigration is seen as necessary to support pension schemes in ageing coun-
tries, immigrant labour keeps welfare services affordable, and lower immigrant (and low-
skill) wages seem to compensate for most increases in corporate taxation. Ethical Rele-
vance: The welfare state and porous borders are not incompatible and can be reconciled in 
a number of ways. However, the tension between welfare provision and the right to immi-
grate is real, and points to the need of priority rules to adjudicate between conflicting 
claims.  
This final comment helps us to see how all the above changes are ethically relevant: they do not, in 
themselves, justify greater immigration restriction, but they point to the need for greater discern-
ment in policymaking. This dissertation provides rules to guide that discernment. The deconstruc-
tive argument above leads us to reject the following hypothesis (cf. 2.4.1): 
• Hypothesis A: The phenomenon of labour migration has changed significantly in recent years 
in its ethically-relevant features, and most of the differences are real, not merely perceived. 
The changes warrant increasingly restrictive immigration policies. 
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We are led therefore to examine the alternative hypothesis (2.4.2), which will shape the construc-
tive part of our thesis in the following chapters: 
• Hypothesis B: The Catholic Magisterium is hinting at the need for a moral framework within 
which to adjudicate conflicting rights claims regarding immigration, and to make the right to 
immigrate more receivable and concrete. Moral theologians need to fill this lacuna and pro-
vide such a framework, and we can do so precisely by formulating clear priority rules. 
In the next chapter, we present a case study that will help us confirm the above observations and 
transition to the constructive part of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION IN MALTA: 
A CASE STUDY 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter has a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it seeks to consolidate the general conclu-
sions of chapter 3, comparing migrations in human history with more recent migration, and hence 
conclude the deconstructive part of our dissertation. It presents a case study to investigate the co-
gency of the conclusions of the previous chapter by reference to a particular case. Malta´s history as 
an “old” European country built on immigration; its experience of almost 200 years of mass emigra-
tion and its sudden transition to become a migrant-receiving country is of particular interest to our 
debate. The Maltese case demonstrates within the confines of a microcosm that some of the prob-
lems being faced today by migrant-sending and receiving countries are not so “new” after all. On 
the other hand, this chapter also inaugurates the constructive part of our dissertation by reflecting 
ethically on the right to immigrate from a historical and particular perspective, namely by devel-
oping the principle of history-laden interdependence and a related priority rule.  
As is fitting, given the content, both of these arguments are interwoven and interdependent. When 
we read this chapter in the deconstructive mode, Malta´s history and current political situation help 
us to challenge four false “givens” in the debate on irregular migration. First is the idea that most 
“independent” and “decolonized” peoples simply bought into the nationalism of the Westphalian 
vision of the world, where clear borders (such as the sea) are seen as means to separate peoples ra-
ther than unite them face to face as equal partners in dialogue (cf. section 4.2). Second is the idea 
that some countries are built on immigration, and others are not (cf. section 4.3). Third is the idea 
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that disorganized and risky forms of mass migration (such as the current “irregular immigration cri-
sis”) are something new and are mainly due to bad will of migrants or of sending countries, rather 
than the lack of political will to find effective legal and sustainable channels for human mobility (cf. 
section 4.4). Fourth is the idea that developed nations are overwhelmed with irregular migrant arri-
vals and cannot but close their borders: if Malta (while being one of the smallest and most densely-
populated nation-states in the world) can accommodate more irregular immigrants (and, as we 
shall see, it can!) then the claims of most developed nations that they cannot welcome any more 
immigrants or make their borders more open become quite hard to believe (cf. section 4.5).  
When we read the chapter in the constructive mode, we can see a notion of history-laden interde-
pendence proposed as a conclusion of section 4.2, consolidated in section 4.3., and then developed 
into an ethical principle in section 4.4, which is applied to the current situation in Malta in section 
4.5. 
4.1  Westphalian Scepticism in Maltese History 4.1.1 POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY DOES NOT MEAN HAVING YOUR OWN AUTARKIC NATION-STATE 
Most Maltese are uneasy with expressions of nationalism and sceptical when they local newspapers 
publish international studies claiming it is one of the “best places on earth” to live (The Times of 
Malta 2011). While explaining to tourists and foreign friends the wealth of history that exudes from 
every little street in Malta´s old towns and villages, the Maltese put little effort into diminishing the 
accomplishments and greatness of the nations who colonized and dominated the Islands. One may 
conclude from this that Malta is a nation with a low self-esteem, and there is certainly some truth 
C h a p t e r :  4  — P a g e :  210 
 
in that. However, as we shall see, Malta is also an example of a nation which can remain critical of 
modern nationalism and absolutist notions of state sovereignty.  
To be sure, few people could question Malta´s pedigree as an independent nation, possessing “pos-
itive sovereignty” (cf. R. H. Jackson 1993, 29f) and fulfilling the criteria for statehood stipulated in 
the 1933 Montevideo Convention: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) govern-
ment; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. The Republic of Malta is an ar-
chipelago with three inhabited islands. It has had a stable democratic government since independ-
ence from Great Britain in 1964, after many decades of self-government under the British, and pre-
viously under the Knights of Saint John. The sea constitutes an undisputed natural border; the dis-
tance from Sicily is significant enough to claim that this is not simply part of the coast of Italy. Since 
the 1500s, Malta has been to all effects and purposes politically independent from Italy though 
technically it remained part of the Aragonese crown in Sicily (Italy) until conquest by Napoleon in 
1798 (and “legal” transfer to Britain in 1815)141. Ninety-eight per cent of Maltese citizens consider 
141 Roger II had established an independent Norman Kingdom of Sicily in 1130 which included Sicily, Malta 
and the Southern half of the Italian peninsula (the “Mezzogiorno”); this kingdom was passed on to the Ange-
vins through papal grant in 1262. In 1282 (the “Sicilian Vespers” rebellion), the island of Sicily and the Mal-
tese islands seceded from the Angevin Kingdom of Sicily to form an independent Kingdom of Sicily, which 
was offered to the Aragonese. Both Kingdoms of “Sicily” (one on the peninsula and ruled from Naples, and 
one on the island of Sicily ruled from Palermo, the former often referred to as the “Kingdom of Naples” to 
avoid confusion) eventually became Aragonese (and then Spanish) possessions, and at times were ruled by 
the same person, but remained constitutionally separate until 1816 when the crowns were united under 
Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies. In Medieval times, Malta was rented as a fief to various lords until the Mal-
tese rebelled against Count Monroy in 1426, and Alfonso V promised the islanders that Malta would remain 
under direct rule of the Aragonese monarch. Yet, Malta did not get a Majorcan-style incorporation into Ara-
gon with self-government; it continued to be effectively governed by the Aragonese/Spanish viceroy in Sicily 
(Palermo), and in 1530 was given in perpetual fiefdom to the Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, 
for the symbolic rent of two Maltese falcons (one for the monarch, one for the viceroy) to be delivered an-
nually to the viceroy in Palermo. The Knights paid the rent but behaved as though Malta were an independ-
ent nation under their rule, and the islands quickly drifted away from the political influence of Sicily. In any 
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themselves Catholic, and most recognise that Maltese culture has been influenced by that of 
Southern Italy, but nobody doubts today that the Maltese are not Italians. Citizens speak Maltese, 
which is a Semitic language ultimately derived from medieval Arabic but significantly different from 
the current Maghrebi vernaculars and quite simplified when compared to classical Arabic. The fact 
of holding on to this peculiar language indicates that, in spite of centuries of colonial rule and Euro-
pean cultural influence, the inhabitants recognised that they had a national identity distinct from 
that of their neighbours and colonizers.  
Yet, the Maltese do not consider themselves Arabs, Greeks or “Orientals”. Malta has had very little 
cultural contact with North Africa or the Arab world during the last millennium142; the Ottoman 
Empire was considered the “enemy” during the rule of the Knights (1530 to 1798), who indulged in 
corsair warfare against the Turks and their vassals in North Africa. The main contact with the Arab 
world was through slaves captured by Maltese corsair ships on the high seas, and in razzias con-
ducted by the Knights on the Barbary Coast, in revenge for attacks by Barbary pirates. Those slaves 
were eventually liberated and took on their masters´ surnames such that classical Maltese sur-
names today do not necessarily denote blood lineage from medieval Maltese clans.  4.1.2 COLONIZATION FROM INSIDE, COLONIZATION FROM OUTSIDE: WHICH DO YOU PREFER? 
For 270 years, under the Knights, Malta experienced a peculiar form of “independence” and “colo-
nization”. The Hospitaliers, immigrant “religious warriors” who came from noble families from all 
case, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Spaniards and the Sicilians accepted that the British should 
get Malta, after having helped the Maltese to liberate it from the French.  
142 Malta was never part of Libya or Tunisia; rather the city of Tripoli and the surrounding region was part of 
Knights´ possessions in Malta until it was lost to the Ottomans in 1551. 
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over Europe, ruled the land. They did not mind accepting “noteworthy” brawlers like Michelangelo 
Merisi da Caravaggio into their ranks and protecting them from facing justice in mainland Europe 
(Sciberras and Stone 2006, chap. 2), and they were even willing to welcome as Knights Protestant 
and Orthodox nobles from Northern and Eastern Europe. Yet, Maltese natives were not allowed to 
join this Catholic Order. The Knights built a system of heavily fortified towns around the Grand Har-
bour, which they sometimes called “the Convent” (Sire 1996, 73–84). Many of these nominally celi-
bate men “adopted” a Maltese family and found a mistress within that family, hence creating a 
cosmopolitan and relatively prosperous bourgeois “settlement” around Valletta, somewhat similar 
to the Portuguese and Dutch colonial trading posts in Africa and in the Far East. The rest of the sur-
face area of the islands was an impoverished hinterland technically governed by the Maltese agrar-
ian nobility and ecclesial authorities through the “Consiglio Popolare” until the 18th century, when 
the Grandmasters became more and more paternalistic and tried to micromanage all aspects of 
Maltese life (Ciappara 2008). The clergy and nobility in the backcountry felt they were being pro-
gressively colonized by a sort of “maritime republic of greater Valletta”. They constantly sought to 
remind the Knights that the islands ultimately belonged to the Sicilian crown and were only leased 
as a fief to the Order of Saint John: the true Sovereign of Malta was the king of Sicily and the people 
could appeal to him when they were wronged by the Grandmaster. However, by the mid-
eighteenth century, the Grandmasters scoffed at this legal technicality; they abolished the “Consig-
lio Popolare”, created new burgher noble titles for their Maltese clients and started to call them-
selves “sovereigns” and to behave as though they were equal in rank with other European mon-
archs. The “sovereign” lords of Malta even cared for the independence of other nations; for exam-
ple, Grand Master de Rohan encouraged 1800 Knights and Maltese sailors to enlist in the French 
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Navy to fight in the American Revolutionary war (Lindsay 2011). Their naval acumen contributed to 
the defeat of the British at the Battle of the Chesapeake in 1781 and the Grandmaster was awarded 
the Libertas Americana medal in 1783 by Benjamin Franklin – (Olson 2004, 180–1)143.  
When Napoleon landed in Malta in June 1798, the Maltese nobility welcomed him with enthusiasm. 
They preferred to be part of the new France, than to be ruled by the “independent” ancien régime 
in Valletta. They yearned for liberty, equality and fraternity with the people of the most prosperous 
nation bordering the Mediterranean. However, the French administration embarked on a rapid and 
forced modernization of all the institutions on the island and reduced the number of convents and 
the authority of the Church, while not having money to pay the huge debts left behind by the 
Knights and not being able to provide sufficient food for the population, due to King Ferdinand’s (of 
Sicily, and of Naples144) refusal to supply the French (Hardman 1909, 77). Soon enough, the popu-
lace of the backcountry revolted, massacred the French troops in the Maltese countryside and laid 
143 In 1794, the United States considered the establishment of a naval base in Malta to protect their com-
mercial shipping in the Mediterranean from the Barbary pirates, but the deal fell through (Bonello 2012). 
The British eventually took the base and the whole country, and the Tunisian corsairs were finally brought 
under control, but some Maltese mariners sought out other seas to navigate. Juan Bautista Azopardo, for 
instance, built a naval career as a privateer fighting for the Netherlands and Spain in South America, and was 
given command of the national navy of Argentina during that country´s independence struggle. 
144 Ferdinand was styled Ferdinand III of Sicily and Ferdinand IV of Naples, and then, in 1816, Ferdinand I of 
the Two Sicilies. At the time of the Maltese uprising, Ferdinand was planning an attack on the French in 
Rome with the help of Lord Nelson. The plan backfired; the French took Naples in January 1799 with the help 
of Neapolitan republicans, and proclaimed the Parthenopean Republic. Ferdinand fled to Sicily. The Neapoli-
tan fleet was burnt in the chaos and could not be used to blockade Malta. In the meanwhile, Nelson de-
stroyed the French Mediterranean fleet in Aboukir Bay, and the French found it hard to supply their starving 
garrison in Valletta. In the spring of 1799, Cardinal Ruffo organized an insurgency from Calabria using ban-
dits, convicts and peasants; they massacred, plundered and burnt their way up to Naples allowing Ferdinand 
to return to his throne in July 1799 and brutally punish the Republicans and French sympathisers. Mean-
while, Commodore Alexander Ball made friends with the Maltese insurgents and calmly convinced them to 
look to London, not to Naples, for help and protection. 
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siege to the French garrison in Valletta. Though some nobles considered independence at that 
point (Cobbett 1803, 3:673–685), most Maltese sought help and protection from their ancient feu-
dal lord, the King of Sicily (who at least could keep them from starving). Ferdinand´s allies, the Brit-
ish, sent their navy to blockade Valletta and together with the Maltese insurgents forced the starv-
ing French garrison to capitulate in 1800 (Gaillard 1997). The British signed the Treaty of Amiens in 
1802, which (against the wishes of the Maltese) stipulated the return of the islands to the Knights, 
but then violated the Treaty by refusing to evacuate Malta, in defiance of Napoleon. Napoleon pro-
ceeded to violate the Treaty of Lunéville, and Britain declared war on France in May 1803 (cf. 
Busuttil 1965, 45)145.  
The islanders were soon persuaded that the British decision to occupy Malta was not such a bad 
thing (Gregory 1996). Between 1803 and 1813, the British mounted a huge smuggling operation 
based in Malta to sell their products in mainland Europe and work around the “Continental System” 
(H. S. Williams 1904, 473; Busuttil 1965, 46). Big money started pouring in and this convinced the 
Maltese that they had hit the jackpot on letting themselves be dominated by the British. They wel-
comed the first British Governor on the 4th October 1813. France and Britain´s allies eventually ac-
cepted the transfer of Malta to Britain in the Treaty of Paris (1814); the rest of Europe (including 
King Ferdinand of Sicily and Naples) confirmed the transfer at the Congress of Vienna. At that point, 
war expenditure and war smuggling ended, and Malta entered into a severe economic depression 
that lasted until around 1842. Very soon, the Maltese realized that their new rulers were not much 
145 This was the start of the Napoleonic Wars which lasted around 11 years and transformed the face of Eu-
rope and the art of making war. 
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better than the ones they had in the past. They actually became quite cynical about political novel-
ty. 4.1.3 POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY? WHY SHOULD A NATION GAIN INDEPENDENCE? 
On the 2nd October, 1964, Time magazine published an article with the title “Malta: The Most Re-
luctant Nation”. It announced the Independence of Malta, granted two weeks earlier, on the 21st 
September. In 1964, the Maltese did not doubt that they constituted a nation, and probably more 
so than any of the “nations” created by historians in the 19th century (Mitchell 2003). Yet, unlike 
many other nations at the time, this nation was sceptical that it could have a functioning sovereign 
polity of its own. The referendum on Independence was held on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of May 1964: 
65,714 voted “yes”, 54,919 voted “no”, while many invalidated their votes in protest (9,016 votes 
were declared invalid – cf. Zarb Dimech (2011)). The Labour Party called independence a transition 
“from colonialism to neo-colonialism”, and some people rioted during the Independence Day pa-
rade. Eight years before, in 1956, another referendum had been held, proposing the integration of 
Malta into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 59% voted “yes”, but the re-
sults were ignored since many people had boycotted the poll. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Maltese were conscious that the economy of the islands was totally 
dependent on services provided to the British Navy, and were doubtful that the country could build 
a truly independent economy based on industry, services and tourism. While most of the world was 
under the spell of the boom years, the Maltese saw that politics was a very risky game; many would 
rather have limited self-government and good friends in 10 Downing Street, than revel in inde-
pendence celebrations and soon be at the mercy of international creditors. The memories of an iso-
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lated, dependent population on the brink of starvation during World War II were still fresh and no-
body wanted to go back to the poverty and unemployment of the 1940s and 50s. The Nationalist 
government which — together with the Archbishop — had staunchly promoted Independence lost 
no time trying to get Malta integrated into Europe146 and made it clear that independence did not 
mean autarchy, but simply a distancing from one particular European polity to further Malta´s ties 
with the others.  4.1.4 OVERCOMING THE RHETORIC OF “INDEPENDENCE”  
Various independence movements, especially after World War II, promised a world where the gov-
erned would be truly represented by the governing, where local cultures and religions would not be 
looked down upon and threatened by colonizers bent on imposing their understanding of “civiliza-
tion”, where non-whites and non-Europeans would not be treated as inferiors. In some of the new 
nations, these aspirations have been realized, while others nations have actually become re-
colonized from the inside by local élites, and from the outside by economic players, while generat-
ing new regional minorities within their territories clamouring for independence.  
Traditional Maltese political scepticism and cynicism helps us take a step back from the enthusiasm 
generated by independence movements and become aware that the political ideas which circulated 
after World War II were not as ethically sound, truthful and liberationist as they seemed then, and 
146 Negotiations with the European Economic Community towards forging closer ties started on the 4th Sep-
tember 1967 and an Association Agreement between Malta and the EC was signed in December 1970. The 
parties agreed to set up a customs union in 1976 and move towards a possible future integration in the EC 
(EC Spokesman´s Group 1970). The new Labour government elected in 1971, however, did not implement 
the customs union, seeking to advance Malta´s political and economic ties with the Eastern Bloc, China and 
the southern Mediterranean countries. Malta eventually joined the European Union in 2004 and the Euro-
zone in 2008. 
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as most of our contemporaries believe. Over the last few centuries, former colonizers not only sold 
manufactured goods to their colonies; they also sold them an exaggerated sense of national pride 
and the early-modern European dream of autarkic self-sufficiency. The spread of these same ideas, 
to be sure, made it increasingly more burdensome for Western nations to maintain international 
empires as nationalism simmered in the colonies. However, once the European nations, prodded by 
the new superpowers that saved them from the chaos of World War II, started to let go of some of 
that bloodthirsty national pride and those vain dreams of self-sufficiency, to accept less glorious 
geographical bounds and adopt a more interdependent view of the world (and of Europe), the old 
European ghosts had migrated elsewhere, to the great advantage of the “lean” and “developed” 
West. Now, they could “set the colonies free” while still retaining access (with some accommoda-
tion of US and Soviet interests, of course) to the mineral and human resources of the “emerging” 
countries (possibly more cheaply now, as the politically manipulable and weak poorer countries 
competed against one another to export their resources on the world markets), and without actual-
ly having to spend any money building institutions in these parts of the globe and helping their 
peoples to develop. As many of the colonized peoples bought the old European autarkic-nationalist 
ideology acritically, the colonizers gracefully or grudgingly granted them “independence”, conven-
iently washing their hands of the development problems faced by these peoples.  
The history of the 20th century could have been different; we could have had the formation of a 
strongly interdependent and politically unified “Commonwealth” and “Francophonie”, instead of 
(but similar to) the European Union, by increasing regional and “national” federalism in the territo-
ries of the old empires, converting all “subjects” into “citizens”, and placing all regions and ethnic 
groups on an equal political footing, and adopting a politics of subsidiarity. We could even have had 
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colonial “devolution” instead of independence, but Britain and France would have had to accept a 
House of Commons where whites are the minority, or a National Assembly with one third of its 
members being Muslim. Indeed, the fact that the Westphalian notion of absolute sovereignty car-
ried the day and that “independence had to happen” may have more to do with xenophobia than 
with the justice of liberation struggles, the wisdom of nationalist ideologies or the generosity of the 
inhabitants of 10 Downing Street or the Elysée.  
To be sure, the Maltese did a much better job at governing themselves than the Knights or the Brit-
ish, and the Maltese slowly became more enthusiastic about being an “independent” polity – as 
long as “independent” did not translate as “abandoned and isolated”, but rather as “recognised as 
equal partner and freed to become more intertwined with others in an interdependent world”. 
Wise economic planning, cunning use of Malta´s strategic position in foreign relations, and the well-
tested safety-valve of emigration allowed Malta to gradually build a resilient economy and weather 
the economic crises of the 1970s and the painful closure of the British naval base in 1979, and 
thrive in spite of the economic vulnerabilities of small island developing countries (Briguglio 1995). 
Even today, the Maltese are guardedly proud, though at times cynical, of having a tiny “independ-
ent” polity of their own; their centuries-old economic pessimism has hardly waned. Maltese na-
tionalism was never taken too seriously in 20th century; independence was a daring dream of an 
élite and a cheeky request which the British conceded maybe too easily and too quickly to a nation 
with low self-esteem (Mitchell 2003). For most of the 20th century, “nationalist” in Malta meant 
“pro-Italian” and “militantly Catholic”. Xenophobic ethno-cultural nationalism is a relatively recent 
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phenomenon in Malta, and is mostly part of the hysteria generated by the arrival of thousands of 
dark-skinned boat people from Sub-Saharan Africa. 4.1.5 CONCLUSION: A THESIS AND A HYPOTHESIS 
This introductory section helped to set the scene of the chapter which focuses three great periods 
of Maltese history: Malta under the Knights, a period of immigration and demographic expansion; 
Malta under the British, a period of mass emigration; Malta after independence and the gradual 
return of immigration. We can, at this point, formulate the “Interdependence Thesis” which will 
guide us in the following sections: 
Interdependence Thesis: The rhetoric of national independence should not obfuscate the re-
ality of interdependence of human societies.  
This also leads us to postulate the hypothesis of “History-Laden Interdependence” which we will 
seek to document in the following sections. 
Hypothesis of History-Laden Interdependence: Interdependence is not simply a general 
human reality, but one which is history-laden and takes different shapes as particular histori-
cal webs of relationships are spun between different polities. 
4.2  A Nation of Immigrants: Malta under the Knights 4.2.1 IMMIGRATION AND MALTESE GENEALOGY 
We mentioned the recent phenomenon of xenophobic ethno-cultural nationalism in Malta at the 
end of the previous section. The presence of “noticeable” numbers of “noticeable” migrants has 
been at the centre of most political debates in Malta in recent years. Most Maltese are typically 
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sceptical that the economy of the islands and their generous welfare state could cope with a sus-
tained influx of refugees and migrants. Some, however, go so far as to sympathise with extremist 
anti-immigrant politicians like Norman Lowell, whose British name, coupled with his Latin-sounding 
political party, “Imperium Europa”, and the poverty of his Semitic Maltese vocabulary make critics 
wonder whether Maltese ultra-nationalism could ever sound convincing. Like most other Europe-
ans, though, the Maltese have a “selective” memory and do not like to consider themselves a na-
tion of immigrants; it will be our task in the next few pages to show that the contrary is true.  
The 2005 Census report that the Maltese population carries 11,440 different surnames (Malta Na-
tional Statistics Office 2006, 1–2) in a population of 404,039 persons147. 24.2% of the population 
carries one of the ten most common surnames, most of which are clearly linked to Western Europe, 
Greece, the Middle East and North Africa, and some of which evidently belonged to Arabs, Berbers, 
Jews or Orthodox Christians in the past148. Many of the other common Maltese surnames are pre-
sent in Sicily, but are of Arabic origin149. Yet other names which are relatively common are typically 
147 That was the population at the time of the census. The total population in Malta as at the end of 2010 
was estimated at 417,617 (Malta National Statistics Office 2011, vi).  
148 Some of these very common surnames give some indication of the origins of the family: e.g. Camilleri (2nd 
in rank) indicates descendants of camel drivers from North Africa or the Middle East, while Grech (8th in 
rank) indicates the progeny of Greek immigrants. Attard (9th in rank) is thought to indicate either a Germanic 
family (“son of Athard”) or a family of perfumers (“distiller of rose attar”), possibly of Jewish origin (Aquilina 
1964). Micallef (7th in rank), one of the earliest-recorded surnames, was a surname common among Jews on 
the island of Gozo, and may also have been a Jewish surname. Spiteri (10th in rank) is a surname that was 
present in Malta since the Middle Ages but which was also a shorthand surname given to illegitimate sons of 
the Hospitalier Knights of Saint John (“de Ospitalieri” > “de Spit’eri”). Cf. Cassar (2003), Wettinger (1968; 
1969; 1999), Aquilina (1964). 
149 Common surnames include Azzopardi (“Sephardi Jew”), Asciak or Asciaq (“son of Isaac”), Musù (“son of 
Moses”), Ellul (“born on the Hebrew month of Elul”), Abdilla (“slave of Allah”, cf. Abdullah), Mamo (probably 
an abbreviation of “Muhammad”); Curmi (“Crimean”), Barbara (“Berber”), Bugeja (“native of Bejaia in Alge-
ria”), Saliba (“crusader”), Pulis (from Apulia), Genovese (“Genoese”), Cremona (from Cremona, in Italy), Pi-
                                                     
C h a p t e r :  4  — P a g e :  221 
 
Italian, Spanish, British, Irish, French, German and Slavonic surnames150. The linguistic analysis of 
surnames thus is highly indicative of a nation built by immigrants. 
History and genealogy help us complete this picture. Detailed parish records started to be kept af-
ter the Council of Trent, and in a predominantly Catholic Country, they allow genealogists to trace 
back a good number of the 11,440 surnames to the immigrants who introduced them to the is-
lands. However, a number of surnames considered “typically Maltese” (including the “top 10”) can 
be found in two 15th century rolls (a militia roster, probably from 1419, and a communal labour list 
from the 1480s) containing 389 surnames (a good number of which do not exist as such on the is-
lands today); the origin of most of these surnames cannot be traced further back through parish 
records (Wettinger 1968; 1969). About 4% of the enlisted in the 1480s were Jewish, but Maltese 
Jews were expelled or forced to convert in 1492. But who were the “Christians” (96%) on that list? 
Some two hundred and thirty years earlier, in 1249, Islam, too, was supposedly “expelled” from the 
Islands (according to Ibn Khaldun), but few historians takes this “expulsion” literally, since as late as 
1241 the royal commissioner Giliberto Abate reported that the island of Malta had a total of 681 
Muslim households and 47 Christian ones (Wettinger 1999)151. Given that a Semitic language was 
retained, it is doubtful that 94% of the population of the main island (the “Muslims”) was expelled 
sani (from Pisa), Tedesco (“German”), Galizia (from Galicia, in Spain), Navarro (from Navarra, in Spain), Cach-
ia (“the ugly/evil one”, in Greek), Callus (“the handsome/good one”, in Greek), Calamatta (from Kalamata, in 
Greece), England (from England). 
150 For example: Bonavia, Bonello, Magro, Pace, Flores, Herrera, White, Evans, Bannister, Jones, Lowell, 
Dougall, Warrington, Marguerat, Wirth, Pugliesevich. Cf. Cassar (2003), Wettinger (1968; 1969; 1999), Aqui-
lina (1964). 
151 There were however more Christians than Muslims on the island of Gozo. The slaves and the poor were 
not recorded; the total population at the time is estimated at 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants.  
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eight years later and replaced by Christian migrants from mainland Europe; rather it is thought that 
the Muslims converted to Catholicism and integrated quickly in the re-Christianised political land-
scape, since no political activity by Muslims (revolts, protests, petitions) is reported in Malta after 
1249. Most of the Christians on the communal labour list from 1480 were descended from formerly 
Muslim families in 1249. Nonetheless, those 230 years of Christian hegemony saw significant de-
mographic changes and a considerable amount of immigration into Malta and into its bigger neigh-
bour, Sicily (Dalli 2007). Among the many happenings of those eventful years, one could mention 
the Sicilian Vespers revolt in 1282 that made Malta and Sicily Aragonese possessions, the repercus-
sions of the European plagues of the 14th century, pillage by Catalan and Genoese Fleets, frequent 
razzias by Barbary pirates (including several raids in 1385 that drastically reduced the population of 
the islands), and a full-scale invasion from Ifriquiya in 1429 that meant a loss of around one third of 
the population (Dalli 2008). The plague epidemics and crop failures of the 14th and 15th century also 
affected the demographics, such that only slowly did the population grow enough to be able to 
somehow defend itself. 4.2.2 IMMIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC EXPANSION 
To be sure, Malta´s medieval rulers, though certainly not very tolerant towards Islam and Judaism, 
put more effort in trying to populate the Maltese islands than in expelling sections of a population 
constantly raided and sold into slavery by the Barbary pirates152. Italians were brought over to start 
152 In the middle ages, immigrants established hamlets all over the Maltese islands, including pirate coves, 
salt-pan communities and fishing villages on the coasts, but during the 13th and 14th century, most of the 
hamlets close to the coast became unsafe due to pirate raids and were abandoned (Hahs 2010). The settlers 
moved to the expanding villages at the centre of the island of Malta which were large enough to organize 
militias and resist most pirate raids, and distant enough from the coast not to tempt the pirates. In fact, 
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new settlements and the migration of merchants from Pisa, Genoa and even from Catalonia was 
encouraged. Sometimes, even more drastic measures were adopted. In 1146, after the fall of Tripo-
li, Muslim slaves were taken to Malta, and in 1224, after a revolt in Celano (Abruzzi), part of the 
population of the town was deported to Malta. Even before the Norman, Suabian and Angevin 
lords started to promote free and forced migration to their outpost at the centre of the Mediterra-
nean, their predecessors, the Fatimid Arabs, seem to have made a considerable effort to populate 
the islands (Wettinger 1986; Luttrell 1987). One account by the geographer Al-Himyarī, based on 
reports by Al-Bakrī, claims that the islands were left uninhabited after a protracted siege in 870 
CE153, and that only in 1040 did the Fatimid Arabs undertake to rebuild the fortified city and repop-
ulate the islands (Brincat 1995). Though some historians have questioned Al-Himyarī´s account (cf. 
Wettinger 1990), most concede that the islands may have experienced a period of very low popula-
tion density with no formal government or literate inhabitants between the 9th and 11th century CE. 
The conclusion is that, just as the Americas were repopulated by immigrants after the population 
collapse of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, so was Malta, starting from the 11th century and 
continuing until the economic depressions of the 19th century.  
The population grew steadily, especially after the Knights of St John were given the islands and 
started to fortify the Grand Harbour, protect the coastline from pirate raids and develop com-
merce. The number of inhabitants rose from ca.7,000 (in 1240), to ca.9,000 (in 1419), to ca.19,000 
practically until the 19th century, when the French forced the Bey of Tunisia to put an end to the pirate raids 
on south-western Europe, the Maltese coastlands were thinly inhabited and only one small village (Mellieħa) 
survived in the northern 1/3 of the island of Malta.  
153 The Byzantines defending the medieval capital of Malta (Melita, now Mdina) probably resisted until the 
bitter end, thus provoking the Aghlabid conquerors to destroy the city and deport its remaining inhabitants. 
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(in 1528), to 29,000 (in 1590), to 51,750 (in 1632), to 114,000 (in 1798), to 140,000 (in 1871) to 
205,000 (in 1906) to 280,000 (in 1939) - (Vanhove 2007; Atauz 2004)154.  
Over the years, through inheritances and grants, the Knights amassed a considerable amount of 
property in mainland Europe and received sizeable rents from it; they used the money to employ 
servants and to create infrastructural projects (especially by building and continually repairing a 
massive system of fortifications) that provided plentiful jobs for the Maltese, especially in times of 
drought and crop failure (Price 1954, 1–8). They also subsidized food staples. This continuous injec-
tion of funds into the Maltese economy ensured a sustained demographic growth, and in times of 
prosperity even attracted immigrants from Italy. Maltese natives also became famous for making 
maximal use of their little parcels of arid agricultural land (albeit with primitive farming utensils) 
and obtaining impressive crop yields. Until the early 19th century, they had become used to buying 
subsidized imported food staples from the Knights and, instead, growing cotton, which was spun 
and woven in cottage industries and fetched good prices in Spain.  
However, most Maltese households were not able to save or invest the money, since they were 
used to marry very young and to maintain very large families, such that in 1813 — with the Knights 
(and their European rents) gone forever, with the Spanish market closed to foreign cotton (and se-
verely crippled by the desamortización), and with the end of the Continental System and of a dec-
154 The Knights also brought with them in 1530 a number of Rhodeans, soldiers and attendants; during their 
rule they brought servants over from mainland Europe and imported hundreds of slaves, mostly villagers 
from North Africa captured and enslaved in retaliation for pirate raids on Malta. The slaves were eventually 
liberated and incorporated into Maltese society, adopting the surnames of their masters (Wettinger 2002). 
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ade-long boom driven by British smuggling155 — the British and the Maltese suddenly realized that 
the islands were severely “overpopulated”, given the fragile economy of Malta. That year, cholera 
struck, Maltese shipping was quarantined and the local economy collapsed. Some Maltese fields 
were slowly returned to food staples and added income from spinning and weaving was lost (Price 
1954, 4). Mass emigration lurked on the horizon. 4.2.3 CONCLUSION:  A HISTORY OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
The Maltese nation is the product of immigration from all over the Mediterranean. After all, there is 
such a thing as a Maltese “nation” because, unlike most other archipelagos in the world of compa-
rable size, Malta´s high population density guarantees a minimum population size necessary to 
sustain a viable economy and the political institutions of an independent nation-state. Further-
more, Malta is not just a group of islands, but a proud and coveted fortress which turned wave af-
ter wave of immigrants into comrades-in-arms with a sense of common identity, and made the pro-
ject of national independence thinkable, even if not immediately credible, to all in the 1960s. In the 
following section, we discuss the problems caused by Malta´s population density and fortress econ-
omy in recent history. However, it is important to note here that both the population density and 
the fortress identity are the products of the interdependence of peoples in the Mediterranean and 
beyond.  
155 The boom attracted immigrants to Malta, including the young Giovanni di Nicolò Pappaffy (1792-1886) 
from Tessalonika, who arrived in 1810 and soon made a fortune importing wheat during the war. Interest-
ingly, this immigrant was one of the very few wealthy persons in Malta who helped Maltese to emigrate by 
establishing the “Pappaffy Fund” in his will.  By 1961, around 560 persons had benefitted from the fund (At-
tard 2003).  
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Population density in Malta in the last millennium depended on the economies of Europe, and more 
specifically on what are now four European polities: Italy, France, Spain and Great Britain. It in-
creased through grain subsidies financed by agricultural workers in France, British smuggling and 
British investments, Italian and Spanish migration. Centuries before “globalisation theories” be-
came commonplace, events like depression in Spain were causing the collapse of the cotton indus-
try in Malta, and consequently, mass emigration from the Maltese Islands. Furthermore, the Mal-
tese fortress identity was forged because there were peoples who could afford equipping and main-
taining a mighty fortress in the middle of the Mediterranean, and those people could not have 
been the subsistence farmers and herdsmen of Medieval Malta. All of this lends support to the Hy-
pothesis of History-Laden Interdependence formulated in 4.1.5. 
4.3 An “Overpopulated” Nation of Emigrants: Malta under the British 4.3.1 FOUR POLICY OPTIONS WHICH TOOK MANY DECADES TO MATERIALIZE 
To be sure, the word “overpopulated”, mentioned above (section 3.3.2), brings to mind Thomas 
Robert Malthus and his correlations between (a) means of subsistence, (b) population size, and (c) 
disorderly population control through famine, disease and vice. In colonial times, Maltese and Brit-
ish Malthusians firmly believed that to avoid these three undesirables, one had to (a) increase the 
means of subsistence on the Islands (a1. via improvements in agriculture productivity, and/or a2. 
via industrialization, and/or a3. via subsidies and welfare hand-outs from London) and/or to (b) re-
duce the population size (via b-1. drastic changes in childbearing and/or b-2. emigration). They be-
came more concerned when they realized that two horrible cholera epidemics (in 1813 and 1837), 
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which were seen as lesser evils necessary to keep the population in check, did not really dent the 
constant demographic growth!  
Before we explore these policy options and see why they eventually whittled down to one — a dis-
orderly form of emigration — during most of the history of British Malta, we will simply note that 
while such a “Malthusian” analysis is helpful to understand both the Maltese reality and its inter-
pretation by colonial policy-makers and their critics, Malthusianism in general is an oversimplifica-
tion of human realities, especially when applied at the level of the total world population.  
4.3.1.1 Improvements in Agriculture Productivity 
We have made reference, above (section 3.1.2), to Lant Pritchett´s (2006) theory of “ghost” and 
“zombie” economies. After the 1813 cholera epidemic in Malta, the Maltese suddenly discovered 
they were living in a “zombie” country: their economy had collapsed but most didn´t have the 
money or education to leave the island in an organized way and find work abroad. The average 
farmer´s cotton harvest was fetching half the price it fetched in the late 18th century on the interna-
tional markets156; his wife and daughters were earning almost nothing from spinning or weaving, 
and things got worse if he planted food crops instead of cotton (Busuttil 1965, 52). His cousin´s car-
go ship, which was earning a lot of money in 1812 smuggling British wares into Italy was now 
banned from entering any port in the Mediterranean because of quarantine restrictions157. The co-
156 This was due to the Spanish ban on cotton imports and due to British economic incentives for Neapolitan 
and Egyptian cotton, which were causing economic hardship in their own colony in Malta. 
157 Some ports kept discriminatory “quarantine” regulations on Maltese ships for thirteen whole years after 
the 1813 cholera epidemic ended, because they felt Maltese shipping had become too prosperous during 
the war. At a time when the British had hegemony in Mediterranean, they let their own client countries and 
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lonial government was not offering him subsidized grain as some of the Grandmasters used to; ra-
ther, the first colonial governor started taxing grain imports (Price 1954, 4)158. Subsequently, when 
the economy fell into depression, he couldn´t find a construction job in the “City”. 
One possible option to deal with this economic disaster by increasing the means of subsistence 
would have entailed introducing modern farming methods in Malta and new cash crops. Slowly 
over the 18th century, the potato was introduced as a new cash crop, and farming utensils and irri-
gation systems (e.g. the construction of watermills) improved, but, in spite of being “low-tech”, 
Maltese agriculture at the time was probably the most intensive and the most productive in arid 
lands (which is why, very soon, Maltese immigrants started making fortunes in Algeria cultivating 
regions deemed infertile by French and German immigrants). In the 1820s and 1830s, one could 
also have maximized the use of land for agriculture159 or used the power of law to reduce the rents 
protectorates unjustly embargo shipping from one of their own colonies, and thus let the Maltese private 
sector collapse, rendering the colony dependent on welfare! 
158 This tax became the major source of inland revenue for the colonial administration. It was effectively a 
tax on the poor, since the wealthy Maltese families had a varied and balanced diet, while the poor Maltese 
ate little more than bread. 
159 Though some agricultural land was laying idle because of family quarrels on inheritance and landlords 
who were not motivated to make their land productive, nobody did anything to make this land available – 
the governor did not reform the rent laws, Maltese intellectuals expected the government to act, rather 
than their wealthy Maltese friends, and the Church did not speak out about lands lying waste. Nevertheless, 
the Catholic Church did become more vocal about social issues after Rerum novarum (1891). For example, 
Rev. Michael Gonzi was a senator of the Labour Party when he was nominated bishop of Gozo in 1924. Bish-
op Gonzi was very active in defending workers´ rights. He was knighted in 1946 for encouraging farmers to 
put their hoarded grain on the market to bring down the price of bread during World War II. However, after 
the war, as archbishop of Malta, he used all his influence to keep the (restructured and more radical) Labour 
Party out of power, but also pushed the centre-right National Party to adopt a social agenda inspired by 
Catholic Social Teaching. 
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being paid by the poor160, and very slowly, some of this did come to pass, later in the 19th century 
and in the 20th. All in all, however, these solutions were difficult to put into practice and could offer 
only a temporary reprieve. 
4.3.1.2 Industrialization 
A second solution, effective in the long term, could have been industrialization. The colonial gov-
ernment, however, did not promote industrialization or even technical education that would have 
aided industrialization; the colonies were not intended to compete with British industry, but to pro-
vide it with raw materials and consumers161. The university and educated classes maintained bloat-
ed and mediocre law and medicine faculties162 — which provided prestige but not profitable em-
160 At the time, some farmers could not pay their dues to the landowners and had their harvests seized; in 
1840-1841 the drought made several farmers indigent and, though 1842 was a good year, many farmers 
wished to emigrate. In 1843, land-rents were lowered by one-quarter and this reduced rural hardship con-
siderably; this reform gave some respite to the lower classes to recover financially, but the wealthier Mal-
tese starting earning less in rents and were less ready to invest in the Maltese economy. In the long run, this 
solution only postponed and slowed down emigration. 
161 Furthermore, British colonial economists expected the private sector to take the initiative but the Maltese 
people were not in a position to do so in the first half of the 19th century. The huge Maltese lower class did 
not have any savings to invest, and could not save money in the depression of the first half of the 19th centu-
ry; the tiny Maltese middle class was relatively thrifty but could save very little (Price 1954, 12–16). In any 
case, those who had some money saved up, including the handful of Maltese aristocratic and merchant fami-
lies, would not readily invest it in a risky economy such as the local one and would not put their money to-
gether in one big industrial investment or colonial venture (Price 1954, 24). If a big nation, such as Scotland, 
and its landowners could go bankrupt by putting all their eggs in one risky basket — as the Scots actually did 
in the 1690´s (Darien scheme) — how much more could the Maltese stand to lose if they invested their capi-
tal in risky local projects? In the early 19th century, the Maltese had invested in shipping, but that investment 
did not bear much fruit because of unjust and irrational quarantine laws in many Mediterranean ports and 
attacks by Greek privateers. Malta did not have a wealthy visionary like Francis Cabot Lowell who dared pla-
giarize British loom designs and convince his rich friends to lend him large sums of money to build mill towns 
in Massachusetts; nor does it have any permanent rivers to provide cheap power for industry. 
162 We could also include the Theology faculty: some tiny villages had dozens of priests and male religious, 
who, at times, celebrated concurrent masses on different altars in the same churches to earn a living. These 
men, however, were not only seeking prestige and the possibility of having an education. Their wisdom 
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ployment — instead of promoting and pursuing scientific, technical and commercial education. The 
lower classes had no savings to invest, and the Maltese middle class was too small and too risk-
averse to invest their limited capital on the islands. 
4.3.1.3 Welfare and Subsidies 
In the 17th and 18th century, during times of economic hardships, the Grandmasters used money 
from abroad to finance some new infrastructural project, and so create jobs. They had no intention 
of creating welfare dependency; they simply had enough common sense to realize that fortresses 
and naval bases do not usually have self-sustaining economies, and Malta was, for them as for the 
British, primarily a military outpost. The first British governors, who had seen a prosperous (for-
tress) economy bloom during the Napoleonic Wars, and wanted to prove their economic manage-
ment skills to an administration weary of military spending, chose to do nothing to stimulate the 
economy but burdened it with a heavy grain tax to balance the books: they staunchly believed in 
fiscal responsibility, balanced budgets, small government and laissez-faire capitalism. In the 1820s 
and 1830s, this meant letting hundreds of undernourished people beg, starve or die through infec-
tious diseases. The resources and the capital of public charities were quickly depleted, but instead 
of facing the facts, the administration castigated the “wasteful procedures” and “undeserving ap-
helped the people endure dire times, and when emigration became a buzz-word, hundreds of Maltese 
priests and religious (including nuns) accompanied migrant communities abroad and staffed Catholic mis-
sions all around the globe.  
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plicants” of such charities, and announced two sets of smokescreen “reforms” to rectify the “ineffi-
ciency” of these institutions163. 
During most of the 19th century, the Maltese craved for a large scale government stimulus package 
from Westminster to create jobs. Yet, this was too “Keynesian” for the British rulers of Malta in the 
first half of the 19th century, and even though the Maltese newspapers such as Il Mediterraneo 
were already quoting the economic theories of Melchiorre Gioia and Sismondo Sismondi (which 
were the precursors of Keynes in Europe) against Adam Smith as early as 1838164, the British stuck 
with the latter and believed that the best way to solve the economic crisis in Malta was to do noth-
ing and adamantly avoid deficit spending. They did not even help people to emigrate in an orderly 
fashion by promoting primary education and literacy in Maltese (let alone in English!) or providing 
capital to start a stable Maltese colony. Only later on in the 18th century, after many decades of 
misery, the governors165 began to question the libertarian ideology of their predecessors — mostly 
from a security standpoint, however — and were ready to spend some money on infrastructure to 
create jobs in times of dire need, so as to earn the loyalty of the natives of their military base in 
case of siege. 
163 Actually, the Royal Commissioners´ Report of 1836-8 admitted that the problem was not that the charities 
were wasteful, but that misery in Malta was real and the charities were seriously underfunded (Price 1954, 
11).  
164 See, for instance, Il Mediterraneo (Malta) of 5th September1838, 24th October 1938, 31st October 1938. 
165 It is easy for us to say, today, that a governor representing the top superpower should have found the 
means to create jobs in Malta. But even a succession of “Keynesian” governors with a lot of influence in Lon-
don could not have created a new economy ex novo in a few years. The alternative — making the Maltese 
economy totally dependent on British hand-outs and government initiative — was not desirable; in fact, this 
was the “solution” adopted by some of the later governors and was part of the reason why the Maltese were 
afraid of gaining independence in 1964. 
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4.3.1.4 Changes in Marriage and Childbearing to Reduce Family Size 
A fourth solution, also long-term, would have been reducing the rate of population increase; at the 
time, Malta was the most densely populated “country” in the world (960 people per square 
mile)166. One could imagine introducing drastic changes in marriage and childbearing customs, 
namely postponing marriage to the late teens, and using marital chastity and rudimentary birth 
control techniques after bearing a third or fourth child, to avoid further pregnancies. Of course, 
these novel and progressive ideas, which became discretely acceptable in rural Catholic France cen-
turies before they took hold in industrialized Protestant Britain, were not necessarily more counter-
cultural in a Catholic Mediterranean country than in Victorian London. Certainly, most Maltese at 
the time were very conservative and prudish on these matters, and resisted any attempt to intro-
duce calculating reason in their sexual and familial affairs. 
Indeed, all the solutions above were difficult or practically impossible to adopt in the political, eco-
nomic and cultural reality of the early 19th century. It would be anachronistic for us to expect British 
administrators, Maltese nobles and village priests to have behaved otherwise. In the short term, 
the only real solution was emigration. Actually, emigration did not reduce population density, espe-
cially since it happened mostly in a disorganized way, but nonetheless served to reduce excess un-
employment on the job market in times of crisis. Sustainable economic growth was only achieved 
166 The birth rate (between 1823 and 1842) was high at 35 per thousand, but indigence also assured a high 
death rate, such that the rate of increase (6 per thousand) was actually less than that of the UK at the same 
period (10 per thousand). Having large families was therefore common even in Northern, Protestant coun-
tries, and in the 19th century, the resistance of the Maltese to Malthusian imperatives (marry later, avoid sex, 
use birth control…) was not simply a question of being “Catholic” or “Mediterranean”. As we noted above, 
the culture change required by this solution was too hard to achieve in the 19th century, especially given the 
lack of effective and ethically acceptable family planning methods at the time. 
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after independence when the birth rate fell and the economy was diversified, and especially after 
the British naval base was closed and the economy was finally weaned from dependence on arbi-
trary military spending binges and drastic navy budget cuts by Westminster. The long-term solution 
which took shape after independence and turned Malta into a “Very High Human Development” 
country, involved a combination of birth rate decrease, industrialization and development of ser-
vices, sustainable government intervention through Keynesian stimuli and generous welfare 
schemes, clever use of Malta’s strategic position in foreign relations, and gradual economic and po-
litical integration in the European Union leading to full membership in 2004. 4.3.2 DISORGANIZED EMIGRATION AND THE DREAM OF FOUNDING A MALTESE COLONY 
4.3.2.1 One Hundred and Seventy Years of Forced Economic Migration 
Like many refugees and economic migrants today, the majority of the Maltese in the 19th century 
loathed the idea of leaving the islands, and some Maltese intellectuals at the time were vociferous-
ly claiming that there were other options besides emigration, that people did not really need to go 
through the pain of being uprooted to be able to feed their families (Attard 1983, chap. 1). In an 
ideal world, this might have been the case. But cases such as that of Malta in the 19th century illus-
trate that sometimes there are no real practical alternatives to mass migration. Indeed, Malta´s 
modern economic history illustrates the fragility of a small, non-diversified economy dependent on 
the bigger market players. It reminds us that globalisation and capitalist cycles of booms and busts 
have a long history. It helps us to appreciate some of the difficulties faced by migrant-sending coun-
tries and regions today.  
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Let us start with a quick overview. After the decades of misery which followed the end of the Napo-
leonic Wars, described above, depressions and booms alternated in Malta in the second half of 19th 
century167. In 1901, the British government decided to spend £1 million to equip the Grand Harbour 
with a breakwater and this meant a short boom (1903-6) with labour shortages in Malta filled by 
unskilled Spanish, Italian and African labourers (Price 1954, 190). Soon enough, the mega-project 
was completed, the workers were laid off and this lead to depression and mass emigration until 
World War I broke out, and offered another economic boom to the fortress economy. The Armi-
stice, of course, meant yet another depression as the naval base was downsized, and marked the 
beginning of what emigration scholar Lawrence Attard (1989) calls “The Great Exodus” towards the 
US, Canada and Australia. To be sure, many more people started leaving the islands than in previ-
ous decades, but the numbers were not that impressive. In the Roaring Twenties, after more than 
one hundred years of haphazard emigration from Malta and British rule, there was not one decent 
167 As we have said above, the Maltese economy was in a depression between 1813 and the late 1830´s, but 
started improving steadily during the early-1840´s with rent reform, the Mehmet Ali crisis in Egypt and some 
British investment in public works. As Westminster allowed the Maltese Government to reinvest more and 
more of its tax revenues in infrastructural projects, prosperity slowly returned to the islands, and then, with 
the Crimean War (1854-7), the economy boomed as the naval base created direct or indirect employment 
for practically all redundant workers. A slump followed the boom in 1857-8. Then came another period of 
prosperity (1859-65) when the local government decided to spend some of the money saved in the boom 
years on infrastructural projects, the naval base was kept busy with political turmoil in Italy, Greece and Syr-
ia, and the American Civil War raised cotton prices on the international markets. All of this ended in the mid-
1860´s, and the decline was compounded by three years of droughts in Europe (1865-7) that forced up food 
prices. The recession eased in the late 1860´s with bumper crops and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 
which increased entrepôt trade earnings in Malta. Rising food prices in Europe plunged Malta again into re-
cession in 1873-4, which eased in the late 1870´s; in the 1880´s booms and busts alternated with the Egyp-
tian crisis, as thousands of impoverished migrants returned to Malta in waves, and similar waves of British 
troops and reinforcements stopped in Malta on their way to the Nile. In the meantime, many farmers start-
ed replacing cotton with potatoes, which fetched good prices on the European markets. After another boom 
in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, depression returned in the mid-‘90s as new steamships were introduced that 
did not need to stop in Malta for refuelling on their way from Britain to Crimea or the Suez Canal. 
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scheme which allowed the Maltese to emigrate easily to English-speaking countries and other Brit-
ish colonies. In the Thirties, following the immigration restriction rules adopted after the Great De-
pression, a British Passport issued from Valletta was not “British” enough at His Majesty´s borders 
in British Canada or British Australasia (Attard 1989, 62f, 81f); meanwhile, US immigration law clas-
sified the Maltese as undesired “Southern Europeans” and set an initial quota of 14 immigrants per 
year (Attard 1989, 40). Thus, when World War II broke out, the strategist´s nightmare came true as 
the Italians and Germans besieged and blitzed the overpopulated fortress, devastating towns and 
infrastructure and bringing the population to the brink of starvation: of course British military ex-
perts had been predicting this scenario for decades, but migration management is very hard to im-
plement. In spite of all the hardship, however, the Maltese did not surrender.  
After the war, though some money for reconstruction was made available, the spending and per-
sonnel of the naval base and Malta Drydocks was quickly “run down” (i.e. downsized). Another se-
vere “run down” was set in motion by Westminster in 1957, and yet another one after Malta´s In-
dependence in 1964. The base, which since the 1800s had become the main source of direct and 
indirect employment in Malta, was eventually closed in 1979. Mass emigration accompanied these 
decisions; between 1958 and 1975, around 5,000 people were leaving the islands every year (out of 
a population of 305,991), such that the population actually decreased from 319,620 in 1957 to 
314,216 in 1967 (Malta National Statistics Office 2011). Canada, Australia, and the U.S (with its im-
migration system reformed in 1965), were the main magnets; finally after 140 years, the British 
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government offered a decent “assisted passage” scheme that worked168. Education in English and 
technical training at the Malta Drydocks equipped many of the emigrants for their new life abroad; 
those left behind were gradually integrated in the new industries which mushroomed in the 1960s 
and 70s. By 1985 emigration had dried out, and the population had reached 345,000. The Great Ex-
odus was over. 
4.3.2.2 Disorderly Emigration, Bureaucratic Indecision and Political Complexity 
We have argued, above, that irregular and risky migration patterns today reflect the general lack of 
political will to organize realistic migration schemes, or fair bilateral or multilateral migration man-
agement accords. The lack of political and legal frameworks makes certain people think that be-
cause of their irregular status, “these immigrants shouldn´t be here”. This is not so new in the histo-
ry of human mobility; it existed even before passports and travel papers became mandatory, and it 
was a problem even for people migrating between different parts of the one same empire in the 
past, with all the necessary papers and stamps. In many ways, the situation of Maltese migrants in 
the 19th and 20th century was similar to that of persons who today leave overcrowded slums in de-
pressed African towns and regions and end up in Malta, which, at face value, is not the “ideal” place 
one would want to emigrate to. Wikipedia, Twitter and GPS satellites provide useful tools to some 
21st-century migrants that should help them land “ideal” jobs in “ideal” countries, but the complexi-
168 It is calculated that between 1948 and 1967, 30 per cent of the population of Malta emigrated (Jones 
1973).  Over 140,000 people left the islands on assisted passage schemes between 1946 and the late 1970s, 
of which 57.6% migrated to Australia, 22% to the UK, 13% to Canada and 7% to the United States (King 
1979).  
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ties of the age-old reality of migration are ultimately political and ethical, and are not readily un-
tangled by technology. 
“The Maltese should emigrate someplace else.” This thought was not only on the minds of immi-
gration officers and of native traders and shopkeepers in North Africa put out of business by ag-
gressive Maltese competition (A. L. Smith 2006, 92). It was also on the pen of the colonial authori-
ties and journalists in Malta throughout this period (Price 1954). Some wanted the Maltese to stay 
in the Mediterranean, close to home, that they might return in better days; others wanted them to 
go as far away as possible and settle there permanently, claiming that there would be no better 
days until the “excess” population had been pumped out once and for all. Some wanted to use 
them to settle the vast under-populated expanses of the British Empire, and so fought to promote 
the English language and culture in Malta hoping that these poor villagers would ardently plant the 
Union Jack wherever they went; others retorted that Maltese culture was Italianate and Romance, 
and proposed emigration to Algeria, Brazil and Argentina, coupled with the active promotion of the 
Italian language in schools. Some pointed to the fact that the Maltese are a Mediterranean people 
who speak a Semitic Language and concluded that they should emigrate to North Africa; others la-
belled the Maltese “Orientals” and wanted them to settle on the Greek islands or in Turkey.  
Everybody nonetheless agreed that the Maltese should settle in big numbers in one or two places 
and found a stable “colony”, allowing for organized migration between Malta and its “major dias-
poras”. Yet nobody agreed where and how to send emigrants in an orderly way; nobody was ready 
to spend the money and effort to train prospective emigrants, select suitable candidates, lend 
money for the passage and help the pioneers survive the difficult first years until the colony be-
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came self-sufficient. Much ink was spilled on this issue, and several theories of migration were 
sketched in the process of seeking what modern scholars would call an “ideal” migration system, 
chain or process for the Maltese. The reality, which involved local, foreign and colonial politics, 
prejudices, fears, economic booms and busts at home and abroad, linguistic and cultural affinities, 
misinformation, false hopes and other human complexities, was indeed far from “ideal”, and assur-
edly difficult to account for using simple mathematical models.  
4.3.2.3 The Dilemmas of Migration Management 
We have listed, above (section 3.1.4), several theories of migration proposed and debated in the 
last 50 years or so, and mentioned the research being conducted today on transnational migration 
systems and networks. Migration management is, however, not as new as it sounds, and some of 
the ideas in these modern theories have been the object of migration schemes and heated political 
debates since the dawn of modern colonial ventures169, and possibly even in marketplaces of An-
cient Greece and Rome. As the history of Maltese migration schemes in the 19th and 20th century 
amply shows, past bureaucrats understood that economics is only part of a very complex human 
equation. It is unfortunate that so many migration scholars today still do not appreciate fully this 
complexity. The advent of modern econometrics, for many decades, often implied adopting over-
simplified models of the phenomenon to obtain workable mathematical solutions, and the shaky 
results of such “scientific” investigations have often contributed to impoverish and polarize political 
169 In Malta, even the Knights had considered the creation of Maltese colonies in Corsica and in the Caribbe-
an; for this reason, the Maltese navy actually occupied or bought St. Kitts, Saint-Barthélemy, St. Martin and 
Saint-Croix between 1653 and 1665 before surrendering them to bigger European powers (Price 1954, 36). 
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debates and led to half-baked policy decisions. Colonial migration experts were, maybe, less condi-
tioned by economic calculus and more versed in history, but that did not make their job any easier. 
Migration management was a very important task of colonial administrations in the 19th century 
which could be called the “century of indentured servitude”. In 1807, Britain ended slave trafficking 
and pressured other European nations to abandon the lucrative “triangular trade” system (export-
ing manufactured goods from Europe to West Africa, slaves from West Africa to the Americas and 
raw materials from the Americas to Europe); this system had meant significant forced labour migra-
tion from Africa to the Americas, and authors like Lovejoy (2011, 19) estimate that around 11.3 mil-
lion people were thus coerced to migrate before 1850. Slavery itself was abolished in the British 
colonies in 1834. The huge demand for labour in the colonies now had to be met by other means; 
mass emigration shifted to the agrarian societies of Asia and Europe as indentured labour replaced 
slavery. The recruitment of these contracted labourers was not always “free”170 and, in any case, 
many were forced to migrate due to increasing poverty in their home countries as the economies of 
Southern and Eastern Europe were restructured (making many agricultural workers indigent and 
hence “free” to migrate), and Britain and France forced Eastern nations to open up their markets to 
the mountains of cheap manufactured goods being churned out by their industries, causing great 
upheavals in the Asian economies. Potts (1990, 63–103) estimates that, in the years 1834 to 1941, 
the system of indentured labour involved between 12 and 37 million workers. Some of the labour-
170 One could mention here the kidnapping or “blackbirding” of Kanakas (labourers from the Pacific Islands) 
for work in the Australian plantations, and the Padrone system (widespread in Italy, Greece, China, Japan 
and Mexico) whereby parents sold or hired children into temporary bondage to a “padrone” (boss) who 
shipped them abroad and exploited their labour for many years before “liberating” them as settlers. Trans-
portation, employment and eventual settlement of convicts (e.g. in Australia) was another important form of 
forced migration in this period. 
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ers, such as the Indian and Chinese “coolies” were bound to work very hard by strict contracts for 
many years to “pay for their passage” before they could settle and own property; many were how-
ever motivated and highly productive, and hence this form of labour at times resulted even cheaper 
for employers than slavery (R. Cohen 1991, 10). 
In this wider context, we can situate the efforts of British administrators and Maltese intellectuals 
at the time. They were trying to catalyse, all through the 19th century, a process of “chain migra-
tion”, even though they were not acquainted with the transnationalist jargon in vogue today. Asian, 
African and Kanaka workers were not the only people on the move. Hard-working, adaptable and 
fecund Maltese (and Irish, etc…) natives were sorely needed to populate territories such as Canada, 
Australia and South Africa. Like some economists today, many imperial bureaucrats advocated (rel-
atively) free flow of labour and open borders, and even active government promotion of labour mi-
gration, at least within the British Empire. The cultural and political obstacles were nonetheless 
huge, even when it entailed something as simple and strategic as reducing the population of a tiny 
but important fortress to avoid rapid surrender (due to food shortages) in case of siege. The basic 
plan, in Malta, was to found one or more successful Maltese colonies or diasporas abroad which 
would have the cultural, social and economic capital to start a migration chain strong enough to 
siphon out tens of thousands of people from the islands. They believed that such migration, besides 
being necessary from a strategic point of view, would remove excess labour from the market and 
reduce unemployment, thereby raising wages, enabling savings, creating a large and prosperous 
middle-class and finally raising the living standards of all. They understood that population move-
ments are integral to developing world economies. They had read enough history to realize that 
whole continents could shift from being migrant-receiving regions to migrant-sending regions in the 
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space of one century: Europe itself needed immigration to recover from the depressions and 
plagues of the 14th century and then it needed to send thousands of emigrants to new, under-
populated lands when its population bloomed in the 15th and 16th century. They had figured out 
how migration chains allowed Europeans to re-populate the Americas through what Massey et al. 
(1999, 45f) call “cumulative causation” and were eager to organize similar migration systems for 
the Maltese.  
Yet, good will, erudition and great ideas are not enough. To set up the Plymouth Colony in 1620, 
the Pilgrim Fathers needed money and transportation, and the experiment almost failed due to the 
usual difficulties encountered in the first years. Scores of schemes for organized migration were 
drafted and proposed in the 19th century and in the early 20th century for the Maltese171, but very 
few were implemented and those few were badly planned, poorly managed and aborted before 
they could bear fruit172. Maltese migration schemes generally lacked the money, transport and ini-
171 Price (1954) provides details of many schemes hatched to promote organized Maltese emigration abroad 
in view of permanent settlement. Let us mention some of those which never materialized (with dates and 
proponents): Euboea (1834 – Governor Ponsonby), Australasia (Australia 1834 – J. H. Frere; Queensland 
1861-2 – Governor Bowen and Maltese investors; Queensland and New Zealand 1881-4 – Australasian 
planters), Western Cyrenaica or Tripolitania (1836 – C. Naudi; 1849 – Governor O´Ferrall; 1865 and 1869 – 
Emigration Committee of the Maltese Council of Government [the Cyrenaica scheme is very old and can be 
traced back to the first months of the French occupation in 1798]), West Indies (1825 – R. W. Hay; 1872 – 
Jamaican planters and Governor Grant), Crete (1885 – Governor Storks), Tunisia (1874-6 – A. Dingli and Mal-
tese investors), Cyprus (1878-80 – A. Dingli and Governor Borton; 1925-8 – H. Grisewood), Argentina (1924 – 
A. Cassar Torregiani and Argentinian government), USA (Floresville, TX and Malta, MT 1910 – Apostleship of 
Prayer). Military migration proposals to station Maltese regiments or battalions in some colonial ports (and 
so create migration chains between the families of Maltese servicemen and officers in Malta and at these 
“Maltese” posts) similarly did not materialize; various schemes included the West Indies (1834), Gibraltar 
and the Ionian islands (mid-1830s), Bermuda (1839; 1848) and Hong Kong (1854). Maltese youths interested 
in a military career were, in fact, offered better conditions by the French in Algeria. 
172 Some schemes did see the light of day, but were shut down and considered failures after some initial hic-
cups. The Cephalonia experiment (1826 – sponsored by Gov. Napier and promoted by Gov. Ponsonby) failed 
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tial support to take off. For this reason, chaotic population movement became the norm. Maltese 
individuals simply left the islands seeking a suitable place to settle or earn some money, often by 
trial and error. The easiest way for the Maltese to emigrate in the 1820s was to pay 2 shillings (4 
days´ wages) and get a passage to Djerba or Tunis on a Maltese speronera (trading boat), or else 
hitch a ride as a stowaway on a British ship heading towards the Ionian islands. From Tunisia they 
would move west towards Algeria (especially after French colonization in 1830) or east towards 
Egypt through Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, making money through odd jobs or “other means”. Those 
headed towards the Ionian Islands could end up in Corfu, Crete, Constantinople or Smyrna. Actual-
ly, some of the first emigrants were beggars and petty criminals allowed to “self-exile” by British 
authorities in Malta; they travelled undocumented and this irked British consuls in Africa and 
French authorities in Algeria (A. L. Smith 2006, 70). Some earned little fortunes exploiting work 
shortages and periodic economic booms in different Mediterranean regions and rushed back to 
Malta when threatened by anti-Christian or anti-Maltese riots, or when they had accumulated 
because the land given to the Maltese colony was in a very bad state and needed years of work to become 
fertile and productive; furthermore, the emigrants were badly selected and had little farming skill. Other 
small experiments (financed by sugar planters) in Essequibo (British Guiana, 1838-41), Hogg Island (British 
Guiana, 1839-41) and Grenada (1839-41) failed for various reasons: bad selection process, disease, demands 
for more benefits (e.g. free rations) than what was established in the contract, and in the end, breach of con-
tract by the Maltese labourers who felt they were being exploited. One of the most interesting schemes 
(that of settling large numbers of Maltese natives on Cyprus before massive Greek migration towards the 
island) was aborted because in 1879, while the negotiations were being conducted between the colonial 
governments in Malta and Cyprus, a Maltese investor, Vincenzo Fenech decided to finance a Maltese colony 
in a malaria-infested area near Larnaca and his investment quickly turned sour. Another scheme, financed by 
sugar planters in Queensland in 1883-4, offered Maltese agricultural workers around twice what they earned 
in Malta, but one fifth of what other Europeans earned in Australia. The scheme aborted when the Maltese 
immigrants refused to work as indentured servants at par with Kanaka labourers to pay their passage; rather 
than wait five years and settle as Europeans, most broke their contracts and left the estates to try their luck 
in Sydney (Price 1954, 178–84). The same problems occurred in the Brazilian experiments on coffee planta-
tions in Fortaleza and São Paulo in 1912-3 (Attard 1983, chap. 2). 
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enough money to live comfortably back “at home”. This type of emigration continued well into the 
20th century; small Maltese groups even settled in some parts of Palestine, in Beirut, in Sicilian and 
Spanish ports, and in Gibraltar. Furthermore, a sizeable community took shape in Marseilles, 
founded mostly by Maltese Algerians who moved to France and by direct migration from Malta. By 
the end of the 19th century, resourceful and adventurous individuals found their way beyond the 
Pillars of Hercules; small groups of Maltese emigrants were running vegetable shops in New Orle-
ans and working on the railway projects in California while others were trickling into Canada and 
Australia (Attard 1983, chap. 3). 
4.3.2.4 The Sociology of Disorganized Diasporas and Liminal Immigrant Communities 
As we have said above, this haphazard form of emigration was obviously far from ideal, and could 
not serve to reduce Malta´s population problem in the long run (Attard 1983, chap. 2). The colonial 
government in Malta did not offer a passage out of Malta (generally because Westminster would 
not allow this sort of expenditure), but offered a free passage back to Malta to those who were 
destitute or felt threatened abroad (this was a very costly form of “charity” but was condoned in 
London since it did not stand out in the accounts) — cf. Price (1954, 141–8). Many people who were 
prone to illnesses or ill-suited to start a new life in a new country simply left to escape misery in 
Malta. They were full of illusions of getting rich quick with little effort in fabled foreign lands, and 
soon found themselves in even greater destitution in the receiving countries deprived of a support-
ing social network; the British consuls had to return hundreds of people back, sometimes whole 
families who decided to emigrate without knowing anything about the promised lands across the 
sea. The little Maltese diasporas in the Mediterranean — with the exception of those in Algeria, and 
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for some time, that in Egypt — were too small and too mobile, and were not in a position to attract 
Maltese migrants out of the homeland permanently. They were not in a position to initiate stable 
migration chains that could relieve the demographic problem in Malta. In French Algeria, many of 
the Maltese who fared well accepted naturalisation, married non-Maltese spouses, and did not 
pass on any Maltese heritage to their children (A. L. Smith 2006, 59f; 119f). Considered to be the 
lowest in the ranks of the European colonizers and the inferior race among the Christians, Maltese 
Algerians tried their best to blend in, separate themselves from the new Maltese immigrant pau-
pers, and get rid (with limited success) of the very sticky and humiliating “Maltese” label. The same 
happened in the United Kingdom in the 20th century (Dench 1975, 207f).  
Serious hard-working emigrants settled and found it harder and harder to return as they became 
parents and grandparents, and sought to forget the misery of their youth in Malta; they consciously 
separated themselves from the “adventurers”. The latter migrants — as the caricature goes — were 
restless youth, who typically wanted to get rich quick and liberate themselves of the moral and reli-
gious strictures of the Maltese village, secretly hoping, however, to end their years of travelling at 
some point, and go back to Malta to flaunt their wealth, and sober up in the shade of some beloved 
and feared village belfry. Though it was not always easy to distinguish these two stereotyped 
groups of migrants in the first years after leaving Malta, we can say that after some time, most “se-
rious” emigrants preferred to disperse and assimilate, rather than stick together as a group with the 
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more restless newcomers, working hard to shed the bad reputation earned by the first Maltese 
“adventurers”173. 
Given the relative paucity of the “serious permanent emigrants” in the many receiving ports of the 
Mediterranean and the reluctance to venture beyond the “Inland Sea”, chain migration from Malta 
did not materialize (until the end of World War II). There was no Maltese community abroad capa-
ble of attracting and financing permanent emigrants from Malta in an orderly way in the 19th and 
early 20th century. By the late 1880s, according to Price´s estimates (1954, 139), around 25% of the 
Maltese population was living abroad, but, in general, the vast majority of those who emigrated to 
the Mediterranean countries returned to Malta174. With the advent of nationalist ideologies and 
decolonization, the small Maltese communities were expelled or “encouraged” to leave by confis-
cation of property and threats, e.g. in Corfu (1864), Turkey (1932), Egypt (1956), Algeria and Tunisia 
(early 1960s), and Libya (1956-65)175; many moved to Malta, Britain or France, or migrated again 
towards Canada, the US or Australia.  
173 Andrea Smith (2006), an anthropologist, finds the proliferation of “Maltese Algerian” associations in 
France quite intriguing. In a way, it can be seen as a form of compensation for the lack of a visible “Maltese” 
community in Algeria before the 1960´s, and a reaction of some of the Pied-Noirs to their parents´ conspicu-
ous effort to assimilate and become more French than the Algerians of French origin. 
174 Price (1954, 189) estimates that around 85% of those who emigrated between 1840 and 1890 returned to 
Malta. That is exceedingly high; Italian return migration in the 1890´s was around 50%, and that is consid-
ered very high by migration scholars. 
175 After Italy colonized Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, most members of the Maltese community in the territory 
of Libya refused to give up their British passports and apply for Italian citizenship. For this reason, they be-
came increasingly marginalised and during World War II many were imprisoned, shipped to Italy and placed 
in concentration camps. The main camp was mistakenly bombarded by the Allies, but after being liberated, 
they received little help from the British. When they were finally shipped back to British-controlled Libya af-
ter the war, they discovered that their costly loyalty to Britain was a very bad deal: they received practically 
no compensation for the property lost and confiscated during the war, and were treated worse than the 
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 4.3.3 LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF MALTESE EMIGRATION 
4.3.3.1 Disorganized Immigration is Not Necessarily the Result of Bad Governance 
When reflecting on immigration from poorer countries, many people today assume that the prob-
lem ultimately lies with the government of those countries and its mismanagement of the econo-
my. However, this is not always the case; economic mismanagement is, at times, the symptom, not 
the cause, of economic disasters with a very complex causality. In the 18th century, the local British 
colonial administration in Malta was authoritarian and paternalistic (Hough and Davis 2009), and 
often distant and phlegmatic, but surely not kleptocratic or incompetent176. The major problem at 
the local level was an obsession with balanced books and with rendering a military base economi-
cally self-sufficient, with no substantial external investment to rapidly industrialize the country and 
educate its people.  
Some governors did try to argue with successive British governments that such policies made no 
sense, but Westminster did not see the point of allowing its colonies to become economically inde-
pendent and better integrated. The more serious problem, thus, was not at the local level. Unless a 
colony was “rebellious” and needed military and infrastructural investments, wealth was supposed 
to flow only in one direction, towards London; loyalty to the crown was thus exploited and pun-
other Europeans. Libyan Independence and Gadhafi´s revolution meant that after three or more generations 
living in Libya, they had to leave the country for good (Cini 2012). 
176 The British governors, though they were not always brilliant leaders led by brilliant superiors, were up to 
the task of managing a small economy like that of Malta. To be sure, in the context of the early 19th century, 
their determination to make the Maltese economy run a surplus and to stick to Adam Smith´s theories to 
achieve economic growth, even while more and more people became destitute, can be labeled ideological 
obtuseness. Had they been more “Keynesian” and pragmatic, they could have spared the native population 
much suffering and hardship, but we would be anachronistic to demand this today, when most economists 
are preaching austerity and minimal government in the wake of the “Great Recession”. 
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ished as colonies like Malta were left alone to face decade after decade of misery. In hindsight, such 
reasoning seems very economically and politically short-sighted. But it did not come from incompe-
tent local authorities. It came from the “experts” who shaped the colonial policies of Great Britain, 
the major superpower after the Napoleonic Wars and, at the time, the most technologically ad-
vanced polity in the world. It is important to note, furthermore, this was not primarily due to per-
sonal evil of one person or group: there were big structural and social resistances that, in practice, 
excluded all the options which required a change of culture in Westminster (e.g. spending money in 
colonies like Malta to help them prosper in the long term) and a change of culture on the Islands 
(e.g. reforming the education system). The only remaining option was disorganized emigration.  
4.3.3.2 How Can We Spare Other Nations from Going Through the Same Ordeal? 
Rather than judge our ancestors, we would do better to reflect on how our generation is repeating 
the same behaviours and doing nothing to deal with the suffering of our neighbours; future genera-
tions may judge us very negatively on these matters. Free-market capitalism and its effects were 
relatively unknown in the early 19th century177 and colonial administrators often relied more on 
bourgeois domestic habits of “living within one´s means” rather than on the theories of Adam 
Smith. At the end of the 20th century, however, after centuries of economic and sociological schol-
arship on free markets, one would have expected the international community to have offered 
workable solutions to heavily-indebted and collapsed third-world economies in the 1980s and 
1990s; instead the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund prescribed “structural adjust-
177 Only in the 1840s did Great Britain adopt a less protectionist policy on the mainland, with the repeal of 
the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts. 
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ment programmes” that further increased misery and debt burdens, fomented political instability 
and violence, and provoked a massive wave of migrations of traumatized refugees and impover-
ished workers (Castles and Miller 2009, 53f; Marfleet 2005, 44f). Though local economic misman-
agement may be part of the problem, some of the most problematic economic short-sightedness 
today comes from wealthy countries and international institutions, just as it came from the top-
level colonial bureaucrats in the past. Transparency, accountability, democratization and clever pol-
icy-making are hard to foster on a local level when a whole population becomes cynical after spend-
ing decades waiting for international solidarity after an economic collapse, and being left in misery 
to fend on its own.  
If for many emerging countries, the 1980s was a lost decade, for Malta, the 19th century was a lost 
century in terms of economic and social development. The problem was not population growth in 
itself, but mainly the lack of will on the part of the colonial government to consistently grow and 
diversify the local economy and to manage emigration properly in the meanwhile. Malta is current-
ly one of the most densely populated countries in the world (1,322 persons/km2), but few would 
claim today that the country is “overpopulated”. Macau, Singapore and Hong Kong have a much 
higher population density and their dynamic economies continue to attract immigrants. Malta’s 
post-colonial economy has weathered the latest economic crisis quite well and will need immigrant 
labour in the near future, especially when Europe´s economy improves.  
Malta´s decades of mass emigration came to an end in the early 1980s. The Maltese still travel and 
migrate in small numbers, but no-one feels “forced” to migrate any more. High population density 
is not a problem. Few countries have a problem today welcoming potential Maltese immigrants. 
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Probably, the same will happen eventually for most emerging polities; the only question is how long 
we will have to wait until that happens. We could allow these countries to lose a century or more, 
as Malta did in the past. Or we could help emerging polities stabilize and grow their economies, 
clamp down on human rights violations, and offer a good standard of living to their citizens, while 
in the meanwhile offering viable and managed systems of labour migration to their people. Malta 
finally got that package between 1950 and 1980 after the Sir Wilfred Woods Report (1945-50): it 
suddenly got war reconstruction money (1947), better education, effective policies to modernize 
agriculture (1956 Acts), promote tourism (1958 Act) and industrialization (1959 Development Plan), 
assisted passage for emigrants (1948), and open doors in Australia, Canada and the US Intelligent 
late-colonial and post-colonial administrators like George Borg Oliver and Dominic Mintoff made 
the best of that package, and extended it after independence with development aid from other na-
tions until the British naval base was closed in 1979; despite their many limitations and defects, 
these men put all their energies into seeking solutions to the country´s problems. Malta is now in a 
position to help others.  
4.3.3.3 Practicing Solidarity with Others Today 
After 170 dizzying years of economic booms and busts, population blooms and mass emigration, 
Malta´s growing economy and declining demography today seem geared once again to attract im-
migrants, as in the heydays of the Knights. Yet, those 170 years have made the Maltese forget that 
they have always been a nation of immigrants, as we have argued in section 4.2, and that immigra-
tion did not stop in the last two centuries. Even during the times of mass emigration from Malta, 
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some immigrants arrived and settled on the islands178, even though many of them were refugees 
not settlers or labour migrants, and a good number eventually left given the economic situation at 
the time179. Like the inhabitants of all major port cities in the Mediterranean, the Maltese are in-
deed the sons and daughters of migrants, refugees, freed slaves, pirates, sailors, Jewish and Muslim 
converts, navy officers, colonial bureaucrats and dissolute religious men. 
It is crucial for the Maltese today to realize that the islands can be attractive to others today, as 
they were to their ancestors in the past. “How could these people want to stay here?” “Why don´t 
they go somewhere else?” “They obviously want to go to the US, or Canada, or the UK” This is what 
many Maltese persons say about the boat people arriving from Africa, often ignoring that hundreds 
of other workers are arriving by plane on tourist visas and finding work in Malta. Besides the xeno-
phobia that colours immigration debates in practically all the immigrant-receiving countries of the 
world today, the Maltese have other phantoms to face from their past: the ghost of Malthus claim-
ing that “the boat is full” and the spectre of 200 years of “zombie” economy. The spirit which is 
hardest to exorcize is however that part of the Maltese identity which is based on an interiorized 
fear of invasion and on the camaraderie of a garrison constantly on the lookout for an impending 
178 Starting in the late 19th century, a number of Hindu Sindhi families from north-western India started to 
settle in Malta to establish businesses through which they sold Indian and other Asian handcrafts in Malta 
(to the Maltese and tourists in high street shops, and to British servicemen on peddler-boats in the harbour), 
and bought Malta lace which they sold in Asia all over the British Empire through their family business net-
works (Falzon 2001). Some of these Indian families remained and integrated themselves well in Malta; oth-
ers moved to Britain or back to India. 
179 Many Italians sought refuge in Malta during the upheavals of the 19th century (O. Friggieri 2012), and es-
pecially during the Crimean War boom. Furthermore, an important group of around 1,000 Russian refugees 
arrived in Malta on April 29, 1919 with the Russian Empress and the royal family. Most eventually left but 
some settled in Malta (Malta Family History 2012). Some Sindhi Indian families came to Malta after the Indi-
an Partition in 1947, fleeing Pakistan (Falzon 2001). 
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assault: its voice echoes from around 60km of ramparts and fortifications scattered all over the is-
lands. Over the centuries, the garrison mentality allowed those families who settled the islands, 
coming from many races, cultures and religions, to blend together into a nation and forge an identi-
ty of their own. The question today is whether they can reshape that identity to welcome immi-
grants and refugees as a new generation of settlers, rather than cast them as a new brand of in-
vaders.  4.3.4 CONCLUSION: DUTIES WHICH FOLLOW FROM HISTORY-LADEN INDEPENDENCE 
During the final years of the Knights, Malta´s economy and culture was most closely linked to that 
of France, Italy and Spain. When Malta was handed over to the British in 1814, a new web of inter-
connections was spun; besides mainland Great Britain, Algeria and Egypt were the “closest” neigh-
bours in the 19th century (in socio-economic terms), but were eventually replaced by Canada, Aus-
tralia and the US in the 20th century. After Independence, Malta became more and more interde-
pendent on the European Union.  
Malta´s strategic position and peculiar history has meant complex and shifting webs of relations; 
other countries often have less links on their map. In most cases, however, history-laden interde-
pendence implies that there is a handful of polities which are expected to show solidarity and to be 
shown solidarity in a special way in times of crisis. The way interdependency takes shape is not the 
most important factor here, though former colonial powers who overexploited their colonies 
should see themselves obliged to be the most dependable partners of their former colonies in 
times of need. The most important thing for our present discussion, however, is that the interde-
pendency is clear and that it exists. 
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All this lends further support to the Hypothesis of History-Laden Interdependence formulated in 
4.1.5. We can combine this hypothesis with the Independence Thesis, and with the moral duties im-
plied by such interdependence to formulate the Principle of History-Laden Interdependence: 
Principle of History-Laden Interdependence: The rhetoric of national independence should 
not obfuscate the reality of interdependence of human societies, an interdependence which 
is not simply a general human reality, but one which is history-laden and takes different 
shapes as particular historical webs of relationships are spun between different polities. Poli-
ties closely linked in such a web to weaker polities have a higher responsibility to help those 
particular polities develop and to help their citizens in times of urgent need than do more dis-
tant polities. 
Applying this to the phenomenon of migration allows us to formulate the following priority rules 
based on History-Laden Interdependence: 
1. Immigrant Entry and Sojourn Selection Rule: Other things being equal, receiving countries 
have a greater duty to grant entry and sojourn to citizens of countries which are politically, 
socially and culturally linked to them through close bonds of history-laden interdependence.  
2. Immigrant Residency and Naturalisation Selection Rule: Other things being equal, receiving 
countries have a greater duty to grant residency and naturalisation to citizens of countries 
which are politically, socially and culturally linked to them through close bonds of history-
laden interdependence. 
We continue to reflect on these rules in the following chapters. 
C h a p t e r :  4  — P a g e :  253 
 
4.4 Independent Malta in the 21st Century: Once again a Country of 
Immigration? 4.4.1 IMMIGRATION IN RECENT YEARS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 
4.4.1.1 Immigration and Asylum in Malta Prior to EU Membership 
Until the 1980s, given the economic situation on the islands, immigration to Malta was limited. Be-
sides some investors, British retirees, returned migrants, professionals with special skills needed on 
the Maltese job market, and persons recently married to Maltese citizens, Malta allowed few other 
people to settle and to eventually apply for citizenship. Two notable exceptions were a few Sindhi 
Indians and some Libyans with business interests on the island. Occasionally, some persons reached 
Malta asking for asylum. For instance, in November 1972, one year after Malta´s accession to the 
1951 Refugee Convention, 362 Asian refugees from Uganda (expelled by Idi Amin) arrived in Malta. 
Given that Malta had signed the Convention and its Protocol with a geographical limitation180, Mal-
ta had no obligation to grant asylum to Asian Ugandans, but given the circumstances, it could not 
send them back to Kampala. It offered temporary protection for six months until the UNHCR pro-
cessed their applications and resettled them in other countries. The International Catholic Migra-
tion Commission (ICMC) in Geneva asked the Emigrants´ Commission of the Diocese of Malta to 
help the UNHCR with the processing of the applications, and for 30 years, this church body became 
the local Operational Partner of the UNHCR Branch Office in Rome. The Emigrants´ Commission 
helped boatloads of Albanians in the early 1990´s and more than 100 Kosovars in 1999 to get inter-
180 Cf. section 3.3.1.1, above. Malta signed the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol in 1971, recognising 
that in theory there may be refugees from all over the world, but limiting itself to grant asylum in Malta only 
to Europeans. This limitation was lifted on the 13th December 2001.   
                                                     
C h a p t e r :  4  — P a g e :  254 
 
national protection; it also worked in the shadows to help non-European asylum seekers who en-
tered Malta with tourist visas or were smuggled in by boat to get protection through UNHCR or for-
eign embassies, given that these persons could be deported if caught by the police. The Jesuit Refu-
gee Service in Malta also helped many people in similar situations, especially displaced Sudanese 
and Iraqi Christians, and put pressure on the government to lift the territorial limitation clause and 
adopt a Refugees Act with proper government structures to process asylum applications and grant 
asylum with all the corresponding rights to such persons in Malta.  
4.4.1.2 Policy Changes Linked to EU Membership 
For 30 years, however, the Maltese government made it very difficult for people to openly apply for 
asylum in Malta, and those who managed to get refugee status through UNHCR-Rome were 
pushed, by the lack of appropriate legislation and bureaucratic inertia, to approach foreign embas-
sies to be resettled abroad. Asylum seekers were not allowed to work legally (and risked being 
prosecuted for working without a permit), and yet were expected to survive and provide for their 
family with no provision of healthcare, education, housing or adequate income by the government. 
At the same time, Malta went out of its way to attract wealthy retirees and foreign investors (and 
their staffs) to reside on the islands. Then, under pressure from the EU, when negotiating the im-
plementation of Chapters 24 and 13 of the Acquis, the Maltese government finally drafted a Refu-
gee Act181, which was passed in 2000 and came into full force in 2002, after the establishment of 
181 Previously, asylum fell under the Immigration Act (1970). 
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the Office of the Refugee Commissioner in 2001 (Buttigieg 2011)182. This was followed by the insti-
tution of Detention Services (DS) in 2005 and the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS) 
in 2009183. 
Just a few months before Malta joined the EU in 2004, Council Regulation 343/2003 — the “Dublin 
II Regulation” — was adopted, and Malta was expected to adopt this regulation even if it was 
deemed overly burdensome by the Maltese government. Dublin II seeks to harmonize asylum in the 
EU and limit the movement and the number of asylum applications of irregular migrants using a 
simple principle: an asylum seeker is allowed to apply for asylum only in the country of first entry 
into the EU; they will be allowed freedom of movement in the EU only if granted refugee status and 
if caught in another country without such a status they will be returned to the country of first entry. 
This means, in practice, that a small border country like Malta which receives a relatively large 
amount of irregular migrants and asylum seekers (compared to its territorial extension and popula-
tion size) is expected to process a considerably large number of asylum applications, provide pro-
182 Mr Charles Buttigieg was the first commissioner; he was previously the Chairperson of the Refugee Sec-
tion of the Emigrants´ Commission of the Diocese of Malta. The current commissioner, Mr Mario Guido Frig-
gieri, is a former Jesuit and is married to an Albanian immigrant. The current director of AWAS (Agency for 
the Welfare of Asylum Seekers), Alexander Tortell, is also a former Jesuit who previously taught theological 
social Ethics at the University of Malta. Mr Ahmed Bugri, a protestant pastor originally from Ghana (who has 
Maltese citizenship through marriage) is the current director of the Marsa Open Centre for Migrants. It is an 
curious feature of Maltese politics and administration that people who belonged to Church organizations 
critical of the government´s asylum policies or who were personally affected by Malta´s immigration laws 
often ended up implementing new (and half-baked) policies regarding asylum and immigration, running new 
institutions with very limited resources, and being criticized by their former colleagues in faith-based NGOs 
and human rights organizations.  
183 For more details regarding laws and institutions in place, see Micallef (2006) and Amore (2007). K. Camil-
leri (2004) provides a good overview of the immigration, asylum, residence and employment laws and poli-
cies prior to, and at the moment of, EU accession. Other relevant overviews can be found in Calleya and Lut-
terbeck (2008) and Lutterbeck (2009). 
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tection to the applicants, offer welfare indefinitely (if needed) to those granted some form of hu-
manitarian protection but not refugee status, and eventually to deport “failed” asylum seekers and 
unwanted migrants, avoiding push-backs to unsafe third countries. In April 2006, the European Par-
liament (Resolution P6_TA (2006) 0136) declared that Dublin II and its effects are not acceptable for 
Malta, but since then, no solution has been offered apart from voluntary “responsibility sharing” 
(or “burden sharing”) agreements whereby some EU states have offered to resettle refugees living 
in Malta. 
Before 2002, when Malta was negotiating the acquis communautaire, the migrants were “invisible” 
(due to the institutional and legal vacuum, and the lack of political will to stop irregular migrants 
landing in Malta from “disappearing” from the Islands and “reappearing” somewhere in Italy). Fur-
thermore, the migration route from Tripoli to the little Italian island of Lampedusa was not well 
travelled, since safer routes were still in operation (Morocco → Spain, Tunisia → Italy). However, 
the Tripoli → Lampedusa route (passing through the Maltese Search and Rescue Region – SRR) 
steadily gained importance in the beginning of the 2000´s as one regime after another in the Ma-
ghreb region was cajoled, coerced and provided with equipment by its EU neighbours to clamp 
down on illegal departures of boats carrying migrants from its shores (Andrijasevic 2006). Maurita-
nia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia — countries ruled by repressive regimes, with a record of serious 
human rights violations and of torture of immigrants and asylum seekers — were suddenly labelled 
“safe third countries” by the EU and started receiving migrants and asylum seekers pushed back 
from Europe. These migrants were in turn pushed back to Sub-Saharan Africa (Del Grande 2008; Del 
Grande 2009a; Médecins Sans Frontières 2005), often deposited on militarized borders (e.g. be-
tween Morocco and Algeria) or at tribal outposts in the middle of the Sahara Desert (if not simply 
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abandoned and left to die in the middle of the desert). By the mid-2000´s, the Tripoli → Lampedusa 
route became the major route in central and western Mediterranean as the Libyan economy 
boomed and attracted hundreds of thousands of migrant workers, and Gadhafi was not willing to 
stop some of those migrants and asylum seekers from travelling north by boat. 
4.4.1.3 A Major Route for Irregular Migration in Central and Western Mediterranean 
As the route gained importance, more and more boats started to drift towards Malta184 or require 
assistance by the Maltese authorities185; some were rescued by the Maritime Squadron of the 
Armed Forces of Malta (AFM) or by commercial vessels, and landed in Malta. Between the 1st Jan 
2002 and the 14th June 2011, 13,029 persons applied for protection in Malta. The first reaction of 
the Maltese government was to set a policy whereby all persons who enter Malta irregularly by 
boat are immediately sent to a Detention Centre while their asylum application can be filed. Vul-
184 Malta itself is not a destination; for many immigrants it is a dead end which offers no access to mainland 
Europe but only detention, some years of work in small and harshly competitive labour market, and eventual 
deportation (M. Micallef 2006, 4).  Reaching the reception centre in Lampedusa, on the other hand, entails 
prompt transfer to Sicily or the Italian mainland, rapid release and unhindered overland travel within the 
contiguous Schengen Area. The Italians, of course, put little effort in keeping asylum seekers in Italy while 
their application is processed, as required by Dublin II, or in tracking them down to conclude the asylum de-
termination process and deport those not eligible for protection, especially if the migrants have left the 
country. That makes Italy an attractive entry point for labour migration into Europe; the problem, until re-
cently, was that Ben Ali had clamped down on departures from Tunisia, and that there is no way to get to 
Italy from Libya without passing through the Maltese SRR and risking being taken to Malta as soon as your 
shoddy and overloaded boat runs into trouble. 
185 The Italian coastguard practically considers all overloaded boats in its SRR as in danger of sinking and im-
mediately rescues the passengers. The Armed Forces of Malta (AFM)´s current practice seems to be the fol-
lowing: if the Maltese authorities encounter an overloaded boat with the engine running in the Maltese SRR, 
they do not rescue the passengers, unless given a very explicit signal of distress or noticing that the boat is 
about to go under; rather, they provide water, food and fuel hoping that the boat will make it to the Italian 
SRR and be rescued by the Italian coastguard. This politically opportunist practice is very risky and may cost 
lives, but the AFM claims it is thereby respecting the freedom of the migrants who prefer to live free on 
mainland Europe than locked up in Malta (Klepp 2011).  
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nerable persons are usually released rapidly, but others may be kept in detention for up to 18 
months while their asylum application is processed (the average stay in 2011 was around 6 
months). AWAS manages the “open centres” where refugees and persons afforded protection are 
housed after release from detention until they find a job and can afford to rent a place to live, and 
also provides food and lodging to irregular migrants while the government seeks the means to de-
port them.  
After a very bad experience in 2002 where “failed” asylum seekers were deported from Malta to 
Eritrea and were tortured and sent to hard labour camps by the government of that country shortly 
after arrival186, and several years of hushed push-backs of migrants to Libya, the Maltese govern-
ment became more keenly aware of its obligation not to return asylum seekers to non-safe coun-
tries, and to deport “failed” asylum seekers only if they can be returned in a dignified way (The 
Times of Malta 2009b). When this is not possible, these persons end up in a social limbo since, in 
theory, they are not allowed by law to work and to benefit from welfare, as those granted refugee 
186 Between the 30th September and 2nd October 2002, ignoring pleas by NGOs such as Amnesty International 
(2002b; 2002a), Malta ordered the repatriation of 223 Eritrean nationals rescued at sea; claiming, together 
with the government in Asmara, that they were army deserters, not legitimate refugees (Grech 2004). The 
Maltese authorities simply disregarded the fact that all Eritrean youth are by law conscripted for life (with no 
possibility of conscientious objection), and so, even if they leave their camp or the country for a valid reason 
(e.g. family needs, discrimination and extreme hardship during military service, fear of persecution) they be-
come deserters, and hence automatically subject to the regime´s torture and hard labour machine as soon as 
they are caught in the country or returned from abroad. After being detained and tortured in the prison of 
Adi Abeito, some of the “Maltese” deportees tried to escape, and were transferred to the maximum security 
prison on the island of Dahlak Kebir and left to dehydrate in the scorching heat, being given 1 litre or less of 
contaminated water a day to drink (Chyrum 2006; Human Rights Watch 2009). Others were sent to hard la-
bour camps, for instance in Gel’alo by the Red Sea where they were coerced to build a “hotel for tourists”, 
working barefoot in the desert with other Eritreans deported from Libya (Del Grande 2009b). Several per-
sons died, while some escaped and were again arrested, tortured and taken to the prison at Sawa (Chyrum 
2006). Others escaped again and eventually made it to Europe where they have been granted asylum and 
resettled in Canada, Northern Europe and Australia.  
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status or subsidiary protection do. These migrants may remain in Malta for many years before they 
can be returned to their country “in a dignified way”; in the meantime a modus vivendi solution has 
been found whereby “temporary humanitarian protection” (THPN) is given to some of these per-
sons187.  
Arrivals by boat peaked in 2008 when most asylum seekers arrived in small boats, but dipped con-
siderably in 2010 following an infamous agreement between Italy and Libya in which, after years of 
cajoling, Gadhafi´s government finally promised Berlusconi that it would take drastic measures to 
stop the boats leaving the Libyan shore or push them back from the sea188. Only two boats reached 
187 After living four years in Malta (i.e. after three years living out of detention and, usually, working irregu-
larly), and after the asylum determination process is completely terminated (2nd rejection on appeal), mi-
grants who cannot be promptly returned to their countries may be given a renewable one-year contract to 
live and work legally in Malta, on a case-by-case basis, at the discretion of the Refugee Commissioner. This 
“THPN” status is usually granted if the person can afford private accommodation in Malta, can communicate 
in English and Maltese and has been certified by the police to be of “good conduct and character” (M. G. 
Friggieri 2011). 
188 The agreement, signed in 2009, inaugurated the “Italian Pushback Policy” whereby migrant boats were 
intercepted at sea by the Italian coastguard and taken directly back to Libya without being allowed to make 
an asylum claim. Libya was deemed by Italian and European politicians a “safe third country” fully equipped 
to process asylum claims fairly, even though it was not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 
1967 Protocol and its police and army were widely known to commit rampant human rights violations. Fur-
thermore, the UNHCR office in Tripoli was not officially recognised by the Libyan authorities (in fact, its ex-
istence there was deemed “illegal” and its officials were expelled in June 2010 (The Tripoli Post 2010)). The 
Italians, nonetheless, claimed that Libya was signatory to the 1969 Addis Ababa Convention governing as-
pects of refugee problems in Africa, even though this convention provided no real protection for asylum 
seekers in Libya. On the 24th February 2012, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously found that 
the pushbacks constituted a breach of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights that prohibits 
“inhuman or degrading treatment”; it also found Italy´s argument that Libya was a “safe third country” in-
admissible and ordered Italy to pay compensation to several Somali and Eritrean asylum seekers (Sansone 
2012). One should note, however, that Italy and Malta had been discretely pushing back boatloads of asylum 
seekers and migrants to Libya for a number of years before the 2009 agreement. Tareke Brhane (2011) was 
pushed back by the Maltese authorities in 2006; in 2011 he escaped by boat once again, made it to Lampe-
dusa, and then published his harrowing experience of abuse in the notorious Libyan prisons (from which he 
was released when he became very ill and abandoned in the desert to die). Jesuit Refugee Service Malta 
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Malta in 2010, and only 28 persons applied for protection. The Arab Spring brought an end to this 
agreement. In 2011 the numbers shot up again as the Gadhafi regime allegedly pushed sub-Saharan 
Africans to cross to Italy en masse to create alarm in Europe and avoid sanctions189; Gadhafi 
claimed that he was the only one who could stop a “massive invasion” of Europe by Sub-Saharan 
African immigrants. Though the “invasion” did not materialize, a spike in arrivals was noted that 
year, especially after the insurgents in Libya started targeting black Africans and projecting them as 
“mercenaries” and “spies” serving Gadhafi, causing more and more immigrant workers to flee Libya 
by sea. By summer 2011, Italy and Malta were back in the “alien-invasion hysteria” and “asylum 
panic” mode of the mid-2000s. Meanwhile, the voyage became more and more deadly190. In 2011 
(2009) also published a number of personal stories witnessing to the abuse and torture of migrants and asy-
lum seekers in Libya, as has Asinitas Onlus in Italy (Segre 2008) and others.  
189 On the 7th March, 2011, while Britain and France were drawing up a resolution for a no-fly zone over Lib-
ya, more than 1,000 asylum seekers arrived by boat in Lampedusa in just 12 hours, two days after Colonel 
Gadhafi warned that Europe would be “invaded by thousands of migrants” if he were removed from power 
(Valdiguié 2011; Flanagan 2011). Harbour officials later claimed that after the no-fly zone was declared, mi-
grant workers were rounded up by the police in Tripoli, herded onto large boats and forced to depart to-
wards Europe; at least one such overloaded boat sank in Tripoli harbour claiming the lives of 200 people 
(Coughlan 2011). Gadhafi´s scaremongering echoed claims by the Italian Interior minister, Roberto Maroni, 
on the 2nd March, claiming that there were 1.5 million irregular migrants in Libya headed for Europe (Sac-
chelli 2011; de Haas 2011). Earlier, Franco Frattini, the Italian foreign minister, spoke of an “exodus of bibli-
cal proportions” with 300,000 people heading for Lampedusa and Malta (Frattini and Arachi 2011). Sure, 
there were about 1.5 million migrant workers in Libya at the time, lured by the construction boom there, but 
not guaranteed any rights or legal status by the regime (Hamood 2006, 19f); very few of these persons were 
transit migrants heading for Europe (Bredeloup and Pliez 2011). Needless to say, the immigrant tsunami did 
not materialize. According to the European border control agency, Frontex, migration flows from Libya along 
the Central Mediterranean Route actually stopped for many months after Gadhafi´s regime fell (Frontex 
2012, 5), and despite having echoed Maroni and Frattini´s estimates in early 2011 (Euronews 2011), the 
agency finally admitted that many of the migrants had “been forcibly expelled from Libya by the Gadhafi re-
gime”, and so were not originally transit migrants headed for Europe (Frontex 2012, 5). 
190 In May 2007, a boat carrying 53 people was spotted and photographed by AFM aircraft but then went 
missing. In August 2008, an AFM boat rescued 7 survivors from a semi-submerged dinghy; the other 71 pas-
senger had perished. Italian journalists like Gabriele Del Grande (2008; 2009a) have documented several in-
cidents of tragic loss of life at sea in recent years. 
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alone, counting only confirmed cases, more than 1,500 lives were lost in the Mediterranean (Strik 
2012, 6). On more than one occasion, Italy and Malta challenged each other on who should take in 
migrants who were stranded, in distress or had just been rescued by unequipped private third par-
ties in the Maltese SRR but very close to Lampedusa191. While the political authorities bickered, mi-
grants were left to cling to tuna pens for days and some even died from dehydration, being denied 
timely life-saving medical attention192.  
191 To further enhance safety at sea, amendments were adopted in 2004 to the 1979 International Conven-
tion on Search and Rescue (SAR) and 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), plac-
ing more responsibility on the country manning a particular SRR. Malta raised objections to these amend-
ments, claiming that they could be interpreted as imposing on a state the obligation to disembark rescued 
persons on its own territory and offer assistance to all those rescued within its SRR; the previous versions of 
the treaties demanded only that the country coordinate search and rescue efforts in its assigned region and 
the practise was to take the rescued persons to the port of call closest to the reported incident, whatever 
country that port belonged to (cf. Amnesty International 2009; Klepp 2011). In practice, given the size and 
shape of the Maltese SRR (which stretches from Tunisia to Greece, and harkens back to a time when Malta 
housed one of the best-equipped military bases in the Mediterranean), most incidents reported in this re-
gion occur closer to Lampedusa, Tripoli or the Tunisian coast than to Valletta. Malta has therefore refused to 
ratify the amendments, claiming that the older practice makes more sense to deal with emergencies, that its 
bigger neighbours are better equipped to launch rescue operations close to their shores, and that the obliga-
tion (following the Dublin II regulation) to process asylum claims and offer protection and welfare to all ir-
regular migrants found in distress in its SRR is overly burdensome, given Malta´s limited resources. Italy, 
however, has ratified the amendments and has on various occasions sought to disembark in Valletta persons 
rescued close to Lampedusa but within the Maltese SRR. Italy has suggested that Malta reduce the size of its 
SRR and transfer some of its SAR responsibility to its neighbours, but Malta has refused to consider this, giv-
en that the SRR corresponds geographically to the Flight Information Region (FIR), from which Malta is earn-
ing around € 8.23 million per year (Klepp 2011, 545). Nonetheless, if Malta were to equip itself and take up 
wholeheartedly its SAR responsibilities under the 2004 amendments and its asylum responsibilities under 
Dublin II, this would probably cost much more than what it rakes in from its FIR.  
192 In May 2007, 27 immigrants were left clinging to tuna pens on the border between the Libyan and Mal-
tese SAR since the Maltese trawler towing the pens refused to take them onboard. They were eventually 
saved by an Italian vessel and then, for three days, the three neighbouring countries refused to take them in; 
meanwhile, one person died of dehydration (Viviano 2007). In mid-April 2009, Malta refused to accept 140 
migrants rescued by a Turkish vessel in the Maltese SRR, claiming that the nearest port of call was Lampedu-
sa and instructing the vessel to take them there. Italy resisted but finally gave in after 4 days, when European 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso intervened (Pop 2009). Later that month, Italy refused to let a 
Maltese military vessel disembark 66 migrants on Lampedusa; they were rescued in the Maltese SRR, but 
only 23 miles from Lampedusa. In May 2011, 61 immigrants died at sea while Italy and Malta ignored their 
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4.4.1.4 Mandatory Administrative Detention in Malta 
It is important to note, at this point, that there were many other foreigners in Malta during this pe-
riod, having come by plane or ferry on a tourist or student visa; a good number found employment 
in the shadows and overstayed their visas as construction and tourism boomed with accession to 
the EU; their presence was tolerated and their work was useful to raise productivity and prevent 
excessive inflation. Recent statistics show that 66% of foreign workers in Malta come from the EU 
and only 7% of the workforce hails from sub-Saharan Africa (Debono 2013). Yet the boat people, 
mostly of Sub-Saharan African or Asian origin, were systematically detained in sub-standard condi-
tions (in dilapidated colonial-era barracks)193 for up to 18 months, treated as criminals and at times 
denied prompt access to urgent medical treatment. Protests by the detainees were quelled with 
excessive force by poorly trained and equipped soldiers, police officers and later by detention ser-
vice staff. Dark-skinned people walking the streets (even tourists) were typically seen as clandestine 
migrants and “bogus” asylum seekers.  
Even so, in this period, around 60% of the boat people were actually given refugee status or subsid-
iary protection. The government thereby implicitly admits that most of these persons violated im-
distress signals and refused to rescue them and while fishing boats and NATO ships from 6 countries (which 
were intensely patrolling the area to enforce an arms embargo) passed by and “saw nothing”. Given that the 
first distress signal came from the Libyan SRR, it seems that everybody expected that the Libyans should take 
care of it, yet nobody even bothered to inform the authorities in Tripoli: Libya was in the midst of a civil war, 
under embargo, and had no SAR capacity. By the time the boat drifted back to the Libyan shore, almost all 
the passengers had died of dehydration and starvation (Strik 2012). In June 2012, another incident was re-
ported where a rubber dinghy with 55 immigrants from Libya was left to drift for 15 days in one of the 
world’s busiest shipping lanes: the vessel eventually ran ashore in Tunisia with a sole survivor (Connett 
2012). 
193 There are three detention centres, situated on the island of Malta in Ta’ Kandja, Floriana, and Safi (Bar-
racks). 
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migration laws out of necessity to seek safety, and are not criminals. Furthermore, this high rate of 
protection (compared to 25% average in the EU-27) is a tacit admission that the horror stories told 
by most of these asylum applicants are true or credible. Most people seeking asylum in Malta do 
indeed come from conflict zones or places where they reasonably feared persecution and under-
went traumatic experiences in their countries of origin and in transit countries. When we combine 
this with the fact, based on empirical evidence, that detention of traumatized persons in sub-
standard conditions for several months only serves to further damage their mental health (Jesuit 
Refugee Service - Europe 2010), we recognise that automatic detention as currently administered in 
Malta is seriously unethical, and furthermore economically and socially dangerous and unsustaina-
ble (Vella 3003). The authorities however defend the current practice saying it avoids homelessness 
and destitution (and related crime), allows for a staggered release into the community and is re-
quired to conduct medical checks and so to avoid the spread of infectious diseases; some honestly 
seem to believe that it is ultimately necessary to combat human trafficking and smuggling and to 
identify terrorists, and serves as a deterrent to reduce irregular economic migration (K. Camilleri 
2003, 12–14).  
Over the last 10 years, the government has gradually poured more money into the protection of 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants; some improvements to the conditions of detention and to 
the quality of housing in the Open Centres have been made, but the conditions, length and the very 
practice of administrative detention have been harshly criticized year after year in a host of reports 
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by organs of the UN, European Institutions and international NGOs194. For instance, in June 2011, 
Thomas Hammarberg, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2012), report-
ed that the policy of mandatory administrative detention of migrants and asylum-seekers was “ir-
reconcilable with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law 
of the Strasbourg Court”. Hammarberg also joined a long list of high-profile visitors in criticizing the 
living conditions in reception centres for migrants, which, when compared to the decent accommo-
dation offered to convicted criminals at the Corradino prison, have become the shame of a nation 
which used to be lauded for its human rights record. The government has responded to the criti-
cism by taking a very defensive tone and pointing to improved administrative procedures which al-
low more rapid release of immigrants from detention. These changes, though welcome, are not en-
shrined in law and can be overturned at any moment (DeBono 2011, 149). 4.4.2 IRREGULAR MIGRATION TO MALTA: FACTS, HYPE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
4.4.2.1 Is There an “Immigration Crisis” in Malta? 
In terms of raw volume, Germany, the US and the UK are the only wealthy Western countries in the 
world’s top ten refugee hosting states, and they are dwarfed by countries like Pakistan (with almost 
2 million refugees, or people in refugee-like situations). Malta has the 7th highest number of refu-
194 These include reports by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2004; 2006; 2012), 
the International Federation for Human Rights – FIDH (2004), the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) of the European Parliament (Catania 2006), the European Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – CPT (2007), the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (2007), Médecins du Monde (2007), Médecins Sans Frontières (2009), the Working Group on Arbi-
trary Detention of the UN Human Rights Council (2010), Jesuit Refugee Service – Europe (2010), the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists (2012), the International Detention Coalition (2012), Human Rights Watch 
(2012), and annual reports by Amnesty International over the last decade. 
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gees per 1000 inhabitants (but Jordan has 5 times as many). When adjusted to GDP, it is clear that 
the burden of hosting refugees is mainly being carried by the poorest nations (UNHCR 2011, 78f; cf. 
Castles and Loughna 2003, 4)195.  
In Malta, the total cost of the detention system and of temporary housing and welfare for released 
detainees rose from € 1.9 million in 2002 to € 12.2 million in 2010 (Caruana 2011), out of a total of 
€ 1,220 million in social expenditure (Malta National Statistics Office 2012). While light-skinned ir-
regular foreign workers who arrive by air or ferry contribute to the economy, rent their own hous-
ing, pay Value Added Tax, do not make use of Maltese welfare and do not go through the detention 
system, darker-skinned boat people are detained in conditions that breed dependency and PTSD-
related depression. When released from detention and placed in Open Centres, most of these per-
sons are inserted into a parallel and defective welfare system which does not really encourage 
them to find work and private housing, if not by perverse means (e.g. placing them in torn tents 
during winter).  
Authors like Mainwaring (2012) have shown that the “crisis” narrative which keeps administrative 
detention in place in Malta is actually creating a crisis that would otherwise not exist. Rather than 
helping them integrate themselves into the community and the marketplace, the authorities con-
sciously project, to those who are granted refugee status or subsidiary protection, a very depress-
195 In the year 2010, the following were the countries holding the most refugees and people in refugee-like 
situations (in descending order of absolute numbers): Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Germany, Jordan, Kenya, Chad, 
China, US, UK; (in descending order of refugees per 1000 population): Jordan, Syria, the Republic of Congo 
(Brazzaville), Chad, Montenegro, Djibuti, Malta, Iran, Pakistan, Kenya; (in descending order per US$ 1million 
GDP): Pakistan, DR Congo, Kenya, Chad, Syria, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Uganda, Iran, Tanzania (UNHCR 2011, 
78f). 
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ing image of the country and its ability to welcome foreign residents. They seem to be trying to 
convince the refugees that their only hope lies in resettlement in wealthier countries. To be sure, 
the promise of imminent resettlement elsewhere, together with dependency and depressions car-
ried over from detention, prevents many of these refugees from seriously seeking to integrate 
themselves in Malta, find work, and establish their roots in the country as productive residents. 
Many in fact remain in the Open Centres, afraid that they would not be given housing and welfare 
were they to leave, rent private housing and then lose their job.  
The Maltese government expects the EU and international community to pay for what Malta 
spends warehousing unwanted migrants, or else to take charge of these persons and resettle them 
elsewhere. Given that the number of arrivals by boat has surged since Malta joined the EU, most 
Maltese see this as a problem caused by the EU which should be resolved by the EU The general 
idea is that Malta joined the EU to reap the benefits, not to shoulder the costs; many Maltese argue 
that this is not “crass egoism” but simply “fairness”, since Malta is less prosperous than Germany 
and France. This self-interested attitude is further compounded by the anger that surrounds the 
Dublin II regulation and the way it was approved by the EU-15 just before the 2004 expansion. As 
noted above, Dublin II puts most of the burden of housing irregular migrants on border countries, 
namely, Spain, Italy, Greece and the 10 (+2) new members of the EU; it was rapidly approved a few 
months before the 2004 expansion (before any of the 10 new members could veto it) and seems to 
follow the ensuing logic: the EU core countries will now receive European workers and immigrants 
from the EU periphery (Germany from Poland…) but the periphery has to deal with irregular mi-
grants from outside the Union (Poland from Ukraine, Malta from Africa…). Given these attitudes 
well-entrenched in its administration, Malta now grudgingly takes in irregular migrants and pro-
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cesses their asylum applications according to Dublin II, but places their wellbeing and human rights 
at the very bottom of its list of social priorities. It interprets its responsibilities in international law 
in the most minimalistic way possible, and actually, many Maltese think that irregular migrants do 
not have human rights since they shouldn´t be here in the first place (DeBono 2011).   
4.4.2.2 “Family Values” and Human Rights in an “Invasion” Narrative 
In a very “Catholic” country that upholds family values, these people “are not part of the family” 
(“m´humiex ta´ ġewwa”), and unlike the Maltese citizens who are disabled, homeless, poor, or even 
convicted criminals (whose rights are well recognised and honoured by Maltese society), irregular 
immigrants are seen not as subjects of rights but merely as objects of supererogatory charity (DeB-
ono 2011). When told by international journalists that there are too few toilets in the detention 
centres, or that immigrants spends months crammed in overcrowded halls with no privacy in bar-
racks or tents (which are sweltering hot in summer and frigid in winter), many Maltese retort that 
“They should be thankful! At least here they have toilets here in Malta, not like in Africa!” or “Why 
are they complaining? Before they were living in the jungle, and now our government is taking mil-
lions from the mouths of our kids to put a roof over their head!” Then, if someone notes that even 
very poor Africans have a sense of dignity, hygiene and personal space — that Africa is not as appal-
lingly poor and shockingly underdeveloped as some Maltese missionaries present it to be — the 
answer is that if Africans are not totally desperate and miserable, then they are even less deserving 
of the pity and charity meted out but the Maltese taxpayer. 
Past and present ministers of Justice and Home Affairs like to repeat ad nauseam a host of statistics 
to prove their thesis that Malta is overwhelmed by irregular immigrants (Catania 2006, sec. 4). To 
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make the unimpressive numbers (a few hundred people per year) seem huge, they note that when 
compared to population size, one irregular migrant landing in Malta is equivalent to 205 entering 
Germany, and that the average arrivals of boat people per year is equivalent to 45% of the Maltese 
birth rate. The same politicians are less eager to mention the real numbers, and the fact that most 
of these migrants actually leave Malta after a few years. Between March 2002 and March 2009, 
there were 12,500 arrivals of irregular migrants; of which some 7,000 have departed (according to 
experts like Martin Scicluna, who advises the government on the issue of immigration). Some leave 
through resettlement programmes and some through repatriation (Malta repatriated 2,958 immi-
grants between January 2004 and September 2008), but most leave of their own accord (The Malta 
Today 2009). 
Why do these politicians indulge in giving the impression of a constant invasion, and in repeating 
alarming and skewed statistics that foment panic and xenophobia? In fact, the statistics serve as 
part of a fallacious moral argument from “extreme emergency” to the effect that Malta is over-
whelmed and cannot protect the human rights of these people.  The thesis, expressed in not-so-
diplomatic terms, is that the conditions in the detention centres and open centres are appalling be-
cause Malta cannot afford to spend so much of the national budget on such a “huge” number of 
unwanted aliens: if the EU and UN really care for their human rights, they should write the Maltese 
Government some fat cheques, and Malta will surely fulfil its international obligations. The more 
obvious solution — abolish administrative detention, set the migrants free, give them access to the 
labour market, and provide decent welfare only when they need it — seems unthinkable to most 
Maltese and their political representatives, lest the 40% who do not qualify for protection (the 
“economic migrants”, “illegals” or “klandestini”) compete with the Maltese for jobs, and lest the 
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60% who actually qualify (and have a right to freedom and jobs) decide they like Malta and want to 
stay. The false dilemma can be framed in these terms: “if we detain them, we cannot afford to de-
tain them in decent conditions, if we let them free, they will take our jobs and make us poor, hence, 
in any case, Malta cannot afford to help these people”.  
4.4.2.3 Xenophobia and the “Necessity” of Detention 
When seen from outside, it is hard to believe that the real problem here is economical and not one 
of racism: when Malta joined the EU in 2004 it opened its tiny job market to hundreds of millions of 
people, hardly blinking an eye (Debono 2013). The Maltese do not feel threatened by the tens of 
millions of jobless Spaniards and Greeks who could come over to their sunny and economically re-
silient islands legally whenever they wish, and apply for jobs; they get hysterical when told that a 
few hundred irregular dark-skinned migrants should be released from detention and allowed to 
contribute to the Maltese economy, even if they know that these migrants often take up jobs that 
the Maltese, Spaniards and Greeks no longer want to do. When seen from the inside, it is under-
standable that such economic fears do have purchase in a country which prospered in the last 25 
years or so after two centuries of economic woe, and is jealous of its hard-earned wealth. Nonethe-
less, one expects a people enlightened by their history of mass labour emigration to show more 
sympathy for refugees, and indeed, for economic migrants.    
The result of these short-sighted policies, dictated by political opportunism and fear of the stranger, 
is interesting to note. The “necessary” detention system, in fact, serves nobody. After a few 
months, all the detainees are released. Such, a system, obviously does nothing to “protect the Mal-
tese worker from competition from the migrants and cannot dissipate the fears of job competition 
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harboured by many blue-collar Maltese workers. Furthermore, most immigrants see the detention 
system as merely a form of punishment for having entered Europe illegally (a chastisement in most 
cases undeserved, and even harmful to these persons´ physical and mental health196). The obvious 
solution, here, is educating the Maltese, not punishing the immigrants197. Unfortunately, like most 
of their counterparts in developed nations, Maltese politicians and — to some extent, even Church 
leaders198 — have not showed enough leadership and resolve to confront these fears, explain why 
these people are here, admit that the “problem” is not going to vanish through any amount of po-
litical magic or wishful thinking, argue convincingly that there is space on the Maltese islands and in 
the Maltese job market for at least some of these people to stay on and eventually become Maltese 
citizens, and educate consciences on human rights and the value of diversity. 
Politicians and journalists have a moral responsibility to bust myths and challenge misinformation 
(International Organization for Migration 2011). For instance, one should note that as more and 
196 Some authors have studied the effects of detention on Somali women in Malta, who continue to be “pun-
ished” by the system even after legally accepted and released (Gerard and Pickering 2012). 
197 Clever and farsighted political leadership, when faced with an issue like immigration, recognises that the 
“situation” is here to stay, and tries to help citizens to understand the reality and face it. A good example is 
the way British government propaganda in the 17th century prepared the country to deal with the arrival of 
thousands of Huguenot refugees (Marfleet 2005, 102f).  
198 With the exception of the occasional strong-worded homily by the bishop of Gozo touching on the human 
rights of migrants (e.g. The Times of Malta 2009a), the Maltese Bishops´ Conference has generally avoided 
condemning xenophobia, administrative detention, job discrimination against foreigners and the lack of ef-
fective and just policies concerning the integration of migrants. When the Jesuits and their staff at JRS-Malta 
suffered multiple arson attacks in 2006 (cf. Farrugia 2006), the bishops expressed sympathy with workers of 
Catholic NGOs which promote the rights of migrants, but did not use the occasion to promote the same 
rights, values and Catholic Church teaching that inspired these workers and religious. In 2012, after an asy-
lum seeker died in police custody, the bishops finally issued a statement questioning the detention system as 
currently implemented. While the bishops have not shied away from writing harsh and ill-timed pastoral let-
ters on delicate topics such as the sinfulness of in-vitro fertilization techniques, and ordering them to be read 
in all Sunday masses around the country, they seem to have opted not to disturb ignorant or morbid con-
sciences on the topic of immigration. 
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more irregular migrants and migrants from EU entered the labour market in Malta, unemployment 
actually fell from 8.42% in July 2003 to 5.81% in December 2007, and after a moderate increase due 
to the global recession dipped further to 5.78% in April 2012 in spite of the Eurozone crisis. In the 
second quarter of 2012, Malta´s unemployment rate was almost half the EU-27 average (EUROSTAT 
2012, 5); if Malta wasn´t at full employment between 2008 and 2012, the reason was not irregular 
migration but the global recession. 4.4.3 MAKING INTEGRATION DIFFICULT 
4.4.3.1 Suspended Lives 
In the long term, the anger against the Maltese, the depressions and the respiratory illnesses that 
accompany many who leave the detention blocks and open centres do not bode well for the inte-
gration of those 60% who — being eligible for international protection — have a right to stay and 
work in Malta, particularly when they proceed to look for a job and rent a house. Indeed, a certain 
number of the “good and deserving” immigrants are damaged by the system and find it hard to get 
a stable job. For many years, they live suspended lives, hoping they might soon be resettled in some 
wealthier country and unsure whether they should make the effort to integrate or to attach them-
selves to Malta and its people (Galea Debono and JRS-Malta 2010).  
In contrast, the “bad” immigrants, or failed asylum seekers (those “economic migrants” who are 
vilified daily on the websites of local newspapers with bile-filled commentaries and blogs), given 
that they have less problems with trauma and do not live in the dream of being resettled in Won-
derland in a couple of days´ time, tend to leave the open centres promptly, find work and housing, 
and learn Maltese. They have to prove themselves to the authorities, since staying on in the coun-
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try is a concession, and they often come to behave as model residents. They could be deported any 
time; in fact they are not promptly deported mostly for economic reasons (given that their work is 
useful for the country and the government cannot afford the return flights without EU financing) 
but sometimes for humanitarian reasons (given that they cannot be returned to their countries for 
the time being – e.g. during a revolt or immediately after a natural disaster) – in this latter case, 
they are granted THPN, under certain conditions. However, the insecurity that they could be re-
turned to their countries in the not-so-distant future seems to be less paralysing than the vague 
promise — made to refugees who are entitled by law to stay indefinitely and eventually become 
Maltese citizens, and to those enjoying subsidiary humanitarian protection — of being resettled in a 
wealthy country. 
4.4.3.2 Temporary Protection or an Admission that Integration is Happening?  
It is, of course, very hard to get rich quickly in a country like Malta with no natural resources and a 
tradition of poorly-remunerated long-hour work shifts in unskilled labour, especially for a dark-
skinned foreigner starting at the very bottom of the social ladder and often a victim of wage dis-
crimination. However some immigrants have started to realize that the low unemployment rate 
and the generous welfare system of the Islands offer a much better future for their families than 
life in their home countries. Furthermore, a minimum wage in Malta (with free healthcare and free 
education for one´s children up to college level) could actually be better than destitution in a 
wealthier country. A study conducted by the Maltese Refugee Commissioner´s Office (M. G. Friggi-
eri 2011) of 847 persons given Temporary Humanitarian Protection (basically the “economic mi-
grants” – the least wanted of the unwanted migrants) shows that 89% of these persons have found 
C h a p t e r :  4  — P a g e :  273 
 
independent housing in 53 different localities (compared with 57% of refugees and 42% of persons 
given subsidiary protection – many of whom continue living in Government-financed “open cen-
tres” concentrated in one area in the south of Malta). Only 3% have a tarnished police conduct rec-
ord, mostly for trying to leave the islands irregularly and reach mainland Europe (to join their fami-
lies or avoid deportation). The majority of those capable of employment are legally employed with 
an official permit and work contract in a wide variety of economic activities. For instance, 50% of 
the THPNs (not eligible for refugee status or subsidiary protection) who work in the construction 
industry do so legally, while 61% of those enjoying protection who work in this industry do so off 
the books. With few exceptions, most found jobs in the line of work they had in their country of 
origin; a handful of professionals and college-educated immigrants had to accept semi-skilled jobs 
(probably since their diplomas are not recognised in the EU). However many took advantage of vo-
cational training provided by government agencies and NGOs to advance in their career.  
The conclusion is that the unwanted and hated “economic migrants”, when allowed to live in the 
community, find jobs (and mostly legal jobs, unlike many EU nationals working in Malta!), rent their 
own apartments, pay taxes, keep out of trouble, integrate themselves easily in most affordable 
neighbourhoods and do not depend on welfare. When one considers rationally Malta´s ageing la-
bour market and the sustainability of its generous welfare and state pension system (Mercieca 
2011; The European Commission - Ageing Working Group 2012), and when one disregards the skin 
colour of these persons and the distorted and sensational reports about them in the media, the 
unwanted immigrants start to appear quite desirable after all. Just as any other developed nation 
with a dynamic economy, Malta requires immigrant labour, and it should not be looking uniquely or 
primarily at refugees bearing the marks of multiple traumas to fill that need. 
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4.4.3.3 Recognising that Undesirable Immigrants are Actually Desirable 
Most refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection will, in time, find employment and inde-
pendent housing (and they will do so much faster if spared the added stress of detention and told 
clearly and frankly that resettlement abroad will be available only for the few), but to boost its 
economy, Malta actually needs economic migrants. Refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protec-
tion have a right to asylum in Malta, and Malta has a moral and legal duty to provide protection, 
even if these persons be a burden to the Maltese economy (to be sure, the responsibility for their 
protection should be fairly shared among European countries). Malta’s and Europe’s borders need 
to be open to these latter migrants. As the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malm-
ström (2012), writes: “contrary to what the xenophobes would have us believe, the number of asy-
lum seekers in Europe is far lower today than it was 10 years ago. And Europe is by no means ex-
ceptionally open in its asylum policies. There are far more refugees in Kenya alone than there are in 
the 27 EU countries”. In a world torn apart by conflicts fuelled by our past deeds and present choic-
es, traversed in all directions by millions of refugees and displaced persons, it is part of Malta’s and 
Europe’s responsibility, as a civilized polity, to provide asylum to those few who manage to reach 
our shores. 
As regards the “economic” migrants, certainly not all have a right to stay, but even a tiny and not-
too-wealthy country like Malta can and should offer access to its labour market, and eventually to 
citizenship, to a certain number of these persons. After all, for better or for worse, Malta is part of 
that same Europe which, over the years, created migrant labour bridges with former colonies and 
manipulated world markets in its favour, creating patterns of dependency; though formerly a colo-
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ny, it has willingly joined the club of countries that, for centuries, sent their unemployed, destitute 
and adventurous sons and daughters to inhabit and colonize other continents and compete in their 
markets, claiming they had a right to enter and stay, and ignoring the laws of the land. So then, just 
like the rest of Europe, Malta should be ready to open its doors to at least some of these migrants 
and offer them ways to stay on legally, and all the more because, at the end of the day — and no 
matter how hard it is for the Maltese and their politicians to admit it — Malta needs their labour 
and is constantly benefitting from it. 
In the medium-term, Maltese immigration policy needs to stop emulating policy responses adopted 
in Italy, Spain and Portugal over the last two decades. These policies have been criticized for being 
inconsistent and irrational, and for in turn seeking to copy the statist restrictive policies focussed on 
control (rather than management) of immigration flows which had previously been adopted only by 
Greece (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). Such policies have irked not only human rights activists but also 
right-wing economists who argue that, since the needs of a modern economy cannot be predicted 
through centralized planning, the current rigid policies on admission of labour migration being 
adopted in Southern Europe and elsewhere will more likely damage the economy of the receiving 
countries than help it (Harris 2007, 36f).  4.4.4 BUILDING A FUTURE TOGETHER 
4.4.4.1 Ten Wasted Years 
Ten wasted years of waiting for the irregular immigrants and asylum seekers to vanish into thin air 
have passed since the Refugee Act came in force in 2002. It now high time for native-born Maltese 
and immigrants to start building a future together. In view of this, how can the negative perception 
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of migrants, prevalent among the Maltese people, be changed? Given the lack of leadership of the 
politicians, some hope that the media will rise to the occasion. Surely, immigration poses a number 
of challenges for journalism in Malta. Journalists with an ethical formation are aware that they are 
called to inform and educate the public, to help to promote human rights and fight xenophobia. 
However, the most influential media are the organs of the main political parties, and tend to sup-
port the security agenda being promoted by both of the major parties199; they are often afraid to 
challenge public opinion and widespread prejudices on immigration and asylum (Sammut 2007). 
Though some journalists are trying to inform and educate the public about who these immigrants 
are and why they end up in Malta, the media are becoming increasingly commercialized and most 
viewers are less likely to spend time watching or reading in-depth news analyses or documentaries. 
Serious reporters have to compete for space with more sensationalist news items cut and pasted 
from news services, and risk reporting alarming facts (arrival of boats, riots in detention centres, 
street fights, etc.) without offering a context for the reader to put things into perspective. Journal-
ists who have been on the forefront in the fight against racism and xenophobia have been attacked 
personally and persistently by far-right politicians. In 2006, arsonists torched the front doors of the 
private homes of Saviour Balzan, the editor of the English-language newspaper The Malta Today, 
and of freelance columnist Daphne Caruana Galizia. 
199 Both main parties, Nationalist and Labour, are careful in how they project their image. While leaders do 
not want to flirt with populist racism, both sides fear that unless they are perceived to be defending the na-
tional interest, they will create a space where xenophobic far right parties could flourish. 
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4.4.4.2 An Interview with a Ghanaian-Maltese Pastor 
Others are sceptical about the ability of the media to take up such a task, and see more hope in the 
face-to-face encounters between persons of different backgrounds, helped by educators and medi-
ators in the community. One of the persons who strongly defend this view is Mr Ahmed Bugri, a 
Ghanaian-born protestant pastor who runs an open residential centre for immigrants in Marsa, and 
who obtained Maltese citizenship through marriage200. Mr Bugri acknowledges the need of better 
human rights protections in Malta, but feels that NGOs and international observers fail when they 
emphasize rights without linking them to responsibilities. He loves to comment on the first article 
of the Maltese Constitution, which states that “Malta is a democratic republic founded on work and 
on respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual”. Rights and freedoms are 
very important, but on an arid piece of rock with practically no natural resources, nobody can bene-
fit from social rights unless someone works hard to make that possible. 
Pastor Bugri became aware of this fact soon after moving to Malta and meeting his father-in-law, 
an industrious jack-of-all-trades, as are many Maltese of his generation. It was hard for him to learn 
the Maltese work ethic and to do plumbing and plastering while studying for a law degree. He dis-
covered that that a college education and a middle-class job do not equate with the comfortable, 
relaxed lifestyle of some of the upper classes in African society, or some of characters of famous TV  
soap operas. Many of the people arriving irregularly in Malta — be they asylum seekers used to cer-
200 Pastor Bugri expounded his unusual take on the issue in an interview I had with him in June 2011. I be-
lieve that his reflections have weight since he is himself an immigrant and he comes from Western Africa – 
the region where most failed asylum seekers come from. His frankness is at once refreshing and shocking, 
his approach is pragmatic, and the fact that he is foreign-born and African allows him to say things that other 
persons in the Maltese administration would never dare say. 
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tain behaviours and survival strategies in refugee camps and transit countries, or young people with 
some education, fleeing unemployment or underpaid manual labour in their countries — find it 
hard to accept that in Malta they may need to work harder than ever before and work their way up 
from the bottom of the social ladder. Mr Bugri believes that blue-collar Maltese workers, who see 
these struggles in their immigrant co-workers first hand, may have a better appreciation of the 
problem of immigration than intellectuals who fight for human rights or defend government poli-
cies, and who frame the issues too neatly in terms of rights, membership, economics or race. For 
this reason, he insists that most Maltese are not really racist or insensitive; rather they are suspi-
cious that the immigrants may bring in certain attitudes that are dangerous and problematic, for 
instance a sense of entitlement when offered a generous welfare system without the work ethic 
needed to support such a system. Working-class Maltese also notice that there are cultural tensions 
which could be problematic in the long term if not addressed201.  
Mr Bugri boldly claims that “nothing in Malta prevents an African migrant from integrating”. His po-
sition seems to reflect Seyla Benhabib´s position regarding “democratic iterations” and “jurisgener-
201 For instance, according to Mr Bugri, one cannot deny that there is a “tribal mentality” amongst some of 
the Africans, even if it may not be politically correct to say so; for example, when there is a stabbing incident, 
it is essential to find the elders and deal with them, and ask them to broker a settlement. A Somali who lived 
in a lawless land for 20 years will not trust the clueless Maltese police force — which kept him for 7 months 
in detention — to protect him from another Somali of a different clan. It will take time for him to get used to 
Western forms of justice. Meanwhile, according to Mr Bugri, Maltese police officers could put some effort 
into adopting forms of community policing that work in other cultural backgrounds, so as to avoid escalation 
of conflict and lurid stories about violent immigrants being published in the news. Similarly, Sub-Saharan 
Muslims may not feel comfortable or welcome in a Libyan mosque, but that does not mean that they have a 
right to pray and celebrate Ramadan in the middle of the street, creating havoc; they need to be taught how 
to worship in a more discrete way. At the same time, the Maltese public needs to be better informed about 
Islam and its practices so as to better accommodate them in its calendar (“yes, today is Eid al-Fitr, and no, 
they are not crazy, they´re having a party”) and carefully allow some of these practices into its unabashedly 
religious (though mainly Catholic, and in some aspects partly secularized) public space. 
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ative politics”, which we shall discuss in Chapter 5. In a small vibrant democracy with pragmatic po-
litical parties and no history of arrogant nationalism, the tension between the rights of others and 
the prerogatives of members, and the shifting of the boundaries between the self, the included 
“other” and excluded “other”, will be negotiated one step at a time, and there is a good chance 
that Malta will find just ways of resolving these problems202.  
The problem, at this moment in Malta´s modern history of immigration, is that while Malta is re-
ceiving some of Africa´s most determined, intelligent and driven people who would make excellent 
citizens, the Maltese continue to see migrants as liabilities, not assets203. Malta gives them training 
and health care, and then lets other countries pick and choose the best and take them away. For 
Mr Bugri, the sooner that Maltese realize how much these migrants can contribute to Malta, and 
how misguided the government´s strenuous efforts to resettle them abroad, the better. He argues 
that (even, and especially) the so-called “economic migrants” should be given a legal status and a 
202 Pastor Bugri is proud to be Maltese and to represent Malta in international fora. The Maltese government 
has used him cleverly for public relations and to implement policies, while Mr Bugri has slowly used his influ-
ence in government ministries and departments to debunk myths and help adopt pragmatic and sensible 
policies. In a small country, personal mediation can help solve many issues. While other countries spend 
decades revising flawed and sophisticated immigration laws written by university professors and mutilated 
by politicians, Malta can put the stakeholders round a table and find no-nonsense solutions to all the issues 
that will be raised by immigration and multiculturalism in the future, if there is the political will and the bro-
kers to mediate a frank discussion. Religion, of course, has a place at that table, and religious leaders and 
activists have often been those brokers. For Mr Bugri, this is one of the greatest things about Malta, and he 
seems confident that in the long run, and in spite of all the problems and ambiguities of these hard years of 
transition — where being more European suddenly entails becoming more African — Malta will find a way to 
integrate immigrants far better and quicker than its wealthier northern neighbours. 
203 In a recent survey (I. Camilleri 2012), the majority of Maltese respondents claimed that “immigration” 
(generally understood to mean irregular immigration from Africa or low-skilled labour from Eastern Europe) 
does not enrich Malta’s economy and cultural diversity. The perception that these persons have nothing to 
contribute to Malta is, of course, a dangerous one for a country that will continue to deal with immigrant 
inflows for the foreseeable future.  
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path to citizenship. Rather than spending its energy and money detaining and resettling immi-
grants, the government should help educate and inform the Maltese public: it is unrealistic and ir-
responsible to think and to make others believe that the “immigrant problem” is going to disap-
pear. The longer it will take to learn to live together, the more problems we create for future gen-
erations. Mr Bugri sees that it is his vocation to bridge cultures, to contribute to an on-going educa-
tional process, where immigrants learn how to become Maltese, absorbing all the good things this 
land and its culture have to offer, while native Maltese come to rediscover and redefine what it is 
to be Maltese in an increasingly diverse society, where some aspects of the “other” slowly become 
part of the “self”. Religious communities can contribute considerably to this process of bridge-
building but many Catholic parishes have still to open their eyes to the situation and start doing 
something204.  
To be sure, many Maltese and Europeans who work in local and international NGOs do not share 
Mr Bugri´s optimism. One may cleverly argue that the Maltese are not “racist”; rather, they have 
known massive unemployment and are “cautious”, they have absorbed the insular and “fortress 
mentality” etched in the mighty fortifications all around them and are “distant”, they construe so-
ciety as an extension of the tightly-knit family structure and are “protective”. There may be plausi-
ble reasons to fear the other, but when xenophobia becomes pathological, it must be condemned 
204 Parish priests may not be too happy with the many new churches sprouting around Malta — and Rev. 
Bugri does not like to comment on his own ministry as a pastor — but he notes that the typical Maltese re-
luctance to reach out to strangers is a pastoral handicap for the Catholic Church. It took years for the local 
parish priest to visit the centre he runs, and to realize that there were Catholics and other Christians living 
there, persons who, according to Canon Law, were under his pastoral care. Then some parishioners started 
visiting, not knowing what to do among these foreigners, and soon discovered, to their great surprise, that 
many immigrants were keen on learning Maltese. 
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and dealt with through serious legal measures and enhanced civil education. Arson attacks (Farru-
gia 2006), deadly fights between immigrants and bouncers at nightclubs (Darmanin 2009), asylum 
seekers dying in police custody (Borg 3012), and unpleasant incidents — such as when a Jesuit pro-
vincial superior was told to “go back to Africa” by a police officer on duty while walking down a 
street (Cooke 2011) — seem to be telling us that it will be very hard to build a peaceful and pros-
perous future together if the inhabitants of Malta, old and new, do not make a serious effort to 
reach out to, and to welcome, one another.  4.4.5 CONCLUSION: HISTORY-LADEN INTERDEPENDENCE AND RECENT IMMIGRATION IN MAL-TA 
There are three kinds of moral duties which Malta has regarding the admission and integration of 
certain immigrants: 
1. Some of these duties, which we will discuss in Chapter 5, follow from general or universal 
ethical principles, such as its commitment to freedom, equality and universal human rights 
as a Western democracy, and from the fact that as a Very High Human Development coun-
try, it can afford to help burdened nations and accept a certain number of immigrants — 
and not only Convention refugees — to help other countries with “zombie” economies de-
velop.  
2. Other duties follow from what we call “anamnestic solidarity” (solidarity built on a collective 
memory, cf. discussion in 6.3.4): Malta needed help to develop in the past and received it in 
part from countries which offered to absorb part of its unemployed and destitute popula-
tion. The memory of this experience and the possibility of helping other countries in similar 
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situations today should push the now-prosperous Malta to generously welcome immigrants, 
according to its capacity.  
3. Finally, some duties can be derived from the Principle of History-Laden Interdependence, 
formulated above (4.3.4). This seems to suggest that Malta should be more ready to accept 
immigrants from the EU and from countries it has been interdependent on in the last couple 
of centuries, than from countries with which it has had no substantial links in its history.  
This last point helps us unravel some of the ethical issues raised by recent immigration to Malta. 
Immigration from the European Union is not seen as problematic and labour migration from the 
Maghreb region is tolerated205. The most complex issue, however, is immigration from Sub-Saharan 
Africa and from countries with practically no historical links to Malta. There is of course a compo-
nent of racism and xenophobia in the relationship with immigrants from these countries, which 
should clearly be denounced. Yet, the argument that they should start by knocking on the door of 
past colonizers in Europe does have some weight, and the anger at Dublin II — which keeps these 
persons from reaching those countries they were headed to when they set out — is somewhat jus-
tified.  
To better understand Malta´s duties regarding the reception and integration of such migrants, we 
will have to reflect on the principles mentioned in (1) and (2) above, and we do so in the following 
205 To be sure, Malta has had strong links to Algeria, Libya and Tunisia in the past 200 years (and also to 
Egypt), but the relationship with these nations is today still burdened by the unfair expulsion of persons of 
Maltese origin from these countries as they gained independence or during times of Europhobia, and by the 
deeply entrenched and re-emerging Islamophobia in the West which, of course, has purchase on the Mal-
tese. Past rivalries and present fears are evoked to negate and weaken the interdependency of peoples on 
both shores of the Mediterranean, even though Malta has been in the forefront of recent political efforts to 
bridge the economies and cultures of the Mediterranean. 
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chapters. Yet, if we consider only the Principle of History-Laden Interdependence, Malta as part of 
the European Union cannot completely wash its hands of the responsibilities of Europe towards its 
former colonies by simply mentioning the fact that it was itself colonized by the Europeans. The no-
tion of Historical Interdependence helps us go beyond post-colonial blame games and the simplistic 
logic of reparations: many regions in Europe were indeed treated as “colonies” for centuries by 
“their” monarchs and one may argue that the British crown often treated people in their colonies 
better than the Bourbons treated their subjects in Sicily.  
I believe that the main ethical issue today in Europe´s relationship to its former colonies is not 
whether it should make reparations for the evils of colonization (measured anachronistically and 
with no reference to the pre-colonial situations in these countries) but whether it should recognise 
the web of interdependence it spun during the colonial period and honour the duties that follow 
from those links of proximity. Of course, Malta did not colonize Africa or Asia, but as part of Europe 
it benefits from the proximity of many countries in Europe to many countries in other parts of the 
world. As it comes becomes more enmeshed in the interdependence networks built by the power-
ful nations of Europe, it should not only be willing to welcome the money and investments of the 
neighbours of its neighbours, but also their needy citizens.  
4.5 Conclusion: Lessons from Malta 
The Maltese case study has helped us contextualize many of the general historical and empirical 
observations made in Chapter 3, while announcing some of the philosophical debates of the follow-
ing chapter.  
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1. The history of Malta has shown us how human mobility is an intimate part of human histo-
ry, and how nations which consider themselves “sedentary” are the products of immigration 
and emigration. History also helps us question the “newness” of the world we live in and of 
its “globalisation processes”. Mass migration, disorganized migration, politically-gridlocked 
proposals for migration management, xenophobia and discrimination: our great grandpar-
ents knew all of this and were often victims; today, new technologies and new laws have 
changed some of the parameters, but many of the underlying ethical, political and social 
problems remain more or less the same. 
2. Using qualitative and quantitative studies, and interviews, we have been presented the em-
pirical data regarding the legal, political, economic, social and cultural implications of irregu-
lar and asylum immigration to Malta in recent years, the beginnings of a difficult process of 
adjustment to an increasingly multicultural society, and the challenges of integration. 
3. From a philosophical point of view, the Maltese case invites us to be sceptical of the West-
phalian system, and of any form of nationalistic communitarianism that easily confuses 
membership in a “sovereign” local community of persons with territorial boundaries of 
“sovereign” political societies. Bigger states are more easily seduced by absolutist notions of 
sovereignty, triumphalist forms of nationalism and illusions of self-sufficiency that the 
Westphalian fictio juris provides; smaller states like Malta are generally more sceptical of 
these ideas and more accustomed to a “glocal” or “rooted” cosmopolitanism which values 
local cultures and identities but is keenly aware of the fundamental interconnectedness and 
interdependency of all peoples and civilizations. The Maltese national community survived 
and thrived under a number of political arrangements, going from self-colonization (under 
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the Knights) to other-colonization (under the British) to dependent-independence within the 
context of the European Union. In all these contexts, borders are important but never abso-
lute; indeed the Mediterranean Sea is at once a frontier and a bridge which gives the islands 
their unity and particular identity, but also brings their inhabitants into contact with the 
wider world.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE BOUNDARIES OF POLITIES 
5.0 Introduction 
The discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 allows us to reject Hypothesis A formulated in Chapter 2 (section 
2.4.1). We here start to tackle Hypothesis B (2.4.2), concerning adjudication between conflicting 
rights claims. To do so systematically, we need to separate two orders of problems concerning the 
rights of immigrants and of polities, even though they are intricately linked. One concerns the origin 
and foundation of such rights (and of their lexical ordering) — Sections 5.1 and 5.2. The other con-
cerns the more precise content of the rights and priority rules in question, which we will deal with 
only briefly in this chapter – Section 5.3. We debate in this chapter with various positions in contem-
porary Philosophy, but keep at the back of our minds the “rooted cosmopolitan” approach and the 
understanding of human rights proposed by CST. We allow this “fore-judgement” to guide the de-
bate, and to be eventually challenged by the debate, as proposed in the methodology (Chapter 1). 
In general, as mentioned in previous chapters, modern legal, political and philosophical thought 
does not recognise that people not born in a given country (in ius soli traditions), or not born to 
rightful political participants of a particular polity (in ius sanguinis traditions) have a right to long-
term sojourn or to political participation (e.g. via citizenship rights). Most thinkers concede some 
right to temporary residence in case of serious necessity (e.g. shipwreck) only to non-hostile politi-
cal strangers. Beyond this, as many believe, immigrants have no a priori (moral) right to enter or 
stay in a country which is deemed “not their own” (though they may have acquired such right 
through positive law, via international treaties between polities, individual contracts sanctioned by 
the law of the receiving polity, etc.). In classical modern thought, polities are therefore deemed to 
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have absolute sovereignty concerning the entry and integration of immigrants. This claim, however, 
is contested by Catholic Social Teaching and by an increasing number of contemporary political phi-
losophers. Without fully espousing the notion of open borders, these contend that (A) in some cas-
es, immigrants have a moral right to (i) enter, (ii) stay, (iii) be incorporated into the polis (5.3); 
hence (iv) a polity´s sovereignty regarding immigration and borders is (morally) limited and subject 
to some form of cosmopolitan right (5.1). Furthermore, (B) they claim that, in liberal democratic 
states, such moral rights and duties should be translated into legal (actionable) rights on all levels 
(local, national, international and cosmopolitan), via the exercise of popular sovereignty according 
to a coherent application of the principle of democracy (5.2). 
In arguing for A and B, this chapter ventures into some of the most complex issues in contemporary 
political philosophy; we will obviously not be able to deal with all the issues exhaustively, and we 
cannot limit such a discussion to one chapter except by assuming that the reader is fairly well ac-
quainted with the major authors and debates we refer to, and by delving almost immediately into a 
critical yet respectful dialogue with such positions. Thesis A and thesis B are linked in a complex 
manner: A challenges absolutist notions of sovereignty to morally establish the right to political par-
ticipation of certain “others” (immigrants); B seeks to deal with the problem that —even if we can 
establish clearly what is morally right — we cannot simply impose the right (e.g. political participa-
tion of immigrants) on a political body without consent (based on the political participation of the 
native-born or citizens). In arguing for A, we will need to critique a group of thinkers — nationalists, 
communitarians, civic republicans — who deny that immigrants have any a priori right to entry, so-
journ and political participation, using the reflections of another group — liberals, liberal-egalitarian 
and cosmopolitan thinkers who challenge the notion of absolute sovereignty. Yet, some of the con-
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cerns of the former group must be taken into account when considering how the moral rights of 
immigrants can become legally actionable (B). 
5.1 Foundations: Sovereignty and Cosmopolitan Right 5.1.1 OF MEMBERSHIP, POLITICAL OTHERNESS AND FALSE ANALOGIES 
One of the most influential thinkers on the side of communitarians and civic republicans is, of 
course, Michael Walzer, though his position actually concedes a great deal to the liberal tradition 
on the topic of political sovereignty and immigration. His chapter on “Membership” in Spheres of 
Justice is a classic on the issues at hand. In this chapter, based on a 1981 essay, Walzer frames the 
problem as one of “distribution of membership” — as the original essay was titled — and few au-
thors actually question this way of approaching the topic. I will however avoid such terminology for 
two reasons. Firstly, in English, the primary reference of the term “membership” is belonging to a 
club or voluntary association. Yet political belonging is a bizarre blend of de facto territorial situat-
edness, assumed societal bonding and intentional political participation, as we shall see below. 
Secondly, membership evokes the idea of becoming an equal consociate with peers, but modern 
political belonging does not simply abolish the premodern “estates” to produce political equals, but 
still maintains the various ranks, such as full citizen, disenfranchised citizen, denizen, metic and so-
journer206. The further complexities of political belonging in complex realities such as the EU — 
206 The problem of political belonging of persons considered “strangers” obviously predates and exceeds the 
political world of modern democracies and the contractarian understanding of citizenship evoked by the 
term “membership”. In Malta, under the rule of the Knights, full political participation was available only to 
foreign-born Knights (the Maltese could not become Knights), hence to “non-members” or “non-natives”. In 
many European countries before the French Revolution, the nobility claimed to be of a different “ethnic” or 
“racial” origin than the commoners, the progeny of a clan of foreign conquerors of superior “virtue” who 
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where in some countries an EU- or third-country national can be a full burgher (or even a local 
mayor207) without being a citizen of the country — further highlights the inadequacy of speaking of 
the topic at hand in terms of “membership”.  
Walzer (1983, 32) starts off comparing “affluent and free countries” to “élite universities”. This 
strikes me as a very poor analogy. In a modern university, students and staff are “members” be-
cause they are admitted as students or employed by the institution, but have no say regarding the 
admission or employment of other “members”: membership is distributed according to principles 
set by those who founded, endowed or were selected as administrators or trustees of the universi-
ty, or by the ministry of education; in any case, the criteria for distribution of membership are es-
tablished by authorities superior to the “members”. Whether the same is the case for “sovereign” 
political societies is precisely what we are investigating. Unlike polities, universities (and clubs) can 
be founded, closed, relocated; if their policies are discriminatory or their practices are illegal, they 
are held accountable to a higher authority; they do not have the power to conquer rival institu-
tions, manipulate markets in their favour, and if they engaged in unfair business deals in the past to 
grow their endowments (e.g. grabbing tribal lands) their property may be confiscated by the courts. 
Walzer (1983, 35f) then juggles around three other analogies – neighbourhoods, clubs and families 
— which are clearly as inadequate as universities to help us reflect philosophically on the duties and 
were entitled to rule over all as long as they remained “strangers” to the people of the land. If the issue at 
hand were a question of “membership”, what membership are we talking about? Is membership an all-or-
nothing status consisting in being able to vote, or stand for elected office, or both? And if so, are infants, 
convicted felons, severely handicapped persons non-members of the same type as people living in foreign 
lands? 
207 For instance, on the 28th June 2007, Rotimi Adebari, a Nigerian refugee (and a Nigerian national at the 
time), was elected mayor of Portlaoise in Ireland. Mr Adebari arrived in Ireland in 2000. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
C h a p t e r :  5  — P a g e :  290 
 
prerogatives of a modern polity; he seems to shift from one analogy to another when the previous 
analogy does not fit his preconceptions of what a modern polity is or should be. If one uses, as 
analogies to understand modern polities, entities which have no moral and legal claim to “strong” 
(if not “absolute”) political sovereignty, autonomous territorial jurisdiction, and the monopoly of 
the use of force, one is already tacitly conceding to the liberal cosmopolitan position that the cor-
rect way to conceive a bounded political society is one which assumes there is a higher authority 
above it (moral, legislative, correctional — though possibly not executive). I doubt, however, that 
Walter would want to concede this too easily. 
The opposite of “member”, in Walzer´s essay, is not “non-member”, but rather “stranger”. Walzer 
(1983, 33) hence embarks on a confusing reflection on what is owed to “strangers”208 by referring 
to the Parable of the Good Samaritan, without making the fundamental distinctions between three 
different forms of “strangeness” or “alienage”: political exclusion, social otherness and physical 
distance. If I am a tourist in Kenya and see a house burning across the street, I have a duty to call 
the fire fighters if I can, because the people possibly trapped in that house are physically close 
(though socially and politically “other” than me); the same is the case if I am at home and my I see 
my neighbour’s house burning, whether or not that neighbour is my mortal enemy or my intimate 
friend (social distance). However, the otherness which we are discussing in this chapter is political; 
is it the question of participation in or estrangement from political and social goods (right to resi-
dence, work, civil participation and representation, etc.): I may be a German citizen and enjoy full 
208 Habermas (1998, 510f) provides a valuable discussion of duties towards strangers, summarizing most ma-
jor positions on this topic. We discuss the issues at stake indirectly in the sections below. Cf. Nussbaum and 
Cohen (2002), Appiah (2002; 2007, 155–174), Waldron (1993) regarding the distinction between duties to-
wards compatriots and duties towards political strangers. 
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political “sameness” with all other German citizens, even though I may have lived all my life abroad 
and never ever met another German citizen except at a consular office. Walzer´s point that socio-
political belonging (“membership”, in his jargon) is a crucial social good, since it is what makes so 
many other goods (and rights) concretely accessible, is well taken. However, to understand better 
what it entails, we need to reflect philosophically on the nature of (modern) polities, in light of 
globalisation and transnational rights and duties. Political societies are very particular kinds of hu-
man societies, and political sameness is not the sameness of people united by “natural” bonds of 
physical distance, blood, or by “rational” bonds of membership in an association, company or uni-
versity. False analogies at best contaminate philosophical reflection and at worst provide an easy 
rationalization for the actions of génocidaires.  
5.1.2 WHAT IS A POLITICAL SOCIETY? MARITAIN´S BASIC DISTINCTIONS 
In the first lecture of Political Liberalism, John Rawls (2005a, 40) claims that “a well-ordered demo-
cratic society is neither a community, nor, more generally, an association”. Though we shall later 
question some of his reasons for this claim (viz., his claim that polities, in ideal theory, should be 
considered as “closed and complete societies”209 and lack “final ends and aims” such as those 
sought by persons or associations), we can note here his refusal to use certain standard analogies 
to reflect on political societies. Polities are very particular entities indeed.  
Jacques Maritain would agree with Rawls that political societies are not communities, but he be-
lieves that if we are willing to characterize them as “societies”, we cannot ignore that, as such, they 
209 Regarding ideal theory and closure in Rawls´ earlier work, A Theory of Justice, cf. Rawls (2005b, 8f; 245f). 
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bear certain similarities with associations. Admittedly, this is a tricky analogy, but let us neverthe-
less take some time to examine it. Following the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic distinction between 
nature and reason (and clearly influenced by the French Republican tradition and the ravages of 
ethno-cultural nationalism in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s), Maritain (1998, chap. 1) distinguishes 
between two sets of concepts: community / nation, and society / body politic. The first set is con-
sidered primarily as a product of nature which is a fact to take into account, while the second is 
deemed a product of reason which is an on-going task to accomplish. Hence, a community, ac-
cording to Maritain, is a “fact” constituted by physical and biological proximity of persons, who find 
themselves in a web of relations through instinct and hereditary linkages. As such, it can never de-
velop into a society but a large community can be recognised by sociologists and anthropologists 
and tagged as an “ethnic group” on the basis of which a “nation” may be identified. A society, on 
the other hand, is a group of persons brought together to accomplish a task, having a common end 
(e.g. a business firm, a labour union, a professional association); it does not “happen” naturally, but 
is a product of the will and reason of human beings. Some societies (e.g. married couples, political 
societies) are considered “natural”, but they are still the product of reason and choice: such socie-
ties can give rise to communities when physical and biological proximity bind these voluntary asso-
ciations into long-term groupings of persons which are sociologically recognisable (e.g. a married 
couple can give rise to an extended family or clan).  
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Maritain builds the distinction between nation and body politic210 on the previous distinction. The 
nation is an ethnic-social reality, “a community of people who become aware of themselves as his-
tory has made them, who treasure their past, and who love themselves as they know or imagine 
themselves to be, with a kind of introversion” (ibid., 5). For Maritain, though nations are usually as-
sociated with a soil or a land, in this context “land” is not a “territorial area of power and admin-
istration but a cradle of life, work, pain and dreams” (ibid., 6). Building the identity of the people on 
the basis of this reality has led to the modern “plague of nationalism” or, what we may designate 
more precisely as “ethno-cultural nationalism”. 
In contrast, according to Maritain, the body politic is a society; it is thus a work of reason, with jus-
tice as its primary condition and intended aim; it is a freely-achieved communion of persons based 
on the form of friendship. People from different nations (e.g. Tanganyikans and Zanzibarians) can 
come together to build a body politic (Tanzania); the body politic in turn can consolidate over time 
as a “fact”, and give rise to a new (“multinational”) nation (Tanzanian). Maritain would not exclude 
the possibility of a healthy patriotic nationalism at this level, what contemporary authors would call 
“civic nationalism” — cf. Brown (2000) and Guibernau (1996). Thus, for Maritain, it is not the (eth-
no-cultural) nation that gives rise to the body politic, but it is the body politic that gives rise to 
(civic) nations (cf. Mitchell 2003). 
Maritain also distinguishes the state (the governing and administrative part of the body politic) 
from the whole body politic (and the “nation”). The state is an organ at the service of the body poli-
210 We use the terms “body politic”, “polity” and “political society” interchangeably in this chapter. We try to 
avoid using “state” or “nation” to refer to modern political societies considered as a whole, and we use the 
term “country” to denote the territory under the jurisdiction of a particular polity. 
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tic, and not vice-versa. Hence, the term “nation-state”, often used to describe modern political en-
tities, is seriously problematic: the legitimate modern political synthesis is one between the civic 
nation and the body politic, and not between the ethno-cultural nation and the bureaucratic state 
apparatus (which is precisely the synthesis proposed by fascist political parties in the 1930s).  
Maritain´s distinctions are helpful, but his insistence on reason, freedom and a common telos 
seems to be too one-sided; most people find themselves belonging to a body politic simply by being 
born in a certain place and risking total political disenfranchisement (and possibly social exclusion, 
misery and even death at the border) were they to try to leave that bounded physical space. 
Though, as Habermas (1998, 492–515) insists, we should not conceive modern polities as “commu-
nities of fate” (Schicksalsgemeinschaften) in the pre-political sense (as in German romanticist think-
ing, e.g. Herder´s theory of the Volksgeist)211, we cannot forget that a modern polity is a human ra-
tional project of social construction superimposed on the physical fact of a territory that must be 
(and is already being) inhabited and managed. We discuss this further in section 5.1.4. At this point, 
let us simply underline Maritain´s (and Habermas’) awareness that the characterization of national 
identities is a “creative” (and at times completely fictional or intentionally deceptive) reconstruc-
tion of the past to serve the political interests of the present generation. National communities are 
“imagined communities”, as Benedict Anderson (2006) would say, and though national myths and 
historical reconstructions are politically useful and epistemologically unavoidable, we can still 
choose whether to fire the national and patriotic imagination on the basis of pre-political idealiza-
tions of the ethnicity and culture of hegemonic groups, or on the political reality and civil unity that 
211 For a good introduction to and critique of Habermas´ views on nationalism, cf. Pensky (2008, 41f). 
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exists today (almost always enriched by ethno-cultural pluralism of some sort). Maritain helps us 
see that, correctly considered, the (civic) “nation” is “natural”212 primarily in the sense of second 
nature, or of an “artifice” of human reason213. His position, while close to Walzer´s, takes us beyond 
the analogy of membership in a club or university and helps us understand better the peculiar “as-
sociations” we call “political societies”. 5.1.3 POLITIES, PEOPLES AND POLITICAL CLOSURE IN RAWLS 
5.1.3.1 “People”: An Ambiguous Term 
If Maritain´s distinctions may seem too clear-cut (and patently intended to deny the claims of eth-
no-cultural nationalism at their root), Rawls use of the term “peoples” in The Law of Peoples tends 
to conflate what Maritain (and Rawls himself, in Political Liberalism) carefully distinguishes. As Seyla 
Benhabib (2004, 75f) argues, though Rawls´ reflection on cosmopolitan law is very much inspired by 
Kant´s Perpetual Peace, Rawls departs significantly from Kant in The Law of Peoples, when, instead 
of bringing human persons to the original position or table of public reason, he chose to bring 
“peoples”. A “people” is a strange moral unit in modern political philosophy: one can always think 
of persons ostracized by their own “people” (or not considered by others as belonging to any “peo-
ple”), persons whose rights could be ignored by an “ideal” system of international justice conceived 
212 “Nation” and “nature” are both derived from the Latin roots (through French) referring to the Latin verb 
nasci (to be born). 
213 On creations of reason as “second nature”, cf. Spaemann (1989). If we consider reason as the most defin-
ing feature of the “nature” of Homo sapiens, and polities (“cities”) as the most basic creation of human rea-
son, we should have no problem accepting that the political artifice is actually a defining feature of the hu-
man “nature”, and that Homo sapiens is a zỗon politikón. 
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to serve “peoples”. It seems to hearken back to some pre-modern notion of political representa-
tion214,215.  
Rawls’ notion of “people” is ambiguous since it seems to mix together sociological (empirical) and 
moral-political (normative) criteria for the determination of what constitutes a “people”. Rawls 
(2001, 23) admits only to his (first) cosmopolitan assembly “liberal peoples” who, on the one hand, 
are made up of citizens united by “common sympathies” (sociological attributes), but are also 
characterized by a “reasonably just constitutional democratic government” and a “moral nature” 
(moral-political attributes). But where will the moral and political attributes come from prior to the 
Original Position216? 
214 In pre-modern polities, persons were considered mainly as members of clans, guilds and social classes 
(e.g. the états system in the Ancien Régime), and where, instead of persons deemed equal in dignity, we had 
(more or less arbitrary) groupings of persons (going from a few dozen to tens of millions, whose dignity was 
deemed as dependent on the dignity of their group or estate). No consistent political theory — “ideal” or 
“non-ideal” — could lump together such human groups as equal partners in a domestic or cosmopolitan 
“Original Position”; one therefore wonders whether the peculiar group Rawls calls a “people” could be any 
different. 
215 Rawls argues that he does not bring equal persons to his thought experiment on international justice, as 
Kant or J. S. Mill do, since he wants to avoid grounding human rights straightaway “in a political (moral) con-
ception of liberal justice” (Rawls 2001, 82). He believes that doing so, he would be prematurely imposing 
liberalism on all parties in the international “original position”. The problem, is that by bringing pre-political 
“peoples” as moral agents instead of individual persons, and by conceiving of “peoples” in a certain way (as 
the quasi-sociological realities concocted by 19th century European nationalist “historians” and “anthropolo-
gists”, fused with the ideal sort of moral agents which inhabit contractarian thought experiments) Rawls is 
actually imposing a much more problematic metaphysical or comprehensive doctrinal baggage in his “origi-
nal position” than more cosmopolitan authors like Kant do in their political philosophy. On top of this, such 
“peoples” are conceived as “liberal democratic peoples” at the outset (Rawls 2001, 23), so one could argue 
that liberalism is imposed on the parties in any case. Rawls, however, claims that at the level of peoples in 
the original position, liberalism does not function as a comprehensive doctrine (ibid., 34), and that the prin-
ciples chosen by liberal peoples can also be extended to “decent hierarchical peoples” (ibid. 6f). 
216 In fact, Rawls seems to fuse together a cosmopolitan pre-political assembly typical of contractarian 
thought experiment with the workings of political assembly such as the United Nations, where one finds 
such things as “liberal democratic” and “hierarchical” peoples. Of course, characters like “liberal” or “hierar-
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This setup could make sense if the domestic original position were logically (and not only historical-
ly) prior to the cosmopolitan original position: such peoples would thus be domestically political, 
but cosmopolitically pre-political, and we could then use political attributes from the domestic level 
to admit or exclude peoples into the assembly which will constitute their cosmopolitan political 
selves. Rawls does not want to bring “states” (constituted political bodies) to the international 
“original position” since when we think of “states”, we are already thinking of sovereign entities; 
rather, and following Kant, Rawls wants sovereignty to arise from a moral cosmopolitan/universalist 
thought experiment (or “overlapping consensus”) and be subject to the moral framework which is 
born of such an “original position”. Rawls also wants to avoid construing his contracting moral par-
ties in the original position as ones prone to realist political reasoning, ones who would opt for ab-
solutist, Westphalian sovereignty. “Liberal peoples” give rise to sovereign polities when recognised 
by others to be “moral”, that is, to be committed to principles of justice in the international sphere 
and in particular to respecting human rights and not instigating war except for reasons of self-
defence (Rawls 2001, 37). Yet, as Benhabib (2004, 78f) argues, if the “peoples” party to the original 
position are to be conceived as non-sovereign, pre-cosmopolitical entities, we cannot expect them 
to be already characterized by a “reasonably just constitutional democratic government”. In other 
words, one cannot conceive a Rawlsian domestic original position before the establishment of 
modern sovereign political units, and these can be conceived only as the results of a cosmopolitan 
original position. No group of persons can become a people unless recognised as such by others; 
even less can they establish a polity (even one without territorial sovereignty, such as the Sovereign 
chical” apply to peoples only when organized into polities, not in the “state of nature” as groups of human 
beings with no sovereignty. 
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Military Order of Malta) unless such establishment is recognised by other groups of peoples. The 
cosmopolitan original position is therefore logically prior to the domestic one, and one cannot 
admit or exclude peoples to the latter on the basis of domestic political attributes.  
Furthermore, prior to the cosmopolitan original position and to political sovereignty, peoples have 
no legal stewardship over any part of the globe recognised as such by other peoples. However, 
without establishing a de jure territorial sovereignty, it is morally futile to propose principles of jus-
tice for a sovereign state that might exist and be “sovereign” only de facto. The principles of The 
Law of Peoples are thus logically prior conditions of possibility for those of A Theory of Justice (or 
Political Liberalism). The conclusion is that, if we could ever establish a consistent cosmopolitan 
original position using “peoples”, we could not already select them on the basis of public-moral217 
and political attributes. We need to think “peoples” consistently as pre-political entities; using Ma-
ritain´s distinctions, we “peoples” are “communities” and not “societies”, they are “nations” and 
not “bodies politic”, they are empirical/sociological entities and not normative/political entities.  
However, when we start working with empirical “peoples”, we start seeing the limitations of the 
notion of “peoples”. Our first temptation is to think of peoples such as those which emerged from 
the breakdown of old empires in the 19th and 20th century. Of course, such peoples are not what we 
are seeking: they are the product of politics, and especially, of ideology, exclusion, power and op-
pression. They were born from ad-hoc conglomerates of individuals culturally homogenized 
through fictional historiography, statist centralization, oppression, exclusion, demonization or con-
217 A “public” morality (or a morality based on “public” reason) is here distinguished from a communitarian 
ethos, as in the classic distinction between Kantian Moralität and Hegelian Sittlichkeit. 
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tempt of the “other”, and dreams of liberty, conquest or autarky. When an empirical “people” (an 
ethno-cultural “nation”) lays claim to a territory, it is practically never alone as a “people” on that 
territory. There are usually other peoples living in the territory which one dominant group of peo-
ples (those banded together by historical alliances, ideology, mythological reconstruction of fiction-
al common origins) want to reduce to “minorities”, by demographical dominance. Sometimes heg-
emonic groups also acquire and maintain their demographic and political dominance by drawing 
boundaries with neighbours in a way that “minority” peoples are created by separation of weaker 
people from similar peoples in neighbouring territories (e.g. the Kurdish peoples in the Middle 
East). Even a territory empirically occupied by a “homogenous” “people” may be claimed by peo-
ples forcibly removed from those territories in the past, whose link to that land is brandished as 
constitutive of their “peoplehood” (e.g. the Jews and the Palestinians). Such empirical “peoples” 
cannot make an uncontested claim to a bounded territory. A laós does not translate directly and 
legitimately into a dễmos. 
5.1.3.2 Should Polities Be Seen As Doubly Closed (Demotically and Territorially)? 
For argument’s sake, let us nonetheless assume that we could think of purely pre-political peoples, 
whose unity and identity is as “real” as that of pre-political human individuals, and whose presence 
on, and link to, a territory is uncontested. Just as the individuals in the domestic Original Position 
would not accept the right to private property without some form of “difference principle”, these 
pre-political peoples in the cosmopolitan Original Position, not knowing if their native “soil” is a 
sinking island in the Pacific or a vast, resource-rich, thinly-populated land, will never recognise the 
right to territorial sovereignty of other peoples without some arrangement regarding migration. 
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There is no way a reasonable “people” which enters the cosmopolitan Original Position as a closed 
and complete social entity could be given title to territorial sovereignty under the “veil of igno-
rance”218 unless it is ready to accept principles regarding opening up its territory (and itself as a pol-
ity) to indigent peoples, or, if it refuses to do so, giving up underutilized territory back to the cos-
mopolitan commons, or offering substantial aid to these peoples.  
Waltzer (1983, 42f) is keenly aware of this moral problem in his work, especially when discussing 
the White Australia Policy. In a changing world of limited resources, one cannot morally justify both 
geographical closure (each polity has a fixed plot of land on the planet Earth) and demotic closure 
(each polity comprises a fixed group of people): if a polity has more land and resources than it 
needs while other peoples are without, it has either to open itself to others as a human group (in-
tegration), or else, if it wants to maintain its “identity” and “culture” by closing itself as a human 
group, it must place its territory and resources at the service of others (territorial and economic 
openness).Yet, double closure (geographical and demotic) is precisely what Rawls219 assumes is re-
218 The Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” is a series of restrictions on knowledge in a hypothetical contractarian 
assembly which force the participants (and the readers imagining themselves thinking in their stead) to 
make a choice which is just, according to rational standards which are acceptable to all in a pluralistic society 
(what Rawls calls “public reason”). It is a way of accomplishing Kantian moral universalization, or forcing 
oneself to will according to the Rousseauian “general will”. Rawls (2005b, 137) lists the following areas 
where one brackets knowledge: “place in society, […] fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abili-
ties, […] conception of the good, […] special features of [one´s] psychology such as [one´s] aversion to risk or 
liability to optimism or pessimism, […] particular circumstances of their own society, [… and] generation [to 
which] they belong”. 
219 Rawls’ reflection on international justice does not put into question the assumption, clearly stated in his 
other works (e.g. 2005a, 41), that a democratic society (in ideal theory) should be conceived as a closed and 
complete system where individuals join by birth and leave by death. Furthermore, in The Law of Peoples, he 
wants us to take the mapping of that society on a territory as a simple given. Following Walzer, Rawls (2001, 
38f) claims that in the absence (and undesirability) of a world state, boundaries are necessary and important 
(no matter how arbitrary their establishment was in the course of history) since they allow effective gov-
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quired for ideal political theory220; for this reason he relegates the subject of migration to non-ideal 
theory and excludes it from his national and international “original position” (cf. Benhabib 2004, 
87)221. He pre-empts any discussion of immigration and emigration under the veil of ignorance, 
rendering them taboo subjects for the contracting parties.  
ernmental stewardship of environmental and population assets, and effective representation. Most people 
would agree at this point, but Rawls seems to conclude from this that ideal theory should not be used to 
question actual boundaries. Yet, one cannot imagine how, in the cosmopolitan original position, the partici-
pants could tacitly accept both a principle prohibiting the redrawing of actual boundaries (without the poli-
ty´s consent) and a principle prohibiting the opening of membership of current political societies (without 
their consent). 
220 It is relatively easy to maintain the closure required by ideal theory at the level of single persons or at the 
level of the human race (both are “closed systems”), but it is practically impossible to work with a unit in be-
tween the two (such as “people” or “polity”) and give it true sovereignty over property and land while main-
taining it as a closed system. Any system in the middle cannot be truly closed, and if it were true that ideal 
political theory in this in-between can only be conceived on the basis of assumptions of strict closure, then 
one would doubt whether consistent and useful political theory were at all possible. 
221 In the introduction of The Law of Peoples, John Rawls (2001, 9) summarily dismisses the idea that migra-
tion could have a place in (ideal) political theory. After describing a realistic utopia as one having a “sound 
social policy” where “religious freedom and liberty of conscience, political freedom and constitutional liber-
ties, and equal justice for women” are guaranteed, Rawls (ibid.) claims that “the problem of immigration is 
not […] simply left aside, but is eliminated as a serious problem in a realistic utopia”. It is possibly true that, 
in a utopian international system made of well-ordered democratic societies, fewer people will be forced to 
migrate due to persecution and poverty; much depends on whether all “peoples” and all persons (even 
those rejected by their “people”) will be included and fairly represented in such a system. Yet, it is less clear 
how, in an international utopia made of monadic utopias, one can find the will to deal with the effects of 
natural disasters on tiny nations, and with cosmopolitan problems such as global warming which may cause 
national territories (such as islands in the Pacific) to disappear and people to become stateless. Creating a 
world system of “realistic utopias” à la Rawls does not eliminate migration as a fundamental human and po-
litical reality that needs to be reflected upon (rather than simply bracketed) in political theory. Nor does the 
adoption of perfectly fair and democratic institutions (and the bonanza of freedoms and riches for everyone 
that such institutions supposedly conjure up) necessarily reduce the flow of persons across borders or make 
citizens more welcoming of poorer immigrants (the Difference Principle, in fact, does not eliminate relative 
poverty). Most of the current migration flows will not dry up simply by ensuring the respect of basic liberties 
— without addressing the economic inequalities between polities and the changing ecology of the bio-
sphere, and ignoring the fact that refugees can be generated even in well-ordered but poor states due to 
rampant crime, or due to interventions and sanctions that may even be compatible with Rawls´ “just war” 
principles. Migration is a human phenomenon that has existed throughout human history and it has never 
been unproblematic; any political theory or ´realistic utopia´ that does not take it properly into account is 
either problematic or unrealistic. 
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To be sure, Rawls (2001, 105–120) does note that reasonably just liberal peoples have a duty to as-
sist “burdened societies”, but such a duty does not, in his view, entail any duty to open one´s bor-
ders and to offer membership, residence, asylum or even bare-minimum hospitality (as in Kant — 
see below), to people from these societies. Rawls insists that peoples do not have a right to migrate 
into other peoples’ territory without their consent, and this means that “a people has at least a 
qualified right to limit immigration” (Rawls 2001, 39 n. 48), even though he prefers to leave aside 
what such qualifications might be. I believe that placing a double closure constraint on political 
theory, rather than being a philosophical necessity, is characteristic of a frame of reference biased 
towards sedentary forms of living which acritically construes polities as stable and practically-sealed 
population compartments. To be sure, Rawls´ “settler-society” approach reflects the “norm” in 
philosophical thought. For this reason, “political membership — the conditions of entry and exit 
into societies — has rarely been considered an important aspect of theories of domestic and inter-
national justice” (Benhabib 2004, 74).  
The obvious need for some boundaries often tempts political philosophers to idealize impermeable 
boundaries; their “ordered political societies” and “realistic utopias” almost always make the as-
sumption of “insignificant” migration, and this constraint on political thinking is considered all too 
easily as a plausible and acceptable one. Yet, while (permeable) boundaries — such as those be-
tween the different states in the US — are administratively necessary, and have existed since time 
immemorial, the notions of closed boundaries, of clearly-separated and clearly-identifiable self-
sufficient “peoples” or “nations”, and of each “nation” having an exclusive right to a territory 
emerged after the peace of Westphalia. The Westphalian system spread in the 19th century after 
the Napoleonic wars, and were quickly idealized and put into place effectively through passport re-
C h a p t e r :  5  — P a g e :  303 
 
gimes and pushback policies, perfected at the height of xenophobic nationalism in the 1930s, as we 
have seen in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2). Rawls, however, does not simply idealize them: he cannot 
even conceive ideal political theory without the strict compartmentalization of “peoples”. Yet “We, 
the People”, used by American and French Revolutionaries in the 18th century is not the same as 
the ethno-cultural Volk, a population unit popularized by Romanticist academics in the 19th century 
(by post-colonialist ideologues in the 20th century) to serve the political ambitions of a generation in 
search of scapegoats and strangers against which to forge a “national” identity. While the “peo-
ples” born from the American and French Revolution are moral and political entities which justified 
their existence on the basis of universalist ideals, were generally open to include neighbours and 
were cosmopolitan at heart (at least in theory)222, Rawls´ peoples remind us of the Romantic Volk, 
jealous of their splendid isolation and terrified of being culturally or genetically contaminated by 
strangers: they are practically “windowless monads who have no interest in mixing, mingling, and 
interacting with others, […] indifferent not only to each other´s plight but to each other´s charms as 
well” (Benhabib 2004, 92). 
222 For instance, the Montagnard Constitution of the 24 June, 1793, Article 4, states: “Every man born and 
living in France, of twenty-one years of age, and every alien, who has attained the age of twenty-one, and 
has been domiciled in France one year, and lives from his labour; or has acquired property; or has married a 
French woman; or has adopted a child; or supports an aged man; and finally every alien whom the legislative 
body has declared as one well-deserving of the human race, are admitted to exercise the rights of a French 
citizen” (my emphasis).  
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 5.1.4 TWO DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY TO BE HELD IN TENSION 
5.1.4.1 The First Dimension: Stewardship of a Territory 
Rawls’ notion of “peoples” may not have been very helpful in our quest for a better understanding 
of borders and sovereignty, but a number of things mentioned in the previous discussion will prove 
useful as we go along. We mentioned, in particular, the tension between societal closure and terri-
torial closure. I believe that this reveals two dimensions of political societies. In this section I will 
propose what I consider the most suitable way of conceiving modern political societies. As we shall 
see below, this scheme is influenced by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and owes much to in-
sights from the Catholic Tradition. 
The first word in “Political Society” comes from polis (city). Cities are, first of all, bounded physical 
spaces: in Malta, by definition, a real “city” has real (and massive) walls. Though vestiges of extra-
territoriality still exist in the modern world, the complex medieval arrangements of overlapping ju-
risdictions and authorities have disappeared, and — excluding certain moments of “crisis”, such as 
wars and humanitarian interventions, and certain parts of the planet, such as Antarctica and the 
ocean floors — every inhabitable plot of land on Earth has one sovereign authority assigned as its 
steward (de jure or de facto) and tacitly recognised as such by practically all other sovereign politi-
cal authorities.  
However, a person who encloses a tract of land from the commons acquires a legitimate title to 
that land not by the act of enclosing it (most such acts in history were indeed unlawful and unjust) 
but when all other claimants tacitly or explicitly accept the enclosure as a fact and pretend to sur-
render their rights to that land, transferring full stewardship rights to that person. They do so, hop-
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ing that by creating a system of holdings, the land will be used more productively, and given the 
higher aggregate wealth produced from that land, benefits (such as well-paying jobs and well-
funded welfare schemes) will somehow accrue to all former claimants, even those who never found 
“enough and as good” land to enclose and those who ended up with no land223. Contrary to what 
certain libertarian authors seem to assume, there has never been a just and rational scheme of land 
enclosure and institution of property rights in the history of humankind. (Any such scheme would 
also need to take into account future generations, for instance.) Thus, one cannot assume that all 
possible legitimate claimants to a tract of land have truly, fully and permanently alienated their 
rights to the current owner. Private property (as a just and lawful permanent institution) is a fictio 
juris; the Earth ultimately belongs to the whole human race224, and private persons and corpora-
223 I will not enter here into a discussion of the Lockean proviso and of right-wing libertarian attempts (such 
as that of the early Nozick) to demonstrate that historical homesteading could be morally justified: they have 
been amply critiqued even within the libertarian tradition. Left-wing libertarian positions, such as those of 
Hillel Steiner and Peter Vallentyne, and the single-tax libertarianism of Henry George, would concede most 
of the points I would like to make here. Suffice it to say that Locke´s (1980, para. 28) claim that homestead-
ing is permissible if “enough, and as good [is] left in common for others” is a logical impossibility for a coher-
ent liberal, since when a person chooses among finite things, she reduces the freedom of choice of the next 
chooser, and freedom is a major human good. Thus, the situation for the second chooser is always one of 
lesser freedom of choice, and hence cannot be “as good” as that of the first chooser. Furthermore, as human 
population grows, land becomes scarce and at some point some people are excluded from the distribution, 
such that all the process of legitimation falls back like dominos (not enough is left for chooser n+1, so n can-
not set up a border, hence n-1´s border is delegitimized, then n-2´s border, etc. up to the first act of closing 
the commons). This objection does not even start to take into account the deception, theft, violence have 
accompanied the closing of the commons in actual human history. Rousseau puts it eloquently in A Dis-
course on the Origin of Inequality: “The first man who, having enclosed a plot of ground, took it into his head 
to think this is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. 
What crimes, wars and murders, what miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared had 
someone pulled up the stakes, or filled in the ditch, and cried out to his fellow-men: ‘Do not listen to this 
imposter. You are lost if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all, and the earth to no one!’” 
(Rousseau 1992, 44). 
224 Though Rerum Novarum 7-8 defends private property as a natural right and as “sacred”, this Lockean doc-
trine was introduced into Catholic Social Thought by its drafters (namely Luigi Taparelli d´Azeglio and Matteo 
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tions are allowed to act as though they have an absolute title to a tract of land for as long as they 
use that land to benefit society at large. If they accumulate large tracts of land and leave them un-
cultivated, or pay misery wages to their labourers and invest all the earnings abroad, or use the 
mineral wealth extracted from the land to finance militias that destabilize the country, they can 
reasonably expect the land to be taken from them, by the government (via confiscation, expropria-
tion and redistribution, or in payment of hefty taxes), or by civil society movements (e.g. land inva-
sions by poor farmers). 
Similarly, the current system of sovereign “nation-states” resulted from the enclosure of practically 
all inhabitable land on the Earth by political societies, often founded as heterogeneous alliances 
between displaced persons or migrants and native born clans, and eventually moulded into a more-
or-less homogenous entity (a “people” or “nation”) through coercion, subjugation and exclusion. As 
we mentioned above, such political units have generally hemmed in excluded others (“minorities”) 
in their midst who refused or were not allowed to “integrate” (via cultural assimilation, religious 
conversion, intermarriage). The existence of current polities as “sovereign” entities is a juridical fic-
Liberatore) and constitutes a break with the greater Catholic tradition which considered that: (i) institution-
alized property is part of the jus gentium (and is not inviolable; such an institution can be reformed by the 
appropriate authorities), (ii) land and material goods on earth are ultimately the possession of the whole 
human race, but stewardship is granted to private individuals for more efficient use of such goods, in view of 
bigger benefits accruing to the common good, (iii) just possession is linked to just use, and titles to posses-
sion can be challenged on the basis of use which does not benefit the common good, (iv) human persons 
have some right to dominion over basic material goods (which is not exactly the same as the modern right to 
private property) necessary for survival and the exercise of liberty (cf. Fortin 1992). Official Catholic teaching 
since Vatican II (on the basis of the authoritative doctrine of GS 71), while not denying the right to private 
property when justly received or acquired, has strictly bracketed the Lockean thesis espoused in Rerum No-
varum, and reaffirms Catholic tradition by insisting that the universal destination of goods is primordial and 
so prior to private property (CCC 2403), placing the regulation of the exercise of the right to private property 
in the hands of political authority (CCC 2406), reiterating the traditional notion of property as stewardship 
(CCC 2404) and avoiding any mention of private property as “sacred” or as a “natural right” (cf. Fortin 1991).   
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tion: persons and polities inhabiting other lands pretend they have surrendered their claim to that 
part of the surface of the planet and tacitly (or explicitly, e.g. the international recognition of South 
Sudan via the United Nations) confer stewardship over that tract of land on a particular polity. As 
long as the polity manages well the territory under its jurisdiction, provides benefits for the whole 
of humanity (which, in the case of a fertile and thinly-populated country, may include placing cheap 
food on the international markets and providing agricultural jobs for non-natives), avoids trying to 
take over the land of others and respects the rights of minorities within that territory — in short, as 
long as it behaves as a decent steward of that territory — other polities will treat it as though it 
were truly and absolutely “sovereign”.  
5.1.4.2 The Second Dimension: Stewardship of a Human Collective 
The second term in the expression “political society” — and the derived meaning of polis — refers 
to a human collective, in part voluntary (citizens accept to belong to the polis tacitly by not leaving 
the “city” and renouncing their citizenship rights, and explicitly by exercising their rights as citizens; 
foreigners may explicitly ask to become citizens, etc.), in part non-voluntary (most citizens are simp-
ly born in that territory or born to other citizens; their forebears became citizens or “members” of 
that polity at the time of its establishment or expansion simply because they happened to be resid-
ing within that physical space). Thus, besides being a matter of (a) territorial situatedness (and thus 
encumbered with the corresponding responsibilities of environmental and demotic stewardship), a 
modern political society is also (b) a human collective which usually combines (b1) an assumed 
(non-voluntary or not-specifically-chosen) network of societal bonding with (b2) intentional (volun-
tary) system of political participation. There are some situations where each of these elements ex-
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ist in an almost pure form, e.g. (a) Antarctica, (b1) certain refugee camps, (b2) the Knights of Mal-
ta225.  
It is not easy to combine the two elements of this equation. On the one hand, a polity is a steward 
of a territory (with its human and material resources) and acts as such in the name of the whole 
human race which is the ultimate owner: it is thus subject to a higher law, a “cosmopolitan right”, a 
body of “universal human rights”. On the other hand, a polity is a society, an autonomous human 
collective with no external superior, answerable only to itself. Thus, on the one hand, if a polity is 
sitting on a territory with an excess of resources while keeping needy strangers out, we can accuse 
it of bad stewardship and consider it at fault qua steward (it can only justify its position by giving up 
territory or using its resources to effectively help meet the needs of those strangers). This can also 
work the other way: a polity sitting on a very fragile or important ecological habitat (which might be 
destroyed by human settlement and activity) might have a duty qua steward (especially towards 
future generations) to keep people out and promote emigration.  
On the other hand, however, if a polity is jealous of the cultural unity and the identity of the human 
group which composes it (a unity painfully built over decades and centuries), and is proud of the 
proper functioning of its democratic institutions due to this very unity, it is not necessarily at fault 
qua society in preventing strangers from joining this human group. Of course, qua society, a polity 
225 (a) Antarctica is a territory with environmental and demotic stewardship but with no real human collec-
tive; (b1) some refugee camps mimic an assumed network of societal bonding with no real territorial auton-
omy and little (if any) political participation (cf. Giorgio Agamben´s (1998, chap. 7) reflection on “camps”); 
(b2) the Sovereign Military Order of Malta is a 900 year-old “sovereign entity” (a sort of polity with about 3 
citizens, and 13,000 members) having a complex system of political participation but no proper territorial 
autonomy (after losing Jerusalem, then Rhodes, then Malta) and no societal bonding of the sort found 
among people who live together in a unified space. 
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might even opt to promote the immigration of similar human groups in order to strengthen its de-
mographical and cultural clout (or offer a haven for people with similar religious beliefs being per-
secuted elsewhere); it might even want to embrace people from different cultures and races, be-
lieving that by becoming a cosmopolitan “melting-pot” society, it will thrive artistically, economical-
ly, and geopolitically.  
5.1.4.3 Double Political Stewardship and Political Realism in Modernity 
The problem here is that modern political sovereignty, correctly understood from a moral view-
point, requires that polities fulfil at once their duties as territorial stewards and their duties as hu-
man collectives in order to be able to enjoy the prerogatives linked to both. Obviously, political re-
alism has tended to obscure this, and promote an absolutist ideology of state sovereignty with 
three features: “internally, the state is the final and absolute political authority over its particular 
territory and its inhabitants; externally, the state is not subject to any other outside its own territo-
ry; and, concerning the boundaries between these two realms, the state has the sovereign right uni-
laterally to determine who may cross and under what conditions” (Abizadeh 2010, 147, my empha-
sis).  
The political realist tries to sell us a world which is basically a blown-up version of a very rough 
neighbourhood, with no police force226, where most people seek to stay inside and avoid gunfights, 
and put on ear plugs when they hear women and children shrieking. But is a “mind your own busi-
226 Properly conducted humanitarian interventions in the case of genocide or crimes against humanity (in 
situations covered by the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect”) are probably best understood as “just 
policing”, as Tobias Winright (2011) convincingly argues. 
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ness” international society the best we can strive for in an interconnected world where we seem to 
have no problem establishing binding global rules to regulate a plethora of “mundane” things227? 
The political realist´s conception of sovereignty without moral limitations seemed plausible after 
the ravages of the Wars of Religion in Europe, and when the mighty polities of the world tried to 
avoid fighting in Europe and busied themselves building empires overseas, colonizing land belong-
ing to polities whose legitimacy was supposedly denied for moral reasons (e.g. the practice of hu-
man sacrifices and the violation of the rules of hospitality). Few people then could be bothered to 
challenge the realist view by proposing limits to state sovereignty and a body of cosmopolitan 
norms which each (imperial) polity would have to respect so as to be recognised as “morally ma-
ture” or “morally well-behaved” and hence entitled to be treated as sovereign. 
Unlike past multicultural empires, modern democracies are smaller political units, and their political 
being depends on the bonding and participation of citizens. They typically have less land and re-
sources to offer to outsiders (or so they believe), and cannot ignore the second part of the equa-
tion: they cannot let people in without eventually building with them a larger body politic, without 
finding effective ways of fostering societal bonding and active political participation so that the 
stranger does not simply remain the other (the colonized or juxtaposed other) but becomes part of 
the self. In practice, prosperous modern polities find it inconceivable to give up territory or capital 
resources to others, and the help they offer to other “burdened” polities is often insignificant, inef-
227 Jeremy Waldron (2008) provides an interesting list of “mundane” cosmopolitan norms which sovereign 
states submit to all the time without raising any eyebrows: “postal and telephone conventions, airline safety 
and navigation standards, the law of international trade, the practices that define the convertibility of cur-
rencies, transnational banking arrangements, weights and measures, time zones, international quarantine 
arrangements, and so on”. 
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fectual, or simply a cover to protect their local and geopolitical interests at the expense of such pol-
ities. All this imposes on them a moral obligation to welcome needy strangers, yet when they do let 
people in (regularly or irregularly), they also find it hard to integrate these strangers socially and 
politically and make them part of their political self. Though, from an ethical point of view, this di-
lemma seems to be simply one of mustering the (political) will to do what is right, the “will” here is 
not that of an emperor discussing his duties with a confessor, but a complex and fragile will of a 
democratic political society afraid of becoming more complex and fragile, and more polarized and 
conflicted, by hastily doing what may be morally right without coming to endorse it fully and will it 
deeply. Indeed, since that very society and its will may be altered in the process of including others 
as part of the self.  
5.1.5 POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND COSMOPOLITAN RIGHT 
5.1.5.1 Cosmopolitan Right in Kant´s “Perpetual Peace” 
The conception of political societies within a cosmopolitan order, presented above, hearkens back 
to Kant, though it has not been inherited today by several thinkers and not only by known Kantians, 
like Rawls. Some “left-wing” libertarians and even communitarians like Walzer would concede most 
of the points. In her reflections on sovereignty, cosmopolitan right and the rights of immigrants, 
Seyla Benhabib (2004; 2008; 2009) offers an insightful synthesis of Kant´s thought on these issues. 
A major text which grounds her work is Kant´s third definitive article for perpetual peace among 
states, which states that “The Law of World Citizenship (Weltbürgerrecht) shall be limited to condi-
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tions of universal hospitality” (Kant 1983, 118)228. Kant insists that hospitality in this context is a 
right, not a question of philanthropy. It is a peculiar right, however: a “cosmopolitan” right (the only 
one that Kant is willing to admit), something between a universal human right and a civil right229. 
“Hospitality is a ‘right’ which belongs to all human beings insofar as we view them as potential par-
ticipants in a world republic [; … it] is situated at the boundaries of the polity; it delimits civic space 
by regulating relations among members and strangers” (Benhabib 2004, 26–7). However, for Kant, 
hospitality (Hospitalität/Wirtbarkeit) is the right of temporary sojourn (Besuchsrecht), not the right 
to be a permanent visitor (Gast) or a fellow inhabitant (Hausgenosse) for a certain time. It means 
that the stranger who arrives peacefully in the land of another (and does not act with hostility dur-
ing the sojourn) should not be treated as an enemy; they may be refused permanent sojourn and 
be accompanied to the border, but not treated with hostility230.  
Kant justifies this right using two premises, ultimately sourced from Catholic Moral Theology: one is 
the capacity of all human beings to associate, and the second is the “common possession of the sur-
228 One of the earliest reflections on this right was developed in 1539 by Francisco de Vitoria in De Indiis q3 
a1 (1991, 278–284). It eventually became part of international law as reworked in the writings of Hugo Gro-
tius, and was further developed in Samuel von Pufendorf, Emmerich de Vattel and Kant. Hospitality as a so-
cial practice was however dismissed by the Scottish Enlightenment, and as an element of international law it 
was completely disregarded after Kant, as nationalism and legal positivism became dominant in the 19th cen-
tury, only to be rediscovered after World War II (Baker 2011, 38).  
229 Though Benhabib does not note this, the peculiar status is mainly Kant´s rendering of the notion of ius 
gentium as something intermediate between the ius naturale and ius civile in the Salamanca school (and in 
Roman civil law, as rediscovered in the Middle Ages). Ius, in Kant, is seen more from the point of view of the 
(individual, “sovereign”) subject´s entitlement, than from that of the political sovereign´s prerogative (as in 
Vitoria), or as merely an “objective” legal corpus. 
230 For Kant, the right to permanent sojourn (Gastrecht) could only be granted through an explicit contract of 
beneficence (ein wohltätiger Vertrag); in the time of Kant, such concessions were occasionally granted to 
certain long-term sojourners (e.g. the droit d´aubaine in pre-Revolutionary France, the right of Jews of Span-
ish origin to reside indefinitely in some Northern European polities since the 15th century, etc.). 
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face of the earth”231. Kant is well aware of the dangers of imperialist conquest, and does not com-
mit Locke´s mistake (and that of many of his political realist readers) of moving from common pos-
session of the Earth in the ethical and transcendental construct of the “state of nature” (cf. Locke 
1980, 18) to the political and historical assumption of some particular land (e.g. “America”) as a res 
nullius prior to the arrival of the Europeans (cf. Locke 1980, 29). In fact, Kant spends half of the sec-
tion on hospitality denouncing European abuses and admitting that while the Barbary pirates do 
wrong when they enslave castaways, the Chinese and Japanese are right in not offering rights to 
permanent sojourn to greedy and treacherous Europeans.  
5.1.5.2 Cosmopolitan Right in Kant´s Other Writings 
However, this historical detour seems to prevent Kant from providing a cogent argument from 
common possession to cosmopolitan right in Perpetual Peace (cf. Benhabib 2004, 31). Hence, Ben-
habib examines other Kantian works, and mentions that in the Rechtslehre of The Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant (1996, 89) seems to argue from the sphericality (and hence, finitude) of the surface of 
the earth that the Right of a state (national law) and the Right of nations (international law) need a 
prior Right which grounds their sovereignty on a particular portion of the surface of earth. This prior 
(moral, implicit, non-positive) law is the “Right of all nations” (ius gentium or ius cosmopoliticum).  
231 Actually, the first is Vitoria´s argument (cf. note 228, above), reproduced in Grotius, the second originates 
in the fifth chapter of Grotius´ Mare Liberum (Grotius 2009; cf. Baker 2011, 46). Ultimately, the idea of com-
mon possession of the Earth prior to privatization and the closing of the commons (as a prelapsarian ideal, or 
a primitive situation of humanity in the “state of nature”) can be traced back to St. Ambrose (Duties of the 
Clergy, I.132), and eventually inspired the famous arguments of Locke and Marx, and the Catholic Church´s 
teaching on the “universal destination of created goods”. 
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Kant frames all of this in a discussion of external freedom (e.g. the freedom of acting on or taking 
possession of something external to the thinking self, in the categories of space and time, distinct 
from the internal freedom of appropriating an idea). Unlike internal freedom, true external free-
dom can be possible only if bounded by law; for Kant (unlike Locke), though I might grab or occupy 
a piece of land using might, I can possess it only by right (in a rationally-organized human society, 
mapped out on a finite landmass232) when my possession is approved by law, that is, when the oth-
er social partners rationally accept my claim to private possession of that land (and agree that no-
body can use it or dispose of it but me). However, for my social partners in a bounded polity (i.e. 
national law) to be able to do so, the landmass of the polity must be theirs to allot; this is where 
cosmopolitan law is needed (cf. Kant 1996, 40 note i). In Rawlsian jargon, there needs to be a cos-
mopolitan “original position” to found a domestic “original position” that establishes titles to prop-
erty, and the latter is subject to the former, such that there can be no warrant for absolute political 
sovereignty.  
Of course, this was a dangerous thing to say in Kant´s Prussia in the 1790s, during the French Revo-
lutionary wars: the ideologues of the French Revolution presented it as a cosmopolitan movement 
which transcended boundaries and unseated tyrants who denied liberty and equality to all. Memo-
ries of the European Wars of Religion were also still fresh, when the sovereignty of polities was put 
232 Locke´s famous assumption that simply by grabbing a piece of land, and leaving “enough and as good” 
land for others, I obtain a right to that land is ultimately based on the idea of a (practically) infinite space, 
where ∞ - 1 = ∞. In finite space, when a chooser X removes a piece of land from the commons, chooser X + 
1 inevitably has less freedom of choice, so the land available for her is necessarily not as good as that availa-
ble to X. Fairness, in a finite world, entails that the right to possession can be granted only by the (at least 
tacit) rational agreement of all. People do not own land simply because their grandparents grabbed it, but 
because society (the body politic, not simply the state) tacitly agrees that they should be allowed to keep it, 
and that it should not be grabbed back from them. 
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into question by invading armies sent by those who insisted that rulers were subject to the authori-
ty of the Holy Roman Emperor, the Pope, God or Sola Scriptura. Kant, using his “right to hospitali-
ty”, quietly drives a wedge into the edifice of absolutist modern sovereignty that threatens to bring 
down the whole fort; he evokes the ghost of a cosmopolitan right superior to domestic right, but 
meekly insists that this should be invoked only when asking “uncivilized peoples” not to kill harm-
less castaways.  
5.1.5.3 Kant´s Double Legacy in Contemporary Debates 
Kant´s Besuchsrecht and the fundamental right to hospitality, resuscitated after the horrors of 
World War II and the pushbacks of Jewish refugees, is seen as the precursor of the principle of non-
refoulement. It might also be used to found a principle prohibiting the use of disproportionate (e.g. 
lethal) force or discriminatory removal procedures against persons who enter a country peaceably 
(though irregularly)233. This part of Kant´s legacy has been inherited by liberals who seek to expand 
on these fundamental rights so as to support today´s immigrants´ claims to political belonging.  
Yet, Kant´s insistence that the ethical assumption of cosmopolitan citizenship (a global “body poli-
tic”) does not imply the political institution of world government (a global “state”) and his refusal to 
construe Gastrecht (the right to permanent residency) as a fundamental right (considering it rather 
as the result of a charter, granted as a privilege by the republican sovereign) has been taken up by 
233 Kant (1983, 118) argues that a person behaving peaceably can be turned away only if this can be done 
without destroying them. Some authors, like José Jorge Mendoza (2011; 2012), have recently argued that 
most irregular immigrants residing in liberal polities today cannot be removed but through acts of force that 
are discriminatory, violent or harmful, and such removals are unjustified.  
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communitarians, civic republicans and defenders of national sovereignty who want to close bor-
ders or keep unwanted migrants out. 
Benhabib (2004, 39) recognises Kant´s legacy as ambivalent, but sees the unresolved tension as 
philosophically fecund in today´s debate on immigration and on the doctrine of the responsibility to 
protect. She sees Perpetual Peace as a key text in political philosophy, marking a transition from 
what she calls Westphalian sovereignty to another conception of sovereignty, liberal international 
sovereignty.  In the former model, all polities are construed ´free and equal´ and can do whatever 
they want within their territory so long as they do not harm other polities, and where intervention 
by other polities is ruled out except perhaps in the case of grave civil conflict with the collapse of 
state institutions. In the latter conception of sovereignty, the formal freedom (viz., the right to be 
free from intervention by others in one´s internal affairs) of states — even functional, non-
belligerent ones — is not absolute. For their freedom to be worthy of respect, states must be mini-
mally “decent”. For Kant, this meant (a) not killing or enslaving castaways and temporary sojourn-
ers, and (b) adopting a “republican” civil constitution (where members enjoyed freedom qua per-
sons, dependence on common legislation qua subjects, and legal equality qua citizens)234.  
To be sure, Kant could not demand much more in a project for the abolition of war in 1795, yet we 
have since developed this nucleus into (a) a body of international human rights law and (b) a re-
quirement for governments to respect the freedom and fairly represent the interests of all persons 
legitimately residing on their territory (a representation which at least should somehow respect the 
234 Cf. Definitive Article 1 of Perpetual Peace (Kant 1983, 112). “Republican”, for Kant, does not necessarily 
mean non-monarchist government, and even less a full-fledged Western democratic system. 
                                                     
C h a p t e r :  5  — P a g e :  317 
 
moral-political principle — drafting laws which are rationally acceptable to those who are bound 
by them — and ideally should adopt some of the institutions and practices of modern democratic 
polities which allow actual political participation of those affected by the laws, according to the 
democratic principle). We shall return to this below, when discussing democratic legitimacy and 
the complex synthesis positions proposed by Benhabib (and other followers of Habermas´ re-
appropriation of the Kantian legacy) to bring together (a) the liberal-cosmopolitan insistence on the 
priority of human rights and (b) the civic-republican defence of popular sovereignty. 5.1.6 CLASSICAL LIBERAL APPROACHES TO THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 
5.1.6.1 A Coherent Libertarian Approach to Immigration 
Let us however take a moment to look at these two groups and at their ideological postures sepa-
rately. Arash Abizadeh (2010) offers a concise and insightful overview of the major positions235: 
235 For a wider overview which goes beyond the scope of our current work, see Barry and Goodin (1992), and 
in particular Nardin´s (1992) concluding synthesis, which also includes natural law, Marxist and political real-
ist positions, and compares the way the movement of money and the movement of persons are treated by 
such positions. We could also include utilitarianism, as Carens (2008, 222) does. In general, Marxism, while 
being cosmopolitan and theoretically opposed to borders which could divide the universal proletariat, sees 
migration with suspicion as an epiphenomenon of superstructures of exploitation and the hopes raised by 
migration as forms of alienation, and in practice, Marxist regimes have had problems even allowing citizens 
to emigrate. Political realism and utilitarianism are very difficult to apply consistently to the problem of sov-
ereignty and immigration: they give different results depending on how you equilibrate domestic national 
interest and geopolitical balance of power factors, or on how you do the utilitarian calculus (i.e. whether you 
are a domestic or cosmopolitan utilitarian, whether you are an act- or a rule-utilitarian, and whether you are 
Millian, Benthamist or Sidgwickian when defining utility). Classical natural law positions are often considered 
as closest to the Catholic position, but generally lack clear proposals of their own to make on such topics 
(apart from adopting and adapting liberal-egalitarian stances), possibly because (in the hands of the current 
generation of scholars, at least) they are too dependent on the exegesis of premodern texts, and are thus 
difficult to reconcile with modern conceptions of political sovereignty and subjective rights. For an example 
of this, see John Finnis´ (1992) very critical response to Ann Dummett (1992). 
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1. Liberal philosophers emphasize human rights without linking them to the procedural-
political dimensions of modern states (viz. popular sovereignty, participation and demo-
cratic legitimation).  
2. Other authors (e.g. civic republicans, moderate communitarians) prefer to emphasize the 
procedural-political dimensions of modern states (and to discuss rights with reference to 
such dimensions, rather than “naked” rights), or at least seek to keep in balance rights and 
democratic participation. 
In the following three sections, we discuss liberal authors, making reference to civic republican and 
other positions, which we present more fully after critiquing the former. Among the liberal authors, 
Abizadeh distinguishes classical liberals (who base their arguments on rights to basic freedoms) and 
liberal egalitarians (who, besides freedoms, include the more egalitarian rights). In general, both 
positions offer valuable critiques to one aspect of the absolutist notion of state sovereignty, viz., its 
substantive-moral dimension. As we have indicated above, they argue that rights to basic freedoms 
and to some measure of equality on the global level place moral limits on the exercise of state sov-
ereignty. Certain laws concerning boundaries and naturalisation are immoral insofar as they violate 
these rights. The main rights privileged by liberals are “liberties”, namely (i) freedom to use and 
dispose of private property, (ii) freedom of contract and (iii) freedom of movement. Let us consider 
in more detail the classical liberals, those who focus on the first two and derive the third from 
them.  
Right-wing libertarians are maybe the best examples of the classical liberals: laissez-faire capitalists 
and free-market ideologues at the end of the 19th century were staunchly in favour of open borders 
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and removing restrictions on the flow of labour and human capital; in their view, governments had 
no business regulating the contracts signed by private individuals, and if one wanted to hire a 
worker from another country, the government had no right to keep that worker out. According to 
these thinkers, markets should be open to everyone, and if they get overcrowded, people presum-
ably move on (cf. Walzer 1983, 37); markets require no state regulation. Similar authors writing af-
ter the collapse of Communism argue that when the West tries to use central planning to control 
supply and demand of labour on the domestic and international market, it simply imitates the failed 
policies used by Eastern Bloc countries to regulate transactions in goods and services (cf. Harris 
2007, 34f). In this vein, in a 1997 paper, Joseph Carens (2008, 213) constructs a libertarian 
(Nozickean) argument in favour of open borders, given that Nozick himself, like most contemporary 
right-wing libertarians, avoids applying his political theory to the subject of human migration. Ac-
cording to Nozick, all persons have the right to enter into voluntary exchanges with other persons, 
and the state does not have the right to interfere in such exchanges unless someone´s rights are 
being violated; furthermore, nobody has a right to be protected against (fair) competitive disad-
vantage. Consequently, the state cannot interfere to stop the exchange of labour for money be-
tween a citizen and a non-citizen (e.g. in order to increase the chances of other citizens successfully 
exchanging their labour force for money and protect them from competition).  
5.1.6.2 Coherent Libertarian Thought and Contemporary “Libertarian” Politics 
Carens (2008, 214) rightly notes that libertarianism does provide a basis for the exclusion of non-
citizens. Even though 
it provides no basis for the state to exclude aliens and no basis for individuals to exclude aliens that 
could not be used to exclude citizens as well. Poor aliens could not afford to live in affluent suburbs (ex-
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cept in the servants’ quarters), but that would be true of poor citizens, too. Individual property owners 
could refuse to hire aliens, to rent them houses, to sell them food, and so on, but in a Nozickean world 
they could do the same things to their fellow citizens. 
Nozick analogously concedes that a small community might agree freely (e.g. through an explicit 
and binding contract) to exclude outsiders (and also to obligatorily redistribute wealth), but he is 
not ready to accept that individuals in a polity are bound by tacit or theoretical contracts of a similar 
kind: in his view, private property is acquired from land which is owned by nobody (and not from 
land held in common by all), so polities have no rights over what is private: I can let into my car and 
sell my house to whomsoever I wish, citizen or not, and the state has no right to interfere or try to 
stop me. 
The conclusion, drawn also by Carens (ibid.), is that certain slogans (typical of far-right groups), like 
“this is our country – we let in and keep out whomever we want”, are incompatible with authentic 
right-wing libertarianism, which adamantly would retort that “what is mine is not ‘our’ — and cer-
tainly not of the state. Nobody but I can let in or keep out anybody from my property”. Of course, 
this is not the only surprise that a theory of just homesteading and just transfer of titles holds for 
intellectually-honest conservatives; the obvious fact that most holdings of land in the Americas 
have not been justly transferred and should be returned to the original title holders and their de-
scendants may surprise many people in Texas and Arizona — who usually consider “illegals” from 
Northern Mexico as the real “squatters”236. Of course, there are some libertarians who are more 
236 Indeed the consequences of such a theory may shock many persons (in any corner of this planet which 
has ever been coveted and conquered) who pretend to espouse libertarianism. Furthermore, the (admitted-
ly very surprising) idea that consistent libertarian theory allows me to secede at will (cf. Steiner 1992, 92f), 
declare my apartment in the centre of Paris and as part of Iran (assuming that the polity over there wants to 
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intellectually sophisticated and admit some sort of tacit social contract237 in their theory of the in-
stitution of private property (e.g. left-wing libertarians, or single-tax libertarians238); according to 
such libertarians it may be “reasonable” to postulate that when a polity (or at least a system of 
holdings) is established, there is an implicit agreement (and contract) to keep out unwanted others, 
just as in some gated communities, where contracts have a clause saying that buyers cannot resell 
their house to persons considered undesirable by their neighbours without previously offering it to 
the community at the fetching price (cf. Steiner 1992, 87f). However, the problem for libertarians 
with allowing complex communitarian clauses in their titles is that all sorts of “reasonable” social 
welfare and recurrent taxation clauses could be introduced into the system in this way, and their 
position ends up being no different from that of liberal egalitarians.  
welcome me), and let the Iranians install chemical weapons in my home may seem somewhat distasteful to 
many conservatives, but if private property is truly “inviolable”, who could rightly stop me? 
237 For instance, some libertarians “regard any original title as encumbered by a proviso designed to render it 
consistent with each person’s self-ownership and/or entitlement to equal liberty. Moreover, since these 
foundational moral rights are vested in all persons, regardless of their temporal/generational location, that 
proviso-based encumbrance remains attached to each title successively derived (through transfer) from an 
original title” (Steiner 1992, 89). 
238 Single-tax, or Georgist libertarians, reject recurrent taxation, but admit “each person’s entitlement to an 
equal portion of the value of natural resources and thus a correlative obligation in owners of such resources 
to surrender that amount” (Steiner 1992, 89), and this entitlement is assumed to be global in scope (or at 
least Henry George never denies this). One could build a single-tax argument in favour of immigration by 
saying that poor immigrants entering prosperous nations seeking welfare are simply reclaiming what they 
are entitled to. 
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 5.1.7 LIBERAL EGALITARIAN APPROACHES TO THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 
5.1.7.1 Recognising a “Right to Immigrate” Behind the “Veil of Ignorance” 
Let us then move on to this second group of thinkers. As the name suggests, liberal egalitarians be-
lieve that we should treat all human beings as free and equal moral persons, that liberties come 
first, but should be protected and/or made available in ways which are egalitarian, and that socio-
economic equality should be promoted as much as possible. As regards human mobility, these au-
thors tend to provide arguments (i) from liberty, in favour of the freedom of movement (but justi-
fied as part of a contractarian thought experiment in which all persons are originarily deemed 
equal, not as in Nozick) and also arguments (ii) from equality, in favour of allowing the world´s poor 
access to the wealth hoarded by prosperous nations. In this vein, Carens (2008, 215f) constructs a 
“Rawlsian” liberal egalitarian argument, well aware of the fact that Rawls himself avoids questions 
about immigration by restricting his political reflection to an “ideal” type of political societies: ones 
which are closed and complete, as we have explained above. “In ideal theory one assumes that, 
even after the “veil of ignorance” is lifted, people will accept and generally abide by the principles 
chosen in the original position and that there are no historical obstacles to the realization of just 
institutions. In non-ideal theory, one takes account of both historical obstacles and the unjust ac-
tions of others” (ibid.; cf. Rawls 2005b, 8f; 245f).  
We have already argued above that Rawls´ exclusion of human migration from ideal theory faults 
the theory as a whole, since natural disasters and sinking islands which displace people and make 
countries disappear are not just “historical obstacles” or “unjust actions” that hinder the realization 
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of a political ideal, but are part of the constitutive fact that modern polities sit on a material piece 
of the planet Earth that no “realistic utopia” can afford to ignore. Yet, in spite of this and many oth-
er objections raised to Rawls´s construction of the original position and definition of the veil of ig-
norance, I agree with Carens that the proceduralist tools provided by Rawls in A Theory of Justice 
are useful to explore the liberal-egalitarian approach to political justice239. Simply, given the prob-
lems of closure mentioned above, we should consider the cosmopolitan level prior to the domestic 
one, and ignore Rawls´ protests that this would unjustly impose a democratic, liberal and pluralistic 
view of human polities on all human persons (and “peoples”): democratic procedures, human rights 
and political pluralism are much more deeply rooted in human cultures and societies than the na-
tionalist, post-colonialist and religious-fundamentalist ideologues of the 19th and 20th century may 
want us to think. 
It is quite reasonable to think, under the “veil of ignorance” of a cosmopolitan original position, that 
people (who cannot suppose that in real life, they aren´t in love with a person living in another 
country, they aren´t living on a sinking island, in a country devastated by desertification or in a rela-
tively well-ordered polity which is nonetheless very poor, etc.,240) would not want to risk unhappi-
ness, death or poverty by choosing a closed-border policy, and would choose freedom of move-
239 Carens (2008, 216f) outlines some of the major objections to Rawlsʼ political theory, and argues that they 
can be effectively answered or else that they do not really matter in our discussion of borders and migration. 
He concludes that “the ‘veil of ignorance’ offers a way of thinking about principles of justice in a context 
where people have deep, unresolvable disagreements about matters of fundamental importance and yet 
still want to find a way to live together in peaceful cooperation on terms that are fair to all”, and this is quite 
adequate for the questions we are addressing. 
240 Note that we are not including here non-ideal theory considerations, such as persecution, genocide, and 
living conditions in countries devastated by crime, unjust international trade rules, histories of exploitative 
colonization, etc. 
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ment across borders. They would therefore adopt a “right to immigrate”, such as the one proposed 
in Catholic Social Teaching, with certain limitations. 
5.1.7.2 Liberal-Egalitarian Limitations on the Right to Immigrate 
One can envision three types of “public-order” restrictions that liberal egalitarians might want to 
place on the right to immigrate. One would want to limit flows, firstly, in the case of a reasonably 
objective and veritable risk of breakdown of social order (e.g. widespread riots, civil war, etc.), and 
secondly, when they constitute a grave threat to national security (e.g. terrorist attacks, etc.)241. A 
third possible valid reason for the limitation of freedom of movement across borders, from a liberal 
egalitarian perspective, is a serious threat to the liberal democratic political culture and the func-
tioning of the institutions of the polity; we will discuss this further below242. Social chaos, serious 
threats to national security or to the functioning of liberal democratic institutions and practices 
may cause severe restrictions of various liberties and so may be used as a reason to limit some lib-
erties (such as the freedom of movement), but only when one can reasonably believe that threat is 
real (Carens 2008, 219; Rawls 2005b, 213). In sum, freedom of movement is a liberty, and following 
Rawls, it cannot be restricted (in ideal theory, at least) except for the sake of liberty (since liberty is 
considered lexically prior to equality). This means, in Carens’ application, that even in the counter-
intuitive cases where a policy of (relatively) open borders were to be economically more disadvan-
tageous than a more restrictive policy to the most vulnerable persons in the world (or in a particular 
241 For a more developed discussion of this points, see Carens (1992, 28. 30). 
242 For further discussion of these and other proposed (but far less plausible) liberally justifiable limitations 
on the freedom of movement, see Carens (1992, 28–34). 
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society, if one rejects the global version of the “difference principle”243), the less restrictive policy 
would (in ideal theory) still trump, given that liberties (e.g. freedom of movement) cannot be re-
stricted for the sake of greater equality.  
However, in the case of non-ideal theory, Rawls (2005b, 247) concedes that “it may be reasonable 
to forgo part of [the] freedoms [of the first principle] when the long-run benefits are great enough 
to transform a less fortunate society into one where the equal liberties can be fully enjoyed” (my 
emphasis). This fourth limitation might be used to restrict freedom of movement in a poor and 
burdened country receiving refugees and immigrants from a poorer and more troubled neighbour. 
It cannot however be used by wealthy and liberal-democratic nations to restrict immigration on the 
basis of its supposedly negative impact on the most vulnerable members of such a society, since 
such nations are closer to strict compliance with the ideal conception of justice. Carens (2008, 221; 
cf. 1992, 32–34), also considers whether poor countries could use such argument to restrict emi-
gration (e.g. to reduce “brain-drain”) and concludes that using the Rawlsian caveat in this way 
would be “a dramatic departure from the liberal tradition in general and from the specific priority 
that Rawls attaches to liberty even under nonideal conditions”. In reality, restrictions on exit migra-
tion (especially of talented and educated people with certain means) are only rarely enforced, and 
if so, only in totalitarian countries. Restrictions on entry are the real problem, and in practice (given 
that immigration restriction does not usually target wealthy and highly-skilled immigrants) it is hard 
243 If one limits the difference principle to the domestic original position, however, the immigrants would 
have to be included in the maximin calculations. In other words, one would have to compare the effects of a 
more restrictive immigration policy and a more liberal one not on the least advantaged among citizens 
alone, but on the most disadvantaged in the set which combines citizens with immigrants allowed in by the 
more liberal policy (cf. Carens 2008, 221–2). 
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to imagine there may be people more vulnerable than the migrants themselves who would be ben-
efited by promoting greater restrictions on entry for “egalitarian” reasons. 
5.1.7.3 Cosmopolitan Liberal-Egalitarian Argument Based on Equality 
Liberal egalitarians, however, do not only offer arguments from liberty in favour of freedom of 
movement. Recognising the complexities of the above debates, and “granting that interstate 
movement may not be a basic liberty, [some social liberals] nonetheless insist that, given the mas-
sive levels of poverty and inequality in the world and the failure of many states to provide their 
populations with an adequate range of valuable life options, prosperous liberal states in particular 
have a duty to keep their borders open to the global poor” (Abizadeh 2010, 152).  Though Rawls 
(2001), in The Law of Peoples, avoids the application of (social) egalitarian principles in his cosmo-
politan ideal theory (limiting himself to suggest some sort of obligation to provide aid to burdened 
peoples), other authors (e.g. Joseph Carens (2008, 218f), Thomas Pogge (2008a; 2008b, 111f) and 
Charles Beitz (1999, 149–150)) have claimed, against Rawls (2001, 106), that a cosmopolitan origi-
nal position would yield an international distributive justice principle (e.g. some sort of “difference 
principle”).  
If so, and if such a principle were to be respected in the real world, immigration flows would most 
probably decrease and become much less socially problematic. If, on the other hand, such a princi-
ple were not to be respected in the real world after lifting the “veil of ignorance” (as is actually the 
case), then one might argue that closed borders (in the case of prosperous nations) are morally 
wrong, since they are there mainly to keep the poor of this world from getting their due. Just as it 
morally wrong for rich people to hoard bread in times of famine, pushing starving people to break 
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into their warehouses to take their share, the liberal egalitarian defence of open borders serves as a 
non-ideal theory approximation or workaround when direct cosmopolitan distributive justice 
schemes fail to materialize (or even to be considered seriously by politicians). Obviously this ap-
proach is quite controversial244, but when we consider both the argument from liberty and this ar-
gument from equality, liberal egalitarians certainly offer us a much more solid theoretical bulwark 
in favour of (reasonably) open borders than libertarians245. 
5.1.7.4 Liberal Egalitarian Responses to Communitarian Ethno-Cultural Objections 
How do cosmopolitan liberal egalitarians deal with the problem raised by communitarian and na-
tionalist liberal egalitarians like Kymlicka (2001) who claim that, intuitively, it seems quite obvious 
that human societies (or communities) have a right to protect their culture and exclude strangers 
who do not share their way of life? Following Maritain´s distinctions, one could straightaway object 
to the parenthesis, which tends to equate communities with political societies and ethnic cultures 
with the national (political) culture. There are two claims being made here, one on behalf of the 
244 For instance, Benhabib (2004, 105f) says that she is “made uncomfortable by the imposition of a global 
redistributive principle to create economic justice among peoples, unless and until the compatibility of such 
a principle with democratic self-governance is examined”. She presents three serious objections (epistemic, 
hermeneutic, and democratic) to Pogge and Beitz´s “global redistributionism” while defending a “cosmopoli-
tan federalist” position which nonetheless “has redistributionist implications” which go beyond Rawls “duty 
of assistance” to burdened societies. 
245 Some liberal egalitarians do not agree that their position implies (relatively) open borders. Liberal egali-
tarian arguments in favour of closed borders have been constructed from (i) brain drain and its purported 
detrimental effects on development — e.g. James Woodward, (ii) the lack of cosmopolitan social and politi-
cal institutions and consequently the lack of cosmopolitan duties of justice, (iii) the territorial correspond-
ence between the exercise of coercive authority by the state and the exercise of freedom of movement by 
its citizens, and the (theoretical?) lack of coercive authority of states over non-citizens — e.g. Michael Blake, 
(iv) the detrimental effect of immigration on welfare states. See Arash Abizadeh (2006; 2010, 151–156) and 
Joseph Carens (1992) for a concise presentation of these arguments and adequate responses. 
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cultural rights of ethnic, linguistic and religious communities, and one on behalf of the political cul-
ture that glues a modern polity and its institutions.  
Let us start with the former. Ethnic cultures obviously have a value, and modern polities have a cer-
tain role in preserving them; probably the worst way to do this is to make one ethnic culture hege-
monic and impose it as the “national culture” to the detriment of others. In this respect, many ar-
gue today that the European Union has done more to enhance regional cultures and identities in 
Europe than national states, and this shows that restrictive national border policies have little to do 
with the preservation of ethnic cultures. Rich human cultures are “preserved” when kept alive and 
dynamic, namely, when challenged to be creatively faithful to their traditions by respectful contact 
with different cultures. Carens (2008, 226) points out that centuries of open borders between the 
states in the US have not homogenized the country culturally: New York City is very different, cul-
turally, from Waycross, Georgia, and both are different from Seattle (which probably has more in 
common with Vancouver).  
5.1.7.5 Liberal Egalitarian Responses to Communitarian Civic-Cultural Objections 
However, as some civic republicans and communitarians like Michael Walzer insist, there is a legit-
imate way of posing the question in terms of a national (political, civic) culture, rather than local 
ethnic (pre-political) cultures246. Certain political values and practices (e.g. democratic processes, 
246 All this forms part of a bigger debate about political culture in a “postmodern” world. In the context of 
increasing globalisation which could threaten the democratic culture of European polities, Habermas (2001, 
88) prescribes a balance between opening and closure, “characteristic of the happier periods of European 
modernization”. To shape the “postnational constellation”, he suggests that we should consolidate regional 
political belonging (e.g. political participation in the European Union), rather than seek some wider form of 
cosmopolitanism.  
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toleration, ways of organizing and protesting as part of civil society, etc.), and possibly a common 
denominator in the content and pedagogy of all educational institutions (e.g. one which would 
promote such a “republican culture”), is probably necessary for a modern polity to function. If so, 
one could argue that in the original position, persons would choose to include some restrictions on 
the cultural provenance or volume of immigration to preserve the national political culture and en-
sure the effective functioning of state institutions and civil society247.  
As we have seen above, Rawls seems to subscribe to this position discretely by adopting his notion 
of “peoples” and constructing his ideal domestic original position using the assumption of a “closed 
and complete” society. Yet, Rawls’ critique of the principle of perfectionism as a basis for structur-
ing a modern polity can be used to critique certain inappropriate uses of such “argument from na-
tional culture”, such as Samuel Huntington´s (2004) “The Hispanic Challenge”. From a moral point 
of view, the role of a polity is not to organize itself to reach some ideal of cultural perfection (or 
economic and military dominance); the purity of the Finnish language (linguistic perfectionism), ex-
cellence in scientific education and research (technological utopianism), faithful transmission of the 
legendary “Anglo-Saxon Protestant work ethic” (“Huntingtonian Americanism”), the ideological and 
forceful exclusion of religion from public debates (laïcité), the use of Shari’a as an objective moral 
standard for public life (Islamic fundamentalism), and so forth, even when highly valued by the ma-
jority of the population, are secondary when compared to basic rights and political justice which 
247 For instance, the political landscape in Israel has changed considerably in the past two decades with the 
arrival of many Jewish immigrants from Eastern bloc countries. Though similar in terms of ethnicity and reli-
gious beliefs, such immigrants are very different in terms of political culture from the Westernized Israelis 
born and raised in the big Israeli cities, and the tendency of these immigrants to settle in ultra-conservative 
neighbourhoods or in isolated settlements does not help to bring them into what was considered the “main-
stream” political culture. Rather, mainstream political parties have had to adapt to garner their votes. 
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seek first to protect and promote liberty and equality. For liberal egalitarians, the only real cultural 
threat which could justify restrictions on immigration is one which, as we mentioned above, is pro-
foundly political, in that it seriously weakens civil society and the functioning of (liberal, demo-
cratic) institutions (Ackerman 1980, 89–95; cf. Carens 1992, 28).  
In this vein, some liberal egalitarians are quick to point out that, though this may be a serious prob-
lem theoretically, on a practical level, it is mostly a question of integration. Well-integrated immi-
grant populations are often more active in civil society, more likely to vote in local and general elec-
tions, and more “patriotic” than native-born populations, since they value the newly-gained liber-
ties more; immigrant populations who are segregated or marginalised, on the other hand, may re-
main politically “inactive”, or use their liberties subversively248. The question then shifts to a more 
248 Benhabib (2004, 183f) provides an interesting analysis of the affaire du foulard in France, where a group 
of Muslim girls in Creil (Oise) ended up challenging the school authorities and the French state regarding its 
interpretation of the principle of laïcité and its practices of toleration and defence of religious liberties. What 
is often missed when discussing the headscarf laws in France and elsewhere is that it is inconceivable for a 
group of schoolgirls in most Muslim-majority country to behave in this way (except in Turkey, which actually 
bans headscarves in universities and civil service). A woman with covered hair, standing up defiantly for her 
rights, as traditionally represented by the figure of Marianne, is the quintessential emblem of French Repub-
licanism; ironically, in Indonesia (the most populous Muslim-majority country), women traditionally never 
covered their hair, and religious conservatives in Turkey (which is 95% Muslim) did not manage to reverse 
Ataturk´s ban on headscarves, in spite of democratization. Of course, one may ask many difficult questions 
here: whether French laïcité is an intolerant perversion of the principle of toleration, whether Muslim girls 
should be allowed to wear headscarves (and look distinctively different from other girls) in Western (and 
egalitarian) public schools, whether their protests were “feminist” or “anti-feminist”, “religious” or “ethnic”, 
whether being able to see the face of the (vulnerable) other is necessary to build a morally sound society 
resistant to repression and totalitarianism, whether such social problems should be resolved using punitive 
legal means, and whether the veil, in this case, is being mandated by the Koran, the Shari´a, Maghrebi cul-
ture, the girls’ “traditional” fathers, their “fundamentalist” boyfriends, or simply the convenience of not hav-
ing to bother with bad hair days. The really interesting question, however, is whether these young women 
are really wearing the scarf because they choose to do so freely and autonomously (as a true act of subjec-
tive conscience), or because they feel it is being imposed on them “heteronomically” as an inescapable bur-
den (and as a symbol of female subordination and sexual repression) by their family, ethnic culture, or cer-
tain interpretations of the Muslim tradition, and, in the light of this, whether public education is helping 
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complex discussion of how many immigrants can we afford (or are we willing) to integrate well, and 
what does an effective and fair integration policy look like, which we will leave aside for now. 
5.1.7.6 The Cosmopolitan Liberal Egalitarian Approach applied to Japan and Australia 
After this discussion, how can we summarize the cosmopolitan liberal egalitarian position? Carens 
(1992, 30) proposes the following rule of thumb: “the state is obliged to admit as many of those 
seeking entry as it can without jeopardizing national security, public order and the maintenance of 
liberal institutions.” However, he also indicates that while his liberal egalitarian position is morally 
binding for Western democracies which present themselves as built on liberal and egalitarian ide-
als, there may be other polities in the world which may be rightly-ordered and justly refuse that the 
above conclusions apply to them. Some polities may choose to follow a perfectionist principle and 
decide to vigorously promote a certain culture and way of life at the expense of liberty and equali-
ty. Rawls takes a similar position in his 1993 Oxford Amnesty Lecture entitled “The Law of Peoples” 
which was eventually developed into the book with the same title we have critiqued above (Rawls 
2001)249. When we extend Rawls” reflection to the issue of immigration, as Carens does, this means 
them stand up for their rights (and conscience) against certain repressive authorities in their admittedly pa-
triarchal communities and cultures with the same vigour as they are ready to do so against the school and 
state authorities. Autonomy is important for the functioning of modern polities since one is expected to par-
ticipate politically as a free and “emancipated” citizen, and not simple as a spokesperson for one´s guild, so-
cial class, ethnic group or religion. 
249 As we have noted, Rawls became so careful not to impose liberal egalitarianism as a “comprehensive doc-
trine” onto all “peoples” and so ready to accommodate other worldviews that he decided (i) to build his 
cosmopolitan original position on the basis of the very problematic notion of “peoples” instead of building it 
on autonomous and equal persons (as is customary in the liberal tradition), (ii) to consider cosmopolitan jus-
tice and its principles as logically posterior to domestic justice (instead of following Kant) and (iii) to bring 
into a second cosmopolitan original position people who were “decent” but did not (entirely) uphold liberal 
egalitarian principles. 
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that while Western democracies are obliged by their liberal egalitarian principles to have relatively 
open borders, with the only restrictions being the ones discussed above, other polities can much 
more easily close their borders to immigrants using a perfectionist cultural justification.  
Carens gives the admittedly problematic example of Japan which, though forced to embrace liberal 
egalitarian principles after World War II, and though it became successfully democratized and 
Westernized in many ways since then, has sought to maintain a particular (public and national) cul-
ture which is different from that of other “Western” countries. Japan adopted strict immigration 
restriction laws intended to protect that culture. As described by Carens in the 1990s, Japan also 
presents itself as relatively (a) densely populated, (b) culturally homogenous, (c) consistent in re-
jecting immigrant labour, and (c) generous in its overseas aid; this is only partially true250, but let us 
assume that such a virtuous isolationist country actually exists. Surely, its case is very different from 
that of Australia and its deep-seated and cyclically-resurgent desires to “remain” white and non-
Asian. Carens uses this difference to argue that different rules regarding immigration restriction 
apply to polities which are different from the US and Canada (and Australia), Western liberal plural-
250 Actually, (a) Japanese cities are crowded, but Japan is far less densely populated than Hong Kong or Sin-
gapore and its population is ageing rapidly. (b) Japan is culturally much less heterogeneous than most other 
Western nations but nonetheless contains 3 important minority groups (the Burakumin, the Ryukyuans, and 
the Ainu) and ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic pluralism is also present. (c) Japan is a country which, 
though consistent in not officially attracting immigrant labour in boom years (e.g. through guestworker 
schemes) when it was economically profitable to do so, still did import Korean labour (and Taiwanese and 
Chinese labour, to a lesser extent) during World War II, “repatriated” people of Japanese descent from Asia 
after the War, hid a new wave of Korean immigration, and then attracted the immigration of Brazilians (and 
other people) of Japanese ancestry. Finally (d) Japan is a country which was No. 1 provider of overseas aid in 
the 1990s, when it sought to increase geopolitical influence (given the strategic limitations imposed by its 
“pacifist” constitution) but whose aid programmes have since declined considerably (Masters 2008)). For a 
less idealized and better documented history of Japanese labour immigration policies and practices than the 
one presented by Carens, see Morris-Suzuki (2006). For a discussion of how demographic decline and exces-
sively restrictive immigration policies have compounded Japan´s economic woes since the 1990s, see 
Rutledge (2001), Tabuchi (2011), Arudou (2012). 
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istic democracies built on immigration which ostensibly adhere to the principles of liberal egalitari-
anism.  
I am not sure I agree with Carens (and Rawls) that Japanese cultural perfectionism as such is ac-
ceptable from the liberal egalitarian standpoint and by itself justifies restrictive immigration policies 
that liberal egalitarian principles would deem intolerable in other “Westernized” polities. If Japan 
were to suddenly reclaim land from the sea and increase threefold in size (or, similarly, Saudi Arabia 
were to suddenly convert large tracts of desert into habitable land), while not providing significant 
aid to burdened polities, and while importing cheap immigrant labour as a disposable good during 
economic booms, then it would become another “White Australia” case. The key issue here is the 
duties attached to territorial stewardship regarding the protection of universal human rights, and 
not primarily the organization of the human collective (which could be liberal, hierarchical, theo-
cratic, etc.). Whatever the cultural perfectionism (or hierarchical political structure) a polity claims 
to uphold, a country with large tracts of underutilized land and a considerable capacity of creating 
jobs and wealth remains the steward of its territory (even if most of it were to be “reclaimed”) on 
behalf of humanity and as such, when faced by the need of people from “burdened societies”, has 
to accept the alternatives that Walzer offers: give up excess land, give significant aid to burdened 
nations and/or open your doors for immigrants. To be sure, I believe that the cultural argument can 
be used (as Walzer believes) to stop immigrants whose basic rights to security and subsistence (cf. 
Shue 1980, discussed below) are reasonably well met in their native country from entering: not all 
countries can be asked to uphold and protect a wide-ranging liberal right to “freedom of move-
ment”. Yet one expects all polities to uphold the basic rights of all human persons to security and 
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subsistence if they want to be considered decent polities and consequently treated as sovereign by 
the international community.  
5.1.7.7 Conclusion: Immigrant Entry and Sojourn Selection Rule 
This brings us to an important conclusion: a robust and complex understanding of the right to im-
migrate (and to emigrate) should not be based solely on property (and contract) rights and on the 
right to the freedom of movement: liberal egalitarians agree that to some extent, the exercise of 
such rights (especially on a cosmopolitan level) may be justifiably restricted. It is when we combine 
these rights with the safety rights of persons threatened by persecution and/or the sustenance 
rights of people threatened by the lack of means for a decent livelihood that the rights to freedom 
of movement and contract (in all “decent” and wealthy nations) become hard to restrict using na-
tionalist or communitarian arguments. If not, we will not get much further than what Carens sum-
marizes as the liberal egalitarian position on this matter: 
Liberal egalitarianism entails a deep commitment to freedom of movement as both an important liber-
ty in itself and a prerequisite for other freedoms. Thus the presumption is for free migration and any-
one who would defend restrictions faces a heavy burden of proof. Nevertheless, restrictions may some-
times be justified because they will promote liberty and equality in the long-run or because they are 
necessary to preserve a distinct culture or way of life. (Carens 1992, 25). 
This conclusion, and the discussions on the limitations to the right to immigrate in section 5.1.7.2 
and 5.1.7.5, will form the basis of one of the priority rules we will propose at the end of this chap-
ter, in section 5.4, the Immigrant Entry and Sojourn Selection Rule. 
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 5.1.8 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LIBERAL APPROACH 
5.1.8.1 Liberalism Critiques the Moral-Substantive Dimension of Sovereignty 
Traditionally, liberal authors generally understand (civil) rights as necessary moral limits imposed on 
the burgeoning power of the bureaucratic modern state, which tends to be exercised to the detri-
ment of the body politic it is supposed to serve unless proper safeguards are introduced: Lockean 
rights are needed to tame the Hobbesian Leviathan. The case of immigrants (who do not belong to 
the body politic when they show up at the border) puts this understanding of rights in a tough spot: 
in manning its borders the state unavoidably uses its power against “outsiders” and limits on this 
power will have to come from the “outside”, viz., from a real or hypothetical international or cos-
mopolitan normative authority, and from the right (ius) it generates as a safeguard against the 
abuse of state power. We speak here of universal human rights and of a “cosmopolitan right”. The 
normative authority which founds such rights has been the object of intractable debates between 
jusnaturalists, juspositivists, pragmatists and theonomists of all sorts in the 20th century, and many 
insightful thinkers, such as Hannah Arendt, were sceptical about the real impact of human rights 
declarations. Little by little, however, human rights not only came to be enrooted in most human 
traditions of thought, but also grew legal roots and structures on the national, regional and interna-
tional levels (Benhabib 2004, 54f. 69). State sovereignty no longer offers a reliable long-term guar-
antee of protection for states and persons who engage in gross violations of such rights. 
Following Maritain, in the above discussion, we have nonetheless avoided an understanding of po-
litical realities which places the state apparatus and its power at the centre; we have spoken of pol-
ities as societies of human persons and as stewards of land and resources, inserted within a cosmo-
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politan human body politic that grounds their legitimacy and whose sociological existence is not 
always historically noticeable, but must nonetheless be morally and politically assumed. Human 
rights are not quite “invented” but rather “recognised” when each person in such a cosmopolitan 
assembly admits each other person´s due, and as a consequence, recognises also the limitations 
each must impose (morally and legally) on their freedom (personal freedom, and that of state insti-
tutions at their service) in order to make such freedom compatible with a fair system of freedoms 
and rights available to all. Human and cosmopolitan rights, in turn, constrain and shape the domes-
tic assembly that founds the state apparatus and the Constitution or Basic Law which makes civil, 
legally-enshrined rights available and actionable, and imposes corresponding duties, using the 
modern state´s monopoly on coercion and violence when necessary. In modern democratic socie-
ties where states have become quite accountable to such “domestic assemblies”, the spotlight 
should be shifted from state institutions to these territorially-bound political societies as a whole, to 
their responsiveness to human rights and to their desire to structure themselves morally on the ba-
sis of an ever-deeper understanding of the human dignity that undergirds such a system of rights. 
5.1.8.2 Liberalism Maintains the Procedural-Political Dimension of Sovereignty 
This brings us to a fundamental problem in the liberal approach to questions of state sovereignty 
and immigration. Given their focus on the state and its power, liberals often fail to offer a critique 
to the procedural-political dimension of absolutist political sovereignty. They effectively demand 
the modern democratic state to give moral reasons (which are publically acceptable in a pluralistic 
context) for any restrictions it might want to impose on certain liberties such as the freedom of 
movement across borders. This limits state sovereignty by rendering it morally accountable; hence, 
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liberalism effectively critiques the moral-substantive dimension of absolutist political sovereignty. 
Yet, given the disagreement on what counts as a publicly acceptable moral and political reason 
(among liberals and with other thinkers), it is difficult to defend the legitimacy of laws solely on the 
basis of moral substance. Rather, when formulating laws to guide the coercive use of political pow-
er, the acceptability of the procedure becomes necessary for legitimacy, so the question becomes: 
who has the legitimate authority to formulate such laws, and how (Abizadeh 2008, 40f; 2010, 156)? 
The obvious answers are “political society” and “democratically”, but then the question becomes: 
who actually belongs to a “political society”, and what democratic procedures can legitimize the 
use of coercion against minorities and marginalised co-inhabitants? This where we start to critique 
the procedural-political dimension of sovereignty. 
Democrats and civic republicans are right in insisting on popular sovereignty, noting that it is the 
“people” (or better, the polity), and not the state, which is truly “sovereign”. Yet, if we want to dis-
cuss the limits of political sovereignty, we need to reflect not only on what a polity can or cannot 
do, but also on who is comprised in the polity when it is claiming to do such and such legitimately. 
In this vein, thinkers who are close to the civic republican tradition, but who share the position of 
cosmopolitan liberal egalitarians on this issue, question the usual assumption that that a polity 
should be immediately equated with its recognised members (“citizens”) and that such an exclusive 
political body has the unilateral right to formulate laws regarding borders and cross-border migra-
tion (e.g. through the majoritarian vote of its citizens).  
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5.2 Foundations: Consent, Actionable Rights and Democratic Legitimacy 5.2.1 LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS WITH DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION 
5.2.1.1 The Paradox of Democratic Legitimacy 
Let us take some time to examine the above claims in more detail. As we have noted previously, 
communitarians and certain civic republicans have often been more reluctant to recognise the 
rights of immigrants, given the fact that their conception of actionable rights is linked to the demo-
cratic self-determination of a “people”. Their critiques of liberal positions on the subject help us to 
understand that there are limits on the rights of migrants, and that established political communi-
ties may make certain demands on migrants if they are to enjoy the hospitality of a new nation, 
with its cultural frameworks, traditions, language and standard ways of proceeding.  
There is, however, a “democratic” or “civic republican” way of recognising limits on the sovereignty 
of polities (which we have argued for above from a liberal stance). For instance, following Haber-
mas (1998, 454f) to some extent, Seyla Benhabib argues in favour of moral-substantive limits. She 
considers (a) human rights and (b) citizenship (civil) rights as co-implicated in a democratic struc-
ture. “Ideally, democratic rule means that all members of a sovereign body are to be respected as 
bearers of human rights, and that the consociates of this sovereign freely associate with one anoth-
er to establish a regime of self-governance under which each is to be considered both author of the 
laws and subject to them” (Benhabib 2004, 43). For Habermas and Benhabib, modern democratic 
polities are “Janus-faced”, in that they act in the name of universal principles (thus looking out to-
wards the cosmopolitan human society) yet circumscribe such principles within a bounded political 
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society (looking in towards a particular group of people bound by and contributing to those laws 
and institutions that make universal human rights legally actionable in the local space of a polity).  
As we know, however, in modern majoritarian democracies, the will of the majority is not always 
respectful of the rights and liberties of all. This brings us to what Benhabib (2004, 43f) calls the 
“paradox of democratic legitimacy”251. The paradox is that, for a modern polity to be considered 
legitimately sovereign, it is not enough for other polities merely to deem it formally so (as in the 
Westphalian model of sovereignty), but it should undertake to limit its “sovereign will” (and to 
frame the acts of popular sovereignty) by a series of precommitments to “human rights”, that is, 
certain universal principles which recognise the liberty and equality of human persons and without 
which the notions of “popular sovereign” and “democratic polity” make no sense252.  
However, more hard-line civic republicans insist here that the commitment is not to some prepoliti-
cal notion of “natural” or “intrinsic” rights, and that the sovereign people has the ability to renego-
tiate and reinterpret such rights253. Yet when cornered and asked whether this “renegotiation” 
could go as far as legally and democratically allowing slavery or genocide, they admit that there 
may be certain tacit and “objective” moral constraints on what can be legitimately decided through 
a democratic procedure, but such constraints are usually guaranteed by the democratic pedigree of 
251 This debate goes back, at least, to the famous discussion of the general will in Rousseau´s Social Contract. 
The will of the majority should bind itself to follow a morally-informed will (the “general will”, that fairly con-
siders and takes into account the rights and freedoms of all those affected by an act of popular sovereignty) 
rather than serve to promote the interests of a particular group (however large). 
252 Universal human rights may be thought of as prior to popular sovereignty, or co-originary with it, but 
cannot be seen as posterior. Political constitutions and assemblies do not create human rights. 
253 Some African authors, for example Mahmoud Mamdani (2009), tend to see most “humanitarian interven-
tions” in Africa as neo-colonialism in disguise, and promote an absolutist understanding of sovereignty.  
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the procedure itself (not by substantive universalist moral principles imposed from outside). This 
debate highlights the necessity of complementing the above moral-substantive limits on sovereign-
ty with procedural-political ones, and exploring another layer of the paradox of democratic legiti-
macy. In fact, besides violating universal human rights under the guise of “renegotiating and rein-
terpreting” them, democratic processes can be morally flawed by civic republican standards by not 
following the democratic principle so as to produce laws that (a) are rationally acceptable to all 
those affected by such laws and (b) have the subjects of such laws adequately represented among 
the drafters. Majoritarian “democracies” could become majoritarian tyrannies where the majority 
becomes just another elite group trampling on the rights of minorities and disenfranchised inhabit-
ants of the polity.  
5.2.1.2 How Can Border and Immigration Policies Be Democratically Legitimate?  
Let us now apply the above reflection on the legitimacy of democratic processes to the case of im-
migration and border policies. Though most scholars do not speak of a “universal human right to 
immigrate”, we have seen how, from the liberal egalitarian perspective, a number of well-
recognised human rights sometimes imply that certain persons have a prima facie right to enter 
certain countries, take jobs and establish their residence there. From a moral-substantive view-
point, a liberal democracy which denies such a “human” or “cosmopolitan” right is betraying the 
universal principles on which it was founded. Yet, many civic republican authors would deny that by 
rejecting the (human/cosmopolitan) rights of immigrants in the name of the polity´s (civic) right to 
self-determination, that polity paradoxically undermines its own legitimacy. Rather, they claim that 
sovereign polities can reinterpret and renegotiate the content of rights recognised within their bor-
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ders. Abizadeh (2010, 157) identifies two civic republican arguments which could be used to justify 
such a “renegotiation” of the rights that liberals would simply grant to immigrants. These authors 
claim, “first, that closed borders are instrumentally necessary for ensuring the empirical precondi-
tions of viable democratic practice; and second, that democratic self-determination intrinsically en-
tails the unilateral right to control one’s own borders, including the moral permission to close it to 
foreigners”.  
The instrumental argument (or argument from the “protection of the national political culture”) is 
granted by most liberal egalitarians, as we have seen above (5.1.7.5). It is an argument which works 
in theory, but in practice, nothing indicates that prosperous modern polities cannot integrate and 
transmit their political culture to many more immigrants than are legally allowed across their bor-
ders at present. Often the problem is that they do not really want to integrate these people, or to 
do it properly.  
This leads us to the second argument, which “is not an argument for closed borders per se, but 
against the putative duty to open borders” (ibid.). For arguments´ sake, let us grant that polities can 
reinterpret and renegotiate the content of the rights of aliens affected by their laws. But, if so, they 
can do so only if the procedure is legitimately democratic. We know that all “foreigners” (non-
citizens) — that is, even those (immigrants, refugees, sojourners, etc.) who are being made subjects 
of the law through the processes of democratic self-determination of a modern polity — are sys-
tematically excluded from such processes on account of their citizenship status. Is this a legitimately 
democratic procedure? Or does the claim to unilateral formulation of border policies actually imply 
a rejection of democracy and a return to oligarchy? Abizadeh argues for the latter conclusion, 
C h a p t e r :  5  — P a g e :  342 
 
claiming that a legitimately democratic procedure which generates boundary laws (and interprets 
the rights of immigrants) should contemplate the participation of those affected by such laws.  5.2.2 THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE  
In fact, if we ask civic republicans to be consistent when they link the formulation of laws (and the 
legal recognition of rights) to political participation, they will help us rediscover the democratic 
principle in all its richness (which goes well beyond majority rule), as certain disenfranchised social 
groups did during the American and French Revolution: “What touches all should be determined by 
all”. In those revolutions, the portion of the population which paid most of the taxes rebelled since 
they had no say in the formulation of tax laws (and other laws). In the case of border policies and 
naturalisation laws, migrants similarly have no say in the laws that primarily concern them. In both 
cases, we have subjects of a “sovereign” authority who are subjected to the coercion of that au-
thority while not being treated as participants in the polis, and not being effectively represented by 
the popular sovereign.  
All this points to the fact that the democratic principle — which links the political participant in de-
liberative political processes to the political subject of laws — cannot be completely confined by 
domestic boundaries and, especially in an interconnected world, acquires a cosmopolitan dimen-
sion, as in Abizadeh (2008). This author´s defence of the democratic principle is very much based on 
a particular notion of coercion (and actual or potential use of political power)254 and critics like Da-
254 For Abizadeh (2008), coercion is a violation of personal autonomy which needs to be legitimized, and this 
is done (in a democratic system of government) by allowing me to be among the authors of the laws which 
subject me to the will (and power) of the polity. Abizadeh builds on a notion of personal autonomy taken 
from Joseph Raz and from Robert Nozick and sees coercion mainly as a constraint of one´s independence (via 
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vid Miller (2010) argue that this notion is too wide to apply to boundary laws. A visa overstayer 
from Ireland who risks being removed from Massachusetts is only being subjected to “prevention” 
(in Miller´s jargon) or to what we might call “coercion-lite”; he is free to move and work in all the 
EU countries, his life options are not seriously reduced by the US boundary laws, and his life and 
health is not being put at risk by the US authorities (unless he is caught and resists deportation). 
Thus, if coercion is the key to the democratic principle, he is not entitled to participate in the draft-
ing of US boundary laws since he is not really being coerced. Miller (2010, 117), however, concedes 
the following: 
It might be said that this caricatures the position of excluded immigrants,  who very often do not have 
an adequate range of alternatives to being admitted. If they are sent back to their countries of origin, 
they may face political violence or starvation, for example. But while this is clearly true of a certain 
category of immigrants — those we would class as refugees — it is not true of all, and Abizadeh’s ar-
gument is supposed to apply to immigrants generally, not just to those who try to migrate to avoid 
desperate circumstances. 
This brings us to a more general discussion of the democratic principle. We cannot do justice here 
to the rich tradition behind the medieval adage: Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et appro-
bari debet (what touches/concerns all should be handled/managed and approved by all)255. The 
point in this principle (which guided the decision-making in monastery chapters) is not primarily 
coercion. A law allowing free practice of medicine and surgery (with no need of training) could ac-
tually increase the options of both potential practitioners and potential patients, and does not limit 
a threat of serious harm) and/or a serious limitation of available options or courses of action; both reduce a 
person´s autonomy. 
255 See Post (1946), Congar (1958), Watner (2005). Tierney (1997, 284) notes the use of this principle in Las 
Casas´ defence of the rights of the Amerindians: insofar as the decisions of the Spanish crown affected them, 
the Amerindians in the colonies were truly subjects, and their free consent to such decisions was required. 
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autonomy; following Abizadeh such a law reduces coercion, rather than increases it. However, if 
everyone is against it (because they fear it will have a negative impact on the quality of heath provi-
sion in a given polity), a “benevolent despot” should not enact it. Democratic participation is neces-
sary when people are seriously impacted (or touched) by a law, when they are subjected (in this 
weaker sense, which does not necessarily imply violence or coercion) to a law256.  
Habermas (1998, 110), for instance, does not mention coercion in his definition of the Democratic 
Principle (DP): “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citi-
zens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted”257. Of course, 
Abizadeh´s proposal challenges Habermas´ use of the category of “citizen” to separate law and mo-
rality and avoid subjecting one to the other, a separation which, in the particular case of border 
laws, has been criticized as an untenable equilibrium which ultimately subjects morality to positive 
law (cf. Ahn 2012)258.  
256 The debate between Abizadeh and Miller could be much enriched by reference to the longstanding dis-
tinction between “natural” and “positive” law. Positive law in modern polities requires democratic legitima-
tion because of its being positive, that is, enforceable (through coercion) and revocable (and replaceable). 
The requirement for legitimation, thus, does not proceed only from coercion. Habermas (1995, 13) similarly 
distinguishes coercibility and changeability. Changes to what was previously accepted need to be legitimized, 
even if they entail greater freedoms and less state coercion. Of course, a “conservative” population could 
end up having to be coerced to adopt freer ways (e.g. through affirmative action), and persons resisting 
change (especially in violent and intrusive ways) may need to be coerced to desist, but I don´t believe we can 
easily reduce changeability to coercibility. 
257 DP is derived from the Discourse Principle (D): “Only those norms of action are valid to which all possibly 
affected persons could assent as participants in rational discourses” (Habermas 1998, 459). The universaliza-
tion of D yields the Moral Principle (MP), as in Kant´s categorical imperative; the key word here is “could”, 
since actual participation is not needed. When D is converted to DP, the “could” becomes “can” (since actual 
participation is needed) and “all possibly affected persons” becomes limited to “citizens”. 
258 In today´s political reality, which Habermas calls the “postnational constellation”, national laws affect all 
sorts of persons outside the territorial borders and outside the citizen class, and Habermas is well known for 
suggesting a gradual move towards global democratic legitimation by first strengthening the democratic le-
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 5.2.3 THE SPECIAL STATUS OF BOUNDARY LAWS 
In the previous section, we have compared immigrants with politically-disenfranchised taxpaying 
gentry in pre-revolutionary North America and France. The case of immigrants, however, brings in a 
further critique of modern political theory because of the special nature of borders: 
[There] is a unique conceptual feature of boundaries: constituting and enforcing them always neces-
sarily subjects both insiders and outsiders to the exercise of political power. [...] When what is at issue 
are boundary laws, the appeal to self-determination begs the question of who the relevant collective 
self rightly is. [...] Since the constitution and enforcement of boundaries is one of the most significant 
ways that political power is exercised over human beings, the boundaries of a democratic polity cannot 
be the taken-for-granted starting point of democratic theory, simply imported as is from history and 
exempted from the demands of legitimation. Insofar as boundaries are politically and coercively en-
forced on an ongoing basis, they are not prepolitical, historically-given facts beyond the scope of dem-
ocratic legitimation (Abizadeh 2010, 158). 
In other words, though we may seriously question the claim of cosmopolitan liberals that there is a 
prima facie right to freedom of movement which merits legal recognition, “the legal recognition or 
denial of such a right must be the result of democratic processes giving participatory standing to 
foreigners asserting such a right” (Abizadeh 2008, 39). This “participatory standing” given to affect-
ed foreigners concerns only boundary laws, given their particular nature, which subjects both insid-
ers and outsiders (Abizadeh 2010, 159). Other laws which do not significantly concern outsiders 
should express the will of the “insiders” only, that is, those people who reside in the territory of the 
polity and are somehow embedded in the life of the polity, and — given the current modus operan-
gitimation of law generated by regional blocks, such as the EU Indeed, the EU has built a federal structure of 
representation in jurisgenerative processes on top of the national one to serve non-nationals (from member 
states) potentially affected by the domestic laws of a member state (akin to the way citizens from Illinois are 
represented in the jurisgenerative processes of the state of Texas via US federal oversight, and easy transfers 
of voting rights). But such structures often do little to offer democratic legitimation of boundary laws via the 
representation of third-country nationals. 
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di of modern “nation-states” which revolves about the status of “citizenship” — all such insiders 
should be offered a path to citizenship and full political participation.  
Abizadeh does not clearly tell us how the participation of foreigners in the drafting of boundary 
laws will be achieved. On the one hand, he rejects the suggestion that immigrants should simply be 
allowed to vote on immigration laws, or long-term resident aliens on naturalisation laws, in the 
context of a majoritarian plebiscite (Abizadeh 2010, 160). On the other hand, Abizadeh (2008, 41) 
rejects that they could “participate” simply by way of a liberal egalitarian thought experiment. In 
this, he sides with Kantian thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas who insist (against Kant and other 
Kantians such as Rawls) that moral legitimation in politics is not achieved by requiring people to 
think alone in a moral (universal/publicly-rational/political) way (and recognise, in their head, that a 
certain stance being proposed is justifiable), but by asking them to participate in fair discourses with 
(real) others (and to actually justify law by moulding it within such spaces of public conversation).  
But how can this be achieved, concretely? One could envisage existing or new, permanent or ad 
hoc cosmopolitan and transnational institutions having a role in drafting and vetting boundary 
laws of liberal democracies, where those particular immigrants most affected by a particular politi-
cal boundary law (and not simply any foreigner who could theoretically be affected) are adequately 
represented when that law is being revised. One could also think of representatives of the predom-
inant migrant groups seeking entry into a particular polity sitting on the parliamentary committees 
which draft boundary laws. Another possibility concerns the judiciary branch of the state (especial-
ly constitutional courts) where migrants should be allowed to present their grievances against laws 
which unjustly restrict the access to human rights or which violate the liberal and democratic spirit 
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of the polity as expressed in the Constitution. Finally, one could start more humbly and pragmati-
cally by giving a strong voice to immigrants (especially those who are already living within the 
boundaries of the polity, regularly or irregularly) in civil society, in the media, in church organiza-
tions, in universities and within grassroots organizations. 
Of course, the participation of non-citizens in democratic processes of a “sovereign” polity is a dar-
ing proposal and in a way subversive of common-sense ideas of how modern democracies should 
function, especially if the “non-citizens” we are referring to are irregular immigrants already pre-
sent within the country, or foreigners outside the country trying to get in. Here, the limitation to 
boundary laws is important if Abizadeh´s proposal is to remain reasonable. Nonetheless, some 
would argue that it is hard to maintain this restriction to boundary laws concerning the transit of 
people, in a world where all sorts of things spill over national boundaries to affect the lives of peo-
ple on the other side, including money, pandemics, crime and pollution. In a sense, most laws en-
acted today (especially in prosperous nations) touch the boundaries, and it hard to establish a bor-
der between “boundary laws” and other laws. Hence, Miller (2010, 117) is right in suggesting that 
the requirement of effective participation be further restricted to a class of migrants (and not all 
people possibly and imaginably affected by boundary laws); one might delimit such a class by sug-
gesting that only migrants whose autonomy is “seriously” affected by a particular boundary law 
need to somehow participate in the democratic processes which formulate or revise such a law, in 
order that the law be considered as truly legitimized democratically in the full sense. We will seek 
to give more precise content to the word “seriously” in later sections. 
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 5.2.4 REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEAS 
There are several benefits which can accrue from Abizadeh´s proposal. Migrant activists could help 
shape public opinion about immigration and not simply enlighten the decisions of state bureau-
crats. Furthermore, the challenge of finding effective ways of getting migrants involved in law-
making processes could also benefit other marginalised people; these could include citizens living in 
poor neighbourhoods and housing projects who feel politically voiceless (and who typically are 
most impacted by the arrival of “needy” immigrants and most supportive of immigration re-
striction). Democratic empowerment of such citizens could do much to help them deal with the real 
problems burdening their neighbourhoods, rather than suffering them fatalistically and seeking 
scapegoats to assuage their frustration. 
All this contributes to a “revolutionary” process where received ideas about national sovereignty 
are challenged and remoulded. Daniel Philpott (2001), an international relations scholar, has re-
flected at length about this, tracing two past revolutions in sovereignty: (a) the transition (in Eu-
rope, mainly) from a medieval structure of overlapping levels of political sovereignty to a horizon-
tally compartmentalized system of sovereign nation-states between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) 
and the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), and (b) the expansion of this system to encompass (practi-
cally) all the world, especially in the decolonization processes after World War II (culminating in the 
1960 United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples). These two revolutions form part of the same movement of consolidation 
and absolutization of (state and domestic) political sovereignty. Philpott´s central argument is that 
over time, (moral and religious) ideas are effective, and international politics is not merely a ques-
tion of realist calculus and balance of power strategies, or of inevitable economic processes and 
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“material” necessities. Indeed, the Westphalian model of (horizontally disaggregated and absolut-
ist) sovereignty is modernity´s first approximation to the desire for more autonomy and equality 
between persons, cultural entities and religious communities (Philpott traces back these ideas to 
the Protestant Reformation and the Theology it engendered). However, new ideas are now spread-
ing, challenging the limits of this model; Philpott (2001, 36–45) argues that we are experiencing 
new revolutions in sovereignty (even if they may seem less dramatic than past “revolutions”), since 
a new movement which circumscribes (state and domestic) political sovereignty is growing: 
A reversal of momentum, [this movement] is the circumscription of sovereignty. This movement has 
not returned us to the Middle Ages, for it has not replaced or eviscerated the state, but it evokes medi-
eval Christendom in its limitation of state sovereignty on behalf of transnational ideals, here human 
rights and European Unity. This movement has consisted of three major resolutions — the rise of mi-
nority treaties in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; European integration, beginning with the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community of 1950 and proceeding through the European Union of today; and 
the rise of internationally sanctioned intervention following the Cold War. Of the three revolutions, mi-
nority treaties have disappeared, while the other two continue in full swing (ibid., 37).  
What could political sovereignty look like in the 21st century? Authors like Thomas Pogge (1992) 
have reflected on the possible vertical disaggregation of sovereignty, which could promote peace 
and security, reduce oppression, enhance global economic justice, and allow us to deal more effec-
tively with ecological issues by strengthening (and giving limited “sovereignty” on particular gov-
ernance portfolios to) political units above and below that of the “national” polity. Though many 
remain sceptical about such cosmopolitan projects, authors like Seyla Benhabib (2004, chap. 4) 
have dwelt on how some of this is already happening in the case of the European Union. 5.2.5 SEYLA BENHABIB ON BOUNDARY LAWS AND DEMOCRATIC ITERATION 
Abizadeh´s proposal seems easier to adopt and less “subversive” when we apply it to certain types 
of immigrants, for example, long-term legal residents with no rapid and easy path to citizenship or 
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no desire to acquire citizenship. Seyla Benhabib (2004; 2008) discusses the need for participation of 
such non-citizens in the democratic processes of the polity within which they reside, given that such 
processes generate all sorts of laws which affect their lives. How can this happen in practice? How 
can sovereign policies come to modify their constitutions, for instance, to allow non-citizen resi-
dents to vote in municipal and provincial elections? Benhabib (2004, 47) builds on the paradox of 
democratic legitimation discussed above, and claims that, even though such a paradox can never be 
fully resolved for democracies, yet, “its impact can be mitigated through a renegotiation and reiter-
ation of the dual commitments to human rights and sovereign self-determination”, in a series of 
processes which she calls “democratic iterations”: 
By democratic iterations I mean complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange 
through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and 
revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associa-
tions of civil society. These can take place in the “strong” public bodies of legislatives, the judiciary, and 
the executive, as well as in the informal and “weak” publics of civil society associations and the media 
(Benhabib 2004, 179).  
Articles by Joseph Carens, Catholic Social Teaching documents, or dissertations such as this one 
may try to establish by rational argument and/or reference to other authorities the rights of immi-
grants on the basis of accepted moral principles (e.g. universal human rights), but sovereign polities 
will not simply accept their conclusions as authoritative (as past sovereigns sometimes submitted to 
the authority of the pope, or of their confessor). Rather, they serve as “revolutionary” ideas within 
“democratic iterations”, influencing the decisions of lawmakers, broadcasters and advocacy groups. 
One might indeed insist on the universality and immutability of human rights, and not agree that 
polities have a right to reinterpret and renegotiate the content of such rights (in the case of mi-
grants, refugees, prisoners, etc.), but in fact, this is what happens when rights (and the necessary 
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limits on the exercise thereof) are enshrined in laws. In this sense, Benhabib identifies certain law-
making processes, called “jurisgenerative processes”, which generate ius, that is, a right (i.e. a body 
of laws) which contains a legally actionable implementation of human and cosmopolitan rights:   
Jurisgenerative politics refers to iterative acts through which a democratic people that considers itself 
bound by certain guiding norms and principles reappropriates and reinterprets these, thus showing it-
self to be not only the subject but also the author of the laws (Benhabib 2004, 181).  
We have seen, above, that the proper exercise of civil rights (e.g. voting in an election) includes a 
self-limitation to respect and promote human rights. Voting for a party which proposes to (unduly) 
restrict the fundamental human rights of a minority is a perversion of popular sovereignty. The 
Constitution and judiciary system (which sometimes reinterprets and extends the scope of the Con-
stitution) are expected to come in to defend the rights of all when the legislative and executive 
branches of government (which respond more directly to popular sovereignty) fail to do so. Yet, 
popular sovereignty sometimes can also counterbalance and overturn certain limitations of the 
Constitution itself which deny the rights of certain groups of people (e.g. by amending the Constitu-
tion to allow women or persons of certain races to vote and run for elected office). Hence, the 
rights of people excluded from membership in the sovereign will bind the sovereign will of the 
members. The details of such rights — including the possibility of obtaining political belonging and 
rights to active political participation — are negotiated in a space flanked on the one side by human 
rights and on the other side by claims of sovereignty, where liberals and civic republicans (and 
communitarians) confront one another in a difficult but unavoidable debate.  
C h a p t e r :  5  — P a g e :  352 
 5.2.6 CONCLUSION: A PROCEDURAL RULE 
The positions of Rawls, Walzer, and others who limit participation in democratic processes to citi-
zens, reflect a need for democratic closure, necessary for obvious legal and functional reasons. Abi-
zadeh too is concerned with this problem when he limits the participation of affected aliens to 
boundary laws and avoids entering into details on how this participation can be obtained. No mat-
ter how we define the boundaries and criteria for such political belonging, some will be unfairly left 
out, and this is morally problematic, especially if one espouses a discourse-theoretical approach to 
morality, as Benhabib does. Morality challenges those who exclude others for reasons of an “ethi-
cal” (communitarian or religious ethos), “legal” or “functional” nature to justify themselves to the 
excluded. “Every person, and every moral agent who has interests and whom my actions and the 
consequences of my actions can impact and affect in some manner or another, is potentially a mor-
al-conversation partner with me: I have a moral obligation to justify my actions with reasons to this 
individual or to the representatives of this being” (Benhabib 2004, 14). This tension between the 
universal moral norm and the bounded legal (and cultural or administrative) fact is at the root of 
the paradox of democratic legitimacy discussed in section 5.2.1. 
Democratic iterations help us deal with this paradox, which can even be fecund. They help us put 
into place flexible and functional forms of democratic closure that allow legal systems to function 
(and rights to be protected) while seeking ways of bringing in and representing those formally (or 
formerly) excluded from the demos. Morality may never be able to justify democratic closure ex-
cept as a “lesser evil” or an “unwelcome functional necessity”, and keeps us vigilant with respect to 
the cases of unjust exclusion it engenders. Thus, Benhabib argues that “there are some practices of 
democratic closure which are more justifiable than others but […] potentially all practices of demo-
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cratic closure are open to challenge, resignification, and deinstitutionalization” (Benhabib 2004, 
17)259.  
The discussion in this section leads us to formulate an important procedural rule when seeking to 
propose border and immigration laws and policies which are democratically legitimate, and seek to 
obtain the consent of those seriously affected by them. The rule concerns our way of applying and 
interpreting other priority rules (cf. section 5.4), and can be stated as follows: “The local fine-tuning 
and concretization of the other rules requires fair democratic processes where those most impacted 
by boundary laws are adequately represented.” 
5.3 Content: Specifying the Rights in Question 5.3.1 MORAL CRITERIA FOR JUDGING CONTENT 
Before venturing to discuss some more concrete moral criteria for judging the content of immigra-
tion policies and laws, it is important to note that our reflection can only be “concrete” to a certain 
extent. Given the differences in times, places and human situations, the details of policies and laws 
is not something which can be determined a priori from universal or general moral principles by a 
259 In her work, Benhabib (2004; 2008) analyses three cases of such democratic iterations: the French debate 
on the use of head coverings (and “ostentatious” or “combative” displays of religious symbols) in public 
schools, the German debate on the use of head coverings by public officials (the “Fereshta Ludin Affair”), and 
the German debate on the participation of non-nationals in local municipal and district elections. It is hard 
and maybe impossible to deduce from universal human rights principles what would be a fair law or policy in 
such cases, yet Benhabib argues that when all involved are given a chance to express themselves and justify 
their positions rationally in public, democratic processes are put into place which can start to deal with the 
grievances of those who feel excluded, both “immigrants” and “native born”, and revise laws and public pol-
icies accordingly. The results may not be immediate, and may not be the best from a moral (e.g. liberal egali-
tarian, discourse-theoretical) point of view, yet this is how moral ideas slowly and effectively transform poli-
tics and law and expand the purchase of human rights around the world. 
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simple process of logical deduction. Abizadeh (2010, 161) underlines the importance of “empirical 
circumstances” in the deliberations regarding such policies: 
Just how much more open borders must be, in light of human rights considerations, will depend on 
empirical circumstances. […] I have suggested that current circumstances justify at least some degree 
of closure, [so] the question is who should be permitted entry; my argument suggests that those whose 
basic human rights are most urgently at stake have the strongest moral claims against prosperous lib-
eral states.   
In the following sections, we will try to say something more about who are those people “whose 
basic human rights are most urgently at stake”, and which are those states which can be considered 
“prosperous liberal states”, and to move towards proposing some basic priority rules that should 
guide the formulation of just border policies. Abizadeh´s insistence that those whose welfare and 
liberty are most impacted by border policies and laws (and their coercive enforcement) should in 
some way participate in the formulation of such laws, however, helps us ensure that the more con-
crete details of policy are formulated in a legitimate way.  
Seyla Benhabib gives us an idea of what we are aiming for in the following paragraph: 
A cosmopolitan theory of justice cannot be restricted to schemes of just distribution on a global scale, 
but must also incorporate a vision of just membership. Such just membership entails: recognizing the 
moral claim of refugees and asylees to first admittance; a regime of porous borders for immigrants; an 
injunction against denationalization and the loss of citizenship rights; and the vindication of the right 
of every human being “to have rights,” that is, to be a legal person, entitled to certain inalienable 
rights, regardless of the status of their political membership. […] Furthermore, just membership also 
entails the right to citizenship on the part of the alien who has fulfilled certain conditions (Benhabib 
2004, 3). 5.3.2 THIRD LEVEL: CITIZENSHIP AND FULL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION RIGHTS 
Benhabib´s proposal mentions different levels of political belonging: citizenship, the status of the 
“alien who has fulfilled certain conditions”, and “first admittance”. Let us start at the top level by 
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focussing on admission to citizenship. One of the most interesting positions is that of Michael 
Walzer (Walzer 1983, chap. 2), which Joseph Carens summarizes very well: 
Walzer’s central claim is that exclusion is justified by the right of communities to self-determination. 
The right to exclude is constrained in three important ways, however. First, we have an obligation to 
provide aid to others who are in dire need, even if we have no established bonds with them, provided 
that we can do so without excessive cost to ourselves. So, we may be obliged to admit some needy 
strangers or at least to provide them with some of our resources and perhaps even territory. Second, 
once people are admitted as residents and participants in the economy, they must be entitled to ac-
quire citizenship, if they wish. Here the constraint flows from principles of justice, not mutual aid. The 
notion of permanent “guest workers” conflicts with the underlying rationale of communal self-
determination that justified the right to exclude in the first place. Third, new states or governments 
may not expel existing inhabitants even if they are regarded as alien by most of the rest of the popula-
tion (Carens 2008, 225–6)  
The second and third constraints reflect Walzer´s position regarding the immorality of maintaining 
a permanent or long-term metic or denizen class in modern liberal democracies: the principles of 
liberty and equality which undergird modern political values and institutions do not allow the es-
tablishment of a permanent underclass of politically disenfranchised residents. By the same logic 
that prohibits ethnic cleansing, denationalization and exile of resident minorities, one cannot simply 
remove people who have been permitted legally to live and work in a country for many years (e.g. 
guestworkers permitted explicitly or tacitly to remain).  
A case which is clear to most people is that of John Tulloch, a 63-year old professor born in India, 
who has lived in the UK since he was 3 years old, dedicated many years of work to the British aca-
demia, survived the London bombings in 2005 and became a symbol of “national” resistance. After 
taking up an academic position in Australia, applying for dual citizenship, and obtaining an Australi-
an passport, his right to live in the UK was revoked. He was not allowed to renew his British pass-
port, and at present can only visit the UK on a tourist visa. For most people, Tulloch is obviously 
C h a p t e r :  5  — P a g e :  356 
 
“British” and should be recognised as such. On the other extreme, we can mention the French 
Montagnard Constitution of the 24 June, 1793 which granted citizenship to any propertied man re-
siding in France for more than 12 months, and the current constitution of Ecuador which recognises 
universal citizenship and grants national citizenship after 24 months of residence. Most people, 
however, think that these time intervals are too short for a foreigner to become truly “French” or 
“Ecuadorian”.  
Most reasonable people would probably agree that after a “generation” of residence in a particular 
country, a cheap, easy and swift access to citizenship should be available. Whether the time period 
of “habitual and continuous” residence that opens the door to citizenship should be 5 years (as in 
France) or, say, 25 years, and whether it should be reduced for certain people who demonstrate a 
good level of integration (as is sometimes done for celebrities and famous academics) is not some-
thing that can be decided a priori in a discussion such as the present one. However, what can be 
said, from the point of view of a universalist moral philosophy, is that at some point residents 
should be allowed to become citizens, especially in polities which consider themselves democratic 
and are built on the exercise of popular sovereignty. Unlike ancient Athens, such polities cannot 
tolerate the existence of a permanent metic class. In the light of this, some traditional jus sanguinis 
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countries, such as Germany260, have amended their Constitution in recent years and moved to-
wards jus domicilii261.  
Many countries block naturalisation (and sometimes denaturalise citizens) on the basis of criminal 
conviction. This can be done in ways which are reasonable or which reflect “crimmigration” para-
noia (Stumpf 2006). The most ridiculous case is probably that of Mark Littler, a British engineer who 
was fined AUD 200 for fare evasion in Brisbane in 2009 when his faulty travelcard failed to register. 
He thereby became a convicted offender for the purposes of the Australian Citizenship Act and cur-
rently has no legal path to citizenship. A more reasonable approach is that taken by the Maltese 
Citizenship Act (Art. 10: 7b) which distinguishes minor infractions from an “offence against the se-
curity of the state” or an offence for which a person “has been sentenced in any country to a pun-
ishment restrictive of personal liberty for a term of not less than five years”. 
260 A significant reform to the German Nationality Act (of the 22nd July, 1913) came into force on the 1st Janu-
ary, 2000, which facilitates the naturalisation of permanent residents and persons born in Germany (or born 
to permanent residents). 
261 Malta, however, which was a jus soli country upon independence, amended its Citizenship Act (of 21st 
September 1964 / Chap. 188) to become a jus sanguinis country after the 31st July 1989, then shifted to a 
discretionary jus domicilii in 2000 (mainly to satisfy EU membership requirements): currently, permanent 
residents by law may apply for naturalisation, but according to the Cabinet Citizenship Guidelines, unless 
there is some blood link to a Maltese citizen or ancestor, such application “will only be given favourable con-
sideration if there are humanitarian aspects involved” (Department for Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs of 
the Republic of Malta 2010, 1). NGOs have repeatedly commented on the hardships and injustices caused by 
such legislation (Times of Malta 2012). 
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 5.3.3 SECOND LEVEL: DENIZENSHIP OR PERMANENT RESIDENCE 
5.3.3.1 The Importance of the Permanent Residency Status in Modern Polities 
Walzer´s (1983) position, presented at the beginning of the previous section (5.3.2) is that a polity´s 
right to exclude can be exercised only during admission; if people are allowed “in”, they should be 
offered a path to citizenship. However, this does not mean that all persons who enter on a tourist 
visa should be able to apply for citizenship, or that all those who enter the country irregularly or 
overstay their visa should be allowed to stay and become nationals. Nor does it mean that, when a 
country sees a castaway approaching its shores, it must either let her drown or grant her citizen-
ship; it is hard to imagine that Walzer would object to Kant´s “right to hospitality”. The “admission” 
we are speaking about here is the passage from visitor status to long-term residency; the Kantian 
problem of allowing the Besucher to become a Hausgenosse, the foreigner to become one´s civic 
kin. The distinction between hospitality and civic kinship is crucial in immigration debates; we will 
explore it further in Chapter 7.  
As we have mentioned above, the status of permanent residence is a very important one today. In 
many EU countries, it makes many political rights immediately available (one may even vote and 
hold elected office in municipal and district elections). This is why many mobile highly-skilled pro-
fessionals, as well as poorer “circular” migrants, are not interested in applying for citizenship in the 
country where they are residing as long as a number of rights are guaranteed by permanent resi-
dence. In the US, most people see permanent residency mainly as the doorstep to citizenship, since 
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during its history, the US has seen immigration mainly as a tool for nation building262. Unlike most 
European countries, the US promises a quick path to citizenship to legal permanent residents, but 
does not grant them much in terms of political rights. In any case, permanent residence status is 
desirable for many sojourners, both in itself and as a conduit to citizenship. This is where the real 
border lies and where the legal wall is raised: here, tourist, student and business visas are pro-
grammed to expire and asylum applications are surrounded by hurdles to make rejection easy. The 
difficulty of keeping sojourners from becoming de facto permanent residents is the reason why un-
desired potential immigrants are not given permission to visit, and draconian border control 
measures are sometime put into place. 
5.3.3.2 Distinguishing Between “Forced” and “Empowered” Immigrants 
Let us start with the case of persons who are in the country legally as visitors, and who would like 
to become permanent residents. Let us also assume that the receiving country is (i) relatively pros-
perous and developed (medium to high HDI and GDP), (ii) does not have a 5-figure population den-
sity per square kilometre (as Monaco), and (iii) is not in an ecologically sensitive part of the planet 
(such as the Maldives); these three assumptions are important and we will return to them below, in 
5.3.4. Who, therefore, has the right to stay and be integrated? 
The rough distinction which most scholars make here is one between “needy” or “burdened” 
strangers, and ones who are less “needy”. In the terminology of Chapter 3, we prefer to speak of 
262 Though circular migration (for instance, of Mexicans and Italians in the 19th and early 20th century) was an 
important phenomenon in US history, the idea that some people actually prefer to return to their native 
countries after having experienced the “American dream” may sound strange to many Americans. 
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“forced” (economic and socio-political) immigrants and “empowered” immigrants. Classical Con-
vention refugees whose personal safety is at risk for socio-political reasons are the most clear-cut 
case of the former. Most people think that countries who can afford to grant them permanent resi-
dency should do so, even though, by international law (as we saw in Chapter 2), they may be reset-
tled in (or “subcontracted to”) other countries, enclosed in camps, pushed back to “safe third coun-
tries” through which they transited and even returned to their home country (when receiving coun-
tries decide that the situation has changed and there is no longer a reasonable fear of persecution). 
Highly-skilled professionals immigrating from a high income, high HDI country are clear examples of 
the latter. They are “empowered” economically, politically and socially in their home countries and 
do not have a real “right” to permanent residency in another country. The trickiest cases, of course, 
are those in between, that is, people who feel “forced” to migrate for reasons of persecution not 
recognised in the Refugee Convention, and for economic reasons. How can we better understand 
the notion of “forced” migrant? 
One possible approach is that suggested by the debate between Abizadeh (2008) and Miller (2010): 
“forced migrants” are persons whose autonomy is “seriously” reduced if they are refused the status 
of permanent residency in a prosperous nation. I will not pursue this here. Rather, I will follow Hen-
ry Shue´s (1980) reflection on basic rights. For Shue (ibid., 13), “a moral right provides (1) the ra-
tional basis for a justified demand (2) that the actual enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guar-
anteed against standard threats”. Certain rights are “basic” since they are necessary for the enjoy-
ment of other rights and hence must be secured in order to be able to live a dignified life; the most 
important ones being physical security and subsistence. Basic rights are “social guarantees against 
actual and threatened deprivations of at least some basic needs” (ibid., 18).  
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5.3.3.3 Civic Kinship: Allowing the Stranger to Become Part of the Political Self 
On the basis of this notion of basic rights, we can start to distinguish between “forced” and “em-
powered” immigrants, and sort out some of the less complicated cases. Some people have no real 
right to stay, though they should be treated hospitably during their sojourn. Others do, and civic 
kinship should be extended to them, so that they may become part of the political self if they so 
wish. 
Shue´s “right to physical security” is a not very problematic basis for requesting kinship: most states 
recognise the right to asylum and the right of stateless people to acquire a nationality since such 
rights offer protection against physical threats and function as an Arendtian “right to have rights”. 
However, for Shue, subsistence — the right to “unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, 
adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and minimal preventive public health care”263 (ibid., 23) — is 
no less basic than security. Shue (1980, chap. 2) argues that the classical classification of security as 
a “negative right” and subsistence as a “positive right” is seriously flawed, as is the assumption that 
there are such things as clearly “negative” rights which trump positive rights. On a personal level, 
the duty to refraining from stabbing someone is intuitively more evident than the duty to offer a 
loaf of bread to a hungry child, but on a political level, security and subsistence must be protected 
positively by costly state institutions. It is not enough for state agents to refrain from killing for 
people to be protected against murder. Political duties regarding deprivation (of security, subsist-
263 Though we cannot reduce subsistence to monetary income, the international poverty threshold helps 
conceptualize what we are talking about. In 2008, the World Bank proposed the figure of $1.25 a day at 2005 
purchasing-power parity (Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2009), but recognises that “for middle-income 
economies, however, a poverty line of $2 a day is more representative” (The World Bank 2010). 
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ence) are tripartite: one should avoid depriving, protect from deprivation and aid the deprived. 
Shue´s notion of subsistence — especially when enhanced with elements from Amartya Sen´s and 
Martha Nussbaum´s capabilities approach and the weights and measures that go into the calcula-
tion of the Human Development Index — helps us understand what a “needy” foreigner or “forced 
economic migrant” looks like, and appreciate the need for prosperous nations to help in dealing 
with the deprivations of such persons which includes effective aid or the offer of legal residency, as 
is currently the case with Convention refugees (at least in decent modern polities). We can, in fact, 
start referring to this case more precisely as forced security and subsistence migration. 
How about “empowered” sojourners whose security and subsistence are amply guaranteed in their 
country of origin, and who would like to become residents? Much depends here on whether the 
receiving country effectively allows them to integrate themselves as de facto residents, and wheth-
er they are willing integrate themselves, or not. Let us consider a person who is allowed to work for 
a number of years, acquire property, build a family, construct a network of friends, learn the lan-
guage and culture, and become attached to the way of life of a polity, especially in times of eco-
nomic prosperity. If this person is not legally admitted to the status of permanent residency and 
continues to be classified as visitor or guestworker (e.g. so that the state may more easily remove 
her when this seems politically convenient), the exercise of political sovereignty here is clearly un-
just and exploitative. In this case, the litmus test for most critical observers is employer sanctions: if 
these sanctions are enforced effectively and consistently both in times of labour shortage and in 
times of high unemployment, then yes, a sovereign polity is entitled to block “empowered” so-
journers from obtaining long-term residency and to humanely deport visa overstayers. Of course, 
employment is not the only dimension of integration; Italy´s point system for granting permanent 
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residency (in force since the 10th March, 2012), though problematic, is an interesting attempt to 
recognise de facto integration using a number of criteria. And if a person is, for all intents and pur-
poses, a co-inhabitant, why not recognise this by law? 
5.3.3.4 Civic Kinship with Irregular Immigrants 
The trickiest case, of course, is that of immigrants who entered the country irregularly or over-
stayed their visa. If they can be classified as forced security or subsistence migrants, it seems that 
they have a prima facie right to “amnesty” and a path to permanent residency (that eventually 
leads to the possibility of naturalisation) in most countries which can provide them subsistence 
rights without significantly affecting the subsistence rights of their current legal residents. The ad-
ministrative infraction does not make such persons “criminals”. It is ultimately due to morally ob-
jectionable elements of laws which unjustly deny first entry to such people or unjustly deny such 
people from obtaining permanent residency.  But how about irregular empowered migrants, who 
have no prima facie right to enter and stay?  
In this case, much depends on their level of integration, as in the parallel case above. Carens (2009) 
argues that “irregular migrants should be granted amnesty — allowed to remain with legal status as 
residents — if they have been settled for a long time. Some circumstances — arriving as children or 
marrying citizens or permanent residents — may accelerate or strengthen their moral claims to 
stay, but the most important consideration is the passage of time”. Building on certain cases264, 
264 Carens (2009) discusses two cases to illustrate these circumstances: that of Marguerite Grimmond, an 
American national who lived “irregularly” for almost 80 years in Scotland without applying for permanent 
residence and risked deportation after leaving the country with an American passport and re-entering on a 
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Carens (ibid.) concludes that “as irregular migrants become more and more settled, their member-
ship in society grows in moral importance, and the fact that they settled without authorization be-
comes correspondingly less relevant. At some point a threshold is crossed, and irregular migrants 
acquire a moral claim to have their actual social membership legally recognized”. For Carens, a mi-
grant can acquire belonging in a society without legal authorization because “social membership 
does not depend upon official permission” (ibid.).  
As time passes, the administrative infraction becomes less and less relevant; if a polity (both as bu-
reaucratic apparatus and as civil society) does not intervene to effectively stop the integrative pro-
cess, one can assume that nobody has any real problem with the presence of that immigrant in the 
country. When a zealous immigration bureaucrat or a jealous co-worker suddenly starts having a 
problem with a person´s “illegal status” after 20 years or more of social membership, reasonable 
people intuitively know that the real problem is not with the papers. The logic behind statutes of 
limitations for minor crimes (which exist in most legal systems) helps us see what the real problem 
is: when an authority does not punish an infraction in a reasonable amount of time, but rather 
keeps it pending as an “ace up its sleeve”, it is usually clear that the authority is not interested in 
justice but in exploiting the situation to its advantage. So, how long a time is long enough? Carens 
does not think we can establish a clear threshold a priori, but suggests that “five years of settled 
tourist visa, and that of Hiu Lui Ng who entered the US on a tourist visa with his parents when he was 17, 
overstayed, completed high school and college, became a computer engineer, married a US citizen, had two 
children, got a job at the Empire State Building, got “caught” and died in detention while awaiting deporta-
tion. 
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residence without any criminal convictions should normally be sufficient to establish anyone as a 
responsible member of society” (ibid.). 
Yet, some would object that a “Miguel Sanchez” — an irregular immigrant living in the US whose 
case is presented in Carens (2009) — should not be treated differently from a “Niloufar Folani” — 
an Iranian woman wanting to immigrate to Canada currently applying for a visa in Tehran, whose 
case in presented in Abizadeh (2009). Why should irregular immigrants be allowed to “jump the 
queue”? Carens responds that in most cases, there simply is no queue: there is no way an unskilled 
person from a poor country with no relatives inside the receiving country can obtain a visa to visit, 
let alone apply for permanent residence. Sanchez may have violated an administrative rule, and if 
he is not a forced security or subsistence migrant as described above, upon irregular entry, or upon 
the expiration of the tourist visa, the state may rightly deport him. However, he is not necessarily a 
“worse” immigrant than Folani: we must take into consideration that he also risked his life and his 
family´s savings to get to the US and his boldness is a positive sign of initiative and desire to belong 
to the receiving polity. An Indian software engineer or an Irish university student who overstay their 
US tourist visas should probably attract less sympathy, but are usually less at risk of being deported. 
In any case, Sanchez and Folani are at roughly the same level of entitlement at day one of Sanchez´s 
irregular presence in the US When time passes, and Sanchez become more integrated, according to 
Carens, his entitlement to stay increases, and after a number of years, he should not be removed, 
C h a p t e r :  5  — P a g e :  366 
 
even if the situation in his home country changes in the meanwhile and his rights to security and 
subsistence can now be adequately guaranteed there265.  
5.3.3.5 Conclusion: Immigrant Residency and Naturalisation Selection Rule 
The reflections in this section help us to formulate another priority rule, the Immigrant Residency 
and Naturalisation Selection Rule: “Immigrants whose security and subsistence rights cannot be 
adequately guaranteed in their home country have a clear prima facie right to enter and stay in 
countries which can afford to provide them such rights while not endangering the security and sub-
sistence of their current population”. This rule, as stated more fully in section 5.4, uses the criteria 
discussed above to help determine cases where deportation might be legitimate, and to adjudicate 
the cases of irregular migrants. 
5.3.4 FIRST LEVEL: ENTRY AND TEMPORARY SOJOURN 
5.3.4.1 Civic Hospitality and Closed Border Regimes 
Our discussion above, especially concerning Kant´s right to hospitality (section 5.1.5), made it clear 
that the border where a polity is morally entitled to keep certain strangers out is not the physical 
265 Carens (2009) does admit that there may be other factors to consider besides time, but he sees them as 
factors which could be used to reduce the time threshold rather than to allow bureaucrats discretion to in-
crease the threshold and keep people from obtaining legal permanent residence after living in a country a 
certain number of years. This attitude towards bureaucracy and state discretion is typical of a liberal egalitar-
ian, and very understandable from a practical point of view. However, a civic republican, while not willing to 
deport a Marguerite Grimmond after 80 years of residence, may still want a Miguel Sanchez to demonstrate 
that he is well rooted in the political democratic culture of the receiving country, as we mentioned above, 
given that Sanchez may not have known such a culture in his formative years. Italy´s point system for grant-
ing permanent residency, mentioned above, reflects such concerns, which are legitimate so long as a com-
prehensive ethnic cultural and religious baggage is not imposed on the immigrant: a modern polity is not an 
ethno-cultural community. 
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one, but the legal and administrative one separating sojourn and permanent residency. Asylum 
seekers have a right to cross national boundaries to seek safety and apply for asylum, but we can 
make a more general claim in terms of the freedom of movement. Alan Dowty (1989, 55–94), for 
instance argues that closed borders are a new form of serfdom: freedom of movement should be 
allowed since it is a basic right which is needed for the exercise of other rights (Christiansen 1988, 
n. 22). I believe that the liberal egalitarian position (cf. 5.1.7.7) which insists that “the presumption 
is for free migration and anyone who would defend restrictions faces a heavy burden of proof” 
(Carens 1992, 25), is correct, if we also take into account the limitations stated in 5.1.7.2 and 
5.1.7.5., and insist, as we have done in the previous section, that not all those who have a right to 
enter have a right to stay.  
The limitations mentioned in section 5.1.7 are mainly concerned with (i) insecurity; (ii) disruption of 
public order and (iii) severe dilution of the receiving country´s political culture. One can imagine this 
happening, in times of war, or in rare situations where massive irregular border crossings may 
cause grave public disorder and civil strife, countries may be entitled to keep immigrants out using 
violent coercion, even as forced security or subsistence migrants. Today, these situations may in-
deed occur on borders between poor countries, or between poor and medium-income countries in 
times of famine or genocide, situations that generally require a quick and effective response from 
the international “community”. It cannot honestly be invoked to describe the current situation of 
irregular migration to prosperous countries, not even tiny ones like Malta, as we have seen in Chap-
ters 3 and 4. However, we cannot simply do away with these limitations, but rather should insist 
that they not be used as excuses to close borders unfairly. 
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Our discussion in previous chapters, however, highlights some other limitations (already noted in 
passing, above, in section 5.3.3.2), namely that some countries may have good reason to restrict 
entry and sojourn due to (i) low prosperity (GDP) and low human development (HDI), (ii) very high 
population density, (iii) ecological vulnerability, or (iv) a constitution (or a form of government) 
which is ill-equipped to deal with strangers and pluralism. These limitations seem to me pretty ob-
vious, and I will not discuss them further here. Of course, refugees and forced migrants usually do 
not enter such countries unless to transit to other countries: the irony in the case of Malta is that 
these persons are let in when rescued at sea, but due to closed borders, they cannot freely leave 
the island. 
5.3.4.2 The Use of Coercion at the Border 
The above limitations indicate that there may be legitimate occasions when borders need to be 
closed, and when coercion needs to be applied to keep people out. To be sure, there are limits to 
the coercion a liberal democratic state may apply at the border. José Mendoza (2012, 21f) uses a 
Rawlsian thought experiment to propose the following principles regarding suspected irregular mi-
grants caught after crossing the border: 
One principle […] is that constitutional protections, such as due process, equal protection, and a right 
to an attorney, should be extended to everyone in all cases including removal proceedings, which is 
currently not the case in the US. Another principle could be that all persons present in a state should be 
assumed to be lawfully present until their presence is proved to be unauthorized. 
Similarly, when trying to keep migrants from entering, the use of lethal force is not proportional to 
the “offense”, and does not allow discrimination between forced security or subsistence migrants 
and others. Ceuta´s fence with Morocco is an interesting example of a literalist interpretation of 
proportionality and “coercion lite”: it is technically not lethal, but very unpleasant to approach and 
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extremely hard to get through. It is also very expensive to build and maintain; there is no way the 
US could afford something similar on the border with Mexico. Yet both the American and the Span-
ish fence have forced legitimate immigrants to risk their lives crossing the Sonora desert or the At-
lantic coast of Africa to the Canary Islands. The “collateral damage” of such “proportional” use of 
coercion is morally acceptable only if, as discussed above, legal and accessible means of first entry 
are made available to persons whose security and subsistence cannot be adequately guaranteed in 
their home countries. Contrary to what most people think, this does not mean a never-ending flood 
of immigrants flying into wealthy nations: rather, it forces such nations to help guarantee safety 
and subsistence rights in their home countries, as Western European nations did after the collapse 
of communism in Eastern Europe. The flow quickly subsided, since, as Waltzer (1983, 38) rightly in-
sists, “human beings […] move about a great deal, but not because they love to move. They are, 
most of them, inclined to stay where they are unless their life is very difficult there”.  
5.3.4.3 Conclusion: Two Priority Rules 
The discussion in this section helps us to propose two priority rules, more fully stated in section 5.4, 
below. One is the Immigrant Entry and Sojourn Selection Rule, already sketched in section 5.1.7.7, 
and applies most obviously in the case of modern liberal democracies, but other states may have a 
duty to adopt some version of it, in the light of the discussion in this chapter. It states that “a mod-
ern liberal democracy which can afford to welcome migrants and asylum seekers should normally 
allow legal entry and temporary sojourn”. A number of exceptions and limitations coming from the 
liberal egalitarian tradition, and considered “obvious” by many communitarians and civic republi-
cans are included in this rule. The second rule is the Recipient Country Selection Rule, which helps 
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us take into account some of the issues related to a country´s capacity of hosting sojourners: pros-
perity, development, population size, ecological vulnerability, and the commitment to human rights 
enshrined in democratic constitutions which also create the capacity for a greater cultural pluralism 
and civic hospitality.  
5.4 A Set of Priority Rules, and a Conclusion 
I think that stating the priority rules introduced in this chapter can also help us to revisit the major 
issues we touched upon above, and hence summarize and conclude the chapter. I will do so in the 
following paragraphs, starting with the last rule mentioned in the previous section.  5.4.1 THE CIVIC HOSPITALITY RULES 
3. Recipient Country Selection Rule: A polity has a greater moral duty to open its borders to 
immigrants if it is (i) prosperous (high GDP) and highly developed (high HDI); (ii) not too 
densely populated; (iii) not situated on an ecologically-sensitive territory; (iv) a liberal de-
mocracy explicitly committed to the promotion of human rights by its constitution. 
4. Immigrant Entry and Sojourn Selection Rule:  
a. A modern liberal democracy which can afford to welcome migrants and asylum 
seekers should normally allow legal entry and temporary sojourn, except when this 
poses a serious and credible risk of (i) insecurity; (ii) disruption of public order; or (iii) 
severe dilution of its political culture and weakening of its political institutions, or 
else (iv) when certain restrictive policies can be shown to enhance liberty and equali-
ty on a cosmopolitan level in the long run.  
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b. This rule seeks to protect (i) the right to file an asylum claim, (ii) the right to freedom 
of movement, (iii) the value of creating a deeper unity between peoples of recognis-
ing their interdependence; it also follows from (iv) the cosmopolitan duties which 
encumber territorial stewardship and from (v) liberal and democratic arguments. 
c. Polities without a liberal or democratic constitution, may refuse (b/v) above, but 
should also adopt some version of this rule for the other reasons in (b). 
These rules summarize most of the discussion in the third part of this chapter (section 5.3.4), and 
have as their background the discussion of liberal egalitarianism, sovereignty and cosmopolitan 
right in the first two parts of the chapter (5.1 and 5.2). 5.4.2 THE CIVIC KINSHIP RULES 
5. Immigrant Residency and Naturalisation Selection Rule: 
a. Immigrants whose security and subsistence rights cannot be adequately guaranteed 
in their home country have a clear prima facie right to enter and stay in countries 
which can afford to provide them such rights while not endangering the security and 
subsistence of their current population.  
b. Other immigrants do not have such a right and may be removed humanely, ensuring 
the legal protections afforded to citizen defendants in civil law cases, unless a long 
time has passed (more or less, 5 to 25 years) and unless they have shown themselves 
to be quite well “integrated” into the political culture of the receiving polity. 
c. Persons who are explicitly or tacitly allowed to stay beyond a sojourn period of a few 
months should be considered as long-term residents and potential candidates for 
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naturalisation. The basic rights of such residents should be respected and guaran-
teed as far as is affordable for the country, including some access to welfare services 
in case of destitution, and a flexible (not overly regulated) access to the labour mar-
ket which reflects the real need of the economy while offering other workers some 
protection against wage competition and depression. 
d. This rule seeks to protect (i) the right of refugees for protection, (ii) the socio-
economic rights of all residents, (iii) the value of integrating persons whose contribu-
tion to the welfare of the polity (at least in time of economic prosperity) is tacitly or 
explicitly recognised, and who therefore enjoy some sort of “belonging” to the recip-
ient political society; it also follows from (iv) the cosmopolitan duties which encum-
ber territorial stewardship and from (v) liberal and democratic arguments. 
e. The reasoning above may be adapted to the cases of irregular immigrants, and also 
to polities without a liberal or democratic constitution. 
6. Procedural Rule: The local fine-tuning and concretization of the above rules requires fair 
democratic processes where those most impacted by boundary laws are adequately repre-
sented. 
The first of the two rules above summarizes the discussion in 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 above, while the sec-
ond comes from the conclusion of the second part of the chapter (5.2). Together, they reflect the 
position we have adopted which, in the light of Catholic Social Teaching, seeks to learn from both 
liberal egalitarian and civic republican/communitarian authors while proposing ways of overcoming 
the impasse between the hard-line versions of these two positions.   
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This is a preliminary presentation of the rules. Admittedly, the list is incomplete, and there may be 
tensions between some of the points listed above which we explore and try to resolve in Chapter 7. 
As we said before, these tensions cannot be fully resolved a priori, but if properly harnessed, they 
can drive jurisgenerative processes and concrete policy decisions which build a positive public con-
sensus responsive to human rights and shared moral claims.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter turn to the Old Testament266 using critical methods, seeking inspiration in the sacred 
texts of a venerable and complex “national” tradition. We will not focus on the whole corpus of the 
Christian Bible, given the limitations of space and given the particular setting of the New Testament 
in a foreign-dominated cosmopolitan empire, which arguably is more remote from the reality of 
modern-day polities than the Old Testament. As we approach the biblical text, we shall ask our-
selves: How does the Bible construe human political realities and their relation to migrants? How 
does it complement modern political philosophy in taking stock of the age-old phenomenon of hu-
man migration? What ethical demands does it place on political societies as regards their relations 
to the stranger?  
266 We follow these conventions in this chapter: (1) References to biblical books follow the shorter forms of 
the abbreviations in the Chicago Manual of Style (16th edition), sections 10.48-10.50, except when they are 
included in citations. (2) Transliteration of words in Hebrew follows BRILL´s scholarly transliteration system 
for Hebrew, which is loosely based on the Encyclopaedia Judaica rules (Rietbroek 2011), except when they 
are included in citations. (The Chicago Manual of Style (11.111) does not privilege any particular translitera-
tion system for Hebrew.) (3) The divine name is transliterated as “YHWH” in biblical citations or references 
to precise biblical texts; however, the divine name “Yahweh” is used in discussions about the principal divini-
ty in the history of Israelite Religion. Ultimately, as suggested by the biblical tradition itself, it is a matter of 
the reader´s discernment (made on the basis of context and priestly dignity), rather than that of the writer, 
whether to vocalize or not the divine name when one proclaims (qrʾ) a written (kṯḇ) text, and what to substi-
tute for it in the latter case. (4) Biblical citations (except when included in other citations, or where specified 
otherwise) follow the New Revised Standard Version, Anglicised Catholic Edition (available at 
http://www.biblegateway.com), amended according to rule 3 above. 
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The complexity of the biblical treatment of the subject, and the ambiguities present in some parts of 
the Old Testament provide valuable resources towards a deeper reflection on a number of key con-
cepts: hospitality and kinship (6.2), national identity (6.3), “strangeness” and “otherness” (6.4). 
The biblical approach also allows us to deepen the historical dimension of our investigation which 
helps us to refine and expand on the preliminary priority rules presented in the previous chapter 
(6.6). All this leads us to the following chapter where a new framework for the ethics of migration is 
proposed. 
6.1 The Bible as Heuristic Source for Political and Ethical Thought  6.1.1 THE BIBLE AS CONCEPTUAL SOURCE OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
The Bible was written in the political setting of antiquity, and we assume here that there is no direct 
way of going from the practices, narratives or laws in the Bible to valid policy recommendations ad-
dressed to modern polities in the 20th century. However, Scripture is useful to our reflection on 
immigration policies in the 21st century in three ways: (a) as a conceptual source of modern politi-
cal thought which cannot simply be bracketed or ignored (as will be argued below), (b) as an inspir-
ing classic that documents how a particular society dealt with the phenomenon of human migra-
tion over a number of centuries (cf. section 6.1.2), (c) as an authoritative text illustrating ethical 
conduct for believers (cf. section 6.1.3). Let us start with the first point. As a conceptual source of 
modern thought, the Bible has praxically inspired both nationalist political movements in modernity 
(6.1.1.1), and speculatively stimulated philosophical reflections on justice in political societies 
(6.1.1.2).  
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6.1.1.1 The Bible as Praxical Source for Modern Nationalist Movements 
Va, pensiero, or the “Chorus of the Hebrew Slaves” from Verdi´s Nabucco, has a central place in the 
history of the Risorgimento267. Based on Ps 137, the chorus uses biblical language referring to the 
peoplehood of Israel, which the audience rapidly associates with a modern nationalistic struggle for 
independence from foreign rule. Biblical texts and narratives have a long history of being adopted 
by groups of persons who consider themselves the biological or spiritual progeny of the “Exodus 
group”. Of course, the Risorgimento is a movement that most scholars consider “nationalist” in the 
proper sense of word, or as that word has come to be understood in light of the events of the 20th 
century; “modern” nationalisms, as Walker Connor argued in the 1990s, are mass political phe-
nomena, the products of mass cultures, which can develop only in modern states. Yet, the biblical 
texts which (modern) nationalist movements often used and referred to in their rhetoric are exam-
ples of a (pre-modern) “nationalism” — a politically-active discourse based on the ostentation of 
(real or imaginary) ethnic ties and sentiments, seeking to define and promote the interests of a par-
ticular human group.  
Anthony Smith (2008) argues quite convincingly that nationalism does have “pre-modern” incarna-
tions which he classifies under three paradigms: “hierarchy”, “covenant” and “republic”. These 
forms of nationalism (hierarchical/covenantal/republican) are already present in some of the politi-
cal arrangements of antiquity: empires (such as those in Mesopotamia and Egypt, which empha-
267 Though revisionists like Roger Parker (2007) may doubt Verdi´s or his librettist´s commitment to Italian 
nationalism, or whether the chorus was actually encored on the première night, there is no doubt that the 
text soon took a life and a meaning of its own in Italian political history, whatever the original intention of 
the author. 
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sized hierarchy, and presented it as divinely-mandated), tribal confederations and ethnoreligious 
kingdoms (such as biblical Israel, which emphasized the idea of a covenant with God and among 
tribes, though it also included elements of hierarchical nationalism promoted in times of centralized 
monarchic rule), and city-states (such as those in Ancient Greece, some of which promoted republi-
can nationalism, while others developed ideologies supporting hierarchy, always in accordance with 
the political propensities of their respective city gods). At the end of the Middle Ages and in early 
Modernity, the Bible (combined with Roman legal texts and Greek philosophical writings) had a 
central role in mediating these ideas and shaping the proximal precursors of what we call “national-
ism”268.  Of course, even modern nationalist movements, starting with the Risorgimento, make am-
ple use of the Bible, as we have hinted above. Moxnes (2011), for instance, traces how the various 
versions of the “historical Jesus” resulting from the different quests in the 19th and 20th centuries 
mirror the nationalist ideals of the different exegetes.  
6.1.1.2 The Bible as Speculative Source for Political and Ethical Thought 
The adoption of biblical stories and concepts by nationalist rhetoricians and thinkers has meant 
that the biblical worldview, whether appropriately grasped or misrepresented, has often shaped 
new constitutions, laws and policies, which the intelligentsia then sought to justify philosophically a 
posteriori. All this shows how powerful the Bible can be, both as a spiritual and rhetorical tool in the 
268 Forms of hierarchical nationalism were developed towards the end of the Middle Ages, notably in Musco-
vy, France, England and Spain, often justified with reference to hierarchical elements in the Bible (A. D. Smith 
2008, chap. 4). Forms of covenantal nationalism emerged by the sixteenth century in several European 
states (promoted by political elites in Russia, Poland, England, France and Denmark, and also by religious 
reformers in Scotland, Holland, England, the Swiss cantons and the American colonies), very much rooted in 
radical readings of the Covenant in the Old Testament (ibid., chap. 5). The republican nationalism of the 
American and French Revolutions, though presented in a “secular” wrapping (especially in France), owes as 
much to biblical covenantalism as to Athenian republicanism (ibid., chap. 6). 
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hands of a faith-based political activist, and as a heuristic tool in the hands of an ethicist or political 
scientist, even if she does not consider herself part of the Judeo-Christian tradition. As contempo-
rary philosophical discussions struggle to rethink Westphalian state sovereignty in a globalising 
world (which continuously invites us to take a new hard look at the historical conditions in which 
modern political theory was born), and as Catholic Social Teaching points us towards new sources 
of inspiration to develop a more concrete and workable ethics of migration, the Bible becomes an 
obvious and privileged locus of investigation. 
In his famous 2004 debate with the then cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Jürgen Habermas presented 
secularization as a twofold and complementary learning process. Religions and theological thinking 
can learn from and be enriched by secular reason, and purified from tendencies of imposing their 
worldview on all by using violence or coercion of consciences. Similarly, philosophy and secular po-
litical reason (with their “thin” or “moral” conceptions of practical reason) has much to learn from 
religion and theology (and their “thick” or “ethical” approach to practical reason), given the “ethical 
abstinence of a postmetaphysical thinking, to which every universally obligatory concept of a good 
and exemplary life is foreign” (Habermas 2007, 43). Faith-based ethics (and any ethics based on a 
wholesome comprehensive notion of the good) not only helps motivate citizens to act morally 
(through practices and narratives learnt in one´s community which could be deployed positively 
within civil society) but also provides concepts that transform the very substance of cross-cultural, 
universalist and secular “public reason” or “morality”: 
Philosophy must be ready to learn from theology, not only for functional reasons, but also (when we 
recall philosophy’s successful “Hegelian” learning processes) for substantial reasons. This is because 
the mutual compenetration of Christianity and Greek metaphysics not only produced the intellectual 
form of theological dogmatics […]. It also promoted the assimilation by philosophy of genuinely Chris-
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tian ideas. This work of assimilation has left its mark in normative conceptual clusters with a heavy 
weight of meaning, such as responsibility, autonomy, and justification; or history and remembering, 
new beginning, innovation, and return; or emancipation and fulfilment; or expropriation, internaliza-
tion, and embodiment, individuality and fellowship. Philosophy has indeed transformed the original re-
ligious meaning of these terms, but without emptying them through a process of deflation and exhaus-
tion (Habermas 2007, 44–45). 
Our discussion explores a series of “normative conceptual clusters” related to the phenomenon of 
human mobility, as they are presented in the Bible, using narrative and juridical literary genres, in 
view of enriching the philosophical reflection in the previous chapter and present an ethical frame-
work in the next chapter which will integrate philosophy and theology while remaining accessible to 
dialogue partners who are non-believers. Of course, modern Political Philosophy has inherited 
many of the concepts we shall discuss below and reset them in a universalist, cross-cultural concep-
tual framework which makes the historical development of such notions opaque and separates 
them from the underlying worldview. Taking the “detour” through the original texts and contexts of 
a particular tradition will help us return to universal concepts more keenly aware of their deeper 
meaning, nuance and concreteness. As noted in the introduction, we explore three conceptual clus-
ters in this chapter: hospitality and kinship (6.2), national identity (6.3), “strangeness” and “oth-
erness” (6.4). 6.1.2 THE BIBLE AS INSPIRING CLASSIC 
The Bible is not only a source of concepts which are useful to formulate ethical theories and deduce 
moral principles, but also a source of narratives which help us see and comprehend the reality we 
face in our daily lives from a different point of view through the use of imagination, which helps us 
cultivate moral virtues and make inductive prudential judgments on complex contemporary issues.  
The Bible is a showcase of human experience, and a “classic” in the Gadamerian sense. It has a way 
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of reformulating history and narrating what is beyond history — what we call “myth” in the best 
and richest sense of the word269. All this provides great food for thought, especially for those want-
ing to “think outside the box”. As Paul Ricœur (cf. 1959; 1974) would say, le symbole (mythe) donne 
à penser. In other words, embarking on a reflection on the ethos of a particular tradition and a par-
ticular “people” implies a shift from the universalist discussion of morality (Moralität), which we 
presented in the previous chapter, to an ethical perspective (Sittlichkeit): the richness of this “par-
ticular” perspective — which nonetheless unveils eternal and universal aspects of human social be-
haviour, albeit using the particular lens provided by the narratives and concepts of a unique tradi-
tion, more than qualifies it to be a suitable conversation partner in a public dialogue on the issue of 
borders, sovereignty and human migration. 
6.1.3 THE BIBLE AS AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE FOR JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
“The alien who resides with you shall be to you as the citizen among you; you shall love the alien as 
yourself” (Lv 19:34). Biblical texts like this have an authority for believers — especially practicing 
Jews and Christians — which does not obtain for a secular audience; even though the natural law 
tradition claims that the universal moral principles expressed in the biblical text may be deduced 
through human reason from other sources (cf. International Theological Commission 2009), the text 
itself does not have the same purchase on non-believers as it does on believers. While noting this 
fact, and being conscious that believers will read the reflections in this chapter from a different 
stance, and probably find them more convincing, we may nonetheless seek to remain in dialogue 
269 Cf. Ricœur´s (1980) remarks on Rudolf Bultmann´s project of demythologization of the biblical text. For 
other reflections on the function of myth in the Bible see Levenson (1987, 102ff) and Westermann (1984, 
4ff). 
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with all “people of good will” in this chapter. In our discussion, we view the Bible mainly as a narra-
tive through which reality is “revealed” (in a secular sense), rather than as a code of religious law 
through which morality is revealed (in a theological sense).  
The critical methodology and narrative focus implicit in this approach helps us to avoid some of the 
critiques of “cherry picking”, which are often addressed to moral theologians who construe the Bi-
ble as a univocal, coherent and systematic code of religious law through which God reveals morality 
directly to believers. If one looks up terms like “stranger” or “border” in a biblical concordance, 
several texts come up, some suggesting hospitality and openness, and others provoking fear of the 
stranger and the need for closure to avoid contamination from evil external influences, be they reli-
gious, moral, political or cultural. To be sure, examples of conduct towards strangers which most 
person today would deem immoral, abound in the Hebrew Bible, sometimes permitted or even 
presented as actions “commanded” by God. Classical examples of this are the “ban” (which implies 
the evils of “genocide” and “terrorism”) in the deuteronomistic history, and the repudiation of 
wives on ethnic grounds given a valid common law marriage (which is clearly an evil, at least from a 
Catholic viewpoint) in Ezra-Nehemiah. Ethical scholars who adopt a simplistic and non-critical ap-
proach to the Bible often cherry-pick from the Bible the texts which seem to “prove” the ethical 
posture that they consider correct, following their understanding of their religious tradition, or on 
the basis of the common-sense notions of right and wrong prevalent in their day and age. Other 
texts are simply ignored, or explained away in a footnote. Such scholars end up creating ad hoc 
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their own canon within the canon, substituting their authority for that of the Church, or to engage 
in cover-up operations of scarce intellectual honesty270.  
The excommunication of Marcion of Sinope in 144 CE meant that ethical and cosmological coher-
ence were not the primary criteria in establishing the canon. The Church values the narratives and 
the worldview of the Hebrew Bible, complete with bans and repudiations and xenophobia (some-
times presented as divinely-inspired commands), as an intrinsic part of revealed salvation history271, 
and is aware that the simplistic reading of singular texts cannot be taken as a sole source of a Chris-
tian or universal moral law (Pontifical Biblical Commission 1993). Since then, and especially since 
Augustine proposed the adoption of Tychonius´ rules for the interpretation of Scripture in De Doc-
trina Christiana, there has been a lively discussion in mainstream Christian Churches on how to use 
Scripture correctly and honestly in ethics (cf. Spohn 1996). In our reflection, we use both synchronic 
approaches (which are centred on the final form of the text) and diachronic approaches (which fo-
cus on historical contexts through which the text emerged), but prefer the latter since they lend 
270 “At one level, it is important to acknowledge [a certain] ambivalence in the Christian tradition and to 
counter passages and stories which could be used to justify hostility towards and oppression of asylum seek-
ers. As postcolonial biblical scholars have pointed out, the Bible is a multilayered and ambiguous text and it 
is vital to challenge exclusive and oppressive elements within it. At another level, however, it is important to 
hear these negative voices and to engage with them. This is because the hatred of foreigners and immigrants 
found in the Bible is no different from many people’s attitude towards asylum seekers today” (Snyder 2007, 
356). 
271 The idea of a “revealed salvation history” can, of course, serve to create yet another “canon within the 
canon”, and, indeed any “canonical” reading of the Bible, which seeks to make sense of the many books and 
literary genres which are contained in the canon, requires some organizing ideas or principles which allow us 
to make sense of the whole. However, the notion of “revealed salvation history” is a deeply ecclesial criteri-
on, derived from the Bible itself, and not simply a particular theological doctrine considered central by a 
theologian at some moment in history. 
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themselves better to the reflection we would like to make on the biblical source in the context of 
the present work. 
6.2 Hospitality, Yes; Kinship, No: Integration in the Bible 
In this section we will quickly introduce what may be considered as the major problem with the ap-
plication to modern polities of the biblical approach to strangerhood, namely, its resistance to the 
notion of integration. In the rest of the chapter, we will seek to understand the sources of this 
problem, and determine what an ethics of migration can learn from the Bible due to, and in spite of, 
this problem.  
One of the key issues raised in chapter 4 is that most Western polities today do not object to some 
understanding of the “right to hospitality”, not only for castaways or people lost in the desert272. 
The more serious problem is moving from mere hospitality to integration, recognising the right of 
certain “former sojourners” to become “future citizens” through the granting of permanent resi-
dency and the implementation of sensible integration policies, converting the “other” to a “kin”. 
Biblical Israel found ways of both hosting sojourners and of integrating foreign individuals and oth-
er ethnic groups so as to make them part of the self. In this section we will see that the hospitability 
of Israel is explicit in the text, while the openness and inclusivity of Israel is implicit and hidden by 
the biblical editors. 
272 For instance, the right of people to enter a country to apply for asylum is generally admitted (even if petty 
and Kafkaesque policies are put into place, seeking to make this physically and legally impossible) and visi-
tors having some money to spend and no urgent motive to stay are actively lured in as “tourists” or “poten-
tial investors”. 
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 6.2.1 HOSPITALITY: TRANSIT AND SOJOURN 
The first level of hospitality concerns the right of safe transit (maʿaḇār) of the non-resident (nŏḵrî) 
through one´s land; refusal of such a right is deemed by the Bible as a grave evil, as can be seen in  
Nm 20:17f; 21:22f273. The second level of hospitality, which is to be shown towards wayfarers or 
temporary sojourners, is one step further than the mere right of transit. We come here to the 
proper meaning of “hospitality”, which translates the Hebrew ʾôreaḥ, that is, the “taking in of a 
guest”. Though the host is not obliged to take in a guest, once she does, violation of hospitality is 
considered a grave evil in the biblical worldview, as illustrated by the sin of Sodom in Gn 19: Lot 
would rather offer his daughters to be raped than renege on his offer of hospitality. Yet, Lot´s abil-
ity to provide hospitality is limited by the fact that he himself is a “guest”, a temporary resident in 
Sodom (Gn 19:9); he is quickly reminded of this by the men of the city when he tries to protect his 
guests274. According to the Bible, Sodom’s inability to offer hospitality and to recognise the dignity 
of strangers makes it an unliveable, uninhabitable space, a non-city doomed for destruction (Bian-
chi 2009, 82). Lot´s two guests (called “messengers” or “angels” [malʾāḵîm] in vv. 1 and 15, and 
273 Here the Israelites request to pass unharmed through the land of the Edomites and Amorites without 
looting the land: “we will not turn aside into field or vineyard; we will not drink the water of any well”. Both 
the Edomites and the Amorites refused, and this is considered by the Bible as unacceptable. In the first case, 
Israel turned back, but in the second case the Israelites decided to pass through all the same, were attacked, 
and while defending themselves ended up conquering the land (according to the text). In the Rabbinic mid-
rash, this text is seen to argue that refusing the right of transit in times of peace (especially to persons or 
groups which do not pose a threat of invasion or conquest) is ethically unacceptable (Novak 2001, 232). The 
irony of the text is that, by pretending that the weak Israelite tribes were a real military threat and refusing 
them safe passage, the Amorites ignited the ire of Yahweh, and ended up totally crushed by this puny band 
of refugees. 
274 In comparison, Abraham does not need to be reminded of the precariousness of his situation as resident 
alien in Egypt and Canaan; he takes the initiative of offering the sexual services of his wife-cum-half-sister to 
ingratiate himself with his hosts (Gn 12:10-20; 20). 
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“humans” [ʾanāšîm] in vv. 8, 5, 12, 16) were part of a group of three who had just visited Abraham 
in Mamre (Gn 18:1-33) where they were shown extraordinary hospitality. We discuss Abraham´s 
hospitality in Mamre in more detail in Chapter 6; it is a well-known paradigm for Jewish and Chris-
tian “settler” hospitality (Bianchi 2009, 66ff; Moyaert 2011; Sacks 2006), where Abraham acts as 
though he were an autochthonous landowner, all the while keenly aware that he, too, is a guest. To 
be sure, the Bible is not ashamed to admit that Abraham´s hospitality is not always practiced 
among his descendants (e.g. Jgs 19)275.  6.2.2 KINSHIP: RESIDENCY AND BELONGING 
Some strangers simply want to pass through, others may require hospitality for a few days or weeks 
as wayfarers or sojourners, but still others stick around. This is where things start to become more 
complicated, when the nŏḵrî becomes a ger (non-integrated resident276). We discuss the problems 
275 This text mirrors the Sodom story, but this time, it is the Benjaminites who gang rape to death the Ju-
dahite concubine of a Levite who was being hosted by an Ephraimite (another vulnerable non-integrated 
resident like Lot). The reader gets the impression that the Israelite wayfarers would probably have been saf-
er had they stayed the night in Jebus, a nŏḵrî city, instead of Gibeah, an Israelite city. 
276 The Hebrew word ger, as we shall see below, refers to a person residing in Israel but not considered part 
of the people of Israel in general, or not fully integrated into the native Israelite population of a particular 
region (e.g. a non-Judahite or a non-Jerusalemite Israelite residing in Jerusalem). Scholars today claim that 
the lack of integration was mostly due to landlessness and should be understood more in terms of class dif-
ference than on the basis of ethnicity, though the landlessness may be linked to immigration many genera-
tions prior (Jobling 2009), or to the pauperization of autochthonous ancestors. “Immigrant” is therefore not 
a very good translation. Similarly, “temporary resident” or “sojourner” do not properly convey the reality of 
persons whose integration is long due, but being a political hot potato, are permanently conceived as indi-
viduals who will be “moving out” sooner or later. “Resident alien” is legal jargon popularized by US immigra-
tion law, however, referring to non-nationals as “aliens” sounds odd and possibly offensive in everyday lan-
guage in most English-speaking countries. Furthermore, using immigration terminology of a supposedly egal-
itarian jus soli polity to designate the class-related alienation of native-born persons completely warps our 
understanding of the Hebrew concept of ger. “Non-national resident” comes closer but the words “nation” 
and “national”, when used to translate biblical concepts, are problematic, and should be understood as 
premodern references to the social “we”, rather than prefiguring the modern (ethno-cultural or civic) sense 
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relating to this transition below, in section 6.4, as we identify different meanings of the term ger, 
and different attitudes towards the “other” who wanted to become part of the “self” present in the 
Bible. In general, we see a double attitude. The editors of the Old Testament who had returned 
from the Exile in Babylon identified themselves with the gerîm. Yet, at the same time, they felt 
threatened by those who had not gone into Exile, the so-called “people of the land”, who, being 
labelled as “foreigners” living in Israelite space, were technically gerîm. The typical biblical attitude 
towards the ger is to propose laws that protect her rights, but do not offer legal, religious or politi-
cal means for these persons to emancipate themselves from the status of subordinate metics or 
second-class citizens and become fully integrated members of Israelite society, or the returnee rul-
ing class in Yehud. The only real means of political integration, after the canonical listing of a set of 
faithful client “tribes” by the monarchy, was to claim to be linked by blood to these tribes, and if 
that was put into question by one´s neighbours, one could only “re-establish” one´s political, cul-
tural and religious belonging through intermarriage.  
“The only way [resident aliens] were able to gain full status in that landed society was to somehow or 
other assimilate with the people of Israel. The process seems to have taken a number of generations in 
order to be complete. It was usually done through intermarriage, especially the marriage of gentile 
women with Israelite men. At least in the explicit norms of Scripture, intermarriage was only prohibited 
with the sons and daughters of the Canaanite nations” (Novak 2001, 223).  
After the Exile, when the mixing of populations became the inevitable reality in a world of trans-
national empires, a dominant group of returnees to the Persian province of Yehud, sought to block 
the access of the people they considered “foreign” to integration by the only available means, and 
preached divinely-mandated endogamy. We hear voices of protest against this group in biblical 
of “nation”. We thus resort to the seemingly tautological term “non-integrated resident”, mostly for lack of a 
better term. 
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texts considered “secondary”, such as Ruth and Jonah. Though, at the level of ideas, these voices 
were probably drowned by those of politicians, religious leaders and intellectuals supporting strong 
identity markers and “ethnic” purity, pragmatic solutions were found on the ground by legal schol-
ars who silently bridged the divide between the self and the other using clever legal hermeneutics. 
Post-exilic Judaism eventually developed a process of naturalisation-conversion (giyyûr) which al-
lowed “others” to become part of the Jewish “self”. The problem with giyyûr, when conceived as 
the only pathway to political integration (e.g. in the Hasmonean Kingdom, and to a great extent, in 
modern Israel), and especially when imposed via social pressure or public law on the immigrant, is 
that it assimilates the other into “national” religion and culture, and does not allow legitimate plu-
rality. Even so, and in spite of the antiquity of the practice, the canonical Bible does not mention 
giyyûr, indicating that the final editors of the Old Testament books (and possibly the community 
which established the canon of the Hebrew Bible) preferred to keep silent about the possibility of a 
systematic integration of outsiders within God´s people. 
A key to understanding why the Bible finds it so hard to shift from hospitality to kinship, to admit 
that integration has always happened in the history of Israel and to provide the legal, narrative and 
conceptual framework necessary to make this transition from stranger to kin a normal practice is 
Israel´s insistence on its distinctiveness. Let us therefore start to unravel the integration problem in 
the Bible by discussing this notion. 
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6.3 National Identity and the Distinctiveness of Israel 6.3.1 ISRAEL´S AWARENESS OF ITS DISTINCTIVENESS 
Tracing the understanding of ethnicity in the history of sociology in the US, Roger Waldinger ob-
serves that what the early scholars had in mind was the Hebrew notion of gôy, rendered in modern 
scientific jargon through derivatives of éthnos, following the Septuagint rendering of gôy (Walding-
er 2003, 21–2). The awareness (and polemic assertion) of distinctiveness of one´s people (ʿam) from 
among the nations of the world (gôyim) is indeed characteristic of the Hebrew Bible. Though, in ac-
tual fact (as far as can be discerned from history and archaeology), it is very hard and maybe im-
possible to determine a trait which clearly distinguishes pre-exilic Israel from the other peoples of 
the Near East (monotheism, aniconism, and other characters have been tried, but they did not exist 
in pure form at the time and were not exclusive to Yahweh religion in biblical Palestine), the Old 
Testament is written and edited in a way that seeks to convince the reader that such a distinctive-
ness is obvious and indubitable. The process of editing and canonizing of the Bible was “part […] of 
a wider struggle to articulate and propagate national-cultural identity during a period when such 
identity was threatened with major change and even extinction” (Machinist 2000, 426). As we shall 
see below, Israel´s awareness of its distinctiveness lead it to shape a national identity that is (a) an-
ti-autochthonous, (b) narratively-construed, (c) anamnestically-solidary (cf. 6.3.4), and (d) religious. 6.3.2 AN ANTI-AUTOCHTHONOUS IDENTITY 
Peter Machinist (2000, n. 22) lists 433 “distinctiveness” passages in the Old Testament. It became 
clear to the groups involved in the process which gave us the Hebrew Bible that it was futile to try 
to re-establish an independent Israelite or Judahite kingdom with clear territorial borders in a world 
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of multicultural and multi-religious grand empires. Thus, a normative-narrative text is produced 
which serves as an ideological boundary wall around the Palestinian clans that subscribed to the 
Yahweh-worship considered “orthodox” in Jerusalem in the post-exilic period. Machinist draws two 
important conclusions from his survey of “distinctiveness” passages in the Old Testament. Firstly, 
given their quantity and ubiquity, “distinctiveness […] seems to have been an established and not 
unpopular preoccupation in Israel well before the advent of the canonical organizers in the sixth 
century BCE” (ibid., 431); hence this concern about Israel´s uniqueness is not merely a post-exilic 
one, but one which has deep roots in the old literary and cultic traditions of Yahweh religion. Sec-
ondly, given that they focus mainly on the distinctiveness of the people of Israel (and of her God, 
who is the source of such uniqueness), it is presumed “that this people has a beginning within al-
ready known time: the Exodus from a long established Egypt” (ibid., 432, my emphasis).  
Let us start by examining the second conclusion concerning the “historical consciousness” of Israel; 
we deal with the first conclusion in the following section. A people which traces its origins outside 
of time (using “classical” cosmogonic narratives) cannot claim to be truly distinctive since it posits 
itself as co-originary and coextensive with the first human inhabitants of the earth (and their prog-
eny): cosmogony “totalizes” while history “particularizes”. From the point of view of Egyptian or 
Mesopotamian cosmogony, while “new” peoples may be created through separation from that 
origin, such peoples will be only dysfunctional peoples, barbarians, severed from the origin and 
from the order and harmony it provides: distinctiveness is tantamount to decay (Machinist 2000, 
434; Albertz 1994, 24f). The Bible does not directly dispute the idea that the ancient inhabitants of 
the earth may have been Egyptians (or Mesopotamians, or Canaanites) by creating a parallel cos-
mogony (in the classical sense); nor does it deny that Israel´s ancestors may indeed have been born 
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of such “ancestral peoples”; it simply claims that the Israelites were separated from their ethnic 
and cultural roots by Yahweh´s salvific action within history and constituted into a new people and 
that this separation and novelty was a “very good thing”. Biblical cosmogony also readily concedes 
(mostly for the sake of the argument) that while other peoples may have been created on their own 
land and have a prima facie title to the land they reside in (cf. Dt 32:8-9), Israel´s ancestors were 
removed by Yahweh from their ancestral lands, and then ordered to invade and take for them-
selves the land of other peoples. This means that the Israelites have no real “originary” title to the 
land (they have simply been stationed there as stewards by Yahweh) and can be removed (by Yah-
weh) at any moment. It also means that Israel, as a nation, can exist apart from the land.  
Indeed, Old Testament prophetic theologies concur that this precarious link to the land is what 
Yahweh uses to chastise and purify Israel when it tries to copy the decadent ways of its older and 
more powerful neighbours. Leviticus 25:23 insists that “the land is mine [Yahweh´s]; you [Israel] are 
non-nationals and residents (gērîm wetôšābîm) with me”. Clifford (1988) argues that even in the 
cosmogonic priestly creation narrative of Gn 1, when humankind is ordered to “fill the earth and 
subdue it” (1:28), the text is not intended to give humans license to exploit nature (as some anach-
ronistic modern interpreters would have it), but it is rather projecting backwards Israel´s “historic’ 
Exodus narrative: Israel needed to fill and conquer Canaan to have a land of its own (Nm 32:21f; 
1Chr 22:17-19; cf. Gn 10:1-11:9; Dt 32:8-9).  
In a way, the cosmogonic setting of Gn 1 universalizes this experience and hints that all peoples 
have been reconstituted in the course of history and have had to conquer the land they now claim 
as their own. After this creation narrative, the Bible presents a series of “cosmogonic myths” (inte-
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grated within a genealogy, and laid out as quasi-historical narratives – cf. Westermann (1984)): Ad-
am and Eve (the banished founders of the first family), Abel and Cain (the fugitive founder of the 
first city), Noah (the migrant and colonizer after the flood) and the Babel story (where peoples 
spread out from a dysfunctional and uninhabitable city to found all the known nations away from 
it). All these stories repeat the same theme that nobody was created on the land she is living in and 
so all are daughters and sons of migrants, and no nation has an absolute right to the land it is occu-
pying. Without resorting to a “classical cosmogony” in competition with that of “older” nations, the 
Bible subtly demolishes the claims of people who consider themselves autochthonous.  
Furthermore, as Machinist (1991, 432; 1994, 50ff) argues, Israel turns on its head the traditional 
claim made by the ancient empires (Egypt, Mesopotamia, China) that to be an “outsider” is to be a 
barbarian, member of an inferior people. Rather, for the Bible in its polemical rhetoric, to be a “na-
tive” (such as the oppressive Egyptians in the Exodus narrative, the Canaanites in the conquest nar-
ratives, and the Baylonians in the Exile narratives) is to be “contaminated”, while to be “separated” 
and constituted as a people on the outside is a “virtue”. Distinctiveness, in the biblical worldview, is 
not decay, but rather a call to excellence in worship, social justice and the use of political freedom, 
in a world dominated by “old”, idolatrous and oppressive nations. 
Political philosophy and universalist moral thought are not always comfortable with history and 
particularity, but ironically, consciousness of the latter two is essential to the development of the 
former disciplines. Israel´s distinctiveness lies in the historical consciousness that a nation´s pedi-
gree and claim to antiquity is no guarantee of its holiness, justice and respect towards the politi-
cally marginalised. Nations are not tasked to stay “civilized” as the gods made them in some golden 
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age beyond history; rather, every nation, given humankind´s history of sinfulness, has to struggle in 
history to become a “civilized” nation. This is not an easy process, as we shall see; even though Isra-
el construed its history as one of marginalised, oppressed and excluded “others”, it did not always 
treat the “others” in its midst as the Israelites wished to be treated while in exile, and as the Israel-
ite slaves of the Exodus narrative desired to be treated in Egypt. 6.3.3 A NARRATIVELY-CONSTRUED IDENTITY 
There is a distinction to be made between the consciousness of being “historical”, “non-originary”, 
“sons and daughters of wanderers” (which makes Israel “distinctive” insofar as other nations did 
not have such a consciousness, and insofar as Israel saw itself as “distinctive” for this reason), and 
the narrative which is used to convey this idea. Machinist´s first conclusion above, as the reader will 
recall, is that the ubiquity of the distinctiveness passages in the Bible suggests that the conscious-
ness was deeply rooted in Israelite society and not merely something that post-exilic authors could 
have invented ex nihilo. However, the narrative which is told to make sense of most biblical asser-
tions of Israelite distinctiveness — the Exodus-Wilderness-Conquest narrative — is not, in itself, a 
distinguishing feature, since other nations in the Mediterranean formed in the Late Bronze to Iron I 
transition seem to have told similar stories about their origins277, and is historically problematic. 
The history of pre-state Israel is told, in the Bible, as a three-part Exodus-Wilderness-Conquest nar-
rative. The “Exodus-Wilderness” part of the narrative, in its essence, is not too problematic from an 
archaeological and historical point of view: one can assume that small groups most probably did 
277 Moshe Weinfeld (1988a; 1988b; 1988c) has discovered similar reversals in the tales of the foundation of 
cities in the Greek and Roman world: city founders are often portrayed as descendants of a hero coming 
from the outside. 
                                                     
C h a p t e r :  6  — P a g e :  393 
 
migrate in and out of Egyptian-controlled areas, and in and out of Palestine, at the time, as has al-
ways happened throughout history of the Near East (Albertz 1994, 45). The “Conquest” part of the 
narrative, however, is much more problematic. In the past, three scenarios have been proposed 
concerning Israel´s presence in Palestine in the pre-state period: (a) conquest from outside (the 
narrative as presented in the Bible, and defended by W. F. Albright and his disciples); (b) infiltration 
of pastoral nomads (proposed by A. Alt and M. Noth, and by their disciples) and (c) indigenous 
revolution (proposed by G. Mendenhall, and in a modified version, by N. Gottwald). Today, most 
scholars reject (a), while considering (b) and (c) obsolete, at least as originally presented (Dever 
2003, 167). Scenario (c) retains some value since “it draws attention for the first time to the largely 
indigenous origins of the early Israelite peoples, which previous academics tended to resist but 
which virtually all scholars now accept”278 (Dever 2003, 74; cf. Killebrew 2005, 181 for a more nu-
278 According to the revolution scenario (more recently recast as a ruralisation scenario), many peasants, 
shepherds and poor labourers — given the hard economic times and weakened military might of the Pales-
tinian city states — “revolted against their aristocratic masters in the cities and built up an independent trib-
al and egalitarian society outside the feudal structure” (Albertz 1994, 71), possibly supported by groups of 
social outsiders and immigrants escaping other declining urban areas (e.g. convict forced labour camps in 
Egypt), or semi-nomads forced to settle permanently, given the decline in trade (cf. Machinist 1994, 35). The 
archaeological evidence seems to support at least the notion of a mostly indigenous origins of early Israel, 
given a decline in the population of the Syro-Palestinian cities during the late Bronze – Iron I transition, and 
the establishment of unfortified new settlements in the hill country and semi-arid regions, a development 
which became sustainable during Iron I, with the development of new agricultural technologies (e.g. terrac-
ing, impermeable cisterns, iron-tipped tools – cf. Stager (1985, 5ff)). The original conjecture of a violent revo-
lution (in Mendenhall and Gottwald), with its Marxist underpinnings, has been seriously disputed, but one 
could however imagine a gradual depopulation and exodus from the cities and their surrounding plains (in-
cluding groups of fugitive slaves and serfs), as suggested in the modified version of this thesis (proposed by 
C.H.J. de Geus, N.P. Lemche and L.E. Stager). The unfortified new settlements unearthed in recent decades 
by archaeologists indicate that their inhabitants did not fear being attacked by their old masters in the city 
states. Cf. Stager (1998, 128–142), Hackett (1998, 193ff). 
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anced but similar conclusion). Scenario (c) has given rise to the ruralisation scenario considered 
most plausible today by the leading scholars279.  
To be sure, this conclusion does not completely discount the “Exodus” part of the biblical narrative: 
claiming that Israel arose largely from indigenous peoples in Iron I Syro-Palestine, does not exclude 
the possibility that small groups of immigrants from the outside may have mingled with the families 
and clans who fled the cities and colonized the hill country of Palestine, and contributed their own 
inspirational family and clan narratives to the bigger “urban” group. 
The distinctiveness question, nonetheless, is not completely settled if we accept that the pre-state 
Israelites were mostly descended from Syro-Palestinian indigenous people. Was there an Israelite 
“tribe” or “people” or “tribal amphyctyony”, distinct from other populations in the hill country of 
Palestine, before the establishment of a monarchy which called itself and its faithful client tribes 
“Israelite”? Diana Edelman claims that, “given the present state of textual and artefactual evi-
dence, nothing definitive can be said about the ethnicity of premonarchic Israel” (Edelman 2002, 25; 
my emphasis). As regards textual (historical) evidence, there are two main sources available to his-
torians, at present: the Bible (in particular Jo and Jgs) and the Mernaptah Stele; Jo and Jgs were 
written many centuries after the events and are seen today as anachronistic and idealized recon-
structions of a period mostly unknown to the authors, while the Mernaptah Stele gives us little reli-
able information and some scholars even doubt whether it speaks of Israel or Jezreel (ibid., 36).  
279 The scenario of a total conquest (Jo 11:23) is contradicted by the Bible itself (Jo 13:1), and the assumption 
that most of the indigenous peoples were eliminated through the ban and disappeared is also contradicted 
in the Bible (Jo 11:13 claims that only Hazor was utterly destroyed) - (cf. Coogan 2010, 205f). Regarding the 
other scenarios cf. Coogan (2010, 224), Stager (1998, 128–142), Hackett (1998, 193ff). 
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As regards the artefactual (archaeological) evidence, the classical methodology, which supposedly 
identifies the presence of “Israelites” — as a population group clearly distinct from other groups in 
Iron I Syro-Palestine — on the basis of some artefact, which is visibly distinct from contemporary 
artefacts in other areas in the Near East, is extremely suspect (cf. Skjeggestad 1992; Edelman 2002; 
Whitelam 1989). To make such comparisons in archaeology, one needs to know the boundaries of 
pre-state Israel (so as to compare the artefacts from that area with those from adjacent areas of 
Syro-Palestine); boundary demarcations are however socio-political (they require some form of 
ethnic or national self-consciousness) and can be only derived reliably from contemporary textual 
sources, which, as we said above, are lacking or inconclusive280. The “collared rim jar”, the “pillared 
four-room house”, the “circular enclosure of an open-space by peripheral buildings”, the “absence 
of pork bones”, the “absence of divine representations”, “traces of past nomadism”, and distinctive 
“burial practices” have all been proposed as archaeological markers of pre-state Israelite identity, 
but they can all be dismissed, since they might just as well represent differences in social status, 
regionalization of the same culture, adaptation to the local environment and different patterns of 
transmission of ideas and materials via trade routes (cf. Skjeggestad 1992; Edelman 2002).  
The conclusion is that, though there might have been, in Palestine before the monarchy, a group of 
people clearly distinct from others (or who thought of itself as clearly distinct), and who is cotermi-
280 For this reason, some contemporary archaeologists try to cleverly avoid the problem of ethnicity and the 
claim of the existence of an “Israelite” population group in the Iron I Near East distinct from its neighbours; 
Israel Finkelstein, for instance, uses a retro-projection of identity to define pre-monarchic “Israelites” in eth-
nic terms: “An Israelite during the Iron I period was one whose descendants described themselves as Israel-
ites. They were the people who resided in the territorial framework of the early Monarchy before the expan-
sion began. Thus even a person who may have considered himself a Hivite, Gibeonite, Kenizzite, etc., in the 
early 12th century, but whose descendants in the same village a few generations later thought of themselves 
as Israelites will, in like manner, also be considered here as an Israelite” (Finkelstein 1988, 28). 
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nous with pre-state Israel referred to in the Bible, we have no reliable historical or archaeological 
evidence of that today; the Bible (which quite consistently offers an outsider narrative to highlight 
this), and the Mesha Stele (which seems to indicate that the Israelites were just another autoch-
thonous Near Eastern tribe (cf. Machinist 1994, 47–48)), were written by people with strong politi-
cal agendas many centuries after the events on the basis of few or no primary sources. Though pos-
sibly not “totally” historically construed, the distinctiveness of Israel owes much to a desire of some 
intellectuals in the late monarchic period (and after the exile) of presenting Israel´s history as clear-
ly distinctive, as that of a people who has a clear beginning in history, and to claim for all the peo-
ples integrated into the “Israelite” identity during the monarchy the stories of the Exodus group, 
and of the wandering patriarchs (Nestor 2010, 208–215).  6.3.4 AN ANAMNESTICALLY SOLIDARY IDENTITY 
6.3.4.1 Wandering and Migration as Markers of National Identity 
Walter Benjamin (1969, 253ff), developing a term coined by Christian Lenhardt (1975), uses the 
term “anamnestic solidarity” to speak of the debt owed by a “liberated” generation (one which 
finds itself living in a reasonably just political society) to its oppressed and marginalised ancestors 
(Pensky 2013, forthcoming). Keeping fresh the memory of the suffering experienced by past gener-
ations (anamnesis), and seeking thus to maintain the contact between generations (solidarity), 
does not erase from history the weight of genocide, slavery, or even less dramatic forms of oppres-
sion and marginalisation, but is necessary in the present to prevent complacency about justice (and 
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the perception that it is something cheaply obtained), and also necessary for the future to prevent 
vanquished forms of oppression from resurfacing281.  
Two things should be noted at this point. Firstly, we do not have to be related through blood line-
age282 to the actual people who suffered to be able to be anamnestically solidary with them. We 
can see ourselves as the political, spiritual or cultural progeny of the exploited and impoverished 
French peasants who revolted in 1789, of the Jews who were led to the gas chambers in Nazi Ger-
many, or of Martin Luther King. Secondly, as we have seen, anamnestic solidarity can be placed at 
the service of social inclusion and hospitality (to promote justice in the present and spare others 
the evils suffered by one´s “ancestors”), but it can also be used to justify isolationism and/or hostil-
ity. The memory of the suffering of one´s forebears can be used to separate oneself from certain 
persons in the present who have different “ancestors”: people who are to be seen as “different” 
(since their ancestors “did not suffer like ours”), or even people who should be treated as “differ-
ent” (as inferior, or as legitimate targets of hatred, since their ancestors were “those who made 
ours suffer”). This distancing from the other may at times be warranted (e.g. to protect one´s group 
from someone who is truly dangerous) but at other times may be simply an expression of xenopho-
bia and/or a form of scapegoating.  
281 William O´Neill has, in recent years, reflected on the relevance of the notion of “anamnestic solidarity” in 
biblical approaches to the ethics of immigration, but has not developed his reflection at length (cf. O´Neill 
2009a; 2009b, 229). Walter Benjamin´s ideas and the Frankfurt School´s debate on memory of oppression as 
a possible central methodological principle in historiography (starting with Horkheimer in the late 1930, and 
continuing today in the writings of Habermas and his followers) was introduced into theology by Johann 
Baptist Metz using the notion of “dangerous memories” and the memoria passionis (cf. Metz 2007). 
282 The Bible builds kinship between biologically unrelated groups through the construction of mythical ge-
nealogies (cf. section 5.5.3.3 below). We discuss civic kinship ties at length in chapter 6. 
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The notion of anamnestic solidarity helps us to understand a central feature of Israelite identity. As 
regards the first point noted above, Israel´s solidarity with the “Exodus group” does not primarily 
pass through blood. The historical evidence explored in the previous sections clearly indicates a 
situation where persons mostly derived from groups of “natives” engage in an exercise of histori-
ography (mainly in the late Judahite monarchy and in the early years of the Judean Province of Per-
sia, Yehud Medinata) wherein a generation (which deems itself “liberated”) adopts the memory 
of a minority group of immigrants. We do not know where the Exodus-Wilderness stories come 
from, but they are not complete fictions: true stories of oppression and liberation abound in the 
history of humankind, and Israel´s link to the oppressed persons in the stories is pervasive in the 
biblical text283. We do no not know if they speak of the blood ancestors of the generations which 
produced the canonical text of the Bible, but certainly these generations somehow felt anamnesti-
cally solidary with the people in those stories.  
As regards the second point, concerning the inclusive/hospitable or isolationist/hostile uses of an-
amnestic solidarity, we need to ask why Israel adopts this memory (given the lack of historical war-
rant for the adoption of the Exodus-Wilderness-Conquest narrative by the whole of Israel). As we 
shall see, the isolationist/hostile element is clearly present: Israel seeks to distinguish itself from 
rival “natives” (which, it seems, the Israelites seek to dominate or exclude, in neighbouring areas of 
Palestine). Firmly established in the land, the so-called “outsiders” behave as natives claiming to be 
283 Bible scholars like Peter Machinist (1994), however, argue that this idea of migrant origins must have had 
deep roots in Israel´s history, given that (with very few exceptions) the many biblical texts tracing the origins 
of Israel agree that the “Israelites” had entered Palestine as outsiders (Machinist actually lists and categoriz-
es all the texts). The only three texts with a seemingly dissonant narrative can be explained as polemical 
provocations (Ez 16:3.45) or truncated versions of the “orthodox” narrative/genealogy (Dt 32:10-14; 1 Chr 1-
9). 
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the sole rightful owners of the land, and treat other “natives”, as well later newcomers, as “outsid-
ers”. By itself, an “outsider” national narrative does not exorcise the tendency of the oppressed to 
become oppressors (in the past, many European royal families, in fact, adopted outsider narratives 
to separate themselves from the plebs and rationalize institutionalized oppression). Thus, calling 
someone a “Canaanite” in the Bible is often not an indication of ethnic origin, but a way of telling 
the person: “you are different, and I am justified in wanting to mistreat you or even destroy you”. 
Yet, the inclusive/hospitable element is also present, and there are many voices in the Bible which 
constantly remind Israel: “You shall not oppress a resident alien; you know the heart of an alien, 
for you were aliens in the land of Egypt” (Ex 23:9; cf. Ex 22:21). 
6.3.4.2 Different Voices, Complex Stances, One Narrative of the People´s Origin 
The different voices and groups which contributed to the text all adopt the same narrative of the 
people´s origin; they tell the same story of Exodus, Wilderness and Conquest, but often for differ-
ent reasons. One may be tempted to associate the isolationist/hostile voices too quickly with xen-
ophobic tendencies clearly present in the Bible as in our societies today, but we have to be careful 
not to stereotype the complex stances in the Bible too quickly. Two things are assumed in the Exo-
dus-Wilderness-Conquest master narrative that becomes the standard way of retelling Israel´s past, 
starting with the Josianic (Deuteronomist) Reform Movement, but consolidating itself during and 
after the Exile. As Machinist (1994, 49) claims, the first assumption is that “the land that the Bible 
understands as home has to become Israel” and this partly explains why there is a “sharp differenti-
ation between Israel and other inhabitants of the land, whether understood as autochthonous or 
also as outsiders. […] Contamination, thus, is a basic fear, perhaps most pervasive in, but by no 
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means exclusive to, the Deuteronomic corpus” (my emphases). In other words, there is a transfor-
mation going on, and the isolationist/hostile voices are afraid it might be hijacked by “outsiders” or 
people who sympathise with the “outsiders”; this fear leads to an “us” against “them” mentality. 
We should note two things about this first assumption. Firstly, the “outsiders” who are most feared 
are powerful and hostile nations outside the boundaries of Josiah´s Kingdom or Persian Yehud, 
not primarily the non-integrated residents (gerîm) living inside Israel´s boundaries, but the distinc-
tion is hard to keep in politics and popular movements, and the contamination language and the 
weakness of the gerîm makes them easy and obvious targets. Secondly, the transformation sought 
by the Deuteronomist reformers was not some racial apartheid or ethnic cleansing, but a number 
of socio-political reforms seeking to render Israel more holy and more just than its neighbours.  
According to the reformers, the Israelite monarchy had copied the oppressive ways of neighbouring 
regimes. It allowed its protégés to accumulate large landholdings at the expense of poor farmers, 
who were further burdened with crushing taxes to support the central government and military, 
and with unpaid infrastructural labour drafts, e.g. for the upkeep of roads and fortifications (cf. Al-
bertz 1994, 110–114). The monarchy came to believe that there was no other way to develop a 
modern economy and protect oneself against foreign aggression than to adopt those oppressive 
social structures that all neighbouring nations — peoples who did not believe in Yahweh, a God 
who fights for the poor and the underdogs — deemed necessary. In contrast, the reformers be-
lieved there were less oppressive ways of building a stabile polity — especially when one trusts in 
Yahweh´s protection and when one fears the righteous anger of a God who loathes oppression 
more than the expansionist schemes of the hostile nations — and part of the purification they 
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sought was a purification from the imperialist and militarist ideas brought in by the outsiders, ra-
ther than from the outsiders themselves. It was hoped that this purification process would create a 
model political regime cleansed from oppression, and with a good dose of optimism, one could as-
sume that when such a regime would be in place, it would actually be very beneficial to the gerîm. 
The fact that, in the master narrative adopted by the Deuteronomic and Deuteronomistic reform-
ers, Israel´s ancestors are identified as being a group of oppressed gerîm living in Egypt, and that 
Yahweh is presented in the Bible as an “outsider God” who intervenes personally on behalf of the 
downtrodden and marginalised, cannot be ignored when dealing with the ger. In this ideal scheme, 
being isolationist/hostile towards the oppressive ideas of the powerful “others” should allow a new 
Israel to be inclusive/hospitable towards the powerless “others”. 
The second assumption, actually a corollary of this first assumption, is that “the community of Israel 
can exist apart from the land, as its experience in Egypt and the Wilderness demonstrates” (Ma-
chinist 1994, 49). We discuss in the following section (6.3.5.4). 6.3.5 A RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
6.3.5.1 A “Nation of Strangers”, Worshipers of a “Stranger” God   
We have just noted that the Exodus-Wilderness-Conquest narrative not only construes Israel’s an-
cestors as oppressed gerîm in Egypt, which one should revere through anamnestic solidarity, but 
also presents their God as a ger to be adored with full awareness of God´s strangeness and other-
ness. Indeed, if Israel and the first Christians considered themselves “nations of strangers” (cf. 
Feldmeier 2002) — an expression which reads like an oxymoron, and which a Nietzschian commen-
tator would treat with contempt as the transvaluation of the “natural” values of ethnic and national 
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belonging — the ultimate basis for this conception of the self as “permanent” outsiders is not so 
much historical as it is theological (and Christological, in the case of the first Christians). For in-
stance, an instructive, yet problematic, text in the Holiness Code, Lv 25:23, argues in favour of not 
selling land in perpetuity, which also implies not allowing the gerîm to integrate themselves fully 
into the people by acquiring land permanently. In the text, YHWH justified this command thusly: 
“the land is mine; for you are strangers and sojourners with me”. The biblical God hence presents 
himself as a temporary resident, a ger, who is also a native (having an ancestral title to the land). 
To the critical reader, this sounds quite cynical and Orwellian: the big boss is a proletarian, the small 
bosses are proletarians, everyone is equal, but some are “more equal than others” and have a right 
to control the means of agricultural production, unlike the others. Some “gerîm” are Israelite and 
have irrevocable ancestral titles to the land, others are non-Israelites and will forever be considered 
as non-nationals and migrant labourers (unless they suddenly get rich and buy property in the city, 
as we shall see below). 
How can we make better sense of paradoxical texts like this? Historians believe that there is good 
historical warrant for this depiction of Yahweh as a stranger. Various texts in the Old Testament 
tradition, as well as some ancient Egyptian lists, suggest that “the god Yahweh was connected with 
a mountain in the desert region of southern Palestine, even if there are only vague ideas in the Old 
Testament about its precise location. The God whom the Exodus group got to know through Moses 
thus comes from an area which was not part of the territory of later Israel” (Albertz 1994, 51). Ac-
cording to Albertz, the Exodus group (the members of which probably adored various tribal gods 
and gods incorporated in the Egyptian pantheon), under the leadership of Moses, recognised the 
God who liberated them to be precisely a Midianite (Kenite) god whom Moses had come to know in 
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his fugitive years through his Midianite wife's family (Ex 2:15f; 3:1; 18:1f). “In view of the markedly 
hostile relations with the Midianites at a later date, this account cannot have been invented and 
may therefore be regarded as historical” (ibid.).  
The Exodus group’s experience of Yahweh, as presented in the Bible, is nonetheless not one of a 
shrine deity or an ethnic god of a semi-nomadic group (as the Midianites related to their mountain 
god), but as the liberator-God of a group of “wanderers”. The Exodus group ended up living far 
away from the mountain of God; they wanted a God who could get down from God´s mountain, 
travel with them and establish himself on other mountains to the north of Midian, thus remaining 
accessible to his “new” people284. Thus, according to the Bible, the Israelites “despoiled” the Midi-
anites of their settler god (as they had “despoiled” the Egyptians of their wealth) since Yahweh re-
veals himself as a migrant God bent on joining them in their quest. The Bible obscures the origin of 
Yahweh worship and the location of his “original” mountain; it assumes that there is no point look-
ing for Yahweh there anymore.  
How can we make sense of a story in which a group of people find their God in a strange land, and a 
God finds his “real” people in a group of wandering strangers? Authors such as Albertz, who clearly 
believe that the Exodus narrative does have a historical basis, argue that Yahweh worship was not 
very widespread in Bronze Age Egypt and hence Yahweh had not been incorporated into the Egyp-
tian pantheon and co-opted by state ideology; this was surely important for the Exodus group since 
284 For a discussion of the religious, social and political functions of “cosmic” mountains in ancient Syro-
Palestine (i.e. divinely-inhabited mountains conceived as spaces which bring together heaven and earth, and 
for this reason, have an important role in the government and stability of the universe), see Clifford (1972). 
For an interesting reflection on the shift of Yahweh´s dwelling place from Sinai to Zion, and the central role 
that this transfer played in shaping Old Testament Theology, see Levenson (1987). 
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Yahweh could then easily be identified as the politically subversive God they came to know through 
the experience of their liberation (Albertz 1994, 52). However, for them this was a stranger-God 
(non-Egyptian), who becomes the God of a stranger-people (marginalised metic residents of Egypt, 
now wandering in the Middle East); his “official” or “original” residence was in the territory of a 
stranger people (and later an inimical group, the Midianties) and his “original” cult is a strange cult 
(unknown and irrelevant to the Exodus group and to the later Israelites who identified themselves 
with this group), the tangible elements of which (shrines, images) are out of reach. Yahweh-worship 
is thus soon recast as the worship of a God who does not let himself easily be fixed by images or 
confined by a residence, who can give up his mountain residence (as Abraham and Moses left their 
family home) and face the precariousness of life as a sojourner. The only relevant feature of the 
original Yahweh worship that seems to be kept in the Israelite religion is the mere fact that this God 
“originated elsewhere” and once inhabited a mountain in a strange land285. Interestingly, this expe-
rience of walking and wandering with Yahweh (before God was enthroned on Mount Zion, trans-
formed into the distant and monarchic God of a settled and hierarchical people, and “confined” to 
the Holy of Holies) is what affords Israel a personal relationship with God which is the source of Is-
rael´s peoplehood286. 
285 While scholars today situate Yahweh's mountain not in the present Sinai peninsula, but in the Gulf of Aq-
aba or east of the ʿArabah (Albertz 1994, 54; Coogan 2010, 114), the older texts in the OT use the Sinai as a 
vague geographical reference, and more recent Deuteronomical additions render this reference more ob-
scure by using the geographically untraceable name “Horeb”. 
286 “The other religions of the Near East know such a personal relation to a god only in the case of small 
groups and individuals (“personal god”, “guardian deity”). The personal bond between a god and a larger 
group is a peculiarity of Israelite religion. By contrast, the Babylonian gods, for example, are related to par-
ticular cities or to the land of Sumer and Akkad. There is no word in Akkadian for “people”; rather, nišū 
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As presented in the Bible, Israel´s national consciousness and identity thus emerge from this rela-
tionship with God (which expresses itself in laws, traditions and narratives — the “Torah” or “Book” 
— and founds a political society) rather than from the land. However, Yahweh´s personal relation-
ship to Israel means that God needed to settle down with God´s people as they became (or became 
integrated in) a sedentary agrarian society, and as he came to be adopted as the central divinity of 
the peoples living in the hill country of Palestine. “Yahweh very probably got into the position of the 
ʾādōn, the Lord of the land, like Baal or El before and alongside him. As such, he was of course also 
‘responsible’ for its fertility” (Albertz 1994, 89–90). In the early period, according to this reconstruc-
tion, Yahweh´s area of competence was simply extended to the agrarian world, with its festivals 
and cultic rituals. Later, however, Israel was tempted to turn Yahweh into another fertility god 
competing for attention with (or manifesting himself as yet another mask for) the gods of the land. 
Israel’s relationship to God grounded in historical experience of liberation of a group whose story 
had been adopted by the unified “Israelite” people under the monarchy had been forgotten, a de-
velopment which prophets like Hosea attacked as apostasy in the direction of the cult of Baal.  
After reflecting on the history of the Israelite religion we can go back to Lv 25:23 and better appre-
ciate this paradoxical or oxymoronic justification of ancestral titles to land which invokes a god who 
is at once a temporary resident and a native with an ancestral title to the land. On the one hand, 
the cultic idea that national gods such as Yahweh are the real owners of the land is widespread in 
the ancient Near East; the god El, who was gradually syncretized with Yahweh, was probably con-
means the “population of the land”, which could change in the course of history without any far-reaching 
change in the divine world” (Albertz 1994, 62–63). 
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sidered as the owner of the land in ancient times (Albertz 1994, 79). On the other hand, the biblical 
idea that YHWH is a temporary resident or a stranger in the land of El and Baal is the result of the 
Exodus-Wilderness-Conquest narrative. The biblical YHWH is presented as both a native and a ger, 
as the biblical authors fused both ideas together in the name of social justice. The purpose of this 
“both / and” is to argue that poor Israelite farmers who had lost their lands due to pauperization 
and usurious loans — thus becoming serfs on their former land or migrant gerîm in some other part 
of Israel — should be given their land back by those who cunningly profited from the situation to 
accumulate huge holdings. The claims of current landholders are refuted twice: first, the land is of 
YHWH the ancestral landholder and humans are merely stewards or squatters (and YHWH may re-
distribute it as he pleases); second, ownership is temporary and should be willingly relinquished 
(since if even YHWH is a ger in YHWH´s land, then all God´s people are likewise gerîm and should be 
willing to pack their belongings and move out). This, in theory, should make it possible for the im-
poverished and dispossessed farmers to reclaim their ancestral property during jubilee years, after 
having been forced into usurious loans and having lost their land.  
Historically, all this points to a desired land reform proposed before the Exile, or a way of reorganiz-
ing landholdings after the Exile, which offers a way to give agricultural property to landless Israel-
ites. However, if taken literally and understood anachronistically to confirm some hypothetical 
“fair” system of land distribution going back to the pre-state period, it does sound like an Orwellian 
slap in the face of the poor gerîm who technically, following this logic, could not integrate them-
selves through permanent acquisition of agricultural property. Of course, as we shall see, there is a 
real problem in the Bible concerning the integration of the gerîm — and especially of non-Israelite 
gerîm — and this text, which uses imaginary autochthonous claims on land to advocate for the 
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landless, is an example of how Old Testament biblical authors seriously committed to social justice 
issues struggle to think of ways to effectively integrate the gerîm and to let the Exodus-Wilderness-
Conquest narrative truly help them think (and not only speak) outside of the box of the sedentary 
peoples of the Near East.  
6.3.5.2 Religious Reform, Xenophobia and National Identity 
The above discussion shows us two things. On the one hand, in the utopian mode287, religious tra-
ditions and ideas can help make political societies more just and less oppressive by critiquing the 
status quo. To be sure, Lv 25:23 may not have much purchase in national parliaments today (and 
similarly, it wasn´t taken too seriously by the authorities in Persian Yehud), and its proposed system 
of land reform would be a logistic nightmare, but the insistence that something had to be done 
about the widening inequalities and the pauperization of farming families in Israel at the time was 
something that those in power needed to hear. On the other hand, in the ideological mode, reli-
gious traditions and ideas, especially when read literally and used out of context, could be used to 
rationalize structural injustice implicit in the status quo and further marginalise powerless per-
sons on the basis of religious difference. Lv 25:23 could thus come to mean that if you can´t trace 
your ancestral lands back to the mythical “time of the Conquest”, then you have no right to acquire 
land permanently and leave a lasting inheritance to your descendants: your progeny is doomed to 
perpetual landlessness and to be gerîm forever. When infused with religious language, the utopian 
call for change can become incendiary, and the ideological defence of the current system can be-
287 I am following here the distinction between utopia and ideology proposed by Paul Ricoeur (1988). 
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come despotic; the violence related with religious zealotry and with the ambiguous use of religious 
traditions has led to a call to secularize politics, especially in modern times. 
Using religion as a defining feature of a polity´s identity, for us in the 21st century, is clearly prob-
lematic, even though there are many examples of modern polities which are technically confession-
al, or whose visible symbols of identity (e.g. the British Monarchy) are coloured with strong links to 
religious institutions. Of course, we cannot expect biblical Israel to construe its identity as modern 
polities do, seeking to be practically secular (i.e. neutral as regards to religion) or at least tolerant of 
legitimate religious diversity, and also committed to promoting religious liberty. Yet the problems 
relating to religious freedom emerge very clearly in Israel´s history, and, it is important to catch a 
glimpse of this in the Bible.  
Ironically, the very “zealot” insistence on having one´s relationship with YHWH as a defining feature 
of Israel´s identity is what makes the apologetics of religious freedom surface in exilic Israel as in 
pre-Constantinian Christianity. Let us start, in this section, with the political use of religious identity 
in the late monarchy and its xenophobic bent; we will come back to religious freedom in the follow-
ing section. A key figure in the rise of an exclusivist Israelite national identity is King Hezekiah of Ju-
dah (who reigned from ca. 715 to 686 BCE), who witnessed the destruction of the Northern King-
dom by the Assyrians and played dangerous political games to maintain Judahite independence 
(courting Egypt, accepting Assyrian vassalage and then reneging on the treaty). Hezekiah initiated a 
cultural and religious reform which sought to homogenize Israel and close its ranks in the face of 
the Assyrian threat, especially given the Assyrian policies of mass deportation and ethno-cultural 
hybridization.  
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Rainer Albertz, who considers the Book of the Covenant (Ex 20:23-23:19) as the basis of the Heze-
kianic reform, argues that one key element of the reform is a suspension of toleration and religious 
pluralism: the text “threatens anyone who worships another God than Yahweh with the ban, i.e. 
with death and the confiscation of his property [Ex 22:20, Christian numbering288], and prohibits 
even the mention of the names of other gods in the Yahweh cult [Ex 23:13b. …] The overall aim of 
the religious and cultic reform is clear: it is to relate Israel as a cultic community clearly to Yahweh 
and to mark it out from the surrounding world [cf. Ex 22:31: ‘you are holy men to me’]” (Albertz 
1994, 184). As we shall see, the reform also sought to protect the rights of the gerîm, but this term 
probably designated people who were predominantly Israelite refugees from the conquered North-
ern Kingdom (in Ex 22:21 and 23:9, the suffering of the Exodus group in Egypt is possibly being used 
to elicit sympathy towards these refugees fleeing Assyrian oppression). 
For reasons disputed today by historians (cf. Grabbe 2003), Sennacherib appeared in Palestine in 
701 BCE, occupied huge tracts of Judah and imposed his cultural and demographic hybridization 
policies. In reaction to this, the reform movement developed a “purist” form of Yahweh worship 
(with high levels of aniconism and iconoclasm, hitherto unknown in Palestine), which tried to force 
the Israelites in the occupied provinces to refuse the syncretism promoted by the Assyrians. Yet the 
royal house soon grew weary of this political contest of attrition. Manasseh (and his successor 
Amon), unlike Hezekiah, decided not to take any further risks and to respect the vassalage treaty 
with the Assyrians. They therefore had to put an end to the reform (or shift it “underground”). The 
royal family soon had to find ways of accommodating some public expressions of Assyrian cult in 
288 Given the discrepancy between the Hebrew and Christian numbering of Ex 22, we shall assume Christian 
numbering throughout this chapter. 
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Jerusalem while privately seeking to maintain the exclusiveness of Yahweh worship demanded by 
the reformers. Under Assyrian occupation in the north, and vassalage in the south, “the internal 
religious pluralism in the late monarchy developed into a regular syncretism which far surpassed 
the diplomatic syncretism that had arisen of necessity at an official level” (Albertz 1994, 194–5), 
and this syncretism is the target of Zephaniah´s polemic. 
After the assassination of Amon, which conveniently placed the eight-year-old child Josiah on the 
throne (c. 641-609 BCE), the reform movement emerged once again in what is known as the “Josi-
anic” or “Deuteronomic” reform movement (which continues during the Exile and beyond as the 
“Deuteronomistic” reform movement). Emboldened by the gradual collapse of the Assyrian Empire 
and the newfound independence of Egypt, the reformers supported military sorties outside the 
borders of Judah-Benjamin to destroy iconic shrines in the former Northern Kingdom which they 
deemed “unorthodox” (cf. 2 Kings 23:15-20), and centralized the public Yahweh cult in Jerusalem. 
However, this was not enough. Aware of the risks of syncretism both in the countryside and in the 
city due to foreign cultural influences, the reform of the cult sought to stamp out religious diversity 
and pluralism even at the level of religious traditions and cultic usages at the family level; this pos-
sible avenue for syncretism had to be closed.  
The Josianic cultic reform was a great success; historians note that it created an unprecedented 
form of national and religious identity — “Jewishness” — deeply rooted in practices at the family 
level, that survived two and a half millennia of political events under a variety of rulers and political 
regimes, some of whom tried to violently convert Jews to some other religion and/or assimilate 
them into some other culture, and some of whom (especially the Hasmoneans) tried to forcibly 
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convert and assimilate other nations into Jewishness. The reform, however, contained a social ele-
ment (visible in the laws concerning the gerîm in Dt), which historians believe failed to material-
ize289.  
It is in this historical context that we have to place most of the biblical passages concerning the 
stranger. As we shall see, the Deuteronomic polemic against syncretism is picked up by a xenopho-
bic party after the exile, at the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, which seems to use a particular reading 
of the reformists´ texts to block the social mobility of persons in the Persian Yehud who were not of 
Golah290 extraction, labelling them as “contaminated”. Historians (e.g. Albertz 1994, 232ff; H. V. 
Bennett 2002) believe that the reform did not manage to promote better integration and political 
participation of landless migrant labourers, and to enshrine this in the Law (but simply regards the 
gerîm as a permanent underclass to be cared for charitably, but not emancipated). For this reason, 
the post-exilic political élites found little in the law which could counterbalance or put into question 
Ezra´s claim that the Bible banned intermarriages with the “people of the land” (mainly composed 
of the lower classes who were not sent into exile), which conveniently kept these people out of the 
spheres of power291. The Deuteronomist reformers’ attitude towards the other is central to under-
standing the complex biblical attitude towards the “other”, often construed anachronistically and 
pejoratively as a “Canaanite” (cf. Albertz 1994, 209). “Canaanite”, in the Bible, is often a code-word 
289 “Nothing had come of the renewal of Judah as a society and state which had been intended, and the re-
form was completely abandoned under Jehoiakim” (Albertz 1994, 203). During and after the exile, in fact, 
the cultic reform continued to solidify, while the social divide grew. 
290 I used the term “Golah”, in general, to refer to Jewish diaspora communities, and treat it as an adopted 
word in English. The more accurate transliteration is gôlāh. 
291 We discuss this below, in section 6.5.2. 
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designating people who blocked the Hezekianic reform and who threatened to put an end to the 
Josianic reform and its successor movements, people who supported or consented to the cultural 
hybridization policies of the Assyrians, or deportees from other parts of the Assyrian empire 
brought in to dampen Israelite nationalism (this mostly happened in the North, but Sennacherib 
may have tried it in some Judahite province in his campaign in 701 BCE292).  
Interestingly, however, the voice of hostility against the “Canaanite-Assyrian fifth column” is not 
the only voice in the Bible, and as the Babylonian empire takes shape, some of the reformists sepa-
rate themselves from the nationalist élites, and realize that the reform can be completed even un-
der foreign rule, and possibly better than under the nationalists: Israel could paradoxically become 
more faithful to YHWH under rulers who did not worship YHWH. One example can be found in Jer-
emiah´s letter to the Judahites deported to Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar in 597, where, for the first 
time, a few years before the “definitive” exile, it is suggested that Yahweh can bring salvation to 
Israel even when in foreign lands far away, and that this salvation also reaches beyond Israel to in-
clude the hostile pagan environment (Jer 29:7; cf. Albertz 1994, 238). The deportees are thus or-
dered to “seek the welfare” of Babylon.  
6.3.5.3 From Zealotry to Religious Tolerance 
In a way, these examples highlight two of the most important theological consequences of the suc-
cessful cultic reform achieved by the Josianic reform and the election theology it promoted. On the 
one hand, religious cult is “personalized” (though perhaps not in the strongest modern sense of 
292 The Babylonians did not continue this policy, and the Persians reversed it, and promoted cultural and reli-
gious pluralism, believing that this was more conducive to fidelity by their vassals and to stability in the Em-
pire (Albertz 1994, 444). 
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the word), and this eventually gives rise to the notion of conscience and to the idea of a right to re-
ligious liberty. If it is true that the Hezekianic and Josianic reforms try to create unity by obliterating 
religious pluralism, at the same time, they start to shift religion to an inner world (not yet the sub-
jective “conscience” as understood in modernity, but a world of family and indoor “private” prac-
tices) that becomes impossible to eradicate by political oppression (excluding genocide, of course). 
Religion, after these reforms (and especially after all world religions had come in contact with Chris-
tianity, which is a major offshoot of these reforms), comes to be understood as a personal relation-
ship of a group with God. This relationship cannot simply be betrayed when moving to a new city 
or being conquered by a new ruler, even when these cities or rulers require loyalty and allegiance 
to their patron gods.  
Ironically, then, the process set in motion by zealous reformers transforms the very essence of reli-
gion, and creates a stronger basis for the religious toleration that the Hezekianic and Josianic re-
forms set out to eradicate in the first place. During the Exile, and after the Exile under Persian, Se-
leucid and Roman rule, the Jews demanded a total form of religious freedom in ways that other 
conquered nations never dared to ask of their foreign rulers before: they resisted the imposition of 
imperial cults and the introduction of foreign gods. The Maccabee revolt was a fight for religious 
freedom, which however engendered a new regime — the Hasmoneans — who had little respect 
for the religious freedom of others. Similarly, persecuted Christians before the Edict of Milan wrote 
impressive texts in favour of religious liberty, but when Christendom was established, those texts 
were quickly forgotten. After being confronted by Modernity on their opportunistic use of the no-
tions of freedom of conscience and toleration, most Christians and Jews today agree that a state 
which is secular (at least in the sense of not imposing a “national” religion) has become a must in 
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modern polities for very reason of protecting that religious freedom that the zealotic Hezekianic 
and Josianic reformers had unwittingly revealed to be an inalienable right. 
On the other hand, YHWH is, in a way, “universalized”. If Yahweh is the one true God (and all other 
divinities are simply human creations, “carvings”), Yahweh is therefore the God of all peoples. The 
one God who acts through history must be acting among foreign nations as well, and even through 
foreign rulers like Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus. This is why all peoples can pray in the Temple, and 
have a right to be heard by YHWH without adopting Jewish identity markers293. Ironically, the Deu-
teronomic reform, therefore, in nationalizing Yahwism and stamping out religious pluralism, ended 
up at the same time universalizing Yahwism, and making the very notion of a national God unac-
ceptable (if God is God, then God must be the God of all peoples).  Since the time of that reform, 
Judaism has been trying to understand better what the “election” actually consists in, how it relates 
to the promise of the “land” (which we shall discuss in the next section), and how to interpret the 
“distinctive” relationship between a universal God and “his” particular people. Many answers have 
been proposed, but what seems to be excluded from the start is a triumphalist nationalism: Yah-
weh is not a “stronger” God who subdues the gods of other peoples and includes them in his pan-
theon as subordinates (as some Israelite theologians probably thought during the early years of the 
monarchy, following their counterparts in Mesopotamia and Egypt), but simply the “only” God who 
acts in history to save Israel from oppression, and acts to punish Israel when it became unfaithful 
and oppressive.  
293 Cf. Benka (2010, 45) on the petition of the foreigner in 1 Kgs 8:41-43. 
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6.3.5.4 Does National Identity Lie in the Book or in the Land? 
In the previous section we mentioned the distinction to be made between the “Election” of Israel, 
and the Possession of the Land; we here make a short excursus to further investigate this distinc-
tion and the understanding of the link between a nation and “its land” in the Bible. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, a key feature of the identity of many nations is that of a “native land”, which phi-
losophers like Jacques Maritain (1998, 6) are careful to distinguish from the actual territorial ex-
panse of a polity, unlike most nationalist authors. The relationship to the “land” is emblematic of 
Israelite identity, but “landedness” is not listed among the features of Israelite identity in sections 
6.3.2 – 6.3.5, since the relationship of Israel to its land is particular: Israel´s identity is markedly an-
ti-autochthonous, as we have argued above, and Israel´s national narrative (the Exodus-
Wilderness-Conquest narrative), when read through the eyes of a people who knew the Exile, im-
plies that Israel can exist apart from the Land.  
Behind this conclusion, quite startling when first proposed in antiquity, lies a very old polemic be-
tween what we may call a “materialist” and an “idealist” notion of national identity. On the one 
hand (A), the Hebrew Bible points to the fact that a Jew can be fully Jewish without a physical link 
to the land (and Paul, in the New Testament, takes this further by saying that Christians do not re-
quire physical ‘identity markers’ to be Christians294): what is essential is the spiritual relationship to 
294 Concerning Paul and Jewish “identity markers” see Sanders (1977), Wright (1997), and Dunn (1990). It is 
interesting to note that most historians believe that the identity markers which today we would most clearly 
associate with “Jewishness” were most probably adopted by the exilic community; for example, circumcision 
(which was common in Palestine and Egypt, but not in Mesopotamia), could function as an Israelite identity 
marker only among the Babylonian exiles (cf. Albertz 1994, 407ff). The Golah communities clearly felt that 
Yahweh worship (mostly practised in the family circle) was not enough to keep the community together and 
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God (the Election for the Jews, the Immersion in Christ´s Paschal Mystery for Christians), conveyed 
by the notion of a Covenant, and symbolised by the “Book”. The “Book” trumps the “Land” as the 
main substrate of Israelite identity.  
Yet, on the other hand, (B) as we see in the Jewish Golah and in early Christianity, the more one 
separates a group´s identity from physical and material markers (the most important of which is, 
precisely, the land), the more it risks becoming politically uprooted and marginalised, unless (B1) 
one had the property and wealth to influence political decision-making, or unless (B2) we move to-
wards the modern “secular” notion of political belonging where one can be fully active within a par-
ticular political society without belonging to the culture, ethnicity and religion of the majority of the 
people residing in that physical space. We do not discuss (B2) here, but simply note that the inclu-
sion of minorities in political decision-making and the protection of their rights is very much linked 
to the discussion above concerning the secular state and freedom of conscience. We will rather fo-
cus on (B1): in premodern societies, a group needed wealth to be politically significant, and 
wealth was mostly based on land: both in the sense of productive agricultural property, and in the 
sense of a group´s control on the economy of a region (often attained through political hegemony 
over that region). This is why, for several centuries, many Israelites resisted the “idealist” position.  
In fact, in the late years of the monarchy, the land was a deemed a central part of Israelite identity. 
For the Deuteronomic covenant theology, in particular, the land is seen as a concrete manifestation 
— a “sacrament” — of salvation and election (cf. Albertz 1994, 230). Jerusalem could not possibly 
faithful to its God, and the existing “cultural” boundaries among the immigrants needed to be reinforced or 
labelled as distinctively “Jewish” to become henceforth the functional substitutes of the territorial bounds of 
the pre-exilic state. 
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fall into the hands of the enemy since Yahweh, being faithful to his covenant, could not let his peo-
ple go back to being exploited non-nationals in the land of the foreigner, as they were before the 
covenant, according to the Exodus-Wilderness-Conquest narrative. The prophets challenged this, 
and were at first disregarded, but the experience of the exile vindicated their thesis whereby the 
land is not necessarily an irrevocable part of the Covenant: Israel could remain Yahweh´s own peo-
ple even in exile. The issue, nonetheless, returned after the Exile295, and the contention was even-
tually resolved (at least until the advent of modern Israel) only with the destruction of the Second 
Temple in 70 CE: mainstream Judaism “finally” concluded that Jewishness was rooted in the “Book” 
(Schmid 2012). Of course, the Egyptian Golah and those who did not return from Babylon had long 
before decided that their “national” identity, their “Jewishness”, was based on their holding on to a 
narratively-embedded Law — rather than to a piece of the Land296.  6.3.6 CONCLUSION: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION 
We have introduced in this section many ideas which we continue to develop in the sections below. 
The notion of Israel´s distinctiveness and its historical development is key to understanding the Bi-
ble´s conception of nationality, national territory, otherness, hospitality and integration. As we did 
in Chapter 4 with Maltese history, we can draw conclusions that support both the deconstructive 
295 Politically, it presented itself in the form of a power struggle between the landed gentry and the intellec-
tuals (scribes and sages): the latter insisted that Jewish identity lies primarily in the “Book” not in the “Land”, 
and likewise, political authority emanates from the sacred texts (cf. Novak 2001, 221), while the former disa-
greed and wanted to put religion at the service of the landowning elite, as was the case during the monar-
chy. 
296 “Many Jews did not return to the land of Israel when Cyrus the Great had permitted them to do so […]. 
Although some of this was because of gradual assimilation, more of it seems to have been because large 
numbers of Jews believed that their religious and social identity did not depend on their physical presence in 
the land of Israel” (Novak 2001, 222). 
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and constructive purposes of our dissertation. On the deconstructive side, the section consolidates 
the arguments in Chapter 5 by providing two important ideas which challenge some aspects of 
modern ethno-cultural nationalism and of Westphalian sovereignty: 
1. Autochthony is mostly a myth and migration is not a marginal phenomenon in human his-
tory (6.3.2). In biblical times, the idea that nations were formed outside their lands surely 
challenged the way ancient empires looked at outsiders and the myths they used to legiti-
mize their possession of the land they inhabited. It can also be used today to help us debunk 
similar nationalistic myths born in Europe in the Romantic Period, and in some newly inde-
pendent countries in the 1960s and 1970´s, even though, ironically, many nationalist 
movements can trace their ideological origins to some interpretation or other of the Old 
Testament. Political societies, as we saw in the previous chapter, have a beginning in histo-
ry, and are not “natural”. They do not sprout out of the land, as autochthonous mythologies 
and ideologies claim. Groups of peoples move across borders, start new political societies, 
and, when they establish themselves as polities, have to struggle with political and cultural 
“others” both within their borders and outside.  
2. Religion is a problematic source of national identity (6.3.5). To be sure, religion, in the Bi-
ble, is a primary shaper of national identity, but the Bible also shows the serious limitations 
of this “cultural” approach to national identity. By insisting on faithfulness to YHWH, even in 
exile or under foreign rulers, and by proposing YHWH as the God of all peoples (who should 
not be co-opted by particular polities or states), the Bible points to a certain decoupling be-
tween religious and political identity. This allows freedom of conscience, which people of 
faith have often demanded from others when powerless, but not always granted to fellow 
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residents when in power. Modernity has helped Christians and Jews become supportive of 
the religiously-neutral state and to respect the right to legitimate religious freedom for all, 
not only for philosophical reasons, but out of faithfulness for their own religious tradition. 
Of course, religion is not the only problematic source of national identity. Imposing certain 
elements of the majority culture on minorities can be very problematic, but this does not vi-
olate the freedom of conscience in the same way as imposing a religion. 
On the constructive side, we will likewise mention two important ideas: 
1. National narratives are necessary, but not any narrative will do (6.3.3). Mythical national 
narratives are useful and often necessary in politics, but one must remain critical of such 
myths. The importance that Israel gives to internal cohesion, to the building of a stable and 
united community, is instructive. The insistence of the Bible on Jewish distinctiveness to de-
fend Israel´s political and religious unity and its cultural identity — even at the risk of be-
coming xenophobic or distinguishing itself polemically from surrounding nations (when the 
actual differences were not so great) — speak of a nation’s need for unity. Though actually 
offering outsiders very few or no formal means of integration, the Bible’s insistence on na-
tional unity and cohesion can support the claims of theological ethicists and Christian politi-
cal activists today that integration is crucial. This, in turn points to the need for an “adopta-
ble” national narrative — one that is not assimilationist, and that we can reasonably expect 
resident political others (who do not want to excise their past but who nonetheless want to 
become part of the political self of the receiving polity) to adopt — and, the parallel need of 
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“adoptable” immigrants — ones who do not refuse to buy into the national narrative and 
integrate themselves. 
2. Anamnestic Solidarity should be a prime shaper of National Identity (6.3.4). Israel adopts 
for itself an outsider narrative, and is adopted by an outsider God; this helps it to see social 
outsiders with greater sympathy than its neighbours. Most polities today can revive memo-
ries of oppression, destitution or wandering in positive ways, to see and sympathise with 
the oppressed and marginalised in their midst, and to fight the amnesic adoption of the self-
same attitudes and behaviours of past despotic rulers and colonizers, suffered and de-
nounced by the “mothers” and “fathers” of the polity. Furthermore, as can be seen in the 
Bible, national narratives are most powerful and longest lasting when constructed from the 
perspective of the oppressed and the “outsider”, not the from that of the “insider” with an 
iron grip on power and wealth. 
The tension between national identity and strangers is resolved in the Bible, paradoxically, by the 
notion of being a “nation of strangers”. Of course, from a Christian faith perspective, the gradual 
deepening of the understanding of what this expression actually means forms part of God´s peda-
gogy, and can be fully grasped only with the advent of Christ which illuminates all biblical revela-
tion. It is nonetheless still a struggle, even for Christians today, to truly see the stranger from the 
loving eyes of a stranger God, to truly understand the implications of being “sojourners” on Earth 
and to be ready to live up to our vocation of walking the road with a Stranger God and with com-
mon strangers created in God´s image, rather than brandish this “strangeness talk” as a mere ban-
ner of distinctiveness and a weapon to fend off those who seem different and strange to us. 
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6.4 Strangeness and Otherness: Who is the “Ger” in the Bible? 6.4.1 DIFFERENT KINDS OF STRANGERS 
In a nation, such as biblical Israel, well aware of its distinctiveness and its peculiar identity, and un-
comfortable with the notion of integration, resident strangers tend to stand out, and could easily 
end up being marginalised and oppressed. In this section, we explore the notion of “ger”, or non-
integrated resident, which is probably the most important concept discussed below. Israel is asked 
to take special care of the gerîm in the Codes of Law of the Pentateuch, which is unusual in the legal 
systems of the Ancient Near East. The Israelites are called to love the stranger, remembering that 
they were strangers in the land of Egypt. Yet, xenophobia and hostility towards the foreigner are 
also present in the Old Testament, and when one looks more closely at who exactly is designated 
by the term ger and why Israel needs to be reminded not to exploit the gerîm, a very complex 
world of inter-ethnic relations and structural injustice starts to emerge. Let us start with some of 
the terminology. 
The Hebrew language uses a number of different expressions to refer to persons who do not belong to 
the majority, however the latter might be defined. Some of these expressions are generally used in a 
more negative sense, always emphasizing the otherness of those persons and their separateness from 
the majority, such as nokrî (e.g., Deut. 17:15) or ben-nēkār (e.g., Exod. 12:43), and zār (e.g., lsa. 1:7). In 
other cases the difference is not as evident and not always emphasized, as with tôšāb which is often 
used together with gēr (e.g., Gen. 23:4), the latter being the most frequent among these expressions 
(Rendtorff 2002, 77). 
The terms nŏḵrî, bęn-han-nekār and zār belong together (P. D. Miller 1988, 1); some scholars un-
derstand these terms to generally refer to “those who occupied what was taken to be essentially 
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gentile space” (cf. Novak 2001, 222f)297, often seen as potential enemies and hence treated with 
suspicion and hostility, and sometimes referred to with strong hatred language298. They were to be 
avoided, or simply suffered, by Israelites who had to enter their space as merchants, diplomats or 
captives. In general, however, Israel recognised one major right of such foreigners: the right to ter-
ritorial integrity.  
The terms ger and tôšāb too belong together: they mostly designate people classified as 
“strangers” or “others” who occupied what was seen as Israelite space, or foreigners passing 
through Israel (such as wayfarers), who, being often poor and defenseless (ger is mostly found in 
the singular, in the Old Testament), were not seen as a threat, and hence were treated with less 
hostility, hospitality, and at times with brotherly love. As Jobling (2009, 314) claims, “some uses 
suggest persons living in a place not their own, even a foreign country, but ger should probably be 
defined in class rather than ethnic terms. Landlessness seems fundamental to the meaning.” In-
297 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. In 2 Samuel 15:19-20, we find a case of a foreigner (nokrî), 
Ittai the Gittite occupying Israelite space. Nonetheless, “the story underscores the fact that he is not really at 
home among the Israelites, that he has come “only yesterday” and is an exile from his own home who by all 
rights should return home” (P. D. Miller 1988, 2). In Trito-Isaiah (Is 56:3,6), bęn-han-nekār is used in a positive 
sense, as a foreigner who could be joined to Israel. 1 Kings 8:41,43 could refer to visiting foreign dignitaries 
or diplomats, who are not seen as hostile or dangerous. 
298 Hatred toward the nŏḵrî is crudely expressed in Ps 137:8-9: “O daughter Babylon, you devastator! Happy 
shall they be who pay you back what you have done to us! Happy shall they be who take your little ones and 
dash them against the rock!” It is important to note that the deprivation suffered by the wealthy Judahites in 
their first years of exile surely enhanced such negative feelings. Furthermore, the “little ones” here are seen 
mainly as the historical extension of an oppressive people, and are not “hated” as individuals, in the modern 
sense. One of the texts which rekindles the painful memories of those years is the book of Esther. The desire 
of vengeance builds up along the narrative, and when we reach the dénouement, we could find ourselves 
hating the Babylonians (at least the “bad” ones) and applauding at the words: “the Jews struck down all their 
enemies with the sword, slaughtering, and destroying them, and did as they pleased to those who hated 
them” (Est 9:5). Nonetheless, not all uses of emotive language in the Bible function as actual expression of 
emotion (as in modern literature since Romanticism); sometimes they are standardized legal or commercial 
formulas implying tort or satisfaction, distancing or rapprochement (Muffs 2003). 
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deed, the word tôšāb seems to indicate a landless resident, it is sometimes associated with ger, es-
pecially in Lv 25, which uses the hendiadys ger wetôšāb several times to indicate “non-integrated 
resident”. Possibly the hendiadys is used to indicate long duration (Jobling 2009, 315). At other 
times tôšāb is associated with śāḵîr (hireling/journeyman). “[The distinctions in Lv 25:39-46 give] 
the impression of a certain social hierarchy: gēr-tôšāb-śākîr-slave, whereby the first three groups 
can be differently juxtaposed. But this hierarchy does not mean that the ger will always be the most 
wealthy of these groups” (Rendtorff 2002, 79). 
The term ger is by far the more commonly referred to “proximal other” in the Old Testament, and, 
following the reasoning above, some authors understand it to mean “non-integrated resident” tout 
court; Novak (2001, 222), for instance, defines the gerîm as “those people living among the people 
of Israel in a subordinate capacity, although one having definite rights and duties and enjoying the 
protection of the due process of law”. However, at different moments in Israelite history, and in 
different situations, ger referred mainly to particular groups of excluded neighbours; in the diaspor-
ic context of the Septuagint, for instance, it was understood to mean (and translated in Greek as) 
“proselyte”. In the following sections we explore the complexities of such a seemingly simple con-
cept, attempting a diachronic reconstruction of prime lexical referents of the term “ger”, and in-
clude a discussion of the rights of strangers in Israel. 6.4.2 THE REFERENT OF “GER” IN THE DEUTERONOMIC LAW TRADITION 
6.4.2.1 The “Ger” in the Covenant Code 
Who is a “resident alien” (ger)? How should she be treated? After reviewing the different codes of 
law in the Pentateuch, Christiana Van Houten (1991, 158–165) argues that there is a development: 
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The laws dealing with the alien developed and became more inclusive. What began as an appeal for 
justice for the alien in the Covenant Code (Exod. 23:9), comes to be understood as a legal principle in 
the Priestly laws: “There shall be one law for the alien and native-born”. This then opened the door for 
the inclusion of the alien into all the rights and privileges of Israelite society [...]. The inclusive tendency 
is the working out, in the legal tradition, of God's purpose to include and save all (Van Houten 1991, 
175). 
Such a simplistic progression towards greater openness and inclusiveness is frowned upon by other 
scholars such as Smith-Christopher (1996). The major problem (which is very much related to the 
first) concerns the meaning of the word “ger” in the different codes. This is compounded by the 
current controversies regarding the dating of the different codes, which we will have to bracket for 
the purposes of our present discussion299. 
Let us start with the Book of the Covenant, which traditionally was considered to be the oldest col-
lection of laws in the Bible, possibly dating from the pre-state period. Scholars today consider the 
Covenant Code as an early stage of the Deuteronomic Law tradition (Jobling 2009, 315); Rainer Al-
bertz, for instance, has argued that Ex 20:19–22:33 is not necessarily older than the Hezekianic re-
form, and may actually have been the basis of this reform:  
“A dating in the eighth-century situation which I have assumed is supported by [several arguments, in-
cluding] the fact that the Book of the Covenant pays quite special attention to the protection of the al-
ien (22.20; 23.9), which could well be a reaction to the increasingly serious refugee problem which Ju-
dah faced after the fall of Samaria” (Albertz 1994, 182–3).  
If Albertz is correct, the word “ger” in the Book of the Covenant refers to a very particular type of 
non-integrated resident: landless Israelites from the Northern Kingdom, who sought refuge in Ju-
299 For instance, Van Seters (2007) argues that the Book of the Covenant could be post-exilic in origin, and 
ultimately based on the Deuteronomic and Holiness Codes. Such a late dating would bring us to question the 
historical reconstruction attempted below, but is rejected by most scholars and we will not take it into ac-
count. 
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dah around 700 BCE, at the time when archaeologists document a demographic explosion in Jerusa-
lem300.  
6.4.2.2 The “Ger” in the Deuteronomic Code 
In the Deuteronomic Code, assuming this body of law was the basis of the Josianic reform, ger  
could refer mainly to a very particular group of people, namely unemployed Levites, as in Jgs 17:7; 
19:1f, or at least, such persons may have been considered as the archetypical gerîm of the day (cf. 
P. D. Miller 1988, 12). As has been shown by the investigations of A. H. J. Gunneweg and H. Schulz 
(cf. Albertz 1994, 58), the ethnological tribe of Levi seems to have perished early on in the history of 
Israel, and was then replaced by a religious “clanless clan” of Israelites who distanced themselves 
from their ethnic groups (becoming thus landless) to live with no tie to clan or tribe (cf. Ex 32:29; Dt 
33:9), entrusting themselves uniquely to Yahweh´s protection (Dt 33:11; cf. Jgs 20). In Dt 26:12 the 
Levite and the ger (as well as the fatherless and widows) are listed as beneficiaries of charitable 
tithes; the Levites and the gerîm, though mentioned separately, are classified together.  
Historians concur that one of the main features of the Josianic reform was the abolition of public 
Yahweh worship outside of the temple of Jerusalem (including the destruction of temples outside 
the official borders of Judah – cf. 2 Kings 23:15-20), and this meant that “the provincial priests (‘Le-
vites’) who had lost their jobs became a significant social problem [and] attempts were made to 
300 “One can claim with certainty that around 700 B.C. the city had expanded to three to four times its for-
mer size. This growth cannot be explained by natural population increase or by normal economic growth. 
[The archaeological evidence points to the fact] the main reasons behind this expansion [were] the immigra-
tion of Israelites who came to Judah from the Northern Kingdom after the fall of Samaria in 721 B.C., and the 
influx of dispossessed refugees from the territories that Sennacherib took from Judah and gave to the Philis-
tine cities” (Broshi 1974, 21). 
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cope with it by charitable measures” (Albertz 1994, 208f; cf. 219f)301. If this thesis is correct, in the 
last years of the monarchy, such Levites became the most prominent and visible resident aliens, 
probably refusing to seek “normal” employment and living on alms. However, this problem most 
probably disappeared after the Exile302, and ger means something else in post-exilic texts (and in 
the post-exilic edits and re-appropriations of Deuteronomy).  
6.4.2.3 The “Ger” in the Holiness Code 
Most scholars today consider the Holiness Code to be post-exilic (Meyer 2005, chap. 6), and so the 
referent of the word “ger” in this text has changed since we are in a political context which is quite 
different from that of the Judahite monarchy. The Priestly laws, as Van Houten claims, are indeed 
more inclusive and sympathetic towards those they call gerîm than the Deuteronomic laws towards 
those they call gerîm. For instance, according to the Holiness code, the gerîm are to be treated as 
“the children of your people” (Lv 19:18) and Israel is commanded to love the foreigner “as yourself” 
(Lv 19:34). But here again, whom do these texts refer to when using the word “ger”? Mary Douglas 
(1994), famous for her anthropological interpretation of Leviticus, asks this question regarding 
Lv 19:34, and suggests “that the gēr was one of the other descendants of Jacob, not descended 
from Judah, nor from Levi or Benjamin, but those other remnants of the twelve tribes who had 
301 According to Albertz (1994, 222), the reformers attempted to integrate them into the Zadokite priesthood 
in Jerusalem, but the Jerusalem priesthood looked at them with suspicion as possibly unorthodox, theologi-
cally syncretistic competitors. 
302 According to some authors, the “urbanization” of rural land for legal purposes in post-exilic Judea, and 
the commercialization that ensued, “led to the gradual obliteration of the old distinctions between those 
who owned land and those who were landless. Thus the Levites, who were only assigned a number of villag-
es that could not support sufficient agriculture for their needs and thus had to live off of the tithes that the 
rest of the people paid them, were eventually integrated into the rest of the population” (Novak 2001, 220). 
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been defeated and scattered by invaders and who still lived in Canaan during and after the exile in 
Babylon. His special status at law would be precisely that he was neither a foreigner nor a Jew” 
(ibid., 286 note 1). Rolf Rendtorff (2002, 86), after analysing the use of the term, especially in Ez and 
Lv, concurs: “This seems to me to be exactly what Ezekiel had in mind, and it fits precisely the role 
of the gēr in the priestly laws”. If Douglas and Rendtorff are right, we should probably translate ger 
as “non-tribal resident” or “resident of non-local ancestry” and conclude that biblical law has little 
to say about non-Israelite gerîm. This could mean either that the all the gerîm living in the land of 
the (former?) kingdom of Judah (and possibly of the Northern Kingdom as well) at the time of the 
writing were considered somehow as “Israelite”, or else that biblical law assumes that “non-
Israelite” residents do exist in the land, but has nothing much to say in their regard. Unfortunately, 
it is hard to obtain more clarity than this from the texts, and we need to keep this in mind as we 
present the rights that are granted to the gerîm in the Bible.  6.4.3 WHAT RIGHTS DID THE GERÎM ENJOY? 
6.4.3.1 Rights Recognised in the Deuteronomic Sources 
Given what we have said above, let us start this section by a little warning. By translating ger as 
“non-integrated resident” tout court, we are probably being much more inclusive than the biblical 
law codes ever intended, and by discussing the problems of the gerîm in a dissertation dealing with 
immigration policy we might be assuming too quickly that the otherness of the biblical gerîm can be 
compared to the otherness of contemporary immigrants. To be sure,  
we should not entirely deny a connotation of alienness to ger in Deuteronomy. Perhaps the existence of 
the class of gerim was rationalized, with whatever degree of truth, in terms of their having originated 
elsewhere than where they live. Perhaps ger was an available legal category for people who continued 
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to arrive as refugees. But the simple definition of ger as “resident alien” is not viable (Jobling 2009, 
315).  
This is why our approach to the question of immigration in the Bible does not place the legal texts 
at the centre, as many theological ethicists tend to do in similar work on immigration. We cannot, 
of course, completely ignore the “classical” discussion of the “legal rights” of the gerîm in a work 
like this, and so we cover this material briefly (and critically) at this point of our discussion.  
According to some authors, non-integrated residents living in pre-exilic Israel and Judah are some-
times seen as persons having “definite rights and duties and enjoying the protection of the due 
process of law” (e.g. Novak 2001, 222f). To be sure, this is how things are presented in the final 
(post-exilic) edition of the Pentateuch, though the actual legal structures in the pre-state period 
and during the early monarchy were very limited, especially in rural areas (Albertz 1994, 92f), and 
as the wealth gap between the rich and the poor widened during the monarchy, poor and marginal-
ised persons often found it very hard to have their rights upheld by local tribunals, easily corrupted 
or co-opted by the wealthy landholders (Is 5:20, 23; Am 5:10; Mi 3:1-3, 9, 11; cf. Albertz 1994, 
165f). The gerîm, it seems, were easily and routinely exploited (cf. Mal 3:5; Ps 94:6). 
In the Deuteronomic sources, “gerim are separated rhetorically from Israel in that they are not part 
of the ‘you’ to whom the law is addressed; they are referred to as a separate group in the third per-
son” (Jobling 2009, 315). Even in ideal situations where justice could be obtained by the non-
integrated resident, his303 rights — as recognised by biblical law — were very limited: if he was a 
slave, he was entitled to little more than bodily integrity (he could not be raped or mutilated), while 
303 The masculine, here, is clearly intended. As we shall see below, the rights of women were generally less 
than those of wayfarers. Even claiming that female gerîm had legally-recognised “rights” would seem grossly 
anachronistic. 
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if he was a free person, he could, in theory, avail himself of the legal structures (mainly arbitration 
by elders) which sought to somehow redress criminal and civil injury (cf. Dt 24:17). Generally, a ger 
could do this when “exploited” (Ex 22:20), which could include forcing him to work without any 
days of rest or Sabbaths (Ex 23:12), or withholding wages (Dt 24:14). Israelite law codes, especially 
Deuteronomy, refuse to offer a path to integration, and simply assume that the ger will be a mar-
ginalised other, to be listed with the two other traditional Eastern personae miserabiles, the widow 
and the orphan (cf. Gowan 1987). For this reason, they are to be given “special treatment” (given 
their inescapable misery) in the form of charity: they may glean after the harvesters (Dt 24:19-22; 
cf. Lv 19:9-10) and benefit from the proceeds of the voluntary third-year tithe for very poor (Dt 
14:28-29). However, the Josianic reformers and some of the post-exilic reformers cannot seem to 
think — or do not want to think — of concrete ways to legally and politically resolve the social 
structures which marginalise these persons (H. V. Bennett 2002). Their social justice projects auto-
matically exclude non-integrated (and especially non-Israelite) residents (cf. Albertz 1994, 217–8; 
435). Some authors, such as Donald Gowan (1987), however, suggest that we should not overem-
phasize the poverty of the gerîm and be too critical of the reform movements’ failure to offer them 
better means to social and economic integration.  
6.4.3.2 Rights Recognised in the Priestly Sources 
The Holiness Code (e.g. Lv 24:22) makes the claim that there is a single law for the ger and the so-
cio-politically integrated Israelite (ʾęzrāḥ); the ger is here seen as an “equal” subject of the priestly 
law, meaning that she is not normally exempt from observing purity rules and religious laws, and 
exhibiting the Jewish identity markers developed mostly during the Exile (Lv 17:15; 18:26; 24:16). 
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Thus, the ger is here assumed (or forced) to be culturally and religiously assimilated to the Jewish 
identity developed during and after the Exile: he is mostly “other” not in terms of culture, religion 
or ethnicity but in terms of class, and is roughly equated to the “people of the land” in Ezra-
Nehemiah (i.e. Judahites who did not return from the exile and were considered as inferior Jews by 
the returnees), as we shall see in section 6.5. The projection of alienage onto non-exiled Israelites 
(implicit in the recycling of the term ger in the context of foreign domination), and the resulting dis-
tinction between ger and ʾęzrāḥ, established by the returnees, “satisfied their sense of being the 
only authentic Jews and justified their economic privilege” (Jobling 2009, 316).  
In the priestly laws, such gerîm have gleaning rights (Lv 19:10; 23:22) similar to those of the gerîm 
in Dt 24:19-21, and have the right not to be oppressed (Lv 19:33-34), as in the Deuteronomical 
sources. They may keep the Passover and participate in certain public religious rituals (of course, 
they are Israelites! — cf. Nm 9:14). They are to be loved “as though they were kin” (which they 
were! cf. Lv 19:34) but this does not mean they should be emancipated from their subordinate so-
cial condition. The rights of these gerîm, do not go much further than that.   6.4.4 CONCLUSION: BIBLICAL GERÎM AND CONTEMPORARY ETHICS OF MIGRATION 
Many theological ethicists writing on immigration focus on the biblical term ger as used in the legal 
materials, read synchronically, and on some verses of the Holiness Code that insist on “loving the 
ger”. However, they generally avoid drawing the more socially problematic consequences of this 
reading, which gives the overall impression that the land laws in the Bible, in trying to protect the 
rights of poor Israelites, deny poor gerîm the right to hold property in an agricultural society, con-
demning them to being a permanent social underclass, and then recognises this as an unavoidable 
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“fact” and provides some meagre legal remedies. Yet, when analysed diachronically, one starts to 
see that the different layers of the legal code may be referring to different social groups designated 
by the term ger, and that the property laws as presented to today´s reader may have never been 
enacted in pre-exilic Israel, and never fully enforced in post-exilic times, under Persian, Greek and 
Roman rule.  
A diachronic reading sheds more light on the reality of immigration today. Firstly, the evolution of 
the historical referents of the term “ger” in the Law points to a double process. (a) The Bible is 
aware that the social reality of who is considered “stranger” changes with time, and seeks to keep 
its laws up to date: from a modern ethical viewpoint, it is hoped that laws concerning strangers 
would be continually updated to adequately respond to changing realities. (b) The Bible is ac-
quainted with the polysemy of legal categories and with the fact that the interpretation of certain 
terms might be expanded or restricted by legal scholars: from a modern ethical viewpoint, it is 
hoped that the interpretation of terms such as “refugee” in certain laws which are politically hard 
to change be expanded through legal hermeneutics to ensure that the human rights protected by 
the spirit of the law are not denied through politically opportunistic restrictive interpretations. Sec-
ondly, the problem of the ger status, seen in historical perspective, is better understood as a prob-
lem of class than of ethnicity or race; it shows how one could exaggerate the cultural, religious or 
ethnic difference of certain poor or under-educated groups to justify and increase their marginali-
sation. Though we cannot deny the existence of racism and xenophobia towards immigrants and 
refugees today, it is important not to overemphasise these factors, and to remember that many of 
the problems of the integration of immigrants today boil down to problems of class (i.e. marginali-
C h a p t e r :  6  — P a g e :  432 
 
sation linked to poverty and lack of education): Muslim millionaires, Indian scientists and Black pop 
stars usually find our doors wide open. 
6.5 Integration Capacity and Post-Exilic Attitudes Towards the Other 6.5.1 INTEGRATION CAPACITY 
The transition from offering hospitality to offering “kinship” or “fraternity” through integration and 
naturalisation is clearly a difficult one, as we saw in Chapter 4. In pre-exilic Israel, integration simply 
“happened”; but the texts, as edited by post-exilic Judeans, pretend that there was no such process 
in the past, and there is no need to think about one for the future. In this section we examine dif-
ferent attitudes towards the other in the post-exilic community, in order to try to better under-
stand why it found the notion of integration so taboo. As we shall see, the major problem of the 
receiving community in this case — the handful of Babylonian returnee families to whom the Per-
sians had entrusted the administration of Yehud — was one of integration capacity. The returnee 
community had a low integration capacity, especially due to (a) demographics (the community was 
small and needed to be built up slowly; they were not against the admission of the “people of the 
land”, but it had to happen in an orderly way, and on their terms), to (b) psychological reasons 
(they had to wrestle continuously with all the complex identity issues faced by typical return mi-
grants) and to (c) political reasons (they were collaborators with the foreign colonizer, and felt they 
had to continually and radically prove that they were “Jews” not “Babylonians”). All these stress 
factors make it very difficult to develop the literary, legal and ritual tools necessary to incorporate 
others into the community.  
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All this is made manifest in a number of different attitudes towards the “other” in the post-exilic 
community (Zohar 2001, 243f). These attitudes, present in the biblical text, are at times contradic-
tory, and are kept together without a clear resolution in the canon; they are not different shades of 
a single theological movement. The claim that the Bible “must speak with one united theological 
voice” (Smith-Christopher 1996, 141) on all issues, and that “apparent contradictions” should be 
airbrushed away by clever hermeneutics, is ultimately a modernist and Cartesian presumption, or 
one which mistakes the Bible for some medieval systematic treatise. Rather, it is the task of the 
theologian to take stock of the different voices in the Bible and to propose to the believers of her 
day what stance to adopt in front of the contemporary versions of the great biblical dilemmas. 6.5.2 FEAR AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE OTHER 
One group of returnees, whom we shall call the “Pure Blood Party”, feared that, especially when 
subjected to foreign domination, Israel risked contamination by the unorthodox (or idolatrous) reli-
gious practices of the stranger304. This group, as most returnees, sees the exile as the result of Isra-
el´s unfaithfulness to Yahweh. However, they are tempted to take the easy way out and look for a 
scapegoat — e.g. the so-called “Canaanites” or “people of the land” — to blame for the unfaithful-
ness of Israel, rather than blame themselves and their ancestors, as if the sinfulness of Israel were 
ultimately due to a contamination coming from the outside. They therefore tend to propose a 
“simple solution” to Israel´s tendency to be seduced by other gods and by the unjust socio-political 
structures of other polities, viz., isolationism, clear separation from the perceived external source of 
contamination. It is however hard to see how such isolationism could be put into place under Per-
304 I associate this group primarily with Ezra-Nehemiah and with the priestly materials in the Pentateuch. 
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sian rule, in a territory standing on the trade route between Mesopotamia, Egypt and Greece and 
pretend they are living alone in the middle of nowhere, without adopting extreme measures of os-
tracism against whomever seemed an “outsider” or maintained relations with outsiders, and thus 
fomenting xenophobia.  
Of course, the “outsiders” most relevant to the debate in Persian Yehud were not the mythical 
abominable ancient “Canaanites”, or the hated Assyrians and Babylonians who waged war and de-
ported the fathers of the returnees, but rather those people living in Jerusalem and the surrounding 
countryside who were “different” mainly because they were not marked by the experience of the 
Babylonian Golah. Should they be written off as hopelessly evil, impossible to integrate in a pious 
and self-righteous “New Israel”, or should the returnees try to reach out to them and build a new 
polity together with these “strangers”?  
To be sure, the more nationalistic and xenophobic Judeans found the latter suggestion quite hard 
to swallow. The most representative texts of this group are in Ezra and Nehemiah. In Ezr 9-10 and 
Neh 13:23-31, social contact between Israelites and “foreigners” is forbidden and mixed marriages 
condemned. As noted above, the problem is that it is very doubtful that these texts are actually 
speaking of “foreigners”. Rather, it seems that they are simply labelling non-Golah Israelites (Jude-
ans whose ancestors were poor and rural Israelites whom Nebuchadnezzar did not bother to de-
port) as “foreigners”, simply to keep them out of power circles firmly controlled by returnee fami-
lies.  
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6.5.2.1 Demographic and Psychological Stress Factors 
Let us first consider Ez 9-10, examined at length by Katherine Southwood (2012) using various exe-
getical tools and insights from social sciences. In the past, it was believed that the “foreign” wom-
en, whom the Israelites are being ordered to repudiate in this text (following a distorted reading of 
Deuteronomic Law, but without resorting to any recognised legal process), were simply the daugh-
ters of Babylonians who decided to “squat” in Palestine during the Exile, or the daughters of fami-
lies transplanted by the Assyrians in Samaria: women, in sum, who did not practice a Yahwist reli-
gion. If this were true, we could actually speak of an “intermarriage crisis” (given the marriage be-
tween persons of different religion and different ethnicity). Yet, most scholars today concur that 
this is not the case. Nothing in the text suggests that these women were not Yahwist or Israelite. 
What they seem to lack, it seems, is the practice of the Yahwist family rites developed as identity 
markers by the Babylonian Golah to assert and maintain its “Jewishness”. Their “Israeliteness” is 
not modern enough, and hence not purified enough, and hence they are not “Jews”. 
The text uses various rhetorical devices to denigrate and stigmatize non-endogamic marriages be-
tween the “children of the exile” and the “people of the land”, portraying the latter as deviant, and 
using Yahwist religion — narrowly defined as to coincide only with the traditions practised by the 
Babylonian Golah community and their blood descendants — to shore up its ethically problematic 
claims. The anachronistic Deuteronomic prohibition of marrying “the Hittites, the Girgashites, the 
Amorites, the Canaanites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites” (Dt 1:3-4) — which obvious-
ly no longer existed as separate nations during the Josianic reform — is extended by Ezra to all gen-
tiles, and “gentile” is made coterminous with “people of the land”, which, in post-Exilic Yehud, were 
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patently Israelites, though not cultural and religious clones of Babylonian Golah which provided the 
paradigm of “Jewishness” for the returnees. Southwood (2012, 215f) concludes that such texts and 
behaviours are best analysed when situated in a context of heightened awareness of a group´s 
“ethnic” identity, coupled with a context of a (real or perceived) imminent threat to that identity 
which elicits strong fear.  
As mentioned above, two major sources of this fear are demographic inferiority and return-
migrant psychology, which are considerable community stressors. Smith-Christopher (1996, n. 14) 
compares the text with the fear of extinction present in some Native-American communities; Job-
ling (2009, 316) notes the small size of the community: their minority status was a sure motive of 
fear of the other. Southwood uses the notion of “hybridity” from Homi Bhabha’s post-colonial the-
ory to help us understand that, just like many post-colonial intellectuals and converts to post-
modern “fundamentalist movements” (who absorbed a great deal from their Western-style educa-
tion and from their colonist or “lay” friends, but hate to admit it), the returnees were cultural hy-
brids who felt they did not really belong, neither in Babylon, nor in Yehud. Their “fundamentalist” 
interpretation of tradition and obsession with recreating an archaic “pre-state Israelite” world was 
mostly an effort to prove to themselves that they belonged and were “more native than the na-
tives”. In this way, they showcase many of the identity issues seen among forced migrants and re-
turn migrants today, seeking to prove they belong by being more traditionalist and archaic then the 
people who remained in the land, and often interpreting developments in their ancestors’ village as 
“corruption” and “decay”. 
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6.5.2.2 Political Stress Factors 
All this was further complicated by the issue of power: given their hybridity, the returnees were a 
“collaborator” minority placed in positions of power by an imperial power, as Anglo-Indians in India 
or Tutsis in Rwanda, and feared losing their power and being “punished” or discriminated against in 
the event of political destabilization. However, while the political situation is stable, they do not 
want to lose their privileges and their grip on power, and tend to ostracize those who marry out of 
the group (and hence “marry down”), providing footholds for ambitious social climbers from the 
majority group to “marry up”; Smith-Christopher (1994) mentions various studies in “hypergamy 
theory” (e.g. on interracial marriages in the US, and inter-caste marriages in India) which can shed 
light on the text. Hence, though the texts are sometimes assumed to be dealing with the same 
“ethnic” and “religious” problem (and frame the issue using such language), they could be dealing 
mostly with what we would call a “class” issue, where one construes one´s class as “religiously su-
perior” and “ethnically distinct” from the “plebs”, as the Bourbon and Hapsburg ruling families did 
in early modern Europe.  
This issue of political power, according to Smith-Christopher (1994, 258ff; 1996, 126), is clearly cen-
tral to the Nehemiah texts (especially Neh 13:23-31) which are to be distinguished from Ezr 9-10, 
especially since they seem to perceive the threat coming from outside Yehud. The returnee-
administrator class is threatened not only by the “people of the land” (who dislike being lorded 
over by their “Babylonianized” kin imported as a new “ruling class” by the Persians), but also by the 
rulers of neighbouring Persian provinces. These political neighbours are angered by the concessions 
and preferred treatment that the “new” rulers of Yehud are obtaining through their contacts in the 
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Imperial court. Tobiah (“the Ammonite”) and Sanballat (“the Horonite”) — both probably “Israel-
ites” in spite of Nehemiah´s labelling305 — opposed Nehemiah´s rebuilding of Jerusalem (Neh 2:19; 
4:7); they believed that the Persians were shooting themselves in the foot by giving political auton-
omy to what they saw as the most rebellious and traitorous region in Palestine, and furthermore 
putting its economy or religious steroids by allowing the rebuilding of the Temple306. Yet seeing that 
the returnees often got what they wanted from the emperor, these powerful neighbours decided 
they wanted a share of their political influence, and tried to get it through intermarriage with the 
returnees. Nehemiah was however decidedly bent on frustrating their plans.  
305 Tobiah (Tovi-YAH, “Yahweh is good”) indicates a Yahweh worshipper. Sanballat, according to many histo-
rians, was a “Samaritan”, a person living in Persian Samaria, culturally and religiously “Israelite” just as most 
of the “people of the land” in the neighbouring Yehud (though not a “Jew”, as defined by the Bablyonian 
Golah). Albertz (1994, 524) argues that the text in 2 Kings 17:24-41, which polemically depicts the population 
of Samaria as alien syncretists, does not probably apply to the post-exilic population of Samaria in general; 
after the Assyrian conquest of the Northern Kingdom (c. 722 BCE; 2 Kings 17:1-6) and the deportation of the 
“Samarians”, the new “Samaritan” population (made of deportee-colonizers from other parts of the Assyrian 
empire, and landless Judahites who moved north in search of land) fell within the cultural and religious 
sphere of influence of the South, and was particularly targeted by the Josianic reforms (which destroyed the 
high places in Samaria and centralized the Yahweh cult in Jerusalem; cf. 2 Kings 23:15-20). 
306 Rebuilding the Temple was not a simple expression of “religious freedom”: since Davidic times, and espe-
cially after the Josianic reform, the Temple and the continuous pilgrimages it generated contributed hugely 
to Jerusalem´s economy and its ability to finance large armies. Historians, based on a reading of a passage in 
Josephus´s Antiquities (XI, ch. 8) in part corroborated by archaeological finds, argue that Sanballat, the Per-
sian governor in Samaria, wanted to share the wealth generated by the pilgrimages by rebuilding a “legiti-
mate” Israelite temple in Samaria (probably on Mount Gerizim) and buy into the Golah returnees´ privileged 
status in the Persian court by marrying his daughter to Manasseh, a member of the high priest´s family in 
Jerusalem. The élite in Jerusalem, however, ostracized Manasseh and started castigating such political in-
termarriages (cf. Albertz 1994, 524ff). The case of Manasseh´s marriage is probably the emblematic case in 
the mind of the author of Nehemiah and his readers: even marrying rich and powerful people from neigh-
bouring provinces is portrayed as “marrying down” and eroding the political and economic privileges of the 
Judean élite. In the view of this biblical author, such people vying for a higher social status, or trying to re-
gain social status at the expense of the returnees, should be labelled as “foreign” and excluded. 
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 6.5.3 HOSPITALITY AND HINTS OF INTEGRATION 
Other groups in post-exilic Yehud/Judea had very different attitudes towards foreigners. Smith-
Christopher (1996, 119) distinguishes two types of non-exclusionary attitudes: transformation and 
inclusion. The “dangerous” foreigner (inside, or outside), rather than being fought, subjected or 
destroyed, may be transformed (into a non-hostile or even amicable “other”), with God´s help: this 
is the leitmotif of many of the regal stories in Daniel, as well as the book of Jonah. The “non-
dangerous” resident alien, on the other hand, should be integrated; the authors here probably as-
sume they are speaking to “reasonable” Judeans, not afraid of some imaginary treacherous “fifth 
column” of “Canaanites” or “Hivites” or “Jebusites” arising from among the populations integrated 
many centuries prior to remove the returnee Judeans from power (as some of the “Pure Blood” 
party seemed to believe).  
6.5.3.1 Hints of Integration in Trito-Isaiah 
In Trito-Isaiah (Is 56-66), everyone who binds himself to YHWH, native or foreigner, can be included 
in the people, and can become a servant of YHWH (cf. Beuken 1990, 69ff; Westermann 2001, 212–
3):  
Do not let the foreigner joined to the Lord say, “YHWH will surely separate me from his people”. […] 
The foreigners who join themselves to YHWH, to minister to him, to love the name of YHWH, and to be 
his servants, all who keep the sabbath, and do not profane it, and hold fast my covenant — these I will 
bring to my holy mountain. […] Thus says the Lord YHWH, who gathers the outcasts of Israel, I will 
gather others to them besides those already gathered (Is 56:3.6.7a.8).   
Interestingly, the term for “foreigner” in vv 3 and 6 is bęn-han-nekār, which is usually used to des-
ignate others deemed dangerous or hostile, and living in non-Israelite space. The text seems to rec-
ognise that, under Persian rule, the spatial distinction is hard to maintain, and counters the scare-
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mongering of the “Pure Blood” party — for whom every ger is a potential nŏḵrî — by inverting the 
argument, and claiming that every nŏḵrî can be a potential “servant of YHWH”. In fact, the main 
theme of the Trito-Isaiah, according to Beuken, is precisely that of the “servants of YHWH”. The 
post-exilic Isaiah elegantly and delicately dismisses the “Pure Blood” party´s thesis that the (only) 
“real” remnant of Israel are the returnees, people descended from the Judahites deported by Neb-
uchadnezzar (who were mainly educated citizens and landed gentry of the time of the monarchy), 
who could claim ancient titles to the land, and who liked to project those titles back to the pre-state 
period. Rather, according to Trito-Isaiah, those who love YHWH and are devoted to YHWH´s service 
are the real Israelites, whatever their ethnic origin or status during the monarchy.  
However, as André Wénin (1995, 297f) argues, this can be understood in two ways: foreigners can 
become part of the People of the Promise either on the condition of complete (or quasi-complete) 
assimilation (submitting to all the laws of the Torah, reneging their cultural identity), or by the ac-
ceptance of a reasonable subset of the basic ethic principles of the Old Testament (e.g. the second 
“tablet” of the Decalogue, or the so-called “Noahide laws”) coupled with some form of Yahweh 
worship, in such a way as to be able to retain most of their cultural identity. The second possibility 
starts to be seriously explored among Christian Jews in Paul´s writings, and in Rabbinic Judaism in 
Medieval times and more intensely in the last two centuries (Sagi and Zohar 1995). The first reading 
is, however, the best that the excluded others could hope for in post-exilic Yehud307.  
307 Over the years, there have been different interpretations of what conversion to Judaism actually entails. 
According to Cohen (1989, 26), there must be these “three elements: practice of the Jewish laws; exclusive 
devotion to the god of the Jews; and integration into the Jewish community. The three elements are stated 
forthrightly by the book of Judith. When Achior the Ammonite ‘saw all that the god of Israel had done, he 
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6.5.3.2 Hospitality and Assimilation in Ruth 
In the same vein, the book of Ruth advocates for the integration of the stranger, though it dares not 
propose anything besides complete assimilation. Scholars consider this text today as a post-exilic 
text, even though it poses as a pre-state novella (Cohn Eskenazi and Frymer-Kensky 2011, xvi–xix): 
remember that we are in a context where, to be convincing, you needed to sound archaic. Given 
the hostility towards the “other” harboured by the post-exilic political authorities, the community 
behind this text needs to convey their counter-cultural message tactfully. As Estévez López (2003, 
25) argues, “the book of Ruth is not simply a story concerning some women, but rather a metaphor 
of the collective construction of a people”. It challenges the idealized “us” brandished by the re-
turnees while seeking to make its message receivable to its intended audience, for this reason, this 
group of post-exilic authors propose a story situated in the pre-state period, to argue that what was 
needed in their society was not restoration (of the social structures and social fabric of the late 
monarchy, the “true we”), but reconstruction (of a new and inclusive social fabric, a “new we”). No-
emi´s family, like the exiles, was obliged to migrate to a foreign land. She had come in contact with 
foreigners in Moab, just as the deportees in Babylon, and in spite of ethnic rivalries, had built close 
friendships and family ties: the “other” is not so different from the “self”, after all, especially when 
one is living in the other’s land. The problem, however, is how to treat the “other” when one is 
back in one´s own land, in a position of power, and precisely how to treat those “others” who, like 
Ruth (and unlike Orpah), have nowhere else to go, or have no desire to go and live elsewhere. How 
believed firmly in god, and was circumcised, and joined the house of Israel, remaining so to this day’ (Jdt 
14:10)”. 
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do we deal with those “others” who feel that “our” land is truly their home? What do we say to 
Ruth when she pleads: “‘do not press me to leave you or to turn back from following you! Where 
you go, I will go; where you lodge, I will lodge; your people shall be my people, and your God my 
God. Where you die, I will die – there will I be buried’” (Ru 1:16-17)?  
Ruth´s only route to integration in Israel was through (second) marriage, but her Israelite next of kin 
(like the “Pure Blood party”) considers that marrying a foreigner entails “damaging [his] own inher-
itance” (Ru 4:6). Ironically, however, Noemi´s (and her husband´s) inheritance seems tied to a Mo-
abite´s marital rights: the coded message here is that the returnees will never justly reclaim the 
whole land of Israel unless they are ready to intermarry with the “impurely bred” resident popula-
tion, given the miscegenation promoted by the Assyrians and Babylonians. Boaz, however, does not 
see things as does Ruth´s next of kin. Boaz accepts to marry Ruth. For this reason, he is commended 
by witnesses and elders at the gate and in Ru 4:11 is compared to Jacob (who married the foreign-
ers Rachel and Leah, and built the house of Israel precisely through such unions with foreigners). As 
for Ruth, she is compared to Tamar (who, by hook or by crook, found a way to bear a Judahite son, 
as was her marital right, from a “close kin” when her “next of kin” refused – Gn 38). The text is 
clearly ironic, especially if we take into account modern scholars’ claim (e.g. S. J. D. Cohen 1999, 
268f) that Ezra and the Pure Blood party were at the time insisting on the adoption of matrilineality 
as proof of Israelite origin: if we follow the logic, the Israelites, being the offspring of Aramaean 
mothers (Rachel, Leah and their servants, whom Jacob obtained from Laban, the Aramaean), are 
not “true” Israelites after all. According Ru 4:17, Ruth then goes on to become the great-
grandmother of David (who may not be Moabite, like his grandfather Obed, but rather “Aramae-
an”, given his mother´s assumed lineage.)  
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6.5.3.3 Biblical Genealogies: Integrating Backwards 
Besides the attitudes of exclusion, transformation and inclusion, an interesting position is taken by 
the biblical genealogies. Genealogies reconstruct links between different populations, and provide 
a classification of other: some peoples are closer while others are more distant, some should be 
trusted on the basis of past interactions while others should be distrusted, some are stereotyped as 
weaker and others as stronger (Cohn 2003). Genealogies project into the past current alliances, 
enmities, and stereotypes, and help premodern societies prudently discern what attitude would be 
most appropriate towards this or that neighbour. By positing “others” as close or distant relatives, 
however, genealogies do not necessarily simplify the complex relationships between diverse ethnic 
groups. In the genealogical system of Genesis, for instance, those most closely related to Israel (e.g. 
Amalek), according to this scheme, are not necessarily the friendliest, nor the most desirable as in-
laws and co-inhabitants of the land (Crüsemann 2002, 71). The main function of “segmented” ge-
nealogies in Genesis, as Robert Wilson’s (1977) famous analysis concludes, is to connect neighbour-
ing tribes and convert the “other” into a “kin” by defining the boundaries of community, rights and 
obligations of members, permissible marriages and titles to land. The first 11 chapters of Genesis 
also extend the genealogies backwards to provide a framework for the story of primeval events and 
argue for the stratified interconnectedness of all peoples (Westermann 1984, 6ff). 6.5.4 CONCLUSION: INTEGRATION CAPACITY AND CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION 
The Bible presents a complex mosaic of ways to see and treat the “other”, and part of that com-
plexity comes from the fact that many of the writers and editors of the biblical texts in post-exilic 
Yehud saw themselves as return-migrants with a tenuous grip on power. On the one hand, they 
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sympathized with the gerîm, since they are the children of exiles who were gerîm in Babylon (cf. 
Ruth, Trito-Isaiah, Holiness Code, pervasiveness of the Exodus-Wilderness narrative in the post-
exilic Deuteronomistic editing, etc.) On the other hand, however, the post-exilic editors were also 
afraid of the “people of the land” – the Palestinian Israelite majority whose religious and social cus-
toms evolved separately from those of the Israelites of the Golah (“Jews”): given their forced return 
migrant psychology, they saw these other residents as religiously impure and ethnically “contami-
nated”; given their political and demographic weakness, they saw these others as socially and eco-
nomically threatening. The receiving society established by imperial decree in Persian Yehud was a 
small and stressed community, with diminished receiving capacity: this is something to note as we 
seek to reflect on immigration policymaking today. However, we can go even one step further: we 
can assume these people mostly returned (when most other Jews stayed) because they found it 
hard to be integrated in Babylon: they had a low integration capacity as refugees in Babylon, and 
they now have a low integration capacity as ruling class in Yehud.  
Reading between the lines in texts like Ezra and Nehemiah, we can see the sociological and psycho-
logical complexes created especially by forced migration and by the return of forced migrants. The 
resentment of the deportees towards the Babylonians is redirected by some of the returnees to-
wards the “people of the land”. Furthermore, the search for a clear identity in the face of a per-
ceived forced assimilation in Babylon becomes a religious, ethnic and cultural “fundamentalism”, 
imposed on people who are actually similar, and who manifest the richness and diversity of a grand 
religious, ethnic and cultural tradition which gets lost in the frantic search for a uniform and distinc-
tive national identity. 
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We have mentioned, in Chapter 2, some of the problems related to the integration of refugees and 
asylum seekers, and also the problems faced by second and third-generation immigrants who grow 
up in marginalised social contexts, are not fully “integrated” and who feel they were uprooted from 
an idealized “homeland” and forced to grow up in a “foreign” country (not fully appreciating the 
difficult choices made by the parents and grandparents). Whether they stay in the country they call 
“foreign”, or return to the homeland of their ancestors, these persons have particular social and 
personal needs and have to be encouraged to integrate themselves “somewhere” with just and in-
telligent policymaking. Furthermore, their particular social and psychological issues are not to be 
projected onto the whole immigrant population.  
6.6 Conclusion: Immigration Policy Priority Rules in the Light of the Bi-
ble 
At this point, without repeating the conclusions above, we briefly show how the above discussion 
fits into the project of this thesis and helps us move towards formulating immigration policy priority 
rules within a philosophical and theological ethical framework. Overall, the contribution of the Bible 
to our discussion is that it “particularises” the reflection and helps us realised that some of the gen-
eral priority rules have to be tailored to particular societies and take into account their conceptual 
tools and their history. More particularly, the discussion above leads us to formulate three princi-
ples which will help us develop further the priority rules proposed in previous chapters. 
1. Polities need ethically-warranted National Narratives. As we have seen in Section 6.3, poli-
ties need to create cohesion by asserting their distinctiveness, so the way they reconstruct 
their histories and tell who they are is very important (6.3.2, 6.3.3). Anamnestic solidarity, 
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in its more inclusive and hospitable form, can strengthen such narratives (6.3.4). References 
to autochthonous origins (6.3.4) and religion (6.3.5) in such narratives are problematic. This 
leads us to formulate the following principles: Receiving societies should adopt National 
Narrative which they could reasonably expect newcomers to adopt (i.e. the buy-in price, in 
terms of identity markers, should not be too high), and which should be expanded and re-
vised to include the stories of the newcomers. Immigrants wishing to be fully integrated into 
a receiving polity should be willing to buy into such narratives. These principles lead us to 
propose the following priority rule: 
a. National Narrative Rule: Receiving societies have a greater duty to integrate immi-
grants who demonstrate a willingness to buy into the National Narrative, assuming 
that such a narrative is ethically acceptable, inclusive, revisable, and (reasonably) 
adoptable by newcomers. 
2. Immigration policy should be aware of the real (not simply perceived) integration capacity 
of both the receiving society and the immigrants. In section 6.5.2, we mentioned demo-
graphic, psycho-social and political stress factors on the side of the receiving society. We 
should also include, today, economic and environmental stress factors. All these limit the in-
tegration capacity and the ability to produce literary, legal and ritual channels that facilitate 
the integration of the other. A society can eventually welcome more immigrants once it has 
faced up to the reality of immigration and developed such conceptual tools. Similar stress-
ors may also be present on the side of the immigrants, especially traumatized refugees. All 
this points to the Integration Capacity rule, with three parts: 
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a. Stressed nations with limited integration capacity and with underdeveloped con-
ceptual tools (narratives, laws, rites) to integrate strangers may have a lesser duty 
to receive and integrate immigrants (depending on the stressors) while they devel-
op such conceptual tools. 
b. Stressed migrants (especially “forced security migrants” who were violently pushed 
out of their land (cf. 5.3.3)), though they may have a greater a priori right to be 
granted residence (and eventually citizenship) in a safe receiving nation on the ba-
sis of need, often need more help to integrate well (and deal with trauma, conflict-
ing identities, becoming kin to those they perceive as “strangers”).  
c. Regional and International Coordination and Specialization are desirable in dealing 
with stressed immigrants. Polities whose public culture is relatively similar to that of 
the migrants in question are usually better suited to take them in and integrate 
them, and their integration capacity should be expanded with the help of the inter-
national community if needed. Other polities may opt to limit more strictly the stay 
of stressed immigrants, and “specialise” in the reception and integration of certain 
groups of stressed immigrants, provided that they (i) offer adequate help to the poli-
ties more suited to integrate them, and (ii) accept to integrate other stressed mi-
grants with an adequate investment of resources. The international community may 
have a bigger responsibility in this case to provide temporary sanctuary for these mi-
grants in countries  with “similar” cultures, and to seek effective means of avoid the 
radicalization of cultural, ethnic or religious identities within poorly-managed refu-
gee camps or ethnic ghettos in the big cities of poor, stable countries. 
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3. Immigration Laws and policies should adapt to changing social realities, and when it is po-
litically difficult to change certain legal formulations, legal hermeneutics should be used to 
protect and expand, rather than deny or restrict, human rights protections enshrined in 
law. This reflection comes out of our discussion of how the referent of the term ger evolved 
during the history of Israel (section 6.4). The different codes of law in the Bible somewhat 
adapted the “gerîm” laws to the different groups of the persons labelled gerîm at the time 
of writing, but the rights of the gerîm were not expanded by the post-exilic community 
when the majority class of the Israelites — the “people of the land” — was placed in this le-
gal category. Rather, the legal category of “ger” became a convenient legal contraption to 
restrict the basic rights of the majority and strengthen an oligarchic form of local govern-
ment. Modern representative democracies cannot afford to emulate this and keep large 
amounts of de facto residents for decades or generations without some legal status that can 
provide them certain rights similar to those enjoyed by citizens. 
The Bible teaches us a lot about hospitality, but its struggles with integrating the other are probably 
more instructive as we reflect on immigration today. The reflections, principles and rules proposed 
above will certainly be of great help as we reap the harvest of ideas presented in this thesis up to 
this point, and move towards more concrete policy proposals and community practices in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: SOLIDARITY AND MIGRATION POLICY. PRI-
ORITY RULES IN A VIRTUE ETHICS FRAMEWORK 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to bring together the priority rules developed in previous chapters and place 
them within a virtue ethics framework and an understanding of human interconnectedness, both 
included in the notion of solidarity. To better understand what solidarity towards migrants entails, 
we first seek to clarify this term with the help of secular authors (7.1). In the process, we distinguish 
between two modes of solidarity: kindred (or fraternal) solidarity, or “civic kinship”, and hospitable 
solidarity, or more simply “hospitality”, practiced both as “settled” and as “itinerant” hospitality. 
The remainder of the chapter examines the virtues of hospitality (7.2) and kinship (7.3), and include, 
for each of these virtues, (i) a discussion of how the virtue can be understood in secular/political set-
ting, (ii) a Christian reflection on the virtue using biblical materials and practices adopted by faith-
based organizations, (iii) a number of suggestions of how the virtue could engender ritual practices 
and narratives that lend support to some of the immigration policy priority rules we have proposed 
in previous chapters. 
The previous chapter provided a biblical approach to immigration issues based on the Old Testa-
ment. For reasons mentioned in the introduction to that chapter, this dissertation does not use the 
New Testament extensively as a source for an ethics of migration. This chapter, however, while not 
primarily biblical or exegetical, briefly explores some texts in the New Testament relevant to our dis-
cussion. 
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7.1 Solidarity: Clarifying the Concept with the Help of Secular Thought 7.1.1 WHAT IS SOLIDARITY? 
We all have a sense of what solidarity is; we tend to relate the term to several words in our vocabu-
lary, such as “‘community spirit’ or ‘mutual attachment’, ‘social cooperation’ or ‘charity’ and – from 
time to time – ‘brotherly love’ or ‘love of mankind’” (Bayertz 1999, 3). Many authors, as we shall 
see, often use it as a more modern version of the term “fraternity”. Etymologically, it is derived 
from the obligatio in solidum contract made with a group of persons, wherein each member of the 
group pledges to fulfil alone the whole contractual obligation, or repay the whole amount of the 
loan, should all the others default or renege (Goffi 1992, 1729). Today, solidarity is generally under-
stood as a term describing and prescribing a mutual attachment between individuals: it is therefore 
a term with both a descriptive and a normative component. The notion of “solidarity” is often used 
rhetorically in politics or religious ethics to spur people to act in the way advocated by the speaker. 
Yet, from a theoretical and critical point of view, it remains a largely unexplained term. “As other 
central concepts within ethical and political terminology, [it is not] defined in a binding manner, and 
consequently [is] used in very different and sometimes very contradictory ways [; however,] other 
than is the case with comparable terms such as ‘justice’, ‘liberty’ or ‘equality’, this heterogeneity 
does not stem from an abundance of competitive theories” (Bayertz 1999, 3)308. Political ideologies 
308 The polysemy and ambiguity is also present in similar terms used by other cultures, such as the notion of 
“ubuntu” or “botho”, originating in the Bantu cultures of southern Africa, which Leymah Gbowee (2010) 
translates as “I am what I am because of who we all are”. Authors like Magolego (2013) have tried to list the 
ideological components of this term, claiming that “[Black South African] botho can be identified by, among 
others, the following five characteristics: extroverted communities, socialisation of prosperity, redemption, 
deference to hierarchy and humanism”; but the term has different interpretations among South Africans of 
African descent (SAADs) (Gade 2012). Some SAADs do not consider all human beings as “persons” — i.e., as 
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based on liberty (economic liberalism, political libertarianism) are alive and well today (in spite of 
the excesses of laissez-faire capitalism and anarchism), and similarly those based on equality (egali-
tarianism) though less popular these days (and dented by the horrors of Stalinist and Maoist com-
munism); however, ideologies based on solidarity and fraternity (corporatism) have taken a big hit 
since the fascisms of Mussolini, Hitler and Franco. The atrocities perpetrated by these regimes indi-
cate that solidarity and fraternity are tricky concepts to incorporate into modern political life.  
Let us however focus on the normative or prescriptive aspect of solidarity, that is, the virtue and/or 
duty of being solidary with others. Authors like Bayertz (1999, 4) argue that one of the main prob-
lems with solidarity is that it points to positive obligations to act (beneficence), whereas modern 
political though has focussed on negative duties (non-maleficence): the main duty of modern states 
and citizens is not to hinder other citizens from legitimately enjoying their rights to personal, politi-
cal and socio-economic freedoms. This does not mean that modern political societies lack implicit 
systems of positive obligation; more simply, only negative duties are showcased and the positive 
moral structures which undergird the normal functioning of modern polities are obfuscated with a 
political rhetoric and a philosophical conceptual apparatus that highlight only rights and negative 
duties. We have already mentioned this problem in Chapter 2 (regarding the insistence in CST that 
every right implies a corresponding duty) and in Chapter 5 (regarding Henry Shue´s argument that 
negative rights imply positive duties on the part of citizens and of the state — e.g. paying for a po-
participants in the interconnectedness assumed in ubuntu, and even those that are get treated differently, 
given a hierarchy of peoples assumed in the notion. As Magolego (2013) notes, “the lens of hierarchy of 
peoples might explain why Mozambicans disproportionately bear the brunt of [Black South African] xeno-
phobia more than the populous Zimbabwean migrants”. 
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lice force, doing jury duty, etc. — and not only negative duties — e.g. simply refraining from stab-
bing people – cf. section 5.3.3).  
Many modern political authors such as John Rawls have sought ways of keeping in balance the lib-
erty and equality, often seen as soeurs enemies in perpetual competition. However, fraternity, the 
third term of the French Republican triad (or solidarity, its “twin”) is typically not even considered 
as a third sister, but as a total stranger, and is kept out of the mix altogether. Mona Ozouf (1998, 
86) argues that “fraternity is clearly of another order, the order of duties rather than rights, of 
bonds rather than statutes, of harmony rather than contract, of community rather than individuali-
ty”. In other words, solidarity and fraternity are (a) covenantal, not contractual, and they focus on a 
possible social harmony, rather than probable social conflict. They often subsume (b) a positive 
(Thomistic/Catholic) theological and philosophical anthropology, rather than a negative (Augustini-
an/Lutheran) one. They see (c) human persons as “city animals” wishing to build deep political 
bonds among themselves, rather than lonely individuals and small groups occasionally purchasing 
services and protection from a minimal state apparatus. They assume (d) that even in plural socie-
ties, a shared notion of the common good can be found, on the basis of which one can define a lim-
ited, but non-banal, list of positive political duties. To be sure, this is not the place to propose a new 
political theory based on solidarity, or to argue why we should help modern political theory redis-
cover the value of covenantal thought, positive moral anthropology, the social dimension of the 
human self and the common good, while avoiding some of pitfalls of contemporary communitarian-
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ism309. Rather we focus on another problematic aspect of the notion of solidarity, namely that of 
scope.  
7.1.2 THE SCOPE OF SOLIDARITY  
7.1.2.1 Solidarity and Fraternity: A Historical Overview  
With whom ought we to be solidary? This is where a distinction between solidarity and fraternity 
starts to emerge. There are two typical answers to this question. (a) We can and should be solidary 
with the whole human race310 (universal solidarity) and this entails being solidary with strangers. 
(b) We can and should be solidary only with some particular human group. Actually, both answers 
can be true if we distinguish between different forms of solidarity. (a) There is a level at which we 
can and should be solidary with the whole human race, and in any case with people outside our par-
ticular social and political spheres of belonging. The bond and corresponding duties are wide and 
less demanding here: we will call this hospitable solidarity, or hospitality, in our specific context of 
solidarity with immigrants311. Yet (b) there is also a level at which we can and should be solidary 
with other members of our social and political groups. The bond is narrower and deeper here, and 
309 Certain forms of communitarianism can, in fact, reinforce the very notions that solidary political thought 
seeks to resist by becoming ways of retreating from mainstream politics, and ultimately (a) considering polit-
ical belonging in modern polities as a rescindable and banal contract, (b) assuming facilely that other social 
partners are sinful, hence not willing or not able to build a just society on the political level, (c) promoting 
the isolation of small groups from bigger society and hence implicitly fomenting the fragmentation of politi-
cal belonging and political individualism, and (d) limiting themselves to seeking a good that is communitari-
an, but not truly common. 
310 Some would extend this to non-human creation, and to past and to future generations of humans. 
Though we mention anamnestic solidarity in this thesis, we do not go into the other forms of solidarity in the 
present work. 
311 The universal form of solidarity also includes the virtue of humanity (philanthropia, or universal compas-
sion) where one practices solidarity with the other away from one´s home.  
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the duties more demanding: we call this (civic/religious) kinship312 solidarity, or kinship tout court 
and relate it to the traditional restricted notion of fraternity (as used in nationalist or religious con-
texts). In this section, I explain the above distinction, and why I believe that kinship or fraternity is 
to be understood today as mainly a form of in-group solidarity, and why solidarity is to be under-
stood as having an out-of-group component which does not apply to the term “fraternity” as it has 
been used in politics since the 19th century.  
In fact, the terms “solidarity” and “fraternity” are sometimes considered coterminous since their 
scopes crossed over at some point. Before the 19th century, given the demands of the obligatio in 
solidum, only people who were closely bonded in a tightly-knit group could describe their relation-
ship as “solidary”. Yet, fraternity had a mainly universal (or at least cross-cultural and super-
national) dimension based on the idea that all members of Christendom were soteriologically 
adopted children of God, and brothers and sisters in Christ, and to a lesser extent, being created by 
God in God´s image and likeness, all human beings were in some sense daughters and sons of God, 
and thus united by creational bonds of kinship. This Christian notion of fraternity was adopted as a 
major political virtue by some of the movements during the French Revolution (Munoz Dardé 1999, 
82), and represented symbolically by a sheaf, or bundle of stalks (Ozouf 1998, 82). The vertical and 
theological stratification of Christian fraternity (Christ – the Most Christian King – the Clergy – the 
Nobility – The Third Estate) was replaced by a more horizontal and secular stratification (the left-to-
right fan of the Revolutionary Assemblée nationale and Assemblée nationale constituante). Yet, in 
312 In the discussion below, “kinship” is used as a more gender-neutral equivalent of fraternity, not as biolog-
ical kinship. 
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the early days of the Revolution, the sheaf represented the kinship of the whole of humanity (uni-
versal fraternity), which the 1789 French Revolutionary “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen” assumed to assert the existence of human rights beyond those established by positive law.  
As the Revolution progressed, and had to fight foreign monarchist armies, the scope of fraternity 
was gradually reduced: universal brotherhood become brotherhood in arms, and the distinction 
between brothers and foreign enemies emerged starkly, as in the Marseillaise, where one hopes 
that the furrows of the new France may be watered by the “impure blood” of those “hordes” sent 
to “slit the throats” of French children. In the 20th century, the sheaf of nationalist fraternalism, or 
patriotic solidarism, is recast as the emblem of fascist corporatism, which Mussolini and other far-
right politicians (righty) believed would win Catholic support, at least until the Catholics wised up to 
the fact that the harmony between social classes that the Fascists were proposing would be 
achieved at the expense of those who “were not brothers” (xenophobia) and those who “did not 
act as brothers” (abolition of diversity). Of course, the misadventures of corporatism in the 20th 
century do not discount fraternity as a prime political virtue. They however underscore the limits of 
nationalist ideologies based on fraternal harmony, and restrict the use of the term to in-group rela-
tionships within a particular political society. The term “cosmopolitan” or “universal” fraternity to-
day sounds like an oxymoron (that idea, in early French Revolutionary texts313, is better expressed 
313 Internationalist revolutionaries, such as Anacharsis Cloots, were eventually side-lined by the likes of Louis 
de Saint-Just, who claimed that “Cloots liked the world, except for France” (Ozouf 1998, n. 27). Saint-Just 
started his political career declaring that the king was not a citizen, but a traitor, and should be executed; he 
ended up seeing enemies of France everywhere, and became the “angel of death” of the Reign of Terror. 
Coots was one of the many revolutionaries who did not survive the paranoia of Saint-Just and Robespierre. 
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today as “universal solidarity”314): fraternity or kinship in contemporary thought denotes a deep 
and proximal relationship which is hard to predicate of bigger human groups, at least given the cur-
rent weakness and representational deficiencies of international institutions.  
To some extent, the meaning of the term solidarity evolved in the opposite direction. As Bruno 
Mattéi (2001) notes, the notion of solidarity (as a new founding principle for the Republican move-
ment in France) was proposed at the end of the 19th century (as part of the “solidarist” political pro-
ject of Léon Bourgeois) in an attempt to substitute the third term of the French Republican mot-
to315. Civic “Republicans have always thought and still think that, in general, solidarity is more ‘posi-
tive’ and scientific than fraternity, which has thus been relegated to the private, emotional or reli-
gious sphere, and that solidarity is more accessible to a public which could consent to forms of re-
distributive social justice in compensation for the social disequilibrium [caused by capitalist liberal-
ism], when this becomes unacceptable to humanist reason” (ibid.). Authors like Mattéi invite us to 
rehabilitate the concept and virtue of fraternity, and avoid conflating it with solidarity. In the view 
of such authors, the vague and over-extended notion of solidarity (which often evokes institutional-
ised forms of charity) obfuscates and relativises the links we have with our political consociates, 
and hence the duties we have towards them. 
314 In Catholic Social Teaching, the scope of solidarity becomes more and more universal during the 20th cen-
tury; Gaudium et Spes 4, for instance, claims that “the world of today has a very vivid sense of its unity and 
of how one man depends on another in needful solidarity [Latin: necessaria solidarietate]”; similarly, Popu-
lorum Progressio 17, argues that “the reality of human solidarity [Latin: mutua universorum hominum neces-
situdo], which is a benefit for us, also imposes a duty.” Cf. Coste (2004). 
315 The triptych “liberté, égalité, fraternité” was one of many popular slogans of the 1789 French Revolution, 
but it was only officially adopted during the 1848 French “February” Revolution, then banned during the 
presidency (and then dictatorship) of Louis-Napoleón Bonaparte (Second Republic, Second Empire), recov-
ered by the Paris Commune in 1871 and slowly reintroduced during the Third Republic as power shifted from 
the hands of the monarchists into the hands of the Republicans in 1880 (cf. Ozouf 1998). 
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How did solidarity come to designate both in-group and out-of-group social bonding, and hence be-
come an obscure term? Émile Durkheim was one of the major scholars who popularized the term in 
his famous work, The Division of Labour in Society (1893), and sketched an important distinction 
within the concept of solidarity, mostly from a sociological and descriptive stance, though not with-
out prescriptive and moral/political intentions at a time when France was at a crossroads316. Me-
chanical solidarity, in Durkheim, is basically the kind of bond present among members of closely-
knit groups, who bond “mechanically” because of their physical closeness and their patent cultural, 
religious, and ethnic similarities. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, designates the anonymous, 
distant, religiously-neutral, legally-sanctioned, culturally diverse, and economically complex web of 
relationships of large human assemblages in an interconnected modern world. What brings these 
amorphic masses together is the interdependency caused by the division of labour, and hence by 
the very differences that exist between members of modern political societies. 
Durkheim clearly associates “mechanical” more closely with “pre-modern”, and “organic” with 
“modern”, but sees them as co-existing (at least in his day). His distinction, which retains its validity, 
entails that close bonding between citizens in modern societies has to happen not in spite of, but 
with the help of, the fact of pluralism, and the availability of autonomy for the masses. However, 
this does not mean that close political bonds are obsolete, that the market is the only thing which 
316 Mac-Mahon´s attempt to use the Third Republic as an excuse to re-establish the monarchy and the an-
cient “Moral Order” backfired, and it slowly became clear in the 1880s that republicanism and its modern 
ideas were there to stay. In this context, Durkheim´s distinction between “pre-modern” mechanical solidari-
ty and “modern” organic solidary, given his non-conflictual and matter-of-fact approach to the latter, makes 
the political transition seem unavoidable, not too problematic (compared to the conflict-based theories of 
other sociologists of his day), and hence implies that it should not be resisted or deemed morally unaccepta-
ble by conservatives. 
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can bring us together, that we cannot find ways of creating close “kinship” ties within bounded, 
modern political societies and thus deal with the problem of anomie. The Industrial Revolution has 
not rendered Aristotelian “political friendship” any less desirable, and may actually have given us 
the technical tools and the social mobility necessary to put it into practice in the large-scale political 
entities created in early modernity317.  
From sociology, the term “solidarity” transits into philosophy, with early 20th-century authors like 
Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann and Henri Bergson: given modern moral philosophy´s strong orien-
tation towards the universal (first due to its adoption of “natural law” tradition, and then given the 
importance of Kant), it is mostly “organic” solidarity which gets highlighted in these authors. Schel-
er, for instance, converts the kinship-based obligatio in solidum notion into a concept of universal 
moral interconnectedness whereby “each individual is “co-responsible” (mitverantwortlich) for the 
actions and desires, the faults and merits of every other individual” (Bayertz 1999, 6). Solidarity 
hence acquires the universal scope which fraternity had in the first years of the French Revolution, 
but which it lost during the Reign of Terror; in the process, however, solidarity does not lose its 
original meaning as kinship bond between members of a closely-knit group. In this way, solidarity 
317 Aristotelian political friendship is a bonding between peers emancipated from a life lived at the service of 
necessity. It is elitist because it actually assumes a certain level of autonomy, which was available only to 
very few wealthy and educated persons in premodern times. Modern communitarians, when claiming to be 
inspired by Aristotle, and at the same time dismissing the value of autonomy, misunderstand ancient politi-
cal Philosophy. Autonomy existed in ancient societies and it is necessary for political action: Aristotelian po-
litical friendship, just as modern political fraternity, requires autonomy to build political societies (and 
“communities” which can claim to be “political” in some fathomable way): without autonomy all we get is 
clans, not polities. Modernity has simply made autonomy available to many more people that the upper 
crust of society, and this makes the task of building political kinship bonds much more difficult. Regarding 
Aristotelian political friendship and its Christian rendering in the thought of Aquinas, see Heffernan Schindler 
(2008, 151ff).  
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comes to have both an in-group dimension (“fraternity” or “kinship”) and an out-of-group dimen-
sion which we associate here with the notion of “hospitality”.  
The kinship element in solidarity is made visible in liberation struggles, from general strikes by trade 
unions, to the civil rights movement in the US, to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, to 
the NSZZ Solidarność (Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”) in Poland. The hospi-
tality element is visible in many practices through which people welcome strangers, such as those 
we will discuss in section 7.2. The tension between the kinship and the hospitality element is per-
haps most visible in debates on the welfare state (which is probably what comes to mind for most 
people when one mentions the word “solidarity”). Libertarians ask: should we be forced by the 
state to share our hard-earned wealth with people who are not our biological kin? Eurosceptics ask: 
should Polish persons with a European health insurance card be allowed to use free public 
healthcare services in Spain during a severe economic crisis? Nationalists ask: should immigrants — 
and especially irregular immigrants — be given free access to the welfare system? Indeed, with 
whom ought we to be solidary?  
7.1.2.2 The Scope of Hospitality: The Kew Gardens Principle 
The above discussion indicates that we can, and to some extent, we ought, to be solidary with all 
human persons, but in different ways. So the question becomes: with whom ought we to be soli-
dary through practices of hospitality? With whom ought we to be solidary through practices of kin-
ship? With whom ought we to be solidary in a more abstract way, through cosmopolitan feelings of 
“love of humankind” or “respect for all persons”, practices of global justice (e.g. ethical invest-
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ments, reduction of one´s carbon footprint), and the occasional response to a grave need on the 
other side of the planet? In this chapter we focus on the first two. Let us start with hospitality. 
A problematic way of approaching this moral issue is to use empirical science (e.g. sociology, eth-
nology, cultural studies, etc.) to draw concentric circles of belonging or dependence around the self 
and jump from there to moral claims such as: to social group A familial kinship is due; to social 
group B religious or civic kinship is due; to social group C hospitality is due, etc. This approach risks 
incurring the naturalistic fallacy (if the groups are purely the result of empirical observation, and do 
not have some ontological value which entails special moral duties to people in that group). It is al-
so the approach that Jesus challenges in the Parable of the Good Samaritan: the delimitation of the 
scope of the social group of our moral “neighbours” (that is, those persons whom we ought to treat 
in a neighbourly way), is not primarily sociological, but moral. The Samaritan in the parable is very 
distant, sociologically, from the victim in need; let us say he is in social group E or F, among the po-
tential enemies to be avoided. Yet, in the given circumstances, he is morally called to treat the vic-
tim as a neighbour, and to offer him hospitality. The distance which is relevant here is not primarily 
a sociological distance, but a moral distance; of course, morality does take into account sociological 
realities but answers the question “whom should I treaty in a neighbourly way, in this situation?” or 
“to whom should I show hospitality?” using various criteria and not just sociological ones.  
This reflection has been applied by some authors, such as Kristin Heyer, to help us understand bet-
ter when we ought we to show hospitality towards immigrants. Heyer (2012, 143) cites David Hol-
lenbach´s analysis of a public stabbing of Kitty Genovese in Kew Gardens (New York City) in 1964 
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where 38 people standing nearby watched and did nothing318. Hollenbach  (2008, 188) argues that 
“reflection on the Kew Gardens case suggests that an agent has a positive ethical responsibility to 
respond when four conditions are present: (a) there is a critical need; (b) the agent has proximity to 
the need; (c) the agent has the capability to respond; and (d) the agent is likely the last resort from 
whom help can be expected. These criteria cannot be applied mechanically, but they are quite use-
ful in thinking about the scope of reasonability in the face of the suffering”. Criteria such as these 
help us delimit better the scope of hospitality; I do not discuss them further at this point, but the 
application make by Heyer and by Hollenbach is very illuminating. 
7.1.2.3 The Scope of Kinship:  Equal Interdependence  
Let us now reflect on the scope of kinship, in particular, what I call “civic kinship”. Law and political 
theory, which are deemed by most people to have a clear moral component (unlike sociology or 
ethnology) given their orientation towards justice, may here help us to define groups of people to-
wards which acts and attitudes of civic kinship are due. Here again, however, we might need to 
challenge legal and administrative distinctions between people who do not belong to the same 
neighbourhood, do not have the same nationality, are legally resident or not. A helpful criterion to 
determine “whom should I treat as my civic kin” is the notion of interdependence, not merely un-
derstood as a sociological fact, but as a sociological fact which can and should be shaped morally. 
For example, David Hollenbach (2010, chap. 7) reflects on the poverty present in American core cit-
ies, and on the moral and political wall which keeps their inhabitants from fully sharing in the goods 
318 Hollenbach´s analysis, in turn, is based on the “Kew Gardens Principle” proposed by Simon et al. (1972, 
22–25). 
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visibly available in the affluent suburbs. He argues that the problem is not so much one of depend-
ence (e.g. the poor being “dependent on welfare”, or the rich being “dependent on the systemic 
exploitation of the lower classes”), but one of unequal interdependence. Hollenbach (2002, 187) 
describes “interdependence in solidarity” as a reciprocal relationship among equal partners, set in 
the context of “a transformed institutional framework that supports a more equal and reciprocal 
relationship with the larger society”. The opposite of this is unequal interdependence, “the kind of 
relationship that exists between persons who hold very different amounts of power, both power 
which enables them to influence the shape of the larger society they live in and power to influence 
each other, whether directly and intentionally or indirectly and unintentionally” (Hollenbach 2002, 
184). In such a relationship, “one of the partners has the power to make things happen while the 
other partner lacks such power” (ibid.).  
Hollenbach links his distinction to that made by Pope John Paul II, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 26, be-
tween de facto interdependence and moral interdependence. The positive (solidary/moral) form of 
interdependence is one which “enhances the agency and well-being of all who are part of it” (Hol-
lenbach 2002, 188), and in this process, greater respect for the human dignity of all is attained. 
Agency and human dignity are common goods, they are shared achievements rather than goods up 
for the grabs in a zero-sum game. This is why John Paul II defines the virtue of solidarity as a “firm 
and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good” (SRS 38).  
In the context of the relationship between core-city dwellers and suburbanites, who have to live 
together permanently, one would hope that such a solidarity would go beyond one of mere hospi-
tality to being one of kinship solidarity. When speaking of relationship with immigrants, however, 
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this depends on the length of their stay and on the depth of the interdependence that develops. 
However, both in the form of hospitality and in the form of kinship, solidarity has a transformative 
element which seeks to reduce or compensate for the power differentials that exist in the relation-
ships between inner-city poor and wealthy suburban residents, and between citizens and migrants 
– both sojourners and long-term immigrants wishing to become fully integrated into the polity. In 
this way, rather than posit a conflict between justice and love, solidarity demands that we love the 
other justly, a “caritas” which does not overlook the dignity of the other or suppress her agency, a 
love which does not perpetuate power differentials which cannot be morally justified, as traditional 
forms of philanthropy and “charity” often do319.  
7.1.3 SOLIDARITY AS A POLITICAL VIRTUE 
7.1.3.1 The Importance of Political Virtues in Modern Polities 
Speaking about solidarity in this manner places us clearly in the realm of virtues, not merely per-
sonal virtues (which aim towards the betterment of individuals) but of political virtues (which aim 
towards the betterment of society through the search for justice and the common good). Modern 
authors such as Rawls (2005b, 126–130) have cautioned us against counting on high levels of virtue 
in building modern polities, while Christian authors have always pointed to the pernicious presence 
of sin in the terrestrial city, and to the fact that “the fullness of charity will be realized only in the 
Kingdom of God” (Hollenbach 2002, 191). As we differentiate solidarity into the virtues of hospitali-
ty and kinship in the following pages, we will not forget this, yet, as we shall see, in some form and 
319 Regarding the link between “caritas” and solidarity in the Catholic tradition, see Coste (2004, 999f). 
Coste´s article also provides an account of the historical development of the notion of solidarity in Catholic 
Social Teaching, from its introduction by Pius XII in 1939 (Summi Pontificatus) until the 1990s. 
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at some level, both virtues are attainable in our modern political societies, and we can at least ex-
pect Christian communities to showcase this on a local level without expecting them to adopt very 
“radical” or “prophetic” forms of life. 
Modern political philosophy also distinguishes between virtues (which habituate persons to adopt 
certain attitudes via shared practices) and rights (based on norms, enforced by positive law, which 
censures specific actions). The debate between liberals and communitarians, especially in Anglo-
American literature, had led many to mistakenly associate virtue with pre-modern (and homoge-
nous) polities and small groups (or “communities”) and rights with modern societies and large (and 
plural) political groups (or “societies”). I do not seek to challenge this distinction directly320, but the 
debate on the virtue of fraternity in the context of French civic Republicanism since the French 
Revolution, which I will refer to in the following sections, amply shows that modern polities require 
certain levels of civic virtue.  
7.1.3.2 Political Virtues and Political Duties 
Hospitality and kinship, I believe, are duties. The priority rules related to hospitality and kinship are 
not mere suggestions. Even so, I prefer to speak of these rules below in terms of virtues, rather 
than duties. I do not think hospitality towards migrants is something purely “optional”, just as I 
don´t think that certain basic moral virtues are merely “optional” means of self-betterment. Aristo-
tle may claim that they are not necessary for biological survival, but I believe they are nonetheless 
320 Modern democratic polities function without excessive amounts of coercion because they depend on po-
litical virtues (e.g. consistently respecting the other person and her rights), which might be different from the 
virtues of the ancients, but are virtues nonetheless. Similarly, the idea of natural rights predates modernity 
(Tierney 1997). 
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political and moral necessities, both for individuals wanting to realize their potential of being truly 
“city animals”, and for the proper functioning of the city itself (that is needed to satisfy biological 
necessities, and go beyond “bare life”).  
Indeed, in political life, virtue and duty are not as separate as one may think: pace Kant, the “voice 
of duty” does not come from nowhere but is cultivated by the narratives, practices, and rituals we 
usually associate with virtue ethics. A child would never understand why she should universalise 
the maxims that guide her actions unless she enters into real face-to-face relationships with other 
people and learns the value of reciprocity by playing games fairly, respecting rules, and discovering 
that she can “survive” better by collaborating with others instead of cheating and exploiting them 
when she can get away with it. Practices that train us in virtuous living (at home, at school, by 
watching people on television, and so forth) help us go beyond acting rightly out of fear of punish-
ment or shame, and habituate us to respect the rights and dignity of others and thus allow us to 
listen to the voice of “duty”.  
In his discussion on the virtues of “solidarity” and “hospitality”, Vogt (2007, 397ff) links social jus-
tice, moral formation and virtue in modern polities. For instance, if we treat “hospitality” as a politi-
cal virtue, we can embed it in a series of narratives, rituals and other practices fostered by small 
groups (e.g. churches, sports clubs, associations) within civil society (even if they may understand it 
in somewhat different ways, and practice it for different reasons). This can help us provide effective 
moral formation (which goes beyond the language of law and duty) which promotes social justice. 
The “virtue approach” is thus relevant to policy debates, political reflection and action, especially 
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regarding difficult issues such as that of immigration which truly push the boundaries of modern 
political thinking. 
To give an example of this, let us take hospitality. Rather than insist here on the duty of hospitality, 
I prefer to use a virtue language that is both more receivable and more fruitful: it can help us think 
of effective ways of encouraging ourselves and others to actually “do our duty”. Indeed, for many 
people who may fear the “different” other, refuse to identify with her, and thus find it hard to treat 
her with respect, cultivating the virtue of hospitality is a prerequisite to be able to bend the will, 
and not only the mind, to universal moral principles such as those proposed by Kant, and to their 
respective duties. This is why I will endeavour, in this chapter, to present normative, pragmatic, pri-
ority rules concerning policy within a virtue ethics framework, and to link them to narratives and 
rituals. 
7.1.3.3 Bridging the Descriptive and Prescriptive Elements of the Virtue of Solidarity 
This discussion of virtue leads us back to the distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive 
meaning of “solidarity”: the descriptive element (we are “one”, we are all “brothers and sisters”, 
etc.) is often used to argue in favour of the rights of the poor and the excluded, both within the pol-
ity and worldwide, and to undergird an understanding of kinship and hospitality as (moral) virtues. 
How can we best understand this relationship between the descriptive and the prescriptive levels? 
Is there a relationship, to begin with? I have already discussed this, to some extent, in the chapter 
on Methodology (1.2.1), but I believe it is useful to include some further remarks at this point. 
Descriptive and normative, “is” and “ought”, are often contrasted in ethics by simply invoking the 
“naturalistic fallacy”, yet many authors misunderstand the distinction and the application of the 
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fallacy (cf. Ridge 2010). While it is true that we cannot infer from a purely empirical “is” to a norma-
tive “ought”, it is not true that we cannot infer from an ontological “is” to a normative “ought”, 
since an ontological “is” is usually “theory-laden” with an implicit morality321. If we simply observe 
ravens, and note that “all ravens observed between time t and t’ were black”, it doesn´t follow that 
we should kill them. But if we also believe that black ravens cause persons do evil things, then may-
be we should. In this last case, the normative theses “evil should be destroyed”, and “black ravens 
are evil” inform our observation, and the observation of black ravens in this context should rightly 
spur us to action, if these theses were actually morally justified.  
Similarly, solidarity is not merely a fact we observe empirically: empirical observation of human ac-
tion can provide only lists of both egotistic and altruistic behaviours with no interpretation. We 
might try to explain altruism and solidarity as a form of “enlightened” egoism, as Richard Dawkins 
does in The Selfish Gene (1976) but this theory has little moral value unless we combine it with 
moral attitudes such as fatalism, or “biologistic” beliefs (such as the claim that biological processes 
are intrinsically good and we should imitate them). Yet, aware of the theory-ladenness of observa-
tion, we could take a different approach, and say that human interactions are to be observed 
through the lens of solidarity, sociological facts through an option for the poor, or economic data 
through an option for the freedom of markets, and so forth, stating clearly where we stand when 
we observe reality, and what moral stance undergirds our observation. This is why I took time to 
explain my epistemic starting points in the introduction of this thesis. When we do this, we do not 
321 This is why there can be such a thing as “Natural Law” ethics, if we are clear that “nature” in this context 
is not a purely empirical fact (R. M. Micallef 2009).  
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incur the naturalistic fallacy, and we can actually move from theory-laden observations (the “onto-
logical descriptive” level) to moral duties and virtues (the prescriptive level).  
This is why I believe that, even on the descriptive level, kinship, and especially universal solidarity 
(or “hospitality”), are best seen as concepts laden with an implicit morality, or a “metaphysical de-
termination of the essence of the human race” (Bayertz 1999, 7), rather than as empirically-
determined sociological facts regarding benevolent and friendly feelings or bonds between human 
persons. The former understanding, though beckoning to a worldview not accepted by all, has an 
implicit prescriptive component (a theory of the good) and can be used to support the notions of 
hospitality and fraternity as virtues. An approach to the different forms of solidarity which pretends 
to be purely empirical and inductive, or as a purely descriptive exercise, is of little use to us here, 
since it cannot lead to normative or moral claims without incurring the naturalistic fallacy.  
In sum, we postulate the “metaphysical” existence of human solidarity because we assume egotism 
to be morally undesirable, and thus chose to see the former, not the latter, as an essential charac-
ter of human beings, at least for the purposes of moral thought. Some authors object to this ap-
proach, but the same can be said of all morally- and politically-operative terms, such as liberty, 
equality, justice, etc. For instance, human freedom as assumed by liberalism is a metaphysical fact, 
not an empirical one, containing an implicit theory of the good — whether “thick” or “thin”, it is 
definitely there — and without some theory of the good which allows us go from a metaphysical 
“is” to a moral “ought”, no political discourse is possible. 
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7.1.3.4 Education for Social Justice and its Limits 
Empirical fact, however, is not to be dismissed in moral reflection. We have seen, in all the previous 
chapters and especially in chapters 3 and 4, many examples of the lack of solidarity with migrants: 
refusal to welcome them hospitably, refusal to integrate them as political kin. There is an almost 
palpable fear of the other in many modern societies today. This is empirically observable in the so-
ciological data and when meeting people and noting their attitudes in parish halls, conference cen-
tres and metro stations. This undesirable situation invites us to reflect, at the moral, political and 
pastoral level, as Christians and citizens, on how we should act in order to overcome it. Susanna 
Snyder (2012) analyses this situation, which she calls an “ecology of fear”, and suggest ways of 
moving towards an “ecology of faith”. Remember that the words “faith” and “credence” are related 
to “fiduciary” and “credit”, and etymologically denote a socialization of trust, and not only religious 
belief322. Snyder however sees faith-based organizations among the best-suited entities within civil 
society to effectuate this transition from fear to trust. For instance, Snyder (2012, chap. 9) mentions 
the JRS (Jesuit Refugee Service) as one of the major Christian organizations with good practices in 
the accompaniment of asylum seekers and immigrants, which also does effective political advocacy 
and works at the level of Christian communities to overcome fear and build trust in their relation-
ship with asylum seekers.  
In my personal experience volunteering with JRS, and living with Jesuits who work full time with JRS 
in Malta (one of the places in Europe where this NGO is most effective and visible), I have seen how 
difficult it is to move from fear to trust, from hostility and distance to hospitality and kinship. Even 
322 Émile Benveniste has written extensively on this (cf. 1973, chap. 15). 
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within Jesuit communities in Malta, I have heard heated arguments among Jesuits who strongly 
support the work of JRS, and other Jesuits, some with doctoral degrees in Sacred Theology and oth-
er human sciences, who believe that “Blacks” and “Muslims” don´t belong in Malta and should not 
be “treated nicely” by the government, who think that Jesuits working in JRS are wasting their time, 
betraying their vocation, espousing “Marxism” and contributing to the “Islamisation” of Malta. One 
of my closest friends in Malta, a plastic surgeon, whom I love to meet on occasion for a good meal 
and a hot argument, calls himself a well-informed “racist”, and cleverly cites all sorts of scientific 
and other data (interpreted in his very own way, of course) to justify his “beliefs”.  
These examples highlight the limits of education, information provision and rational dialogue in 
helping people overcome fear and hatred, or even becoming more critical of beliefs they feel very 
strongly about. If it is so hard to get well-educated and “informed” people to recognise the rights of 
immigrants and to inculcate in them the virtue of hospitality, how can one reach the “masses in the 
streets” or the typical church-goer? Educating the public (and the Christian faithful) and providing 
correct information is necessary, but not sufficient, to help overcome the fear of the other. Meeting 
immigrants and refugees face-to-face, listening to their stories, and empathising with them is often 
a necessary pre-condition to be able to absorb objective information about immigrants and immi-
gration, interpret it correctly, and allow it to challenge one´s xenophobic prejudices.  
After several years organizing conferences and other awareness-raising activities for adults, JRS 
Malta realized it was much easier to work with children and adolescents in schools: children are less 
free to refuse to meet the other, or to refuse to listen to the other, and that actually makes them 
freer to let their prejudices be challenged. It is harder to get adults to meet immigrants and refu-
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gees and engage in meaningful exchanges with them (unless they are forced to work with them, 
spend time with them in a hospital queue, or have them as neighbours in the same apartment 
block, and in Malta it is still easy to avoid such forms of prolonged contact). Furthermore, even 
when adults participate in face-to-face dialogues with immigrants which could potentially challenge 
their prejudices, or when they are provided with reliable and objective information that could cor-
rect their stances on emotionally-charged subjects, the information is dismissed or “creatively” re-
interpreted to further entrench their beliefs. 
Several recent sociological studies show how “facts” can backfire in this way (Keohane 2010). For 
example, Gaines et al. (2007), analysed how opinions in the US concerning the Bush administra-
tion´s handling of the Iraq war evolved as real-world conditions changed, and concluded that “actu-
al beliefs […] become relevant for political judgments only when people interpret them. Interpreta-
tions provide opportunities for partisans to rationalize their existing opinions”.  In their study, it was 
clear that “most respondents held similar, fairly accurate beliefs about facts. But interpretations 
varied across partisan groups in predictable ways. In turn, interpretations, not beliefs, drove opin-
ions. Perversely, the better informed more effectively used interpretations to buttress their existing 
partisan views.” Similar results were found in studies by Taber and Lodge (2006) and Nyhan (2011): 
strongly partisan views on hot issues not only remain unchallenged when scientific data is provided 
that should normally weaken the basis of their arguments; they also fail to react to personal testi-
mony in ways deemed reasonable or rational by eternal observers.  
Nyhan et al. (2013) shows that when politically informed Tea Party Republicans were provided with 
clear factual information trying to correct myths regarding the Affordable Care Act, they became 
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even more convinced that such myths were true. Studies by Cobb and Kuklinski (1997, 114–115) al-
so point to the fact that many a time, arguments against policy change, even when poor or not 
supported by rigorous studies, often carry more weight, since “people tend to be both risk and loss 
averse [and thus,] con arguments, which accentuate the unpleasant consequences of a proposed 
policy [tend to ] quickly and soundly resonate with the average citizen. Moreover, fear and anger, 
which con arguments presumably evoke, are among the strongest emotions […], and serve as readi-
ly available sources of information when people evaluate an impending policy initiative”. All of this 
has to be kept in mind when trying to change public opinion and public attitudes regarding immi-
grants, and when proposing policy changes that alter the status quo. Interestingly, in many of these 
studies, people who are better read and have a higher level of education seem to be less ready to 
put aside their prejudices, meet the other, listen, and let their opinions be challenged and their 
hearts be changed. 
7.1.3.5 Habituating the Heart by Describing Solidarity: (a) Narrative and Ritual 
The above discussion should not make us despair as regards the human capacity to reason, search 
for and discover the truth through rigorous, critical research and argumentation, and enter into a 
deep dialogue with the other which can thoroughly challenge some of our deepest-held personal 
beliefs. The problem is that, when troubled with strong emotions like fear and hate, the human in-
tellect often ends up rationalizing prejudices rather than analysing facts and situations rationally. 
One tends to find all sorts of “reasons” to avoid meeting the other and being challenged by her tes-
timony, and if that meeting happens, the listening becomes very selective.  
C h a p t e r :  7  — P a g e :  473 
 
When the intellect stops being “rational”, we have to appeal to the “rationality of the passions”. 
Normally, the intellect, via the will, can seek to habituate the passions so that they enhance, rather 
than impair, its rational functioning. When this system fails, however, we may have to move the will 
through the emotions, so as to habituate the intellect to think rationally. There is a long debate in 
philosophy and ethics behind all this, which I will not delve into here. It is the kind of debate that 
made staunch supporters of the rationality of the intellect, such as Plato, to grudgingly admit that 
rhetoric was an important discipline, or Aristotle to distance himself from Plato´s moral intellectual-
ism and develop an ethics based on virtue; it has provoked Ricoeur´s investigations of the role of 
moral imagination, and Lévinas’ reflection on the moral value of truly seeking the face of the vul-
nerable other323. Contrary to what most people believe, the emotive part of the self (figuratively 
referred to as the “heart”, or the “bowels” in the Bible), properly habituated (for example, trained 
to be compassionate), can be a veritable repository for reason, at times more reliable than the in-
tellect. 
Narrative and ritual offer descriptive representations of solidarity which help us to imagine our-
selves in a relationship with the other, one oriented by certain recognisable goods and requiring 
certain behaviours and attitudes. Listening to a narrative that helps us see the immigrant as our 
guest, or participating in a ceremony where the refugee is united to us as a kin, is not descriptive in 
the sense of an empirical observation of a link which exists out there as a “brute fact”. It is descrip-
tive of a reality seen from the perspective of what we consider as morally desirable. This is why nar-
323 Regarding Plato, cf. Griswold (2012). Regarding Aristotle, cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1095b (claim that train-
ing in good habits is a prerequisite to become a student of the Right and the Just); 1103a (distinction be-
tween intellectual and moral virtues). Regarding Ricœur, cf. Power (2003). Regarding Lévinas, cf. Totality and 
Infinity (Lévinas 1979, 187–253). 
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rative and ritual are very powerful means of converting the will and habituating the “heart” to go 
beyond a spontaneous tendency of fear or hate of the other, especially when persons feel threat-
ened by the presence of someone they perceive as radically “different”. We have hinted at this in 
the previous chapter, when discussing integration capacity (section 6.5). Anamnestic solidarity (cf. 
Chapter 6), in its inclusive and hospitable form, can recreate bonds with marginalised people in the 
past, seen as one´s “ancestors”, through story-telling (narrative) and re-enactments of history (ritu-
al). For this reason, a feature film on the hard life of Maltese emigrants which, at the end, points to 
the experiences of immigrants in Malta today, when narratively constructed in such a way as to 
promote the virtue of hospitality, can lead the viewer to strongly identify with migrants and then 
shocks him when he suddenly finds himself, in real life, on the side of the “baddies”. Sports events 
offer the possibility of inclusive public rituals where both fans and players of different ethnic origins 
and cultural backgrounds can come together and live moments of passionate fraternity which help 
them wonder why they resist similar bonds of civic kinship in everyday life. In a religious context, 
narratives and rituals are even more powerful tools to build communion, if our churches muster 
enough leadership, from above and below, to commit themselves to promoting hospitality and kin-
ship using the immense theological, literary and praxical resources they command. This is, of 
course, a very important challenge for the Catholic Church and for other Christian churches, who 
are able to produce impressive bodies of teaching on the ethics of migration, but often find it very 
hard to inform the persons in the pews about this teaching, and to convince them that this is not 
“optional” (G. A. Smith 2006).  
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7.1.3.6 Habituating the Heart by Prescribing Solidarity: (b) Law 
Law is another important tool to habituate the heart; it embodies the more directly prescriptive 
element of solidarity. Laws which intelligently but firmly force people to work and live in the same 
neighbourhoods, attend the same schools and parishes, use the same forms of public transport, 
respect the human rights of others, or make sure that minorities are represented and have a say in 
decision-making processes are very valuable. Such laws, at times, have to come from “above”, as 
corrections to morally unacceptable policies and practices which local majorities are often not will-
ing to change. This obviously challenges popular notions of democracy – especially those which 
simply conflate democracy with majoritarian rule.  
European institutions, US Federal authorities, or national constitutional courts are also important 
organs of democracy which is not a system where people have rights only when the majority so de-
cides. We have seen examples, in Chapter 4, of how the EU forced Malta to adopt a Refugee Act 
after decades of pretending that there was no “refugee problem” in Malta, and then to improve 
reception conditions (4.4.1.2). We mentioned, in Chapter 5, how the German Constitutional court 
nudged politicians to change citizenship laws and voting laws and hence to better integrate immi-
grants and guarantee their rights (5.3.2). Religious law has a role to play too, though it is not usually 
resorted to when promoting social justice issues: I am not referring here to simple condemnations 
of racism as “sinful”, but of parish councils being pushed to plan Sunday masses and events in ways 
that bring together the native-born and immigrants, and parishes in ethnically-segregated vicariates 
to work closely together. At some point, when certain laws — such as anti-discrimination laws, or 
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affirmative action — have been in place for a number of years, most people come to see the injus-
tice of the situation prior to such laws.  
To be sure, simply imposing laws from above, to substitute current laws or practices deemed “mor-
ally unacceptable” by some “higher authority” is an extremely problematic way of proceeding to-
day, especially in politics: this is why we focus on narrative and ritual in our proposals below, and 
why we emphasize the role of churches and faith-based organizations, active in civil society, in help-
ing to overcome the “ecology of fear” and its perverse effects on the intellect. Fostering hospitality 
and kinship towards immigrants and refugees within civil society, as virtues rooted both in authen-
tic Christian discipleship and in citizenship informed by justice and the common good, may actually 
bring about a change of attitude from the grassroots which is eventually translated into law 
through normal representative democratic processes. 
7.1.4 CONCLUSION 
This first part of the present chapter helped us to clarify the concept of “solidarity”, mainly using 
reflections from Philosophy and the Social Sciences. We have distinguished two forms of solidarity 
relevant to our topic, hospitality and kinship, and have briefly explored the questions: “whom ought 
we to treat hospitably?” and “whom ought we to treat as our (civic) kin?” (7.1.2). We have pro-
posed a virtue ethics approach to solidarity and an application of the component virtues of hospital-
ity and kinship to immigration, while insisting that such virtues should be understood mainly as po-
litical virtues (which seek the betterment of society, and the common good), and not merely as vir-
tues seeking personal betterment (7.1.3). In this context, we have seen how descriptive, morally-
laden, approaches to solidarity (namely narrative and ritual, which provide morally-operative, non-
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empirical representations of the desired unity of the human race, and of particular human groups) 
and how prescriptive approaches (expressed in the language of law) are important to habituate the 
heart to overcome prejudice and xenophobia.  
In the following two big sections of this chapter, we discuss hospitality and kinship more in detail, 
apply them to immigration, and explore New Testament sources, Christian tradition, and the activi-
ties of faith-based groups as sources of narratives, rituals (and practices), and religious law which 
foster these virtues in civil society. What we hope to do in the process is provide a glimpse of hospi-
table and kindred discipleship, which can serve as a prophetic voice within society advocating for 
hospitable and kindred citizenship. Discipleship and citizenship, informed by solidarity in this way, 
provide a reliable framework for the priority rules proposed in previous chapters, allowing them to 
be something more than wishful thinking, and hopefully bring them to bear on actual policymaking. 
7.2 Hospitality 7.2.1 FORMS OF HOSPITALITY 
7.2.1.1 Strategic, Reciprocal and Discommodious Hospitality 
We reflect, in this section, on the kind of solidarity which we extend to people who are somehow 
“strangers”, which we refer to as “hospitality”. On weekends of village feasts in Malta, or during 
Thanksgiving break in the US, many families practice what is called “hospitality”. Does this mean 
welcoming kin or welcoming strangers? Christine Pohl (1999, 4) claims that the vocabulary has 
shifted in recent centuries and has become confusing: “Today when we think of hospitality, we 
don’t think first of welcoming strangers. We picture having family and friends over for a pleasant 
meal. Or we think of the “hospitality industry,” of hotels and restaurants which are open to 
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strangers as long as they have money or credit cards”. Pohl contrasts this to the Greek term 
philoxenia, required of Christians in the New Testament (Lk 16;19-31; Heb 13:2; cf. Mk 10:113-15; 
Mt 10:42; Lk 9:12-13; 10:38-42; cf. Meeks 1995, 104–106), and recommended by some pagan au-
thors (cf. Berthelot 2003, 57–64): 
“Hospitality is not optional for Christians, nor is it limited to those who are specially gifted for it. It is, 
instead, a necessary practice in the community of faith. One of the key Greek words for hospitality, 
philoxenia, combines the general word for love or affection for people who are connected by kinship or 
faith (phileo), and the word for stranger (xenos). Thus, etymologically and practically, in the New Tes-
tament, hospitality is closely connected to love. Because philoxenia includes the word for stranger, 
hospitality’s orientation toward strangers is also more apparent in Greek than in English” (Pohl 1999, 
31).  
I am not so sure, however, that the people we welcome on special occasions, and with elaborate 
dinner rituals, are seen as “kin”, rather than “strangers”, and that term has lost its proper or origi-
nal referent in modern English. The advent of the nuclear family has made cousins, old friends, and 
most neighbours distant: they don´t come around to visit except on special occasions; we often 
treat them with elaborate rituals of hospitality to maintain a certain distance. Though less common 
today, even in wealthy and Westernised countries, we still have a sense of what kinship is: the 
“close” neighbour who knocks at least once a week to say Hi, or to borrow something; the “close” 
relative who walks into the kitchen and starts opening cupboards and washing stuff. When we open 
the door for these people we don´t call it “hospitality”; some of them might even have a key to our 
house. 
Hospitality, therefore, primarily denotes welcoming people who are somehow “distant”. We may 
classify these people into three categories: (a) important or useful people we would like to ingrati-
ate (strategic hospitality), (b) peers and friends whom we would like to keep in contact with (recip-
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rocal hospitality), and (c) strangers in need of welcome — temporarily, like the elegant gentlemen 
who just lost his wallet or had his car stolen, or constantly, like the homeless person begging for 
money or a nourishing meal — whom we opt to take into our house, or accompany to a restaurant, 
not seeking any recompense and accepting all the risks (discommodious hospitality).  
In (a) strategic hospitality, the host expects to receive, in the long run, more than what he gives to 
the guest; a small business owner hosting a politician or an influential person for a banquet is the 
classical example of this, but sometimes even the rich and powerful have to treat useful underlings 
(especially underpaid or under-appreciated aides) to ensure their continued loyalty. In (b) reciprocal 
hospitality, the cost and benefit to the host and guest are roughly equal. Many Romance languages 
use the same word for “host” and “guest” indicating reciprocal roles. In some cultures, for example, 
after inviting a friend to dinner, one expects to be invited in return; in others, one brings a present 
to reciprocate the hospitality, and thus be freed of the obligation of inviting the host (though one 
often ends up hosting the host in turn, at some point). In (c) discommodious hospitality, the host 
gives without expecting a material return, and — at least when first engaging in such forms of hos-
pitality — is challenged to move out of her comfort zone; many such hosts later comment that they 
receive more than they give in such exchanges, but what is received is on a different level and not 
comparable to what is given. Discommodious hospitality can be practised superficially (e.g. handing 
out a few coins to silence the person and one´s conscience) or more radically, by venturing out of 
one´s comfort zone to listen to the person and spend time with her. A classical form of radical dis-
commodious hospitality, which authors such as Pohl (1995; 1999) would like our western societies 
and churches to recover, is that of welcoming strangers — especially those who are feared or 
avoided by many in our societies, and who cannot return the gesture — to share a meal with us, or 
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to sleep in our houses: engaging in such practices of hospitality is very important, but as we shall 
see, this is not the only way, and not always the best way, of being radically hospitable.  
7.2.1.2 Is There a Distinctive “Christian” Understanding of Hospitality? 
Authors like Rodney Stark (Stark 1997, chap. 6) highlight how paleo-Christian radical hospitality to-
wards the sick, especially during epidemics, made the “Galileans” stand out in the Roman Empire, 
and helped the little “sect” grow into a significant religious movement. Stark, together with social 
historians like Wayne Meeks (1995), highlights the importance of hospitality as a distinctive moral 
trait of early Christianity. It is important to note, however, that early Christians put into practice the 
notions of philanthropia and philoxenia that pagan authors often proposed, but which had not yet 
been translated into widespread social practices and institutions. Christians thus sought to avoid 
the accusation of misanthropia often levelled at Jewish communities (Berthelot 2003) and their 
hospitality also had an apologetic function. Furthermore, over the centuries, Christians have not 
always been faithful to this tradition, as Pohl (1999) amply illustrates; Christian Ethics may even 
have to be reawakened to the hospitality tradition with the help of modern and contemporary Phi-
losophy (Ogletree 2003).  
Pohl (1995) has argued that early Christian hosts empathised better with marginalised guests, given 
their own situation of marginality324. Today, however, most Christians in Western countries have 
324 However, the marginality of the early Christian hosts should be understood as a product of “otherness”, 
not of “alienation”. “In studying numerous historic texts on hospitality in the Christian tradition, it becomes 
evident that the marginality of hosts is better interpreted through the notion of being aliens than through 
the notion of being alienated because aliens are connected somewhere rather than nowhere, and the ques-
tions of identity, meaning, and community are different from those raised by the experience of alienation. In 
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no experience of social marginalisation, do not read the Bible or Christian tradition from an experi-
ence of “otherness” or “strangerhood”, and see the obligations towards strangers as mostly arising 
from supererogatory “charity”. Solidarity with strangers — especially of the kind rooted in personal 
experience — is not easy to evoke through regular contact with Scripture and tradition. Pace Ameri-
can authors like Hauerwas and Willimon (1989) and some European authors who tend to overem-
phasise the impact of secularisation, most Christians in Western polities are not “resident aliens” 
today, will not become marginal in the foreseeable future, and should not seek to recast them-
selves — mostly through rhetorical constructs — in the situation of pre-Constantinian Christianity. 
Rather, as we have seen in Chapter 6, anamnestic solidarity (in its more inclusive form), the 
memory of being born to a “nation of strangers”, is key to revitalising the Christian hospitality tradi-
tion today. This is not fomented by a distinctiveness of separation, but a distinctiveness of love and 
of service lived at the heart of modern political societies325. Sometimes, Christians may also need to 
adopt “fathers” and “mothers” from other traditions, closer in time and space, and be anamnesti-
cally solidary with them and their experiences of marginalisation, if they want to better understand 
the alien status of the early Christians 1800 years ago. 
an alien community, persons still have a place and an identity, though they experience vulnerability, need, 
and the loss of “home.” Their reference point is still a community in which they have a place” (Pohl 1995, 
123). 
325 This does not exclude the possibility — the necessity, even — of having some Christian groups who con-
struct micro-societies which embody counter-cultural, prophetic and eschatological forms of common living; 
these groups, however, can incorporate only a minority of Christians, and must resist the constant tempta-
tion of an anti-incarnational or neo-gnostic spirituality, claiming that they are “more perfect” than the other 
Christians who opt to “dirty their hands” living in, and seeking to transform, a sinful world. 
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Christian leaders who have dedicated their lives to make the Church more hospitable, such as Enzo 
Bianchi who founded the interdenominational monastic community of Bose, and who was for a 
time censured for welcoming non-Catholics into the community, can teach us a great deal about 
hospitality. The Bose community is renowned for its sterling scholarship in patristic and biblical 
hermeneutics, but Bianchi does not side-line secular and humanistic thought when speaking of 
hospitality: 
"Why should we be hospitable? Because we are human, so as to become human, so as to humanize 
our own humanness. If we do not become aware that we all have become the guests of humanness 
when we were brought into the world, hospitality risks remaining just another duty to fulfil. Seen as 
such, hospitality may still be a significant gesture on an ethical level. Yet, it will remain a fundamental-
ly extrinsic practice, rather than become a way of answering to humankind´s profound calling, a reali-
zation of our humanness as we open our arms to welcome the humanness of others. (Bianchi 2009, 90) 
To be sure, there is a great deal of material in Scripture and in Christian tradition which should 
make today´s churches shining examples of hospitality towards strangers, and, as we shall see from 
the examples below, it is true that faith continues to be a major inspiration and motivation for the 
pioneers of radical hospitality today. Nevertheless, one has to be wary of Christian triumphalism 
and remember that non-Christian and secular voices have often had to remind the Church to live up 
to its ethical tradition, and to revise certain interpretations of authoritative Christian texts which 
deprive them of all their original radicalism and vitality, and turn them into religious rationalizations 
of given, unjust, social structures. The Christian tradition on hospitality is not univocal, and has time 
and again been badly reinterpreted to reinforce, rather than challenge, latent or explicit fear and 
hate of the other.  
The temptation to refuse hospitality is present in Christianity as in other religions and ideologies 
and is visible already in the canon: Meeks (1995, 106) notes how the author of 2 Jn asks his readers 
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to refuse hospitality to Christians who have a different understanding of the faith than he does (2 Jn 
10), then, presumably the same author laments in 3 Jn 10 that those who conform to his reading of 
the Christian tradition have been refused hospitality. Chapter 53 of the Rule of St Benedict starts 
with the command: “Let all guests who arrive be received as Christ”; yet, in practice, such hospitali-
ty “does not imply that Benedict also accepted non-Christian guests, a thing unthinkable in that pre-
ecumenical age” (Kardong 1996, 422). Benedictine hospitality was often restricted to monks and 
pilgrims (Milis 1999, 60), and did not preclude the establishment of separate guesthouses for the 
rich and the poor, as in the Benedictine abbey in St Gall, or guesthouses intended only for the rich, 
as in the Carthusian monastery outside Florence. Luther´s (1971, 275–6) abuse of Jews as unworthy 
guests of the German nation, the welcoming of whom is incompatible with the welcoming of the 
real “little ones” (cf. Mt 25:45) — i.e. deserving German Christian guests — is a classic example of 
how a text traditionally used to showcase Christian hospitality can be turned inside-out by clever, 
xenophobic, interpretation (Pohl 1999, 81).  
In sum, one could doubt that there is a distinctive “Christian” understanding of hospitality, or that 
the Christian tradition of hospitality automatically leads to better practices than those found in 
other religions or among non-believers, but one should hope that Christian hospitality will distin-
guish itself by being more hospitable towards other traditions, and towards the critiques that they 
may want to level at it. 
7.2.1.3 Settler and Itinerant Hospitality 
In one of his books, Bianchi (2009, 87–107) provides a valuable phenomenology of hospitality, and 
discusses features of monastic hospitality towards strangers, such as “leaving the door open”, “lis-
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tening”, “suspending judgement”, “practicing sympathy and empathy”, “engaging in dialogue”, “of-
fering whatever you have”, and recognising that being hospitable is a gift “from beyond”. Pohl 
(1999) similarly describes many elements of the hospitality that Christian households and commu-
nities can afford to their guests. Such texts describe forms of hospitality within the reach of every-
one, however, most authors seem to assume and focus on settler forms of hospitality, and ignore 
that itinerancy is another prominent feature of the early Christian churches, and that Jesus and the 
Twelve were not only itinerant guests, but also itinerant hosts. In this vein, James Keenan (1999, 
234ff) distinguishes between what he calls “Benedictine” and “Jesuit” hospitality. Quoting various 
foundational documents of the Jesuit Order, Keenan (1999, 236) concludes, in agreement with Bri-
an Daley, that St Ignatius seems to picture the typical Jesuit as a “kind of apostolic vagabond”, and 
asks how such a person could ever be hospitable.  
Jerome Nadal, one of the closest collaborators of Ignatius, and probably the most influential Jesuit 
during the difficult transition upon the death of Ignatius, considered the road or the “journey” as 
the main and most characteristic dwelling place for Jesuits. He believed that Ignatius saw this fea-
ture of Jesuit life as a recuperation of one of the most important traits of the primitive church. 
Adopting this hermeneutical key from Nadal, Keenan (1999, 238–9) traces the leitmotifs of itiner-
ancy and hospitality in the major contemplations of the Spiritual Exercises. Keenan concludes that, 
even though the world is a place where people are sinning, even though it can only be a temporary 
home for Christians, and even though living as though the whole world is our home entails embrac-
ing homelessness of some sort, Jesuits, and indeed all Christians are missioned to go out to the ends 
of the earth. This missioning is ultimately a response to a commission, the one received by the dis-
ciples at the end of the Matthew´s Gospel (28:19). According to this evangelical and Pauline itiner-
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ant model of hospitality, which is better evoked by a Christian presence in a refugee camp than by 
life in a Benedictine monastery, “our welcome is not into a particular domicile but into a world 
where God labors” (ibid., 240). The “Benedictine” or settler model of hospitality, of course, retains 
its value, but the “Jesuit” or itinerant model helps us explore new ways of being creatively faithful 
to the primordial Christian tradition in today´s world, and has the added advantage of not requiring 
the guest to adjust herself to an existing order, implicitly imposed upon her by the host, and adopt-
ing the set of values that structure the host´s domicile. 
7.2.2 SETTLER HOSPITALITY  
7.2.2.1 A Biblical Example: Abraham at Mamre 
Abraham´s hospitality at Mamre in Gn 18 is one of the most significant narratives of hospitality in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the first scene, we see Abraham sitting at the entrance of his tent 
in the heat of the day when most would be tempted to go inside and take a nap.    
I would like to underline the fact that Abraham positions himself on the threshold of his tent, in that 
spot which gazes towards the outside while also guarding the inside, on the line that marks the bound-
ary between intimacy and public life. The threshold, both our own and that of the other, is the existen-
tial locus where we should always position ourselves when meeting the other: it marks difference while 
being open to relationship, to what is beyond that difference, it becomes the first site of a renewed ex-
change with those who pass by or suddenly show up (Bianchi 2009, 68–69). 
In verse 1, YHWH visits Abraham, yet in verse 2, Abraham sees three men. What is the relationship 
between YHWH and the three men: is the trio the actual form of manifestation of YHWH, are there 
two divine manifestations at once (YHWH and the trio), or are the men simply travelers who hap-
pen to visit while Abraham is having a theophanic experience?  Though many Christian commenta-
tors consider Gn 18 as a single pericope and tend to equate the men with Yahweh, Jewish commen-
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tators (partly in reaction to past Christian apologetics which often claimed that the Trinity is prefig-
ured in this passage) make it clear that the Lord is not to be confused with the three visitors (Sacks 
2006)326. The typical rabbinic solution is to dismember Gn 18; v. 1 is construed as a quick visit by 
Yahweh to Abraham (e.g. Rashi depicts it as a sort of hospital visit after Abraham´s circumcision in 
Gn 17:24-27), vv. 2-15 as a successive visit by a group of strangers (and annunciation of Sarah´s 
pregnancy), and vv. 16-17 as a separate visit by Yahweh (after the strangers depart), where Abra-
ham bargains with God, seeking to spare Sodom and Gomorrah. Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, how-
ever, suggests another way of making sense of Gn 18, while keeping it as a single pericope and dis-
tinguishing two sets of visitors. In his reading, Abraham starts by welcoming Yahweh at the en-
trance of his tent, but before Yahweh gets the chance to speak, Abraham sees three men approach-
ing. Abraham, therefore, interrupts Yahweh and welcomes the three visitors in his tent (since they 
are hungry and tired, they seem to require more urgent and more prolonged attention than Yah-
weh, who gets out of the way and waits patiently for his turn). Finally, when the men leave, Abra-
ham continues his conversation with Yahweh (ibid.).  
To be sure, readers who conceive God as a busy corporate executive who cannot possibly be kept 
waiting in line, and who have never travelled on foot in a desert “in the heat of the day”, will quick-
ly dismiss this interpretation (or even find it offensive): nobody in his right mind would interrupt 
God and keep him waiting in this way. Yet, readers more accustomed to Near Eastern hospitality 
and the conception of time in agrarian and nomadic societies will see that this interpretation ex-
326 Maimonides, however, considers Gn 18:1 as a title of sorts (“The Appearance of YHWH to Moses Near the 
Great Trees of Mamre…”) and so assumes, like many traditional Christian authors, that Yahweh appears in 
the form of the three men (Sacks 2006). 
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plains the singular form in v. 3 (“If I have found favour in yoursingular eyes, my lord {adonāy}, don’t 
[yousingular] pass yoursingular [singular] servant by”) better than the more “pious” classical interpreta-
tions: Abraham seems here to be politely telling YHWH to wait until he is done serving the other 
guests, rather than addressing the senior member of the trio. It also explains better the transition 
between vv. 16 and 17 (“Abraham walked along with [the men] to see them on their way. Then 
YHWH said […]”): rather than starting a new conversation while walking with the trio, who suddenly 
is referred to by the text as YHWH and addressed in the singular, Abraham has actually sent the 
men off and gone back to converse with Yahweh.  
Sacks (2006, 3) convincingly argues that Abraham, in this reading, does not have his priorities in-
verted: he can easily assume that the theophanic God does not mind waiting, since it is the very 
same God that he is waiting upon in the “needy” strangers. We do not only welcome God in the 
mystic heights of prayer, but also in the seemingly banal encounters with the people we welcome 
in everyday life, which are equally important (and sometimes more pressing) manifestations of 
God´s presence. That is why, at the end of the passage, Abraham (unlike Noah in Gn 6-7) is not 
afraid of arguing with the theophanic God, seeking to spare the citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah: 
no matter how evil their deeds, there may still be a remnant of innocence in these cities in which 
Abraham can see God´s presence. The Bible highlights Abraham´s ability to recognise the divine 
presence in a multiplicity of ways, in personal YHWH theophanies as in the visit of human-angelic327 
327 Two members of the group of three who visited Abraham in Mamre (Gn 18:1-33) later visit Lot; the text 
refers to them at times as “messengers” or “angels” {mlʾḵ} (Gn 19:1.15), at times as “humans” {ʾnš} (Gn 19: 
5.8.12.16).  
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travellers, in the itinerant God who walks with him and visits him regularly as a guest (e.g. Gn 18) as 
in the settler El Elyon who hosts the wandering Abraham at the shrine in Salem (Gn 14:18-20). 
7.2.2.2 Welcoming Migrants today in Italy and Mexico 
Many NGOs working with migrants follow the settler hospitality model, especially when faced with 
a high turnaround of people who do not always settle in the city or area where the organizations 
operate, and in their early years. For instance, in 1997, when I volunteered briefly at the Centro 
Astalli in Rome, run by the Italian Jesuit Refugee Service, the NGO focused on legal aid to asylum 
seekers, while distributing meals, offering temporary lodging in large dormitories and providing 
some basic health services. In recent years, Centro Astalli328 has spread to seven other Italian cities, 
become involved in cultural initiatives and seconda accoglienza (second level of welcome) projects, 
but the first-level hospitality remains at the core of its activities. 
Basic hospitality is also the predominant model adopted by the Mexican network of immigrant 
shelters, some of which I visited in summer 2012, starting from the border with Guatemala. In the 
first major city in the south of Mexico, Tapachula, I visited two shelters, one run by the Scalabrinian 
fathers329, and one founded by a lay woman, Olga Sánchez-Martínez330. The first one was very well 
organized, clean, and professionally run. It bore the marks of an international franchise run by a re-
ligious congregation with a lot of experience and resources. The screening routines seeking to keep 
out people-smugglers, crime syndicates and their agents, and the strict separation of men and 
328 Cf. http://www.centroastalli.it/ (visited on 2nd June, 2013). 
329 Cf. http://www.migrante.com.mx/Tapachula.htm (visited on 2nd June, 2013). 
330 Cf. http://www.alberguebuenpastor.org.mx (visited on 2nd June, 2013). 
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women seeking to avoid harassment, however, gave the place a feel of a Western-style government 
agency. The “guests” had little say in the running of the shelter, and the visible distance from the 
“service providers”, trained to maintain professional boundaries, seemed to engender negative be-
haviours in a few of the guests, which in turn give rise to more regulations and restrictions on the 
migrants´ agency. To be sure, giving the guests a sense of agency and reciprocity in an immigrant 
shelter is an extremely challenging ideal to put into practice. I have seen other extremes where 
shelters are practically run by the migrants themselves, with serious problems of hygiene, inept 
administration, discrimination against certain types of immigrants, and risks of criminal infiltration.  
Olga Sánchez Martínez (“la Señora Olga”, as she is known) runs a different style of shelter which 
specialises in receiving mutilated immigrants, often pushed off the train by gangs or beaten with 
machetes for not surrendering their money (crime syndicates in Mexico prey on Central American 
immigrants who decide to travel to the US or to the factories in the North of Mexico without their 
costly “assistance”). Many years ago, this woman, who has struggled with crippling illnesses all her 
life, felt called by the Crucified Christ to dedicate her life to the service of these “little ones”, and 
started taking severely injured and disabled immigrants into her home. They were often left waiting 
and bleeding for hours in emergency rooms by nurses who argued (mainly on the basis of their 
Spanish accent) that they were “not entitled” to care, and then provided a simple bandage and sent 
them out into the streets (Sánchez Vázquez 2012a). Sra Olga soon started begging and pestering 
business owners and surgeons to finance artificial limbs and provide surgery, and wealthy money-
lenders to allow her to take out huge loans to pay for the medical expenses of the immigrants. She 
eventually bought land, and built a shelter with the help of volunteers and immigrants: the building 
is not professionally designed (she sketched the plan herself in the soil), not professionally run, and 
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lacks the level of cleanliness one would expect in a place full of convalescing patients. The “guests” 
who are strong enough to participate in the running of the place, and support the shelter by baking, 
knitting, and doing handcrafts which the foundress sells in the city through her network of support-
ers. Ms Sánchez Martínez hopes to eventually build a clinic with a fully-equipped surgical ward and 
professional team; if she ever gets there, the shelter will probably end up looking very different. 
Today, much depends on her personal charismatic style. This means that though she has won pres-
tigious prizes and international fame, she has no idea how to use the publicity to raise funds from 
big Mexican and international donors, and is not sure that she wants to pay professionals to do that 
for her. Rather, she continues to go out every morning to beg for money and help from her neigh-
bours and from the nouveau riche of this bustling border city. 
The above examples show us different types of settler hospitality towards immigrants. The tenden-
cy towards institutionalisation is very strong, even when one starts off welcoming immigrants in 
one´s own home, and showing the kind of hospitality privileged by authors like Pohl (1999). Yet, in 
today´s complex world, when thoughtfully set up, institutions can become true “houses of hospital-
ity”, venues where people can sit together, listen to each other and share a meal, in relative safely 
(legal, physical, medical), and where volunteers and guests (and to some extent, professional staff) 
can all host each other simply and reciprocally. This becomes possible when such institutions be-
come venues of itinerant hospitality, welcoming not only itinerant guests, but also itinerant hosts. 
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 7.2.3 ITINERANT HOSPITALITY 
7.2.3.1 Itinerant Hospitality in the Gospel 
Abraham and Lot offered hospitality to strangers, being themselves strangers; as we have seen, the 
Old Testament repeatedly seeks to help its readers become aware of their otherness and their be-
ing gerîm of some sort, and uses this as a central argument to promote hospitality and defend the 
rights of strangers. Similarly, the New Testament depicts Jesus as a stranger in all kinds of ways — a 
wondering Galilean and a liminal Jew, raised in Egypt, who ultimately comes from a heavenly Father 
and is not welcome in the “world” (Senior 2008; Cervantes Gabarrón 2003, 273–275). As Christine 
Pohl (1999, 17) argues, the “intermingling of guest and host roles in the person of Jesus is part of 
what makes the story of hospitality so compelling for Christians, Jesus welcomes and needs wel-
come; Jesus requires that followers depend on and provide hospitality. The practice of Christian 
hospitality is always located within the larger picture of Jesus’ sacrificial welcome to all who come 
to him”. 
Jesus did not have a “home” of his own (Lk 9:58). He nonetheless welcomed persons and hosted 
them on the wayside, in the houses of friends, and at the inns and taverns of first-century Palestine 
(the structures of “commodified hospitality” which existed at the time). The Last Supper is a central 
itinerant hospitality narrative in the New Testament (cf. Mt 26:17-30, Mk 14:12-26, Lk. 22:7-39 and 
Jn 13:1-17:26), as is the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:29-37) and the Emmaus narrative (Lk 
24:13-35): 
 The story of Jesus’ post-resurrection encounter with two disciples on the road to Emmaus reinforces 
the promise of Jesus’ presence in shared meals (Luke 24:13-35). Jesus comes to them as a stranger 
(they do not recognize him), but they welcome him as a guest, and in breaking bread together, Jesus 
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becomes their host. In this moment of table fellowship they recognize him as their risen Lord. Jesus is 
known to them in the breaking of the bread — an anticipation of the Eucharist and a foretaste of the 
final Kingdom banquet (Pohl 1999, 31). 
Yet another important example, found in all four Gospels, and in some cases repeated to underline 
its significance, is that of the multiplication of the loaves, or the feeding of the multitude (e.g. Jn 
6:5-15): Jesus provides a banquet for thousands of people in a place which is not his “house”, out of 
a lunch bag which was not his own, demonstrating that, in fact, all the world is his home. 
When reading these stories, Christians come to realize that to be hospitable one does not need to 
have a spacious house or a well-stocked pantry, that true hospitality can be practised on the road 
or in a restaurant, that is, in a common or rented space with purchased or borrowed food. Fur-
thermore, this model of hospitality insists that, to be hospitable, we may at times need to leave our 
home and become travellers ourselves. Indeed, many people who need our hospitality will never 
dare approach our neighbourhoods or knock on our doors. We can only welcome them by moving 
out of the spaces we control so as to meet them on ground which is “neutral” or somehow “for-
eign” to us.  
Some authors, however, seem to dismiss or bracket too quickly this form of hospitality; Pohl (e.g. 
1999, 7), for instance, tries to argue that in the last 300 years the practice of hospitality virtually 
disappeared from Christian life and faith. Though Pohl is right in arguing that we should rediscover 
and update some of the past practices of settler hospitality, one might also argue that in the past 
centuries, Christians have developed more “itinerant” forms of hospitality where persons are wel-
comed through church-based, private or public institutions, in wayside inns run by “others”, and 
such forms of hospitality need not be “defective”. Furthermore, some of the institutions — such as 
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the many schools, universities, hospitals, shelters and retirement homes founded by religious con-
gregations, dioceses and lay Christians in the 19th and 20th centuries — seek to go beyond hospitali-
ty and try to help the needy stranger become a sister or brother on an equal footing with the for-
mer host, now no longer in urgent need of discommodious hospitality, but fully integrated in socie-
ty and able to offer hospitality to others. 
7.2.3.2 Itinerant Hospitality in Mexico 
Let us give some contemporary examples of this form of hospitality. Another immigrant shelter I 
visited in southern Mexico is that founded in 2007 by Fr Alejandro Solalinde Guerra in Ixtepec City, 
Oaxaca. The institution seeks to provide food and shelter in a safe environment, especially for im-
migrants from Central America riding north on cargo trains, and also medical, psychological and le-
gal services. The model, of course is basically one of “settler hospitality”, yet, when I was visiting in 
summer 2012, Fr Solalinde was in hiding, after receiving serious death threats by criminal networks 
linked to the police and to local politicians, whom Solalinde was not afraid to confront and accuse 
publicly (Matías 2012). The shelter had become a space run by volunteers from all over Mexico, and 
from all over the world; I remember meeting groups of young people from the US and from Scandi-
navia. Of course, these volunteers were coordinated by a “permanent staff” of religious sisters, and 
given the visibility of the project, the authorities had decided to equip the shelter with armed 
guards. Thus, in a way, most of the people running the shelter came from the outside, and were at 
once guests and hosts practicing itinerant hospitality. Given that the shelter was only five years old, 
the buildings were half-finished, and the organization lacked a trained permanent staff that could 
function well in the absence of Fr Solalinde, the services provided were very basic, and the volun-
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teers seemed lost in a leadership vacuum. This does not mean that itinerant hospitality doesn´t 
work; rather, it points to the fact that structure and leadership are very necessary when hosting 
others in a space which we don´t “own”331.  
Another form of itinerant hospitality is that practiced by “las Patronas”, the ladies of “La Patrona”, a 
village dedicated to Our Lady of Guadeloupe, the “patrona” of Mexico, which forms part of the mu-
nicipality of Amatlán de los Reyes in Veracruz. Growing up on fertile farmland adjacent to a railway 
line, these farm girls slowly became accustomed to seeing immigrants passing by, hanging on cargo 
trains. Then, one day, 18 years ago, one of those immigrants, who typically spend hours trying not 
to faint or fall asleep (and risk falling off the train and being sucked and crushed under it), asked 
them for some food and water. They have since then been providing meals to the immigrants, 
throwing bottled water and neatly wrapped packets of rice and beans at them while the train slows 
down slightly to take a bend (Najar 2012). Norma Romero and her 13 companions work hard to 
prepare simple but tasty food, collect and sterilize plastic bottles with the help of schoolchildren, 
and solicit donations of food staples from their neighbours and from aid agencies. When they start-
ed, in the 1990s, there used to be maybe 10 migrants on each train, but in the mid-2000s before 
the economic crisis, some of the trains were carrying 500 people or more. The women struggled to 
slow down the trains and find ways of distributing food to this multitude without risking their life 
and without being accused of encroaching on railway property. Over the years, they have seen 
growing national and international support for their work, but some of their neighbours still fail to 
331 Solalinde returned to the shelter in late July 2012 (Mariscal 2012), but the local bishop immediately took 
over the institution and sought to move him to a regular parish (Gil Olmos 2012); instead Solalinde decided 
to take the road to Washington to support comprehensive immigration reform in the US. 
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understand why they are putting so much energy into helping strangers, and call them “crazy”. 
Some cannot believe that such a group of unsophisticated women could actually cook and distrib-
ute so many meals, and suspect they might be stashing away the food or the aid money for person-
al gain. Local church authorities have not always been supportive, at times giving the impression 
that they were more interested in taking over the project than in helping and empowering these 
women. 
In other cases, the local church and its hierarchy can be truly supportive. Another example of itin-
erant hospitality is that organized by Fr David Hernández Tovilla in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz. Here 
too, the work started with a group of women, who, with the help of Fr Uriel Medina Romero 
founded the association El Comedor de María in the early 2000s, to offer hospitality to immigrants 
who often stop and rest under a highway bridge over the railway line. Many inhabitants of the in-
creasingly prosperous coastal city passed by the migrants huddled under the bridge, day and night, 
but did not “see” them (Carrasco 2012). The Comedor group, however, started to notice their pres-
ence and make them visible to others. Diana Hernández Magaña, who coordinates the group, says 
that they are “only a group of women who started doing this work out of love for Christ, for Jesus, 
seeking to see the face of Christ in that of our immigrant brothers” (Ramos Álvarez 2012).  
The amount of immigrants passing by foot through Coatzacoalcos increased dramatically in summer 
2012, given the collapse of railway bridges in several southern Mexican states due to flooding in the 
spring. When I arrived at the site, in early June, at around 1:00 pm, I could see only groups of mi-
grants dozing under the bridge, and stalls set up by locals selling overpriced beverages and snacks 
to these “guests”. Then, at around 1:50pm, a group of pick-up trucks appeared, unloaded chairs 
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and tables, and within minutes set up a space for mass332, a space for food distribution and a space 
for medical attention. The mass started at 2pm, and finished at 2:40 pm, at which time the medical 
staff arrived, accompanied by another fleet of vehicles loaded with freshly-prepared food. We were 
told that there was a rotation of 17 teams (of 2 to 20 persons) from different parishes in the city 
who prepared the food daily and delivered it to the site at the scheduled time (cf. Santiago Mendo-
za 2011; Sánchez Vázquez 2012b).  
All of the above examples of hospitality, “settler” or “itinerant”, help us to anchor the priority rules 
we have developed in previous chapters, regarding transiting migrants and sojourners, within the 
social practices that make the virtue of hospitality visible and allow both hosts and guests to reap 
its benefits. 7.2.4 PRIORITY RULES BASED ON THE VIRTUE OF HOSPITALITY 
Let us now present the priority rules sketched in previous chapters within the framework of the vir-
tue of hospitality as outlined above. While generally following an inclusive approach, inspired by 
Catholic Social Teaching and cosmopolitan trends in contemporary Philosophy, the rules do place 
some limits on hospitality. 
We have to recognise that there are limits to hospitality: not the limits dictated by the selfishness of 
those who have barricaded themselves in their own well-being and close their eyes and heart to the 
suffering other, but the limits imposed by a real ability to “make space” for others, objective limits, 
which could possibly be widened with serious commitment and a strong determination, but limits 
nonetheless (Bianchi 2009, 12–13). 
332 It was a feast day of obligation for the Mexican volunteers, most of whom were Catholic, and they want-
ed to celebrate mass with the immigrants, even though the latter were mostly Evangelical Christians from 
Honduras. 
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Bianchi argues that the criteria for refusing someone should not be inspired by ideology, and also 
refuses criteria based on religious affiliation or cultural “similarity”; he also quotes St. Ambrose, 
who claimed that “to choose from among guests is to demean and to empty hospitality”. Yet, one 
cannot speak of limits and avoid choosing among guests in some way or other: simply establishing a 
quota of immigrants that a country can afford to “make space for” every year, and letting them in 
on a first-come-first-served basis is another form of choosing from among guests. Moreover, it is 
probably the most rudimentary one since a discerning host doesn´t “make space for” all kinds of 
guests in the same way. This is why, on the basis of the argumentation in the previous chapters, we 
will present the following priority rules which help us choose fairly among immigrants, while also 
treating the receiving community fairly, hence establishing “borders fair on all sides”.  
In this section we present the four priority rules based on the virtue of hospitality. The first rule 
(H1) has to do with a country´s capacity to receive travelers, sojourners, refugees and immigrants 
for an initial stay (which is different from the capacity to integrate political others on the long run – 
cf. rule K3 below). It is based on the idea that freedom of movement is not to be unduly restricted, 
and that asylum seekers should be allowed in to file an asylum claim. More prosperous, developed, 
thinly-populated countries in non-ecologically-sensitive territories have a greater duty to leave their 
borders as open as possible in times of peace, especially if they are liberal democracies explicitly 
committed to the promotion of human rights and personal freedoms. The second rule (H2) reiter-
ates this, by specifying the conditions when modern liberal democracies can justifiably keep people 
out. The point here is that only grave moral reasons can be used to justify restrictive immigration 
policies in such countries: economic gain, political opportunism or vague references to cultural or 
racial hegemony, as such, are not valid reasons to restrict people´s freedom of movement and to 
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seriously endanger the lives of persons seeking asylum. The third rule (H3) brings the reflection on 
history-laden interdependence, which we made in Chapter 4, to bear on reception and entry of asy-
lum seekers and immigrants.  
All of these rules express the kind of hospitality one would expect from receiving countries, espe-
cially those who can offer it and who ostensibly uphold certain rights (e.g. of asylum, freedom of 
movement, freedom of opportunity) which have hospitality as their correlative duty. As we have 
stated above (7.1.3), they are “duties” in that they are not simply optional, but they are also virtues 
in the sense that people need to be habituated to fulfill such duties, and to accomplish them not 
grudgingly, but willingly and well, seeking a certain enjoyment and excellence in the practices that 
make hospitality a lived reality. 
Of course, the distinction between entry and long-term residence is very important, as is the dis-
tinction between hospitality and kinship. Letting people in is one thing, letting them stay is another. 
We return to this point when we discuss kinship, below. We do not seek to provide substantial fur-
ther argumentation for these rules at this point, but given our virtue-ethics approach, we will simp-
ly show their compatibility with, and their place within, Christian virtuous practices, some of which 
can be emulated by non-believers. We hope that this will help our political societies overcome the 
“ecology of fear”, and eventually find legal and political means of adopting these rules as part of 
their policies. 
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(Rule H1) Recipient Country Selection Rule (cf. section 5.4) 
A polity has a greater moral duty to open its borders to immigrants if it is (i) prosperous (high GDP) 
and highly developed (high HDI); (ii) not too densely populated; (iii) not situated on an ecologically-
sensitive territory; (iv) a liberal democracy explicitly committed to the promotion of human rights 
by its constitution. 
Note: This rule is linked to Rule K3 below (Integration Capacity Rule); the countries fitting the above 
description generally have a higher capacity to host and eventually integrate immigrants, though 
integration requires certain cultural assets (ritual, narrative and legal traditions) over and above 
those needed to temporarily host migrants. 
Hospitable citizenship: (a) Narrative: This rule makes sense when situated in political narratives of 
gratitude, where a people learns to count its blessings: many countries like Malta, who have found 
prosperity in recent decades, often highlight the suffering and misery in their past. In liberal democ-
racies, telling the story of how the Constitution and the current political structure came into being, 
is important to explain why the country attracts immigrants today. Told in all honesty, such narra-
tives serve to debunk the myth that “we did it all by ourselves”, and help citizens to realize that 
burdened polities need help to attain a comparable level of well-being. Note: such a narrative, in 
this section and in those below concerning the priority rule, should be told in a variety of ways to 
stimulate the moral imagination: history books, TV documentaries, feature films and short videos, 
song and drama are among the most relevant media. (b) Ritual: The celebration of Thanksgiving in 
the US is an important moment of civic gratitude; other countries often take time to count their 
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blessings on New Year´s Eve, but the deeper significance of this is lost in forms of revelry which 
have lost their significance. 
Hospitable discipleship: (a) Narrative: The Bible and Christian tradition can provide many narratives 
which underscore the joy and beauty of sharing, which can be used to help us reflect on our atti-
tudes towards immigrants and refugees. The whole of salvation history points to God´s desire to 
take us into God´s home, leading us into a better place, settling us in a “promised land”; this can 
help Christians explore the aspirations of migrants for a better life for themselves and their chil-
dren, as well as their unflinching eschatological hope in the future which is better grounded than 
the facile progressivist optimism common in Western thought. (b) Ritual: Izuzquiza (2011) invites us 
to highlight the presentation of gifts during the Mass to recognise what we have received and to 
open our hearts and our hands towards immigrants. Water is a very important element in Christian 
liturgy; it can be used to remember the phenomena of desertification and the rise of the sea level 
elsewhere in the world, in ecologically-sensitive territories, and its impact on migration. The Te De-
um celebration, at the end of the year, can be enriched and used to foster a greater sense of grati-
tude, and a desire to share one´s blessings. Finally, as more and more people embrace the practice 
and spirituality of pilgrimage, it is helpful to remember, in the context of such gatherings, that a pil-
grimage entails going somewhere, and yearning for someplace. It is not simply wandering about. 
Similarly, migrants and refugees are not wanderers: they yearn to go someplace worth the trip. 
Seen in this context, policies which send them back home, or return them to “safe third countries” 
when they can really take them in, seem petty. 
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(Rule H2) Immigrant Entry and Sojourn Selection Rule (cf. section 5.4) 
A modern liberal democracy which can afford to welcome migrants and asylum seekers should 
normally allow legal entry and temporary sojourn, except when this poses a serious and credible 
risk of (i) insecurity; (ii) disruption of public order; or (iii) severe dilution of its political culture and 
weakening of its political institutions, or else (iv) when certain restrictive policies can be shown to 
enhance liberty and equality on a cosmopolitan level in the long run.  
Note: As mentioned above (section 5.4), this rule seeks to protect (α) the right to file an asylum 
claim, (β) the right to freedom of movement, (γ) the value of creating a deeper unity between peo-
ples of recognising their interdependence; it also follows from (δ) the cosmopolitan duties which 
encumber territorial stewardship and from (ε) liberal and democratic arguments. We also men-
tioned that polities without a liberal or democratic constitution, may refuse arguments of type (ε), 
but should also adopt some version of this rule for the other reasons. Though this has to be careful-
ly examined in each particular case, we assume that (i) to (iv) above do not usually obtain in pros-
perous Western countries in times of peace, and we will focus here on promoting (α) and (β) above, 
and countering xenophobia rationalized through arguments of type (i) to (iv) above. 
Hospitable citizenship: (a) Narrative: It is healthy to underline that the great majority of immigrants 
do respect reasonable and morally-acceptable laws, and to place crime stories related to immi-
grants in the proper context, helping people to understand the effects of trauma and marginalisa-
tion. Promoting the right of people to enter to seek asylum entails providing these people with the 
opportunity to tell their story to the natives in the receiving countries — persons who often are 
completely unfamiliar with the experience of oppression or persecution — in ways which can evoke 
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empathy. Promoting the right of freedom of movement entails highlighting the richness which the 
other brings, the contagious sense of adventure and thirst for the unexplored that some migrants 
carry with them, experienced in real, challenging, long-term contacts with the other that bear no 
comparison with Western tourist trips. (b) Ritual: Sports rituals can embody and represent all of 
this in the freedom of movement of the players, the contact between cultures which occurs during 
sporting events, and the richness and strength of teams which bring the diverse and plural into one 
concerted action. Political rituals and sites which remember the horrors of genocide and the suffer-
ing of people refused asylum, such as the Jews in the 20th century, can be used to shine a red light 
on policies which seek to keep people from filing asylum claims in our countries today, and on 
demagogic politicians who depict all asylum seekers as “bogus”. Walking together along symbolic 
trails, such as the Boston “Freedom Trail”, in support of the rights of refugees and immigrants can 
be a powerful public ritual. 
Hospitable discipleship: (a) Narrative: The Bible and Christian tradition abound with refugee stories 
which should stimulate us to keep our national borders as porous as possible. It is also important to 
remember the freedom of movement in the Roman Empire, and in Christendom, which helped 
Christians unite and spread, and made the Church truly “Catholic” (cf. Schreiter 2008). (b) Ritual: 
Pentecost, and the pneumatological element in liturgy, can serve as a good ritual basis for welcom-
ing the other (cf. EM 89). The Eucharist itself speaks loudly and clearly of communion between all 
peoples in Christ Jesus. Nonetheless, certain settings make the relevance of the Eucharist to policy-
making regarding immigrants and asylum seekers even more concrete. On example is the mass cel-
ebrated on certain occasions, on the border between the US and Mexico, where the congregation is 
divided by a militarized fence (D. G. Groody 2008). Furthermore, the hundreds of people who die 
C h a p t e r :  7  — P a g e :  503 
 
each year trying to cross deserts and seas to reach Fortress Europe, Fortress America, or Fortress 
Australia should not be forgotten on All Souls´ Day. Their silent and painful agony should be afford-
ed the full voice of the religious symbols used in our commemoration of deceased relatives, espe-
cially in southern Europe countries which abound with such traditions. 
(Rule H3) History-Laden Interdependence Rule: Immigrant Entry and Sojourn333  
Other things being equal, receiving countries have a greater duty to grant entry and sojourn to cit-
izens of countries which are politically, socially and culturally linked to them through close bonds 
of history-laden interdependence.  
Hospitable citizenship: (a) Narrative: Independence struggles, decolonization, and processes that 
split up polities on ethnic or religious lines (India-Pakistan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, the Balkans, etc.) often 
leave many scars. Yet, the nationalist rhetoric does not abolish the very real bonds of interdepend-
ence among nations, and attempts to deny or sever those bonds often hurt both sides in the long 
run. This is why it is important to tell the story of one´s history in common with the other, to tell it 
honestly together with the other, to seek and remember primarily what was built together and 
what was learnt from each other, and to write the biographies of bridge-builders, not only of “con-
querors” and “liberators”. (b) Ritual: Healing past wounds involves a deep recognition of the other. 
Rituals of apology for colonial oppression may be useful, but providing more visas, and providing 
them more readily, can often have a greater impact than apologies and vague promises of “aid” or 
“reparation”. Rather than celebrate past military victories in the colonies, we could celebrate the 
333 Cf. section 4.3.4. 
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positive moments of our common history, and recognise an unequal interdependence in the past 
which we would like to transform into a truly reciprocal interdependence in the present. 
Hospitable discipleship: (a) Narrative: The early church was built by bringing together Jews and 
Gentiles, building bridges among nations, marrying together different cultures and “philosophies”. 
For hundreds of years after the fall of the Roman Empire, in the Patristic era, Christianity saw mass 
movements of peoples in Europe, the Near East, and North Africa, and found ways of bringing these 
peoples together (Phan 2008). Retelling this story is important, especially through hagiographical 
accounts of the Early Middle Ages, and critical reappraisals of modern missionary hagiography. Tell-
ing the story of the Galilean — read “mestizo” — Jesus in our parishes today is also crucial (Elizondo 
2000; Éla 2008). (b) Ritual: Celebrations of diversity in our religious spaces should be welcome, 
even though they often become overly “folkloristic”. Reciprocally adapting and adopting religious 
traditions from the cultures of the hosts and the guests can be more telling of our interdepend-
ence. For example, the Posadas tradition, adapted to an American setting and celebrated in com-
mon between Mexican Americans and Americans of other origins, can be a very powerful way to 
challenge one another ritually regarding our tendency to deny hospitality to one another. Finally, 
we should not forget the Trinitarian aspect embedded in most Christian rituals, starting from the 
most simple “sign of the cross”, calling us to emulate the hospitality ad intra and ad extra which 
characterizes our triune and constitutively relational God (Baggio 2008). 
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 7.2.5 THE LIMITS OF HOSPITALITY 
7.2.5.1 Being Hospitable Together 
Hospitality is a central virtue to promote in our societies. It can be challenging to be constantly en-
gaged in practices of discommodious hospitality, especially should this become a regular “duty”, 
given a concentration of marginalised people in the neighbourhood where we live. To be sure, mid-
dle-class people may find occasional and voluntary acts of hospitality — settler or itinerant — not 
too hard to bear, and eventually even enjoyable once they overcome their prejudices and miscon-
ceptions of poor people. They tend to live in neighbourhoods where marginalised persons, poor 
immigrants and refugees often work, but do not live, and where they tend to become invisible. Yet, 
the urban poor often find themselves locked into neighbourhoods where the needs are great and 
radical hospitably is in demand constantly and visibly. Those who actually engage in hospitable 
practices often become targets of violence and xenophobia themselves, especially in core cities or 
poor satellite cities where social resources are few and inadequate, and all “others”, especially asy-
lum seekers and immigrants, are seen as competitors. “Lot’s story demonstrates that when hospi-
tality is contrary to the intentions of the larger group, it can be dangerous — an act of defiance, a 
challenge to the unity and expectations of the community” (Pohl 1999, 25).  
Susanna Snyder (2007) notes the dangers of presenting hospitality mainly as a “duty”, especially 
since it is burdened communities which are then expected to “do their duty” towards the immi-
grant and refugee population residing in their midst. Ritual and narrative help us go beyond the 
language of moral “law” and duty, as we have said above, and think in terms of necessary political 
virtues. Yet all this points to the need of an approach which not only transcends the language of 
C h a p t e r :  7  — P a g e :  506 
 
duty, but also transcends the model of hospitality, especially in the way we deal with de facto resi-
dents, or long term immigrants. A more adequate model to envision the relationship in this case is 
that of civic kinship, which challenges not only the relationship of citizens with long-term immi-
grants, but also the relationship between the suburbanites who mostly benefit from immigrant la-
bour, and core city dwellers who ultimately bear most of the financial and social costs of integrating 
the “other”.  
7.2.5.2 “Merely Guests” or “Here to Stay”? Hospitality and Self-Deception 
In many European countries, today, reframing the relationship with poor immigrants and asylum 
seekers who enter the country irregularly in terms of civic kinship is especially problematic, espe-
cially when dealing with Muslims and people from Sub-Saharan Africa. While some migrants can 
travel to Europe and obtain visas with relative ease, the “desirable undesirable immigrants” who 
wish to work and settle in Europe, and whose services are welcome (especially in times of plenty), 
are forced to enter Europe irregularly, pass through the asylum procedure, and spend years waiting 
for what will probably be a denial of refugee status. The system thus creates the impression that 
most of these persons are “bogus asylum seekers” who will eventually be removed and returned to 
their country, and so that it makes no sense trying to integrate them or treat them as civic kin. If it 
were so, hospitality would be the right way to treat these persons, but in fact, sticking to the model 
of hospitality when we know, deep down, that these persons are not merely “guests”, is ultimately 
a form of self-deception. 
Of course, the narrative that these people are simply “guests” is quite seductive. We might easily 
catch ourselves believing that, when the immigrants´ countries of origin actually solve their prob-
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lems and develop, then they will deserve to be treated with reciprocity; or that when the flow of 
immigrants dries up and the current “emergency” is over, then we may actually start giving them 
more entry visas and work permits, and some day in the very distant future, we might also start 
thinking about treating them as civic kin. Such a story is morally unacceptable and its short-
sightedness is socially disastrous. A parallel illusion is often conjured up with regards to core-city 
dwellers. Many wealthy citizens convince themselves that, if these people really wanted, they could 
climb the social ladder, and end up living in wealthy neighbourhoods; thus their old burdened 
neighbourhoods would gentrify and the problem would disappear. Of course, such myths are con-
venient forms of avoiding reality. Sensible people don´t solve social problems by making them van-
ish into thin air through a narrative which relieves the people who can actually do something from 
all responsibility. We solve social problems by dealing with them together, each contributing ac-
cording to their capacities and according to the benefit they derive from situations of injustice and 
inequality. 
7.2.5.3 Thinking in Terms of Civic Kinship 
It is saddening to see Europe (and other countries) not facing the reality that many of these people 
will stay, for many years or for the rest of their lives. History shows us that when the economy gets 
better, the political will to “remove” them will fade, and that even if they are actually shipped back 
to their home countries or to “safe third countries” in times of plenty, others will replace them (es-
pecially given Europe´s dependence on their labour) and that such a turnover has a huge human 
and social cost. While not wanting to draw false parallelisms with Canada and the United States, I 
will simply note here that in these countries, people generally accept that most asylum seekers and 
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immigrants are there to stay (whether they personally like it or not), and this makes the shift to 
models of civic kinship more intuitive. Nonetheless, especially in the US in recent years, there is an 
“eclipse of the public” (cf. Hollenbach 2002, chap. 1) and a great resistance to forms of civic kinship 
which go beyond one´s immediate neighbourhood, close family, and peers, and to any moral claims 
such larger social bonds may entail. This could partially explain the greater openness towards the 
idea of receiving immigrants permanently: the assumption is that somehow and somewhere “inte-
gration happens”, but this doesn´t really concern me unless I want it to. In this context, civic kinship 
is hard sell, not only in relationship with immigrants, but in all its forms. 
Thinking in terms of kinship is akin to thinking in terms of reforming evil or unjust structures, an ap-
proach often underlined in liberationist approaches to social ethics. Yet I avoid this language be-
cause both hospitality and kinship can be “structural” as well as “personal”. Justice means treating 
a guest as a guest and creating structures of hospitality not only in our houses and churches and 
universities, but also in civil law and through political institutions. Yet, treating someone who is not 
merely a guest as though she were only a guest is not just. Some immigrants may be passing 
through, and we should treat them as such, but others stay for years. Some stay because they really 
cannot go back to a place where their safety and subsistence is at risk. Others stay because when 
we need their labour, we provide them with jobs, accept their services, allow them to become de 
facto residents, and give them the hope that will eventually treat them as civic kin (even though we 
might still hold on to legal contraptions that impede their full integration as legal residents and citi-
zens, just in case we want to get rid of them when times are hard). After some time, it is not too 
hard to distinguish between immigrants who are passing through, and immigrants who are there to 
stay, if we are honest with ourselves. By not creating the structures that permit and facilitate the 
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full integration of those who have a right to stay, or those whom we tacitly allow to stay, according 
to the priority rules discussed below, we actually contribute to structural injustice.  
The resistances to and difficulties of thinking in terms of kinship are real, and they are hard to deal 
with politically, but this does not mean we should give up and pretend that certain immigrants are 
only “passing through”, so that all that is needed is hospitality. Indeed, as Ogletree argues: 
Under conditions of structural inequality, hospitality alone is an insufficient moral response to social 
oppression. In the stance of hospitality, the host continues to be “at home,” which means he retains 
control. At most he only welcomes those who are socially estranged into his own world, and largely on 
the terms of that world. He cannot develop a reciprocal relation with the victims of oppression, for they 
have no world over which he does not already in some respects preside. He discovers that condescen-
sion and paternalism corrupt his hospitable intentions despite his conscious desire to avoid them (Ogle-
tree 2003, 6).  
At some point we have to accept that our polities are also the “home” of long-term and permanent 
immigrants, that they have the right to move the furniture around and put their stuff in the refrig-
erator, even if that may make us feel we are not quite “at home” as we were before, that we are no 
longer fully in control, however that “we” (which excludes these new kin) is construed to be. To go 
beyond a hospitality approach in policy-making, we need to start by treating long-term immigrants 
as our civic and religious kin in simple ways, in everyday life. Christians here have an important role 
to play in this transition by styling the relationship of their parishes and institutions with immigrants 
not uniquely on the model of hospitality, but also creating spaces, structures and practices which 
are truly fraternal, which honour the agency of the other, which allow them to integrate them-
selves and become true sisters and brothers in a reciprocal relationship with the “natives”.  
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7.3 Kinship-Fraternity  7.3.1 KINSHIP IN POLITICAL SOCIETIES 
7.3.1.1 Who is My Brother? Am I my Brother´s Keeper? 
“Home,” he mocked gently.  
“Yes, what else but home?  
It all depends on what you mean by home.  
Of course he's nothing to us, any more  
Than was the hound that came a stranger to us  
Out of the woods, worn out upon the trail.” 
“Home is the place where, when you have to go there,  
They have to take you in.”  
“I should have called it  
Something you somehow haven’t to deserve.” 
(Frost 1917, 20) 
In Robert Frost´s poem, The Death of the Hired Man, Mary and Warren argue about whether they 
should take in Silas, an elderly farm hand who regularly sought their hospitality in winter but disap-
peared at haying time when his help was needed. Warren sees Silas as a poor, useless, stranger 
who likes to take but gives back nothing in return; he does not wish to extend hospitality to Silas 
any longer. Mary, on the other hand, sees Silas as part of the family. To her, he is no stranger to her 
and their house is his home, a place where one does not have to be deserving to step inside and 
belong. For Mary, welcoming Silas is no longer a question of hospitality. It has become a matter of 
kinship.  
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Mary´s conception of the family, here, clearly transcends the biological. Her attitude towards Silas 
showcases the classical notion of “fraternity”. As noted above, we often use the term “kinship” as a 
more gender-neutral rendering of “fraternity”, even though the political (non-biological, non-
exclusively-communitarian) usage of term “kinship” is still relatively new in the English language. 
We at times use the adjective “fraternal” or the adverb “fraternally” for clarity and the term “fra-
ternalism” for certain political ideologies based on kinship. Etymologically, the term fraternity is 
more inclusive than it sounds and this partly explains its long political heritage; it hearkens back not 
only to the Latin “frater”, but also to the Greek “phrátēr”, which designates not so much a consan-
guine male sibling (“adelphós”), but as a co-member of a “social/political” (in Jacques Maritain´s 
sense of “non-biological”, “voluntarily constituted”) clan of adopted “brothers” and close friends 
(cf. 5.1.2). A similar notion is conveyed by the terms “camaraderie/comradeship” (etymologically, 
the bond between people regularly sharing a room), “companionship” (etymologically, the bond 
between people regularly breaking bread together, as in the French “copain”), or “fellowship” (et-
ymologically, the bond between partners in a joint lucrative undertaking): all evoke images of mili-
tary or university life.  
In the Christian tradition, fraternitas, in Latin, is also the translation of adelphótēs in 1 Pt 2:17, a 
Christian 1st-century neologism designating the Church (cf. Dujarier 2013). Many associations within 
the church — such as trades guilds, and groups promoting certain devotions and charitable activi-
ties — were referred to as “fraternities”, especially in medieval and early modern times. Fraternity 
thus came to designate the bonding uniting such groups (descriptive aspect), and the virtue that 
maintains such bonds and promotes “fraternal” behaviour (prescriptive aspect). As we have seen 
above, both aspects of fraternity became important political concepts during the French Revolu-
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tion, which early on secularized the notion of universal Christian brotherhood as “universal fraterni-
ty” of all human persons (a concept which undergirds the French Revolutionary Human Rights dec-
larations of 1789 and 1793), but eventually restricted the notion to national “civic kinship”. 
In Chapter 5 (section 5.1) we criticized the use of false analogies in politics, where political belong-
ing is related to family or ethnic ties, or to membership in clubs and universities. Many authors to-
day dismiss the concept of “civic kinship” for this reason, but the above discussion shows that the 
idea of “fraternity”, properly understood, manages to achieve what most other analogies in politi-
cal discourse fail to do: it speaks at once of a belonging which is chosen and not chosen, of purely 
voluntary membership and the demands of biological ties, of a descriptive fact and a moral virtue, 
of the deep bond which incorporates the other into a larger “self” while never negating the endur-
ing otherness of the other. On the one hand, this complexity makes the notion of civic kinship a 
very rich political concept today, especially when speaking of the integration of immigrants or soli-
darity towards core-city dwellers: it show us to how to treat the other person as part of the political 
self, and offer solidarity to her not as a “pure” stranger, but as though she were one´s own kith and 
kin, one´s close neighbour. On the other hand, the complexity of the traditional notion of fraternity 
makes it hard to handle in political discourse, or place at the service of simplistic ideologies or uto-
pias: it is a bridging concept, hard to define, which could be used in many ways. Its´ “standard” con-
tent is not readily monopolized by one school, party or movement. 
7.3.1.2 How Can Kinship Be a Useful Concept in Contemporary Political Discourse? 
Historians and political philosophers in the French-speaking world have long reflected on the prob-
lems raised by the complexity written into the notion of fraternity. As part of the French Republican 
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triptych, fraternity can be understood in three different ways. (a) Kinship could be projected as the 
highest point of a crescendo, starting with freedom from bondage, developing into formal equality 
of all in spite of social distinctions, and finally flourishing into the sisterhood and brotherhood of all 
(hyper-egalitarian fraternalism). (b) It can also be seen as a value mediating between liberty and 
equality, seeking to transcend radical economic egalitarianism in favour of a political and legal “civ-
ic” egalitarianism which protects liberty while recasting social classes as fraternally “equal” and fra-
ternally “free” partners (mediating fraternalism). Finally (c), it can be understood as the heart of the 
triptych which creates a well-bonded national “family” through citizenship, on the basis of which 
the notions of freedom and equality obtain their meaning and their legitimate limitation (national-
istic fraternalism) (cf. Ozouf 1998, 79). Civic kinship also challenges modern political philosophy in a 
number of ways: it undergirds rights, but underlines duties; it justifies laws equally applicable to all, 
but points to a spectrum of bonds of varying intensity; it blurs the boundary between contract and 
covenant; it recognises fratricidal conflict while not losing hope that social harmony can somehow 
be achieved; it highlights the social and communal element of political life, respecting individuality 
but denouncing individualism.  
Given this complexity, many political scientists and philosophers choose to understand the concept 
in a very limited way, and often end up discounting it. As Andreas Esheté (1981, 34) notes, fraterni-
ty, as a civic ideal, “is often summarily dismissed as utopian either in the backward-looking sense of 
a regression to simpler stages of social life or in the forward-looking sense of a yearning for forms 
of social life that are stripped of the recalcitrant complexities of society”. To show that fraternity 
can be a civic virtue, Esheté provides an analysis of nationalist/patriotic bonds of loyalty. To be 
sure, nationalism and patriotism are the most tangible and visible exemplars of “fraternalist” ideo-
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logies in our modern societies. Traditionally, however, nationalism and patriotism are obsessed 
with identity markers and proofs of belonging, often with the desire to exclude; furthermore, they 
are invoked not only against hostile or distant political others, but also against immigrants who al-
ready reside with, and who wish to become integrated in the same polity as, the national-
ists/patriots.  
The concept of civic kinship or fraternity we will espouse here, while recognising the need of strong 
bonds to unite those with different levels of belonging to the polity, seeks to overcome the false 
dilemma between “certified brother” and “potential enemy”. Through this distinction, often con-
strued by nationalist ideologies, pedigree (in the form of native birth, ethnic belonging or citizen-
ship papers) becomes the sine qua non condition for being treated fraternally. In the classification 
noted above, we will generally reject nationalistic fraternalism, and overly onerous or intimate un-
derstandings of kindred bonds (cf. 7.3.3 below), such as those implied in hyper-egalitarian frater-
nalism. We will tend towards an understanding of civic kinship which seeks to mediate between the 
values of liberty and equality, and which does not deny the modern claim that justice is the first vir-
tue of social institutions (Munoz Dardé 1999, 81ff; cf. Rawls 2005b, 3).  
We of course do not attempt here to construct a political theory linking civil kinship to political jus-
tice, liberty and equality. Rather we point to a critical notion of civic kinship which seeks to include 
immigrants and resident “others” gradually into the bond of loyalty between citizens, such that the 
official citizenship papers (when they are granted) come to express a reality which is already there 
in some form, and to some extent. Here, civic kinship is built up from within civil society, with the 
active participation of individual believers and faith-based organizations, among others. In Chapter 
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5, we have given examples of forms of civic participation, including local governance (e.g. in the EU) 
which do not require national citizenship; this shows that we can no longer conceive the political 
bonds between residents of a particular political space in terms of an all-or-nothing membership 
regime, and that nationalist and patriotic bonds are not the only (and may no longer be the most 
relevant) forms of strong political bonding today.  
7.3.1.3 Civic Kinship and Familismo 
It is often tempting to compare civic kinship with other forms of kin-based social bonding in socie-
ties where the extended family is still very present and influential. Some recent liberationist and 
mujerista approaches to ethics have highlighted the familismo culture, especially in Latin American 
countries, noting its strong points and weaknesses. As Heyer (2012, 81) points out, familismo can 
become a form of individualism which excludes those outside the “family”. We have seen this in the 
general attitude of the Maltese towards immigrants (4.4.2.2), summarized in the expression “dawn 
m´humiex ta´ġewwa” (they are not our kin/ they don’t belong in our house). Familismo can also be 
used to oppress women and vulnerable members of the “family”, stifling their agency. This is why 
we resist attempts to make easy comparisons between fraternity and familismo. Even so, a reflec-
tion on civic kinship stands to learn from certain aspects of the familismo mentality:  
Familismo or familism typically refers to a strong value placed on family relationships and obligation, 
the value of children and community, and the importance of intergenerational kinship networks. Fami-
ly serves as the primary organizing structure in most Latin American migrants’ lives, for their social 
identity is relational rather than individual. The traditional cultural value of familismo intensifies the 
connection of familial relationships to women’s identity with motherhood constituting an integral part 
of the female gender role. Women play a central role in familismo, serving as the backbone that binds 
this unique cultural, economic, social, and often religious network of familial relationships. Migrant 
women are frequently accompanied by children or family members, whether at church, socializing, or 
even on the job if they can work it out. As the symbolic center of la familia, women’s primary identity is 
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formed and understood in relation to their web of kinship relationships. The inclusion of extended fami-
ly and community within familismo contrasts with the dominant focus on the nuclear family in the 
United States (Heyer 2012, 81). 
Forms of familismo, though weakened, still exist in many migrant receiving countries, especially in 
southern Europe, and in many of the new countries of immigration (such as South Africa, Egypt, 
Mexico, Brazil, the Middle East). It can function in ways that exclude immigrants, but it can also 
highlight cultural similarities that can be used to build bridges and strengthen social bonds with the 
other. In “northern” and strongly “westernized” spaces, such as in the big cities in the US, “familis-
mo can perhaps broaden a dominant US Christian notion of kinship restricted by idealized nuclear 
family assumptions and underscore the ways in which solidarities can both connect and conceal, 
suggesting the importance of autonomy and interdependence alike” (Heyer 2012, 84) . 7.3.2 CHRISTIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIC KINSHIP 
Though it is important to distinguish modern civic kinship from experiences of biological or small-
community of kindred links, part of the political usefulness of the notion of fraternity comes from 
the analogies it permits, which, when properly used, also contain antidotes to the ideological sim-
plifications and misrepresentations of the concept.  Étienne Grieu argues that the biblical tradition 
helps us to question idealized forms of fraternity, pretending to create perfect equality between 
kin: in politics, as in human families, such an understanding of kinship can become a façade hiding 
violence, injustice and tension, especially when we choose to ignore or punish difference and hu-
man “otherness” (realities which are not completely erased by kinship): 
From the first pages of the Genesis narrative, the relationship with one´s brother is presented as the 
trickiest aspect of life in common: the characters of Cain and Abel, Ishmael and Isaac, Jacob and Esau, 
and Joseph and his brothers force us to recognise that brotherhood is also associated with violence and 
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suffering, not the direct and brutal clash of the relation with an enemy coming from afar, but the com-
plexity of tangled, poisoned ties, ones burdened by painful memories (Grieu 2012, 61). 
Grieu believes that Christian theology can make an important contribution to the secular under-
standing of fraternity by insisting that kinship is not just something we build or create, but also 
something we receive. Firstly, nobody can build kinship alone; it exists in the measure in which it is 
reciprocated. Secondly, the political societies we live in and their bonds of kinship precede us; pre-
vious generations of citizens and residents have bequeathed them to us as they welcomed us into a 
long history of civic kinship. Thirdly, we all came into the world naked, and have experienced mo-
ments of want where we were not in a position to immediately reciprocate acts of kindred recogni-
tion. Finally, especially for believers, kinship is often experienced as a “gift from above” or a “gift 
from beyond”, as we recognise a silent Presence within us and within our world which allow us to 
overcome fear and fratricidal hate, and build a communion of trust. From a Christian viewpoint, 
true civic kinship is a manifestation of God´s Grace in the world.  
This approach, Grieu (2012, 62) argues recognises our creatureliness and the existence of someone, 
a “Creator”, who bestowed kinship on us as a gift. It helps us overcome ideological constructs of 
kindred bonds which encapsulate particular understandings of kinship, and leave it bending over 
itself in a closed, stifling space. Kinship as a gift is something we are invited to receive and respond 
to; kinship as a virtue is precisely that receptiveness and that response. For believers, it is a matter 
of receiving the love of God and of our neighbour, and of responding to that love, thus obeying 
God´s commandment to love one another. “Here are my mother and my brothers! Whoever does 
the will of God is my brother and sister and mother” (Mk 3:34-35).  
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 7.3.3 MISCONSTRUING KINSHIP: THE DANGERS OF ASSIMILATIONISM   
As we have seen in the previous sections, the complexity inherent in the notion of civic kinship also 
means that it can be misconstrued. At one extreme, “kinship-lite”, we may pay lip service to civic 
kinship while denying that strong bonds between consociates in modern polities are possible or 
desirable. Other citizens and residents are simply “there”; they should be tolerated and their nega-
tive rights should be respected, but there is where our responsibility ends. As we have seen, this 
position, common today, while not dismissing the existence of social interdependence and de facto 
solidarity, avoids reflection on the common good and on the duties of civic kinship. Individualism 
and rationalized fear of the other lead to to make light of civic bonds; in this process even people 
who share our same language and culture, and who live next door, could become totally other 
(Bianchi 2009, 89). This position is often taken for granted or poorly argued; most authors simply 
point to the other extreme, caricaturizing thus the notion of civic kinship so as to summarily dismiss 
it. Let us however take a look at the dangers of that other extreme and learn from them. Indeed, a 
positive and politically viable notion of civic kinship is possible if we learn to avoid these extreme 
positions.  
The other extreme, “fusional kinship”, is to consider fraternity as an excessively onerous, intense 
and intimate form of civic bond. In this vein, Kinship may be construed as “fusional bonding”, 
where one seeks to remove the boundaries, and negate the otherness of the other. Using French 
psychoanalytic symbolism (e.g. Jacques Lacan), we may say that there is a risk of social incest im-
plicit in certain idealisations of fraternity, such as those proposed by Corporatist ideologues in the 
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early 20th century334. Even in a biological family, being “kin” does not mean having one body, and 
healthy political bonding can never be umbilical. Authors like Lévinas, who have seen the devasta-
tions caused by such ideologies, sternly remind us to shun totalising (and Totalitarian) visions which 
seek to abolish the irreducible distance between the self and the other and recast the other as a 
clone of the self. Such an understanding of kinship also leads us to exclude people who share our 
same language and culture, and who might live next door, not by making the bond too light, but by 
making it too heavy and then excluding those who exhibit any form of difference or resistance, both 
seen as threatening to such an intense bond. In chapter 6, we have seen this happen between re-
turnees from the Exile and the “people of the land”. This position also determines the integration 
processes in post-exilic and rabbinic Judaism, which, as noted in that chapter, the Bible does not 
dwell upon.  7.3.4 CENTRO PUEBLOS UNIDOS: HELPING PEOPLE TO INTEGRATE 
After mentioning the possible pitfalls of the concept, let us now turn to a positive example of civic 
kinship. For a year between 2007 and 2008, while living in the north of Madrid, I volunteered in a 
faith-based organization run by the Jesuits, called Pueblos Unidos335. Though eminently local and 
not too large in size (in 2011 it offered its services to around 5,000 immigrants), Pueblos Unidos 
seeks to accompany, serve and defend the rights of immigrants in the north of Madrid, and to help 
them integrate themselves holistically into the life of the city. On the one hand, it is actively in-
volved in advocacy and awareness-raising in the Spanish capital. Its director, Fr Daniel Izuzquiza SJ, 
334 Luchino Visconti´s allegory of Nazism as a mixture of fratricide and incest in the film The Damned (1969) 
comes to mind here. 
335 Cf. http://www.pueblosunidos.org (visited on 2nd June, 2013). 
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is the author of many books and pamphlets on the ethics of migration, and regularly collaborates 
with a network of immigrant rights groups to set up conferences, organize formation evenings, is-
sue press releases, start online campaigns (e.g. on www.avaaz.org), and so forth. On the other 
hand, Pueblos Unidos works within the neighbourhood of La Ventilla (officially called Almenara), in 
the borough of Tetuán, providing job training, legal aid, psychological help, information about ac-
cess to public health and education, and community contacts for employment and housing to mi-
grants (mostly of Ecuadoran or Moroccan origin). It also offers formal and non-formal after-school 
education to their immigrant children and adolescents, with the support of a considerable network 
of people in the local community and in more affluent Madrid neighbourhoods where Jesuits are 
also present (via parishes, high schools, university campuses), as well as local businesses and large 
corporations like IBM and BBVA. Given the weakness of civil society and the weak social tissue in 
the area, Pueblos Unidos also seeks to empower residents — especially immigrant women — to 
form neighbourhood associations of their own, and provides them with the necessary support.  
In the past, La Ventilla-Almenara was a shanty town in the North end of the city336, where genera-
tion after generation of immigrants (first rural Spaniards, then foreign-born workers) have passed 
as they moved up the social ladder. Housing in the neighbourhood has improved considerably since 
the 1970s, and in recent years (at least until the Great Recession), government services increased 
and improved steadily; it is a slowly gentrifying neighbourhood. Following St José Maria Rubio´s pi-
oneering outreach to the poor neighbourhoods of Madrid, Jesuits have been present in the area for 
336 Vicente Blasco Ibáñez´s novel La Horda (1905), set in this neighbourhood, describes very well the margin-
alisation and lack of fraternity with Madrid´s poor in that era. 
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many decades, patiently nudging Spaniards of different social classes and ethnic origins to build 
links of kinship with each other, against the backdrop of a long history of fratricidal divisions in the 
Iberian Peninsula culminating in the Spanish Civil war and the Franco dictatorship. Pueblos Unidos is 
linked to a state-funded Jesuit High school in the area, which provides quality education to the local 
residents; to a Jesuit Parish where immigrants of Ecuadoran origins venerate and celebrate their 
national patron saint, La Virgen del Quinche (also known locally as “La Virgen de los Sin-Papeles”, or 
Our Lady of the Undocumented); and to a number of Jesuit insertion-formation communities in the 
area, one of which is a mixed community where immigrants and Jesuits live together. 
Pueblos Unidos’ “civic kinship” approach to immigration, though promoted and put into practice by 
committed Christians, is not “uniquely Christian”, even though the ecclesiology of Izuzquiza himself 
(e.g. 2009) is manifestly inspired by John Milbank and John H. Yoder. For many years, as the Spanish 
economy boomed and immigrant labour became “necessary”, secular and religious voices con-
curred on the need of building up a strong Spanish civil society which fully included immigrants and 
offered them concrete means of integration. Thus, Pueblos Unidos´ kinship approach resonated 
with a certain openness in Spanish politics towards immigrants, even irregular immigrants. It also 
was in harmony with the general anti-xenophobia and anti-nationalist tendency of the mainstream 
political parties, which seek to distance themselves both from the horrors of the Franco dictator-
ship and from the identity politics of the separatist movements in the Basque Country and in Cata-
lonia.  
In this context, past Spanish governments have developed a firewall between the national immigra-
tion authorities and municipal service providers through the Padrón muncipal (Municipal Residency 
C h a p t e r :  7  — P a g e :  522 
 
Register) system, so as to ensure that the rights of all, including irregular immigrants, will be re-
spected (cf. Abogacía General del Estado 2010). Though not without its flaws, the Padrón system 
offers a “certification of residency” independent of entry visas, which irregular immigrants could 
use to send their children to public or state-funded schools, have access to public healthcare and 
make use of certain public services. In recent decades, Spain has periodically regularised the immi-
gration status of large cohorts of irregular immigrants, even introducing a “settlement” system in 
the 2000s where undocumented migrants could earn the right to reside legally and eventually be 
naturalised through a permanent legal channel (Sabater and Domingo 2012).  
The grave economic crisis in recent years has taken its toll on this generous and inclusive system. 
While many immigrants left Spain on their own, given the exorbitant rates of unemployment, re-
cent governments have beefed up and extended the minimal detention and expulsion measures 
present in past laws, supposedly to conform the Ley de Extranjería to the European “Returns Di-
rective”, but more probably to provide the public someone to blame and punish for Spain´s eco-
nomic woes (Europa Press 2013). Royal Decree-Law 16/2012 of the 20th April, 2012, seeking to mak-
ing the National Health System financially sustainable, has barred access to all foreigners not regis-
tered for social security (Buades Fuster, Díe Olmos, and Melero Valdés 2012)337. In many ways, 
these measures are not only (or not primarily) the simple economic effect of austerity policies im-
posed on countries like Spain (which, until the Sub-Prime crisis in 2008, had been more fiscally con-
337 The decree lumps together long-term irregular immigrants, non-EU tourists, and tourists possessing the 
European Health Insurance Card (hailing from countries which offer access to public healthcare to Spanish 
tourists bearing such a card). This provision has not been applied by all the Spanish regions, given reserva-
tions on its impact on human rights and its conformity to EU law, highlighted by NGOs and church organiza-
tions. 
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servative than Germany). Rather, they are the legal embodiment of a prevalent anger against Ger-
many´s perceived (and partly real) lack of kinship with politically and economically weaker Europe-
an polities. If “big sister” Germany (often equated with Angela Merkel) doesn´t want to help “small 
sister” Spain, and doesn´t live up to the demands of kinship with the EU, then why should “big 
brother” Spanish government, which officially represents citizens, offer any help to irregular immi-
grants and other “foreigners”? It is precisely when civic kinship is in crisis that faith-based organiza-
tions like Pueblos Unidos can be truly “radical” — literally, rooted in Christ, as Izuzquiza (2009) loves 
to argue — by insisting that wise and inclusive policies, discerned consensually in moments of polit-
ical calm and hopefulness, not be rashly abandoned in times of trouble. 
7.3.5 PRIORITY RULES BASED ON THE VIRTUE OF KINSHIP 
Let us now present the priority rules sketched in previous chapters within the framework of the vir-
tue of kinship as outlined above. The rules cover mainly the transition from temporary sojourn to 
long-term residence and the granting of citizenship status. To some extent, they assume the rules 
above regarding first entry, transit and sojourn, and they assume that people are already present 
within the national territory, even though some people may be allowed in on the basis of such 
rules, in view of permanent residence and full integration. 
The basic rationale behind these rules is the following. Most human persons seek some form of 
stability and political belonging; some people are very mobile often because they have found other 
forms of stability and belonging which anchor their lives (e.g. corporate executives, journalists, 
sportspersons). People fleeing persecution and grave need stay on in other countries, even if dis-
criminated against and treated as third-class residents, mainly because they have a greater hope 
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that stability and political belonging can be achieved in the receiving country than in their home-
land. People seeking better economic opportunities often stay on in the countries they enter in 
search of a more lucrative job because, if their work is consistently needed and welcomed, this is a 
clear signal that the receiving country does have the capacity to integrate them, and eventually of-
fer them or their children a deeper form of stability and political belonging than their motherland 
could offer at present. If nobody were to offer them a job, or the economic, political and cultural 
milieu had no real capacity to integrate them, these latter migrants would move on, or return to 
their home countries.  
Rule K1 helps us distinguish between these two types of immigrants. Rule K2 reflects on the issue of 
identity which is crucial to integrate people and make them civic kin: a national narrative which the 
other can reasonably buy into is necessary here. Rule K3 helps us distinguish between the capacity 
of letting people in for short stays (cf. H1 and H2), which many relatively prosperous nations have, 
and that of integrating them fully, which certain countries may not yet possess (given certain 
stressors, or the fact that certain practices and narratives needed to integrate the “different” other 
have not been sufficiently developed). It also reflects the capacity of the migrants themselves to be 
integrated. Rule K4 reminds us of past bonds of interdependence between countries and their due 
impact on immigration policy. 
(Rule K1) Immigrant Residency and Naturalisation Selection Rule (cf. section 5.4) 
a. Immigrants whose security and subsistence rights cannot be adequately guaranteed in their 
home country have a clear prima facie right to enter and stay in countries which can afford to 
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provide them such rights while not endangering the security and subsistence of their current 
population.  
b. Other immigrants do not have such a right and may be removed humanely, ensuring the legal 
protections afforded to citizen defendants in civil law cases, unless a long time has passed (more 
or less, 5 to 25 years) and unless they have shown themselves to be quite well “integrated” into 
the political culture of the receiving polity. 
c. Persons who are explicitly or tacitly allowed to stay beyond a sojourn period of a few months 
should be considered as long-term residents and potential candidates for naturalisation. The 
basic rights of such residents should be respected and guaranteed as far as is affordable for the 
country, including some access to welfare services in case of destitution, and a flexible (not over-
ly regulated) access to the labour market which reflects the real need of the economy while of-
fering other workers some protection against wage competition and depression. 
Note: We have already mentioned above (section 5.4) that this rule seeks to protect (α) the right of 
refugees to protection, (β) the socio-economic rights of all residents, (γ) the value of integrating 
persons whose contribution to the welfare of the polity (at least in time of economic prosperity) is 
tacitly or explicitly recognised, and who therefore enjoy some sort of “belonging” to the recipient 
political society; it also follows from (δ) the cosmopolitan duties which encumber territorial stew-
ardship and from (ε) liberal and democratic arguments. Furthermore, the reasoning above may be 
adapted to the cases of irregular immigrants, and also to polities without a liberal or democratic 
constitution. 
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Kindred citizenship: (a) Narrative: To understand the security and subsistence rights of others, and 
why some persons have a right to immigrate into the “country of others”, philosophical arguments 
and sociological data may be useful, but telling personal stories of misery and persecution is often 
the most powerful way of explaining why these people should be allowed to stay, why sending 
them back is not an option. In this context, retelling the economic history of now-prosperous na-
tions, their past experiences of oppression and misery, and the flows of people in and out of the 
country which accompanied those experiences is crucial. (b) Ritual: Most countries have had expe-
riences of immigration and emigration, but few care to celebrate them publicly and to let these rit-
uals bear on immigration policy today. Celebrating human mobility, while soberly remembering the 
grave causes that usually provoke it, is an important task that could help us build practices of an-
amnestic solidarity in our polities. 
Kindred discipleship: (a) Narrative:  Ellacuría´s metaphor of the crucified people helps us retell the 
Passion narrative and make it speak to us today in the lives of the poor, marginalised and persecut-
ed people of our times (Campese 2008; D. G. Groody 2009). Various CST documents, e.g. CHM 8 
and EM 3, highlight the link between immigration and the Paschal Mystery. (b) Ritual: A public 
blessing of immigrants — regular or irregular — for instance during a Sunday Mass, after a stay of 
five years, can help symbolize that, if we have allowed them to stay for so long, and have benefited 
from their contribution to our society, they deserve to stay and belong. Furthermore, whether 
morally justified or not, removal and deportation is a reality in most of our countries. It is often 
tragic and traumatic, and we should develop religious rites to support people about to be deported 
from our polities, just as sending rites have been developed in sending countries. Religious pres-
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ence in centres which concentrate people for deportation could also help expose abuse and make 
their staff more accountable. 
(Rule K2) National Narrative Rule (cf. section 6.6) 
Receiving societies have a greater duty to integrate immigrants who demonstrate a willingness to 
buy into the National Narrative, assuming that such a narrative is ethically acceptable, inclusive, 
revisable, and (reasonably) adoptable by newcomers. 
Kindred citizenship: (a) Narrative: All of the narrative proposals discussed in previous priority rules 
could find their place here. Rather than repeat the above, we simply underline the importance of 
building a national narrative that immigrants can reasonably adopt and buy into. An important part 
of the recipe is to highlight, rather than gloss over, the diversity and plurality present in one´s histo-
ry and culture. (b) Ritual: Naturalisation rituals are very important; they should be celebrated with 
dignity, and their rubrics, texts and symbols should be very wisely chosen. Giving recently-
naturalised immigrants a prominent place in national ceremonies is another way of showcasing the 
desirability of integration. 
Kindred discipleship: (a) Narrative: Religious traditions can help purify and strengthen national nar-
ratives in many ways. They can, for instance, link positive “national” values to the Gospel and to 
Christian tradition. They could use the Old Testament to show how the search for a national identi-
ty which strengthens the bonds of civic kinship among all residents can, under certain conditions, 
be legitimate and essential. (b) Ritual: Besides showing due respect towards legitimate national 
symbols within Christian liturgies and other activities, Christians can develop their own ways of 
honouring their polity and foreign polities, as in John Paul II´s custom of kissing the ground upon 
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landing in a foreign land. All this expresses our belief that, in spite of the evil present in all political 
structures, and in all human history, God is at work in every nation and people, and all lands are 
sacred in that they bear the mark of God´s presence. 
(Rule K3) Integration Capacity Rule (cf. section 6.6) 
a. Stressed nations with limited integration capacity and with underdeveloped conceptual 
tools (narratives, laws, rites) to integrate strangers may have a lesser duty to receive and in-
tegrate immigrants (depending on the stressors), while they develop such conceptual tools.  
b. Stressed migrants (especially “forced security migrants” who were violently pushed out of 
their land), though they may have a greater a priori right to be granted residence (and even-
tually citizenship) in a safe receiving nation on the basis of need, often need more help to in-
tegrate well (and deal with trauma, conflicting identities, becoming kin of those they per-
ceive as “strangers”).  
c. Regional and international coordination and specialization are desirable in dealing with 
stressed immigrants. Polities whose public culture is relatively similar to that of the migrants 
in question are usually better suited to take them in and integrate them, and their integra-
tion capacity should be expanded with the help of the international community if needed. 
Other polities may opt to limit more strictly the stay of stressed immigrants, and “specialize” 
in the reception and integration of certain groups of stressed immigrants, provided that they 
(i) provide adequate help to the polities more suited to integrate them, and (ii) offer to inte-
grate other stressed migrants with an adequate investment of resources. 
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Kindred citizenship: Narratives and rituals are important ways of increasing the integration capacity 
of both receiving nations and of immigrants, as we have mentioned above (section 7.1.3.5) and in 
Chapter 6 (section 6.3.3). 
Kindred discipleship: Read in a faith perspective, the “immigration crisis” — in places where it ac-
tually exists on the ground, in those where it is invented through unjust or simply irrational policies 
and bureaucratic procedures, and in those where it is mostly a fiction of the mind (with some very 
real consequences) — can become a kairos, a moment of opportunity which transforms the Church 
and society at large (Orobator 2005). Mass human mobility may be a stressing and distressing “sign 
of our times” (M2006). Faith-based narratives and rituals help us cope with the stress that we and 
our neighbours face in an age of mass migration, especially when we let ourselves become engulfed 
in an “ecology of fear”. They can also help us deal with the stress experienced by the immigrants, 
especially those showing symptoms of PTSD. 
(Rule K4) History-Laden Interdependence Rule: Immigrant Residency and Naturalisation338  
Other things being equal, receiving countries have a greater duty to grant residency and naturalisa-
tion to citizens of countries which are politically, socially and culturally linked to them through 
close bonds of history-laden interdependence. 
We have discussed the history-laden interdependence rule above, in the framework of hospitality 
(7.2.4/H3); what has been said there can be adapted, mutatis mutandis, to a kinship setting. 
338 Cf. section 4.3.4. 
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 7.3.6 A SOLIDARY PROCEDURAL RULE 
(Rule P1) Procedural Rule (cf. section 5.4) 
This last rule, linked to the kinship approach, is a procedural one: it helps us understand how to ap-
ply the above rules. We cannot go directly from priority rules based on moral considerations to the 
formulation of policy, which has to be discerned and adapted to concrete situations, and in a dem-
ocratic system must meet the consent of the governed. Except in cases of grave violation of human 
rights, moral laws and policies cannot be imposed “paternalistically” from above against the will of 
the majority who is supposed to abide by them. Yet, we can make the democratic processes 
through which these policies are formulated fairer and more representative, not only of citizens, 
but of all the “governed”, that is, all touched in a significant way by those laws. This helps us reach 
a deeper and richer form of democratic rule than merely one based on power games between ma-
jorities and minorities who refuse to listen to each other.  
Here is the rule: 
The local fine-tuning and concretisation of the above rules requires fair democratic processes 
where those most impacted by boundary laws are adequately represented. 
Kindred Citizenship: The debate regarding whether and how to represent non-citizens in democrat-
ic decisions which concern them is a complex one; narratively and ritually, however, it is important 
to underline that democracy is not simply majoritarianism, that modern political history is one of 
the emancipation and political empowerment of groups of people who, in the past were deemed 
incapable or not entitled to participate in political decision-making.   
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Kindred Discipleship: Christian communities have an important role to play by being the voice of 
the voiceless, and not doing this paternalistically, but rather helping immigrants develop their own 
voice and agency within civil society. We can start by giving migrants a real voice within our Chris-
tian communities. (a) Narrative: Migrants have important things to say to us; M1989 reminds us 
that migrants can be missionaries today, in a secularized Europe, as they were in the past in other 
parts of the globe. Stories of pioneering work by immigrants in the history of the Church should not 
be forgotten. (b) Ritual: Popular piety is one way which migrants use to express their faith; though 
we might find some aspects of this problematic, we should not rush to silence and impose our ways 
of praying on them. Furthermore, we should seek to live more deeply the central act of Christian 
worship — the “Mass” — especially in its aspect of missa, or sending forth “in peace”. The fullness 
of shalom which we seek to establish as we go out together into the world, in one procession that 
includes all, cannot be authentic if it leaves some of our sisters and brothers “voiceless” in the 
world outside (Izuzquiza 2011, 28ff).  
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have completed the pastoral or hermeneutic cycle of this dissertation, bringing 
the previous moments of “seeing” and “judging” to bear on our action as citizens and disciples of 
Christ, by adopting a virtue ethics approach. We highlight below the main points discussed above: 
1. Solidarity is a central concept, which helps us to understand our relationship with the immi-
grant and the refugee. Ethics however helps us to move beyond de facto solidarity, and unequal 
relationship of interdependence, to a moral understanding of solidarity as a virtue, which not 
only provides assistance to needy others, but helps them to become counterparts in a more 
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equal and reciprocal relationship. Yet, solidarity is often ill defined, and in most discussions to-
day it is mostly used as a rhetorical device, rather than a solid ethical concept which allows rig-
orous debate and fruitful dialogue. This is why we seek to clarify the concept by reference to 
secular sources in the first part of this chapter, and by distinguishing two modes of solidarity 
relevant to our present discussion: hospitable and kindred solidarity. 
2. Hospitality is a very important cross-cultural social virtue, which certainly exists in our modern 
societies in both settler and itinerant modes, but hospitable practices are not labelled as such. 
Traditional Christian practices of hospitality, as well as those developed more recently by faith-
based organizations (often stemming from simple initiatives of poor women), can be very useful 
today to challenge xenophobia and help our societies and neighbourhoods move from an “ecol-
ogy of fear” to an “ecology of trust/faith”. Hospitality, however, has its limits and we should 
shift to the kinship mode of solidarity in our relationship with people who are de facto resi-
dents, and who wish to be fully integrated into our polities rather than be treated as permanent 
“guests” or “sojourners”.  
3. Civic kinship or fraternity is a difficult virtue to put into practice in modern polities, given 
many misunderstandings and resistances. Framing the relation with long-term and permanent 
immigrants within this virtue obviously challenges patriotic, nationalist, and — in some coun-
tries — familista understandings of strong social bonding. Furthermore we recognised that es-
tablishing deep social bonds among political consociates or residents of a territory at a given 
point in time is hard work, and it is very challenging to pry open that communion again and 
again as new potential members arrive and ask to be admitted. It is obviously much easier to 
treat newcomers as guests and hope that they will eventually leave. We have nonetheless ar-
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gued, anchored in Christian hope and in a certain cosmopolitan humanist optimism, that such 
resistances should, and somehow can, be overcome, that certain realisations of civic kinship are 
possible in our modern societies. In that vein, we have proposed some valuable examples of 
how kinship with immigrants can be lived out, and have placed a number of priority rules with-
in the framework of this virtue. To be sure, civic kinship will not magically solve all the problems 
of marginalisation in our societies; as the Gospel insists, “you always have the poor with you” 
(Mk 14:7), and discommodious hospitality, or at least some form of “charity”, will remain nec-
essary. Similarly, we will always have sojourners with us, people who do not wish to stay longer, 
or whom we cannot allow to stay permanently among us, and the appropriate way of treating 
such persons is that offered by the framework of hospitable solidarity.  
4. In the light of the above-mentioned difficulties and resistances to the practice of these virtues, 
both in political societies at large and in our Christian communities, we have linked the priority 
rules to hospitable and kindred citizenship and discipleship, underlining the value of narrative, 
ritual and law in the habituation of people to the virtues which undergird the proposed priority 
rules.  
C h a p t e r :  8  — P a g e :  534 
 
CHAPTER 8: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
I do not provide, in the following pages, an overview or summary of the dissertation, chapter by 
chapter. I have done this already at the beginning of the General Introduction and at the end of 
each chapter. I rather limit myself to highlighting what I believe to be the major achievements of 
this dissertation, and its original contribution to Moral Theology as applied to the phenomenon of 
human mobility. 
8.1 The Argument 
The argument of the dissertation can be summarized in four steps. In the first step (Chapter 2), we 
noted a tension in CST between the right of certain persons to immigrate, and the right of polities 
to control their borders. Given that the basic tenets of CST on immigration were formulated be-
tween 1950 and 1980, we proposed two possible ways of solving this tension. (a) We could argue 
that the reality of international migration has changed drastically in recent decades, in ways that 
require a new ethical appraisal of the phenomenon. On that basis we could claim that, with the ex-
ception of convention refugees, people today no longer have a right to immigrate unless this right is 
explicitly granted to them by positive law in the receiving country. In this case, countries would 
have an absolute right to control their borders, and the tension would disappear. (b) We could also 
resolve the tension by claiming that these two rights are not “absolute” rights, and must be kept in 
tension: which one of them trumps the other in concrete situations is determined partly by a set of 
(moral) priority rules, and partly through political discernment via fair democratic processes (which 
are always necessary to formulate concrete policies which require the consent of the governed). 
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Here the tension remains, but we have ways of resolving it in policymaking and moral criteria to 
guide advocacy. 
The second step sought to deconstruct the first option (a). Though we noted various changes in the 
phenomenon of international migration in recent years (in Chapter 3), in the context of “globalisa-
tion”, we argued that these do not really allow us to alter past ethical appraisals of what is at stake 
when people move. Neither can they support the claim that people in emerging countries have less 
reason to emigrate today than in the past, or that receiving countries have significantly less capaci-
ty per capita to receive immigrants today than in the 1890s or the 1950s. When, in the middle of 
the 20th century, the Catholic church embraced human rights and many aspects of the cosmopoli-
tan moral worldview that modern political thought has invoked to support certain freedoms — 
such as the freedom of movement, freedom from want, freedom of opportunity, freedom from 
persecution and oppression — it did not espouse a vision that could become obsolete in a few dec-
ades when certain social realities change. Catholics believe that human rights, and the freedoms 
they suppose, though they should not be understood as “absolute”, are true of all persons and for 
all ages, being anchored not only in human reason, but also in Revelation and in Christian tradition. 
In recognising the right to immigrate, and not only the right to emigrate, the Church has taken the 
logic of human rights beyond what most liberal and liberal egalitarian thinkers would dare to pro-
pose when drafting documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which ultimately 
have to be approved by representatives of “sovereign” polities. Chapter 4 helped us to confirm, 
through a case study, that the tension between the right to immigrate and the right to control 
one´s borders is not resolved by claiming that the situation has changed and thereby denying the 
first right. 
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The third step was the investigation of the second way (b) of solving the tension. Here, the two 
rights are not contradictory and can be kept together so long as they are not considered absolute. 
This entails that “sovereign” polities do not always have the right to close their borders to immi-
grants, and choose whom to let in, and whom to integrate politically. For this claim to make sense, 
we needed to critique the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, and propose a different way 
of understanding political societies, especially in today´s “globalised” world. The first part of Chap-
ter 5 allowed us to do precisely this. In the second part we transitioned to the more constructive 
movement of our dissertation and proposed a reasonable way of holding these two rights together. 
We did this by proposing a series of “priority rules” that helped us determine which of the two 
rights trumps the other, and in what circumstances. Most of the priority rules were proposed in 
Chapter 5, though others were proposed in Chapters 4 and 6. 
The final step in our argument sought to answer the sceptic’s question “so what?” As proposed, the 
priority rules may seem like lofty ideals which could never be taken into account by “real” policy-
makers. In Chapter 7, we took a virtue-ethics approach to indicate how hospitality and kinship can 
be fostered in Christian communities and in civil society, and thus make citizens and policymakers 
receptive to the moral propositions we make in this dissertation.   
8.2 The Priority Rules 
The priority rules we have proposed (listed in Annex B) are, I believe, the most significant contribu-
tion made by this dissertation to the field of “ethics of borders and immigration”. The rules clarify 
the notion of “porous borders”, and of just “immigration management”, by helping us solve some 
of the major tensions between two sets of rights claims: those related with the right to immigrate, 
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and those related with the right to control borders. I sum up the two sets of rules and the rationale 
behind them in the next few pages. I start with the “hospitality” rules which pertain primarily to 
entry and short-term stays, and then move to the “kinship” rules that are relevant to integration, 
permanent residency and naturalisation.  8.2.1 THE HOSPITALITY RULES 
The rationale guiding the priority rules concerning entry and sojourn is that freedom of movement 
should not be impaired in times of peace, except for grave reasons. Some people have a right to 
enter a country to file an asylum claim and should be allowed entry. Other people may want to visit 
family, possibly look for a temporary job, or seek solace from serious want and poverty in their 
homeland. In such cases, most countries grant visas easily to visitors from certain countries, but not 
to others. Though there may be good reasons to facilitate exchanges with certain countries and not 
with others, I believe that the current system is discriminatory, ineffective and unreasonably lethal. 
“Desirable undesired immigrants” continue to reach Europe from Sub-Saharan Africa, the US from 
Central America, Australia from the poorer and more populous nations of Asia. They continue to 
come because wealthy countries can, and in fact do, take them in for the long haul, in spite of the 
rhetoric that “the boat is full”, and the visa regimes which force thousands of people to risk their 
lives to reach these countries through irregular channels. I believe there are means of ensuring that 
certain “visitors”, who have no right to stay on, actually leave when their visa expires, and this is 
where a polity´s sovereignty with regards to immigration is rightly exercised, not at the moment of 
entry. Effective employer sanctions and humane removal may be required at times to manage the 
flow, prevent wage competition with local workers, and allow more effective integration. We dis-
cuss this below, but our point here is that spending billions of Euros building fortresses and funding 
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patrols to keep people out is not a good way of dealing with immigration. It is a wasteful exercise 
which causes thousands of unnecessary deaths, forces smugglers to join international criminal net-
works, keeps legitimate refugees from filing an asylum claim, separates families, and does not solve 
the real problem. 
The first hospitality rule (H1) is the Recipient Country Selection Rule. It states that polities which 
can afford to should keep their borders as open as possible. The capacity we refer to here is not 
primarily that of integrating long-term immigrants but rather the ability to welcome visitors, so-
journers, seasonal workers and asylum seekers. As such, letting these people in does not mean that 
they should be allowed to stay indefinitely. Four criteria are proposed to identify countries with a 
more pressing duty to adopt this rule. Polities that are (i) prosperous, (ii) have a high level of human 
development, (iii) are situated on an ecologically-resilient territory which can take a higher popula-
tion density, and (iv) are committed to liberal rights (such as the freedom of movement) through a 
liberal democratic constitution are those most concerned by this rule. 
The second hospitality rule (H2) is the Immigrant Entry and Sojourn Selection Rule. It builds on the 
above rule, stating that modern liberal democracies, in particular, should normally allow legal entry 
and temporary sojourn. Such polities, in general, should lead the way in the promotion of human 
rights, and being well-equipped politically to deal with a plurality of ethnic groups, cultures and re-
ligions, have less reason to keep people out. Valid reasons to close one´s borders to visitors are giv-
en in this rule. If opening one´s borders poses a serious and credible risk of (i) insecurity, (ii) disrup-
tion of public order, or (iii) dilution of the polity´s political culture and weakening of its political in-
stitutions, then measures which restrict entry may be justified. Similarly, (iv) if certain restrictive 
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policies can be shown to enhance liberty and equality on a cosmopolitan level in the long run, they 
might legitimately be taken into consideration.  
It is important to note what is not mentioned in (i) to (iv) above. Cultural, racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious differences between the immigrants and the majority population are not, by themselves, valid 
reasons to keep people out (though, as we shall see, allowing immigrants to stay on as permanent 
residents and citizens requires some “cultural” adaptation on their part, namely, the adoption of 
the polity´s “national narrative”). Such differences can be invoked only to keep certain individuals 
out if it can be shown that such individuals embrace dangerous or fundamentalist beliefs linked to 
cultural, religious or ethnic identity, and thus constitute potential security risks. In general, the limi-
tations to open borders mentioned in this rule serve mainly to manage volumes, rather than to dis-
tinguish between individuals or groups of migrants. A sudden huge inflow of poor sojourners or asy-
lum seekers into a tiny medium-income country with a small police force, with thousands of people 
roaming about the streets without a place to stay or a job, may lead to a disruption of public order. 
In such a crisis situation (which is obviously not the case in Malta, let alone in the US), a country 
may legitimately close its borders. The international community and neighbouring countries with a 
higher reception capacity should, of course, step in to provide help and shelter to these persons.  
The History-Laden Interdependence Rule (applied to immigrant entry and sojourn) is our third and 
final hospitality rule (H3). It offers a valid reason to distinguish between immigrants on the basis of 
their country of origin. Here again, the criterion is not culture, ethnicity or religion as such; France 
and Algeria, Italy and Libya, Britain and India, Spain and Morocco are not very similar on the basis of 
ethno-cultural criteria. Rather, what is seen as linking countries and peoples is a common history: a 
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bond of “history-laden” interdependence. The rule claims that, other things being equal, receiving 
countries have a greater duty to grant entry and sojourn to citizens of countries which are political-
ly, socially and culturally linked to them through close bonds of history-laden interdependence. The 
main rationale, here, is that the world of human migration is not a homogenous mass, and cannot 
be compared directly with the world of the migration of investments. If the risk is reasonable and 
the return is good, investors usually do not bother whether they know the country they are invest-
ing in or not. Most migrants, however, do not move to the place where they can earn most money 
or get the most benefits; they move within a network of interdependent countries usually bonded 
by a common history. This means that certain countries tend to receive more migrants from a cer-
tain network of countries, than from other networks. This allows them to specialize in offering hos-
pitality to, and eventually integrating, certain kinds of immigrants. Such a setup is not discriminato-
ry, unless certain countries are completely left out of these networks, and provided that this rule 
does not become the only criterion deciding entry. It is actually reasonable and desirable.  
8.2.2 THE KINSHIP RULES 
The “hospitality” rules above set up a regime of porous borders. We can envisage a world where 
more and more people from poorer countries can get a tourist visa, or temporary work visa, and 
travel safely to wealthier nations than is the case today. This would mean less money spent ineffec-
tively on “securing borders”, less people dying at sea or in the barren deserts that separate coun-
tries, less women raped, or men mutilated by traffickers. Locals providing services to these visitors 
would earn more money, and the steady supply of temporary workers would, most probably, cover 
labour shortages. All this seems too good to be true. So why do most people and most politicians 
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consider an open borders regime unacceptable? The fear is that massive amounts of people will 
pour in, take the jobs of the natives and push wages and work conditions down, and that after 
some time, many of these foreigners would want to stay on permanently, even when there are not 
enough jobs to go round. 
The position taken in this dissertation is that, in general, keeping people out is not the morally-
appropriate way of dealing with such problems. Rather, we should not allow certain sojourners to 
become de facto residents, if the country cannot afford to, or (for legitimate reasons) does not wish 
to, integrate them, and if they have no real moral right to remain in the country. If there are no jobs 
available for immigrants, or if employers are not allowed to hire people irregularly, and property 
owners are not allowed to rent housing for “long lets” to people without a legal status, then the 
“sojourners” whose safety and subsistence can be reasonably ensured in their home countries will 
return, and will not be replaced by similar potential immigrants as soon as they leave. Refugees and 
people whose subsistence is threatened in their home country will not return, but will ask for basic 
social security and the possibility of legal employment. They will have a moral right to “immigrate”, 
that is, stay on as permanent residents, subject to certain conditions, which polities should respect. 
This “automatic selection” method helps us mediate effectively between the right to immigrate and 
the right to control one´s borders. It works in theory, but is rarely put into practice. The problem is 
that such a system places the burden of honesty, consistency and respect for the rule of law mainly 
on the receiving polity and on its citizens, not on the migrants. When the economy is prosperous, 
employers hire people without a legal status, authorities stop enforcing border laws, and trade un-
ions do not bother to protest as long as their members have jobs and are being promoted as man-
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agers over immigrant workers. Few people are interested in giving irregular migrant workers a work 
visa and residence permit, or to replace them by other migrant workers who have a more pressing 
claim to be allowed to work legally and reside permanently in the country. The vulnerability of ir-
regular migrant workers is convenient to most of the people they ever get in contact with: employ-
ers, unionized supervisors, landlords and so forth. All of this reveals the hypocrisy and callousness 
of the people in receiving countries, who de facto integrate immigrants socially (though not legally 
and politically) without raising serious objections in times of plenty, and then suddenly start to 
claim that the immigrants “do not belong here” when a recession strikes. To be sure, some south-
ern states in the US (such as Arizona and Alabama) did espouse a migration management philoso-
phy similar to that proposed above (focussing on keeping sojourners from getting jobs or long-term 
housing), but they did so in the middle of a recession, in a legally-flawed manner, without providing 
social security and legal status to refugees and migrants who cannot be expected to return to a sit-
uation of great poverty. Most of these states stopped enforcing the new “show me your papers” 
laws as soon as the economy got better (or employers complained about labour shortages), target-
ed the immigrants rather than citizens (who also didn´t have their lease or job contract papers in 
order), focussed on creating fear rather than promoting rights, and engaged in racial profiling. If it is 
true that the problem is wage competition and a lack of capacity to integrate more than a certain 
number of immigrants per year, and not baseless xenophobia and political opportunism, then the 
laws should be honest enough to provide adequate legal channels for seasonal labour and perma-
nent residency to the immigrants that the country can afford to take in, while consistently keeping 
unentitled sojourners from becoming permanent residents.   
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The first “kinship” rule (K1) is the Immigrant Residency and Naturalisation Selection Rule. It under-
lines the right of refugees (“forced security migrants”) and people escaping serious economic need 
(“forced subsistence migrants”) to stay on (after first entry) and to be integrated (if they so wish). I 
believe that wealthy nations should accept and integrate as many of these immigrants as they can. 
Poorer nations often have to deal with the vast majority of these people, and when wealthy nations 
claim they cannot cope with the trickle of forced migrants which actually reaches them, they sound 
very cynical.  
As regards other sojourners (who have their basic rights met in their home countries), this rule says 
that they may be removed humanely unless a long time has passed, and they have become de facto 
residents. I have indicated roughly what I mean by “long time” and by the satisfaction of “basic 
rights” in Chapter 5. The point here is that I am not a priori against laws which distinguish these lat-
ter immigrants from the ones mentioned above, and in a fair and timely manner do not allow them 
to overstay their visas, or remain in the country without a regular status. There is a sense in which 
political sovereignty should be recognised and respected. However, noted above, the way these 
laws are designed and enforced is a clear litmus test of a polity´s honesty and consistency in its im-
migration policies, and of a polity´s respect for human rights and personal freedoms.  
The second rule (K2) concerns the National Narrative. As noted above, culture, ethnicity and reli-
gion are not, by themselves, valid criteria to keep visitors out. Yet, when those visitors wish to inte-
grate themselves and become permanent residents and citizens, it is legitimate to ask for a certain 
level of cultural integration, which I believe should be limited mainly to a demonstrable willingness 
to buy into the National Narrative. I assume, here, that such a narrative is ethically acceptable, in-
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clusive, revisable, and (reasonably) adoptable by newcomers. In other words, people wanting to 
reside permanently in a country such as Malta, and raise their children as Maltese citizens, should 
have a sense of what it is to be “Maltese”, and should want to be Maltese as much as possible 
(without necessarily abandoning the culture, religion and language of their parents). However, Mal-
tese people should reflect on what being “Maltese” entails in a pluralistic society, and distinguish 
the character of the Maltese polity from the ethnic, religious and cultural traits of the historical 
Maltese “nation”. Some of the historical symbols, traditions and civic rituals should, of course, re-
main, but they may need to be reinterpreted so that the newcomers can recognise themselves in 
these stories and rituals. For instance, naturalised immigrants could see certain summer festas 
rooted in Christian tradition as an expression of their Maltese national identity, and feel comforta-
ble participating in such events, in spite of being Buddhist. A person adopted as a child by a Maltese 
family may commemorate the lifting of the 1565 “Great Siege”, even though their biological ances-
tors may have been among those Turks who laid siege to Malta in that occasion. 
The third kinship rule (K3) is the Integration Capacity Rule. It addresses both the ability of receiving 
polities to integrate immigrants, and the ability of immigrants to be integrated in a particular polity. 
This is more than just the ability of opening borders to sojourners, or the ability to sojourn in an-
other country. Certain polities and immigrants may be stressed and thus incapable of properly and 
fully integrating immigrants, or being integrated. We should, of course, not exaggerate this point, 
and not allow it to be used as a general excuse to avoid integrating immigrants. Rather, countries 
should reflect on their capacity to integrate immigrants and increase it. For instance, a small coun-
try in the Caribbean may receive thousands of wealthy tourists from Muslim-majority countries eve-
ry year without any problem, but may find it hard to integrate Muslims properly as immigrants in 
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significant numbers. Before starting to give permanent residency permits to (poorer) Muslim immi-
grants, it may have to wait until its citizens overcome hostile Islamophobia, until its labour laws 
have been adjusted to allow practising Muslims to observe Ramadan, until the Muslim community 
becomes large and strong enough, and integrated enough, to be able to welcome newcomers, help 
them avoid marginalisation and fight discrimination, and so forth. A prosperous Muslim-majority 
country may be better equipped to receive and integrate such immigrants. Cultural and religious 
considerations of this kind, hence, are much more relevant to integration than to entry and so-
journ; they point to a specialisation in the types of migrants one choses to integrate, and not neces-
sarily a quantitative restriction. Furthermore, there are certain kinds of immigrants which require 
certain resources to be properly integrated, and not all countries should be expected to allow such 
immigrants to reside permanently in their territory. Not all countries are equipped to integrate dis-
abled immigrants, for instance, or traumatised former child-soldiers. All this points to the need of 
regional and international coordination and specialisation to deal with stressed immigrants, and 
help “new” receiving countries increase their integration capacity. 
The fourth rule (K4) is the history-laden interdependence rule applied to integration, and is linked 
to the rule above. We have argued that countries are joined together in networks of interdepend-
ence given their histories. This entails a greater capacity to integrate certain types of immigrants, 
and an ability to specialise. Lebanon and Jordan have a greater capacity to integrate Syrians and 
Palestinians than, say, wealthier Estonia, and the history and interdependence of neighbouring 
countries the Middle East explains much of this difference in capacity.  
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The final rule (P1) is a procedural one. It claims that the local fine-tuning and concretisation of the 
above rules requires fair democratic processes where those most impacted by boundary laws are 
adequately represented. Of course this assumes we are speaking of liberal democratic polities, as 
we have usually done in this dissertation. It does not necessarily mean giving the right to vote and 
be elected to every person who happens to be in the country. Even so, democracy means that the 
people who are most impacted by laws should have a say in their formulation. Proposing priority 
rules such as these can take us only so far in formulating concrete policies which are adequate to 
local situations. The details of immigration laws, and the setup of institutions which deal with im-
migrants, usually cannot (and should not) be imposed as moral duties from above. They should re-
sult from complex political debates and compromises. Such political bargaining is acceptable and 
even desirable, as long as the policymakers truly listen to those most affected by the laws they 
write and seek to represent them, and also listen to moral arguments and propositions such as 
those contained in the above rules and take them into account. 
8.2.3 THE APPLICATION OF THE RULES 
The observations above explain why, in this dissertation, I choose not to apply these rules to a par-
ticular situation, say that in Malta, and propose concrete policy recommendations. I do not believe 
that it is the task of Moral Theology and Moral Philosophy to propose concrete policies, as though 
these could be determined a priori and deductively from moral principles and rules. Rather, the pri-
ority rules are offered as guidelines that should inspire activists and politicians as they negotiate 
compromises, and as they discern the fine print of policies, with the help of experts better versed in 
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the framing of laws and institutions, and better informed of sociological, economic and geopolitical 
realities, than moral theologians and philosophers. 
8.3 Other Contributions Worth Noting 
Besides the priority rules proposed above, I believe that this dissertation makes a number of other 
contributions to various debates in theological Ethics, which could be further developed in the fu-
ture. In our introductory chapter, we proposed a methodology for theological Social Ethics which 
rethinks the traditional “see-judge-act” method in the light of the epistemological debates of the 
20th century. Our case study in Chapter 4 is, of course, one of the most “original” pieces. To be sure, 
it speaks of immigration in Malta, a reality which is probably unfamiliar to the reader. However, it 
does more than that. It uses Malta to challenge certain assumptions made both by respected inter-
national scholars (whose reflection on contemporary immigration is often limited by gross historical 
and geographical generalisations, which miss the details that a microcosm like Malta can provide), 
and likewise by many Maltese nationals (who are fixated on the current “crisis” and cannot see the 
bigger picture). Indeed, most Maltese readers would probably be quite surprised and challenged by 
some of the information I provide, and the claims I make, in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 is “original” in its own way. Firstly, as regards method, its shows how the Old Testament 
texts, and how information from a diachronic analysis of the Bible, can be used rigorously and prof-
itably in theological Ethics. It indicates a way, surely one among many, to break out of the tendency 
of “proof texting”, and to use a classic text from a particular religious tradition in a moral argument 
addressed also to non-believers. There are, of course, other legitimate ways of using Scripture in 
Ethics, but this approach seems to me the most fruitful for the purposes of our dissertation. Sec-
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ondly, as regards content, many biblical concepts are brought to bear on the ethics of migration, 
and not only the concept of ger in the biblical law codes, as has become commonplace in this kind 
of work. Furthermore, by insisting on the polysemy and the evolution of the term ger, I argue that a 
reflection on contemporary migration seeking to make rigorous use of the Bible should, in fact, not 
start from, or focus on, the “ger” laws in Leviticus.  
Our effort, in Chapter 7, to better understand and define “solidarity” is, I believe, another valuable 
contribution to the field of theological Social Ethics. The reflection on the virtues of hospitality and 
kinship, and on how they can be lived and fostered not only within Christian communities, but also 
in civil society as political virtues, further enriches this final chapter. 
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ANNEX A: CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON MIGRATION 
Table A1: The Causes of Migration, according to CST 
Push factors – mainly linked to conditions of life and working conditions in sending areas/countries, 
which are objectively bad or perceived as such. In general, the following are mentioned in Church 
documents: 
1) Violence and Injustice 
a) Conflicts, rebellions, wars, persecution of minorities by oppressive regimes or majority 
groups (ES-RDS; ES-PM I:1:2:c; IT-UCD 7). These are often fuelled by excessive nationalism, 
and by the violent exclusion of ethnic or religious minorities (EM 1); 
b) Oppressive regimes and oligarchies, seeking to holding on to power by severely limiting the 
fair freedoms that enable citizens in sending countries to live with dignity (PT 105; EA 7), 
and severely limiting the exercise (or directly violating) human rights (EA 7; ES-PM I:1:2:c); 
c) Violence related to gangs, drug trafficking, etc. (EM 10). 
2) International Structures 
a) International Trade 
i) Economic globalisation (which opens markets, not borders; allows free circulation of in-
formation and capital, but not people (EM 1, 4; M2000 3-4; USMX-SNL 57)); 
ii) Trade agreements and historical events and decisions, which have increased the inequal-
ity between the global north and south (EM 4; IT-UCD 7), and in particular protectionist 
barriers in international trade which “do not allow emerging nations to sell their prod-
ucts on competitive terms in the markets of western countries” (EM 4); 
b) Demographic imbalances between developed countries and emerging countries (EM 1, 4; IT-
UCD 7; ES-IEI 2); 
c) External interference, which provokes or prolongs civil wars and conflicts, used by foreign 
governments and multinational companies seeking to advance their political and economic 
interests and to create demand for the arms industry (SRS 24; RDPS). 
3) Poverty, Economic Mismanagement 
a) Underdevelopment (PP 67.69; ES-PM I:1:2:c); 
b) Lack of capital and skills for investment in agriculture, low market prices for agricultural 
produce and lack of transport infrastructure (cf. MM 124); 
c) Unfair competition on international markets and price fixing by multinationals hampering 
growth in poorly-diversified economies; 
d) Difficulty in creating enough jobs for a rapidly-expanding population (ES-PM I:1:2:c); 
e) Lack of economic initiative (SRS 15); 
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f) Adverse economic effects resulting from onerous interest payments on national debt, past 
defaults, structural adjustment programmes, etc. (ES-PM I:1:2:c); 
g) Corruption, kleptocracy, incompetence in government (ES-PM I:1:2:c). 
4) Ecology and Geo-specific Factors 
a) Natural disasters and hostile climates (OA 17; ES-PM I:1:2:c); 
b) Desertification, fish-stock depletion, flooding and droughts due to global warming, pollu-
tion, over-exploitation of natural resources. 
5) National Policies that Favour Emigration (which, through the education system, often accustom 
young people to think that their future lies abroad): 
a) Policies that promote exit migration to support development of the sending country 
through remittances, which are also a major source of foreign currency needed to pay debt 
burdens (IT-UCD 7; Caritas Europa et al. (2006a)); 
b) Policies that promote exit migration to relieve demographic pressure and unemployment 
(which depress wages) or social discontent (which creates instability and scares foreign in-
vestment) – (IT-UCD 7; Caritas Europa et al. (2006a)). 
Pull factors – mainly linked to better living and work conditions in receiving countries, real or per-
ceived, generally as regards economic opportunities and personal freedoms: 
1) Receiving countries are perceived as havens of personal freedom and economic prosperity, being 
portrayed so especially by the media, popular TV shows and dramas, and by returning/visiting 
regular migrants (or irregular migrants who managed to regularise their situation); this stimu-
lates the personal desire to migrate – (IT-UCD 7; ES-IE 37; FR-QEF A:2). 
Subjective Motives 
In general, people migrate to seek better living conditions and better employment (OA 17; LE 23). 
But the subjective decision to migrate often is due to a mix of desires and motives (MM 124; EM 
1.10) namely: 
1) Positive motives: broader horizons, better quality of life and personal freedom allowing better 
self-realisation, the promise of a better future for one´s family (education, healthcare, job op-
portunities), cultural preferences;  
2) Indifferent or possibly not-so-positive motives: desire for novelty, adventure, comfort, quick 
enrichment, etc.; 
3) Negative motives: illusions and idealisation of life in urban centres and foreign cities. 
Facilitating factors  
1) Globalisation and links 
a) Transportation costs to reach receiving countries deemed affordable or worth the invest-
ment/risk (IT-UCD 7; ES-PM I.1:2:c); 
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b) Language and cultural barriers deemed surmountable, due to globalisation and past rela-
tionships between sending and receiving countries (M2000 1.3-4); 
c) Internet and mobile phones (and innovative forms of banking and money transfer) allow 
migrants and their families in receiving and sending countries to remain in contact, offer 
psychological support and send remittances, while networks of migrants provide useful tips, 
support in times of crisis, housing and job opportunities (cf. Caritas Europa et al. 2006a). 
2) Networks 
a) Transnational networks have spurred the development of pendular movements making 
mobility a way of life for some workers (FR-QEF A:2) 
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Table A2: The Effects of Migration on the Migrants themselves, according to CST339 
Positive Effects: 
CST does not speak at length of the positive effects of migration on the migrants themselves. 
1) CST assumes that if people migrate, it is because they hope they will live a better life in the new 
country340 (more freedom, better living conditions, a better future for one´s family). Though this 
hope may not be realized immediately and may even prove to be chimeric for some migrants, 
most migratory movements are sustained by the news and evidence of the wealth, freedom 
and other benefits obtained by emigrant friends and relatives. 
2) Migrants are also enriched by the culture they meet in the receiving countries, especially long-
term migrants and students (M2008). 
3) Travelling “brings to mind the sense of life as a journey and therefore the final goal of this 
earthly pilgrimage, whose outcome will be the return to God, in participation in the Lord’s Pass-
over” (CHM 12). 
 
Negative Effects: 
1) Economic and work-related: 
a) Difficulty in making social demands and have one´s rights recognised and protected (OA 17; 
VPRF 6; EM 5.6); 
b) Seasonal, dangerous, unattractive work, or work in the informal economy (L1984 2); with 
long working hours and often without health care or social security provisions (EM 6); 
c) Being used as “reservoirs of cheap manual labour [and], should there be a recession, they 
are the first victims” CHMa I:1 (cf. ES-JLE). 
2) Social: 
a) Loss of cultural identity (PP 68; OA 17; FC 77; ES-CP 91; ES-PM L2:2:b);  
b) Risk of becoming victims of intolerance, marginalisation and abuse (ES-PM I:2:2:b) due to 
racism and xenophobia (L1983; ES-RDS) and due to attitudes of cultural superiority (USMX-
SNL 40); 
c) Marginalisation and poverty (especially in wealthy and secularised environments) may en-
tice immigrants to 
339 A similar, but simpler summary of CST on this issue may be found in Departamento de Pensamiento So-
cial Cristiano de la U. P. Comillas (2006, 183f). 
340 For instance, RN 47 states “No one would exchange his country for a foreign land if his own afforded him 
the means of living a decent and happy life”. 
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i) Engage in criminal activities (PP 67; L1984 2; ES-PM 1:2:2:b) 
ii) Subscribe to subversive and fanatical doctrines (PP 67);  
d) In turn, their marginalisation becomes worse when they are being portrayed as “criminals”, 
“fanatics” or “terrorists” due to highly publicized acts of a small minority of immigrants, es-
pecially in recent years when the threat of international terrorism has become a source of 
great concern (EM 4, USMX-SNL 100). 
3) Personal and family-related: 
a) Deception by traffickers and fictitious employment agencies (L1984 2); 
b) Human trafficking, sexual exploitation and enslavement, especially of women and children 
(EM 5.29; M1995 3; M2008); 
c) Physical, verbal and sexual abuse (EM 6); 
d) Traumatic and life-threatening experiences to enter, travel through and live in other coun-
tries in irregular ways (M2007); 
e) Separation of family members and break-down of family life (FC 77; ES-PM 1:2:2:b; M1986 
2; Caritas Europa et al. (2003)); 
f) Precarious housing conditions in dangerous neighbourhoods (M1986 2); 
g) Insecurity (GS 66; OA 17; ES-PM I:2:2:b);  
h) Difficulties, especially for children and young migrants, to juggle multiple identities (M2008); 
i) Loneliness, isolation and depression (PP 67, CHM 6); 
j) Difficulty of raising and educate children (M2008; M2010); difficulties faced by migrant chil-
dren often deprived of a parental figure and forced to live with relatives who may not be 
able to provide adequate parenting or within institutions which can never properly replace a 
health upbringing in one´s family (IT-UCD 35-36); cultural tensions between parents and 
children (M1986 2);  
k) Difficulty in living up to the high expectations of “striking it rich” of families in sending coun-
tries and of the immigrants themselves (when they compare their situation to very wealthy 
people in the receiving country) (PP 67); 
4) Legal: 
a) Rights are not legally recognised, adequately enshrined in law or adequately enforced, lead-
ing to discrimination (EM 5, 6); 
b) Irregular migrants easily become victims of crime or injustice since they risk deportation if 
they report offenders or seek protection from the law (EM 5);   
c) This means that they are often discriminated against in law and fact (ES-PM I:2:2:b) in what 
concerns: 
i) Salaries (GS 66; ES-PM I:2:2:b); 
ii) Working conditions (GS 66); 
iii) Housing and living conditions (GS 66); 
A n n e x e s  — P a g e :  554 
 
d) Dependence on state bureaucracy which is often slow, excessive and not flexible enough to 
cater to foreign languages and cultures, and to deal with complex cases (cf. CA 48). Institu-
tions are often understaffed and officials are poorly trained and supervised in their dealings 
with vulnerable persons who are not fully aware of their rights and not acquainted with the 
procedures (USMX-SNL 79-99); 
e) Irregular migrants (even asylum seekers) risk detention and incarceration in very poor con-
ditions in border raids or when booked for minor offences, both in transit and in receiving 
countries. Lack of access to these facilities (siting and bureaucracy often make it extremely 
difficult if not impossible for pastors, human rights organizations, pro-bono lawyers or jour-
nalists to visit) often means that serious human rights violations occur and go unreported 
(cf. USMX-SNL 42, 94) and that asylum seekers are, in practice, not given the real possibility 
to apply for asylum (USMX-SNL 95-99). In some cases, deportation does not respect the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
5) Religious and Moral: 
a) Precarious living and working conditions and mobility may have a negative effect on the 
immigrant´s participation in the life of a religious community in which they may deepen 
their faith (PP 68; OA 17; FC 77; ES-CP 91; ES-PM II:1:2:b); cf. CHMa II:4 (religious and moral 
crises). 
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Table A3: Effects of Migration on Sending Communities, according to CST 
Positive Effects 
CST does not often dwell on the positive effects of migration on sending communities. 
1) CST mentions remittances (EM 5; USMX-SNL 72 [boxed insert]). One document, signed by the 
Working group on Migration of the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European 
Community, as well as various Christian Churches and NGOs, provides an insightful analysis of 
the links between remittances and development (Caritas Europa et al. 2006a). Remittances: 
a) have a positive impact on development;  
b) often contribute more to the development of a country than development aid; and,  
c) in the long term, sustain development which makes it less likely for people to feel the need 
to migrate seeking to ensure a decent quality of life for themselves and their families. 
2) The Spanish Bishops also mention studies which claim that migration reduces the social burden 
on developing countries with high unemployment and rapidly expanding populations, hence 
promoting development (ES-PM I:2:1:a-b).  
 
Negative Effects 
1) Family-related: women and children left behind have to build a family in the absence of a fa-
ther-figure, and often need to “submit to a great pressure of work in order to provide for the 
family’s daily sustenance” (M1995 1). 
2) Social: whole villages may be depopulated of their young people (USMX-SNL 47).  
3)  
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Table A4: Effects of Migration on Receiving Countries and Communities, 
According to CST 
 
Positive Effects 
Church documents sometimes mention the “many benefits”, economic, social and cultural, that mi-
gration brings to receiving countries (e.g. UK-MCM 1; Caritas Europa et al. (2004a n.1)) without 
mentioning specifically what these benefits are341. Some hints may however be gleaned from the 
minor documents. 
1) Economic growth: Immigrants increase the economic output and allow accumulation of capital 
in receiving countries by providing the labour market with a flexible pool of additional workers 
who are young, adaptable and ready to work long hours for lower salaries, while generally re-
quiring less investment in housing and social security (Cf. EM 5). 
2) Stabilization of the social order (cf. Departamento de Pensamiento Social Cristiano de la U. P. 
Comillas 2006, 180): 
a) Immigrants participate in social burdens that they contribute to and rarely enjoy (e.g. re-
tirement pension schemes, unemployment benefit schemes, health insurance and social se-
curity in general); 
b) they help contain inflation (absorbing money that could otherwise be used for consumption 
in order to send remittances); 
c) they put pressure on global and national labour markets in such a way as to prevent rapid 
hikes in wages (with losses in competitiveness), allow and spur the indigenous working class 
to move on to better-paying jobs requiring higher skills; 
d) they often assume the role of scapegoats, allowing the cohesion of the working class in a 
country, which sees them as different and inferior. 
 
Negative Effects 
1) Rise in Xenophobia and Hostility Towards Migrants (cf. ES-RDS): Some documents of the local 
magisterium attempt to list the motives behind the rising hostility towards migrants and the 
shift in public opinion towards ever-more restrictive and oppressive migration laws and border 
policies. The following reasons are mentioned in the documents: 
341 However, one report by the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community´s 
Working group on Migration (Caritas Europa et al. 2006a) refers to a study commissioned by the UK House of 
Commons (2004) that concludes that the benefits of migration amply exceed the costs.  
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a) fear of loss of identity (ES-PM I:1:2:b); 
b) ignorance and lack of knowledge of the other, sometimes feeding into the xenophobic ideas 
and tendencies of certain groups and politicians (M1983; ES-PM I:1:2:b); 
c) resurgence of a nationalistic liberalism, opposed to the promotion of social and economic 
human rights, yet also opposed to full economic liberalisation when this requires the free 
flow of labour (ES-PM I:1:2:b; EM 4); 
d) fear of the erosion of social welfare programmes (ES-PM I:1:2:b); 
e) fear of acts of terrorism committed by immigrants (EM 4); 
2) Problems related to irregular migration (that generally accompanies regular migration) and the 
spaces of illegality it creates: exploitation, criminal activities, prostitution, drug trafficking 
(M1995 3); 
3) Wage competition (real or perceived) with unskilled citizens, and the fear that migrant labour 
(often not unionized and in the informal economy) might harm other low-income groups by de-
pressing wages, increasing unemployment, reducing the bargaining power of trade unions and 
worsening labour conditions for all workers (cf. IT-UCD 14). 
4)  
 
  
A n n e x e s  — P a g e :  558 
 
Table A5: Rights Concerning Migration and Borders, as Defended by CST 
 
A BASIC FREEDOMS AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS 
A1 Right to Nationality 
 Right Right (of individuals) to have a homeland. 
Duty Duty (of states) not to deprive individuals and ethnic groups of citizenship and 
to provide paths to citizenship to stateless persons. 
Reason/s The human person has a social nature and so has a right to be a full member of 
human society.  
Statelessness does not allow persons to claim their fundamental human rights. 
CST DPMC 6; CHM 17; RCS 9; M1992 2; M2001 3 
A2 Right to Asylum for Refugees and Forced Migrants 
 Right Right (of refugees and forced migrants) to asylum;  
Right (of poor receiving countries) to receive help from the international com-
munity to provide decent living conditions to refugees and asylum seekers 
Duty Duty of countries to process asylum claims promptly and fairly and to offer de-
cent living conditions to refugees and asylum seekers.  
Duty of the international community to help poor countries meet these obliga-
tions.  
Duty of non-refoulement when people may be seriously risking their lives if 
obliged to return to their homeland, even in cases unforeseen by internation-
al conventions. 
Reason/s The right of asylum is a “strict right”, grounded in human dignity. 
CST L1979; PFD 3; M1996 4; RCS 14 
A3 Right to Emigrate 
 Right Right (of individuals, and their families) to emigrate, when, in one´s own coun-
try 
• one cannot use the material and spiritual goods which allow ready ac-
cess to one´s fulfilment, and/or  
• one cannot provide for one’s family,  
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due to: 
• poverty and overpopulation, and/or 
• conditions imposed by the state which offend human dignity. 
Duty Duty (of states) not to block or impede emigration “except where grave re-
quirements of the common good, considered objectively, demand it.” 
Reason/s Flourishing: Right to use the material and spiritual goods 
which allow ready access to one´s fulfilment. 
GS 26; DPMC 7; 
CHM 17; LE 23; 
M2001 3. 
Universal Destination of Created Things: The Creator of the 
universe made all good things primarily for the good of 
all. 
EF (§102 in Bag-
gio and Pettenà); 
GS 69; PP 22; 
M2003 3. 
Freedom of Movement, Unity of the Human Family: The 
fact of being a citizen of a particular state does not de-
prive persons of membership in the human family, nor of 
citizenship in the world-wide fellowship of human per-
sons. 
PT 25. 
Parental Duties: Parents may need to emigrate to secure 
“the healthy liberty [they] need in order to fulfil the du-
ties assigned [them] by the Creator regarding the physi-
cal, spiritual and religious welfare of the family.” 
MM 45. 
A4 Right to Immigrate 
 Right Right (of emigrants and their families, in the cases mentions in no. 3, above) to 
enter and select a new home in foreign lands. 
Duty Duty (of states) not to block or impede immigration “except where grave re-
quirements of the common good, considered objectively, demand it.” 
Reason/s As above, in right no. A3. (Most documents in Latin speak in general of the right 
to migrate – ius migrandi – which are often translated incorrectly as the “right 
to emigrate”; cf.  GS 65; OA 17.) 
CST DPMC 7; PT  25, 106; GS 65; CHM 17; CCC 2241; M2001 3 
A5 Right to Basic Freedoms in one´s Homeland 
 Right Right (of citizens) to dwell freely in one´s own country. 
Duty Duty (of states, communities) to protect and guarantee basic freedoms;  
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Duty of citizens to be “instruments of their own liberation” (M1992 4). 
Reason/s Basic freedoms are inalienable human rights, based on human dignity. 
CST PT 14-24; CHM 17; M2001 3. 
B SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF PERSONS 
B1 Right to Employment in one´s Homeland 
 Right Right of citizens to find jobs in their own countries and regions (as far as possi-
ble). 
Duty Duty (of states, local authorities) to create job opportunities.  
Duty of the international community and of states to diminish and eventually 
help overcome enormous inequalities in economic and social development 
between countries, and between regions and communities within the same 
country.  
Duty of citizens in these countries to be proactive and to contribute to the de-
velopment of their countries. 
Reason/s One should avoid uprooting people; migration should ideally be the result of 
free choice, not compulsion. 
CST DPMC 9; GS 63, 66; PT 101-2; M1992 4. 
B2 Right to be Helped to Integrate in a New Country 
 Right Right of immigrants and their families to receive help to integrate themselves 
and live a dignified life in the host country. 
Duty Duty of governments in receiving countries to offer help to immigrants when 
needed, especially through the provision of housing, education, social securi-
ty. This includes a duty to set up welcoming structures to help migrant fami-
lies “break out of their isolation and ignorance of the juridical, social, educa-
tional and social security norms of the host country” (M1986 3).  
Duty of the international community (through agencies, NGOs, etc.) to help 
poorer nations (especially those having to deal with significant influxes of ref-
ugees and migrants) provide for the various needs of the people residing 
there.  
Reason/s Equality: Immigrants should not be treated as inferiors given that they have the 
same dignity and often pay the same taxes as citizens and other residents. 
Human dignity: Migrants should be treated as persons, not merely as instru-
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ments of production, offering an opportunity to work is not enough.  
Healthy families: Need to ensure a decent family life and standard of living (this 
is also beneficial to the receiving community and its future citizenry if the mi-
grants´ descendants are naturalised). 
CST AA 14; GS 84; L1982 (Baggio and Pettenà 2009, 314); PFD 2; M1986 3, M1992 
2; Caritas Europa et al. (2004b). 
B3 Right to Receive Equal Pay for Equal Work 
 Right Right of migrants to receive pay equal to that received by natives for equal 
work. Special care should be given to migrant women who are particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation. 
Duty Duty of government to enact and enforce just labour legislation, and of em-
ployers to pay fair wages. 
Reason/s Fairness: One should avoid discrimination and wage competition with native 
workers. 
CST LE 23; M1992 2; M2005; ES-JLE 
C RIGHTS OF FAMILIES AND GROUPS AFFECTED BY MIGRATION 
C1 Right to Family Reunification 
 Right Right (of immigrants) to live together with their families. 
Duty Duty (of states) to allow (affordable and reasonably rapid) family reunification. 
Reason/s This right follows from the dignity of the family. 
It is important to have united, functioning and healthy families for the future of 
any society. 
Marriage is not simply a contract, but is a sacred union; “man should not sepa-
rate what God has united”. 
CST AA 11; CHM 17; M1986 3; M1993 1; M1995 1; M1996 4; M2001 3; Caritas Eu-
ropa et al. (2003; 2004a n.5). 
C2 Right to Live in a Cohesive and Well-Ordered Society 
 Right Right of host communities to a serious effort, on the part of immigrants, to in-
tegrate themselves and thus show respect to the host culture (and the laws 
of the land). 
Duty Duty of immigrants to integrate themselves in the host community, learn the 
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language, adapt to the new culture, respect just laws (preferably without 
compulsion, and without placing excessive demands on those who suffered 
serious traumas). 
Reason/s Great esteem is due to the patrimony and language of another people when 
one encounters that people and resides among them.  
CST DPMC 10; PT 97; AG 26; CHMa III.2; CCC 2241; M2005 
C3 Right to Keep one´s Native Identity 
 Right Right of migrants to keep their native tongue and spiritual heritage (customs, 
tradition, religion). 
Duty Duty of receiving communities not to hinder this, but rather to help them do 
so.  
Reason/s Value of Identity: These goods are part of their identity; they are products of 
another culture and people which should be valued. 
Dangers of Assimilation: Integration should not be understood as assimilation, 
which can have harmful effects on everyone (cf. M2005 1). 
CST DPMC 11; GS 29. 59; PT 95-96; CHM 17; CHMa I.5, III.2; L1981; M2001 3 
C4 Right to Public Profession of Religion 
 Right Right of migrants to publicly profess their religion. 
Duty Duty of public authorities to permit the exercise of that right (with due respect 
to public order). 
Reason/s This follows from the basic human right to religious freedom, as understood in 
CST. 
CST PT 14; DPMC 11; M2001 3 
C5 Right to Full Membership in the Local Church 
 Right Right of (Catholic) migrants (even undocumented persons) to be considered 
full-fledged members of local (Catholic) churches in receiving countries. 
Duty Duty of local (Catholic) churches to consider migrants as full members, and to 
offer them assistance and services, especially in spiritual matters, normally 
through the parish system. 
Duty of local authorities not to impede this, and not to penalize Churches and 
Christian NGOs for providing spiritual and humanitarian assistance to mi-
grants. 
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D RIGHTS OF POLITIES AFFECTED BY MIGRATION 
D1 Right to Limit “Brain drain”342 and Capital Flight 
 Right Right (of poor communities, nations) to native human resources (of their peo-
ple, citizens) and native investment of material goods. 
Duty Duty (of persons possessing material wealth or useful skills and knowledge) to 
contribute to the development of one´s community and country of origin. 
Reason/s Duty to serve the common good, giving due importance to the local common 
good and to the good of poorer communities. 
CST DPMC 8; GS 65 
D2 Right to Sovereignty, Limited by Ethical Imperatives343 
 Right Right of civilized and ordered communities, within the limits of the shared in-
ternational ethical standards, 
• to protect their own territory,  
• to take proper measures to safeguard their legitimate national interests,  
• to take measures against the circulation of fugitive criminals, subverters of 
public order and traffickers of arms and drugs. 
Duty Duty (of states and individuals) to respect the sovereignty of foreign countries 
and to obey their laws when just and where applicable. 
Duty (of states, especially) to compensate for unjustified past violations of the 
sovereignty of other countries.344 
342 “Brain drain” should not be understood in the classic sense of skilled workers leaving poorer countries, 
since many poor countries actually benefit from the migration of skilled workers, and some actually train 
citizens to work abroad and support the sending country through remittances. Rather, what is mostly in-
tended here is “brain drain which is overall harmful for the sending countries”. One report by the Commis-
sion of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community´s Working group on Migration (Caritas Europa 
et al. 2006a) helps us to make that distinction. Pistone and Hoeffner (2007) offer a compelling treatment of 
the subject of how to interpret CST on brain drain in our contemporary world.  
343 Catholic tradition has always fought against absolutist notions of state sovereignty, insisting that positive 
law is subject to shared morality (making reference to the “natural law” and to human rights); cf. RH 17. EF 
§102 (Baggio and Pettenà edition) insists that sovereignty not be used as excuse to limit immigration: “The 
sovereignty of the state (dominium singularum civitatum —lit. “the [right of] dominion of particular poli-
ties”), although it must be respected, cannot be exaggerated to the point that access to this land is, for inad-
equate or unjustified reasons, denied to needy and decent people from other nations, provided of course, 
that the public wealth (utilitas publica), considered very carefully, does not forbid this”. 
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Reason/s Not clearly stated345. Border controls are assumed to be part of sovereignty. 
More recent documents assume that the right to control borders implies a 
right to systematically restrict immigration. 
CST EF §102 (Baggio and Pettenà edition); L1984 2; CCC 2241; M1995 2; EM 4, 21, 
29.  
Reason/s Catholicity implies that in the Church there are no strangers. “Through baptism, 
the Christian is a full-fledged member of the Christian community in the area 
in which he or she is living” M1990, 9. 
CST M1990 9-10; M1996 5. 
Though there may be other rights mentioned in CST346, I consider this list exhaustive enough for the 
purposes of the present work. 
 
344 Though not specifically discussed in CST, this follows from classic Church teaching on restitution and jus 
post bellum. It would imply taking some responsibility for economic underachievement and political instabil-
ity of weak states in the international system if one´s political, economic, military or ecological behaviour in 
the present and recent past (or that of multinationals operating in one´s territory) is/has affected those 
countries´ sovereignty and is one of the causes of their underachievement/instability. 
345 EM 21 (and other documents, e.g. ES-PM II:2:2) refers to GS 87; however, this text does not speak about 
the regulation of cross-border migration (as some translations would have it) but rather of the transitum 
ruricolarum ad urbes (movement of country-dwellers to the cities) within the borders of the same country. 
CCC 2241 claims that restriction is allowed for the “common good” while M1995 2 mentions that restriction 
may be allowed for reasons “which affect the migrants’ own interests”. 
346 The documents also mention the right of the individual “to be able to achieve his rights and satisfy his 
legitimate demands in his own country” (EM 29), or “to find opportunities in [one´s] homeland” (USMX-SNL 
34) which can be inferred from the rights 6 and 7 stated above. This is sometimes referred to, using a termi-
nology which is rhetorically compelling but not very rigorous, as “the right not to [have to] emigrate” (cf. 
M2004 3). As we know, people are sometimes forced to migrate due to causes that are predominantly natu-
ral (e.g. earthquakes, climatic cycles, etc.) or causes where we cannot impute human responsibility in a sim-
ple manner (e.g. cities/regions which have sunk under sea level due to human activity considered harmless 
at the time, cities/regions that grew rapidly due to a resource or industry that is no longer in demand and 
are now experiencing depression) or where solutions other than migration are not easily available (e.g. is-
land nations which underwent a demographic explosion due to the introduction of modern medicine with 
little or no education in family planning). In these cases, people have no real “right” not to be affected by 
such causes, no real “right” to be provided with easy or magical solutions that make emigration unnecessary. 
Some parts of the earth at times can support high human densities, and at other times cannot; to think that 
we can manipulate the biosphere to maintain human densities always and everywhere at the present level 
(such that nobody would ever be obliged to migrate) would imply a Promethean view of human abilities and 
a belief in the power of technology that would clearly contradict other aspects of Catholic Social Teaching. 
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Table A6: CST: General Right-Order Principles Applied to Migration  
G1. Principle of the Universal Destination of Created Goods: “God intended the earth and all it con-
tains for the use of all human beings and peoples. Thus, under the leadership of justice and in 
the company of charity, created goods should flow fairly to all” (GS 69, as translated in the offi-
cial translation of PP 22347; cf. EM 8; M2011). According to PP 22, “all other rights […] are to be 
subordinated to this principle”. CST often reminds us of the words of Leviticus 25:23: “The land 
is mine; for you are strangers and sojourners with me”. 
G2. Principle of Solidarity, Local and International, to ensure freedom from want:  
a) Solidarity, according to CST, is “not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the 
misfortunes of so many people, both near and far [but rather] is a firm and persevering de-
termination to commit oneself to the common good” (SRS 38). Solidarity should be prac-
ticed actively by individuals, communities and states, and should be concerned with the 
good of persons both near and far. 
b) “In view of the increasingly close ties of mutual dependence today between all the inhabit-
ants and peoples of the earth, the apt pursuit and efficacious attainment of the universal 
347 The Latin text of the second phrase is as follows: ita ut bona creata aequa ratione ad omnes affluere 
debeant, iustitia duce, caritate comite. One official translation of GS 69 (cf. O’Brien and Shannon 2010, 223) 
renders this as follows: “thus, as all men follow justice and unite in charity, created goods should abound for 
them on a reasonable basis”. This translation seems to force a Smithian liberal reading of affluo and imply 
that in a fair economic system (a free market economy, perhaps), wealth should abound for all, automatical-
ly, with no real need of regulation or redistribution, so long as we do not expect a full-fledged equality (since 
this would be “unreasonable”). Such a translation is not truly warranted by the Latin: the primary meaning of 
affluere is to flow to, especially when used with ad; the flow should be the active result of just leadership 
accompanied by charity (it is not the result of some inevitable natural or economic process by which “all 
men” end up following justice and uniting in charity); and finally aequa ratione implies fairness in distribu-
tion, not “being reasonable”. The translation is even less warranted when we consider its context. It is there-
fore not surprising that the translators of the citation of this same text in PP 22 felt they should revise the 
official translation of GS 69. We have here an example of how one of the most explosive statements of an 
Ecumenical Council can be cleverly de-fused by a translator. When we consider the huge impact of the Eng-
lish translation on the universal reception of such texts, we realize that most readers of this text may end up 
thinking that the Council is actually endorsing liberal capitalism here, rather than critiquing its very founda-
tions. Note that the translation on the Vatican Website is somewhat better, but still tries to dampen the im-
pact of the text on a liberal reader: “Thus, under the leadership of justice and in the company of charity, cre-
ated goods should be in abundance for all in like manner,” (Vatican Council II 1965). 
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common good now require of the community of nations that it organize itself in a manner 
suited to its present responsibilities, especially toward the many parts of the world which 
are still suffering from unbearable want” (GS 84; cf. IT-UCD 23-24). This means that wealthy 
nations have a three-fold obligation: 
i) “mutual solidarity – the aid that the richer nations must give to developing nations;  
ii) social justice – the rectification of trade relations between strong and weak nations;  
iii) universal charity – the effort to build a more humane world community, where all can 
give and receive, and where the progress of some is not bought at the expense of oth-
ers” (PP 44).   
G3. Principle of Subsidiarity – One should not “transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions 
which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies” (QA 79; cf. MM 65; 
CA 48). 
a) In line with this principle, CST underlines the importance of churches, associations, move-
ments and trade unions which help the integration of migrants, promote their participation 
in the local church or religious association, help them preserve their culture, and defend the 
rights of migrants and migrant workers (cf. L1982 - §1004 in Baggio and Pettenà 2009; Cari-
tas Europa et al. (2004b n.12 and conclusion)).  
b) Families too have a role to play; for instance, they should offer foster care to child immi-
grants, rather than let them grow in orphanages and other institutions (IT-UCD 36). Similar-
ly, schools and educational institutions, both private and public, are crucial to the welcoming 
of migrant children and their families, and to their effective integration into civil society (IT-
UCD 37). The mass media can play a very important role; they should be faithful to the 
truth, uncover hidden acts of injustice or human rights abuses, and help citizens understand 
migrants better and overcome xenophobia and prejudice, rather than stoking fears, provok-
ing hostility and rejection, and misinforming the public about the reality of human migration 
(cf. M1998 1; ES-PM II:2; IT-UCD 38). 
c) Migrants should be active in civil society. Participation in the social life of the receiving na-
tion, and, to some extent, in its political life, is a very important part of the integration pro-
cess (PFD 6; IT-EF28). Ideally, one should maintain one´s original identity (through solidarity 
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with persons of the same culture) while moving towards becoming an active citizen of the 
receiving country (through solidarity with the whole of the receiving nation and active 
membership in its diverse local communities). 
d) Subsidiarity does not mean that the role of the state should be reduced to penning just 
laws, maintaining public order and defending the country from foreign aggression. The state 
too has an important role to play to ensure that the families of refugees and migrants live in 
dignity (with their human rights to housing, education, basic health care, etc. adequately 
provided for – cf. AA 14; GS 84; L1982; IT-UCD 40). However, one must also make sure that 
the welfare state does not create dependency (CA 48). A number of services to migrants can, 
at times, be more adequately provided by communities, associations, churches, and other 
actors in civil society which are often more creative, more flexible, more efficient and less 
bureaucratic than state agencies; the state should help these agents provide such services 
(e.g. by financing their projects and offering tax rebates to those who provide funding to 
these organizations) (ibid.). 
G4. Principle of Priority of Labour: Capital should be at the service of labour, not labour at the ser-
vice of capital (LE 23; L1982 – cf. Baggio and Pettenà 2009, 312; PFD 6). This means that: 
a) Rather than exploit migrant workers to build up the wealth and resources of a nation, the 
material and intellectual resources of a wealthy receiving country should be placed at the 
service of the persons being integrated into its labour market and their families. This can be 
done, in part, through the provision of adequate social services to migrants (cf. AA 14, GS 
24). 
b) Circulation of goods, capital and labour are needed to redress imbalances among nations, 
and between rural and urban areas. However, as far as possible, capital, rather than labour, 
should be forced to move for the development of peoples (PT 101-2).  
G5. Principle of Just Legislation: True and enforceable legislation should conform to (at least mini-
mal) shared notions of justice. As regards migration, just legislation is one that ensures that the 
rights and duties of all parties are respected (LE 23; M1986 3; EM 87; ES-JLE), in sending coun-
tries, transit countries and receiving countries.  
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a) Legislation should be kept up to date, especially since the phenomenon of migration gives 
rise to constantly changing realities on the ground, and laws which may have been fair when 
enacted may become unjust and discriminatory when contexts change (cf. OA 23; ES-JLE; ES-
IE 51).  
b) The conformity of national law with widely accepted international conventions is one way of 
evaluating the fairness of national law (cf. EM 6), as are the rights and duties listed above 
and principles establishing the right order of relations in the public sphere. 
c) There are certain rights which cannot be denied, or restricted indefinitely or for unreasona-
ble amounts of time by positive law. One example of this is the right to live with one’s own 
family. It is not acceptable to issue administrative regulations that deny or restrict such 
rights indefinitely, such that people may be forced into illegal situations by such regulations 
(M1996 4). 
d) Representatives of civil society should be consulted when drafting laws, and the Christian 
faithful have a right and duty to propose and promote migration laws and policies in con-
formity with CST (ES-PM II:3:2:c). 
G6. Principle of “Cosmopolitan Patriotism”:  
a) “The Christian faithful gathered together out of all nations into the Church are not marked 
off from the rest of men by their government, nor by their language, nor by their political in-
stitutions, and so they should live for God and Christ in a respectable way of their own na-
tional life. As good citizens, they should be true and effective patriots, all together avoiding 
racial prejudice and hypernationalism, and should foster a universal love for man” (AG 15; 
cf. EM 8). In a globalising world, non-Christians too are invited to be “cosmopolitan patri-
ots”348. 
b) One should maintain an appropriate dialogic tension between diversity and universality. Di-
versity brings richness as cultures meet, but also creates conflict, mistrust, misunderstand-
ing and fear of the other when encounters are forceful, unprepared, and ill-timed, and peo-
348 Philosophical positions similar to the one in this principle can be found in Appiah (2002; 2007) and Nuss-
baum (2002). 
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ple are not willing to make room for the other and engage in a sincere and cordial dialogue. 
Universality allows different peoples to understand one another and build a society togeth-
er in spite of their differences; it fosters the cosmopolitan dream of unifying the human 
family. When different people come together, they discover shared values, based in a com-
mon humanity. Unity and universality, however, is not something created politically or so-
cially to suppress diversity but must coexist with diversity (Cf. M1991 3). Together, they al-
low a fruitful intercultural dialogue that is essential to world peace (M2003 5). 
G7. Principle of Inseparability of Faith and Justice, and the Option for the Poor: “The truth about 
God, who is the source of every gift, cannot be separated from the manifestation of his love and 
preference for the poor and humble” (RM 37, cited in M1988 5; cf. OA 51, JW (intro.)). Applied 
to migration, this entails that: 
a) Christians and Christian institutions cannot claim to profess or proclaim a true and justifying 
faith in the God of Jesus Christ without living a praxis which promotes justice for migrants. In 
the Catholic tradition, faith is not merely a pure mental operation of assent to verbal propo-
sitions but a lifelong action involving the whole human person —mind and body— under-
stood as a relational being; 
b) Social justice, rather than being based on simple arithmetical notions of equal desert, should 
find inspiration in traditions of religious faith to deepen humankind´s understanding of jus-
tice. The option for the poor and the election of the lesser, key notions in the Jewish and 
Christian Scriptures, have inspired secular thought on social justice (e.g. John Rawls´ differ-
ence principle). Such notions are crucial when reflecting on what is truly due, in justice, to 
immigrants and refugees, and are key to understanding the rationale behind certain claims 
made by CST349. For instance, when John Paul II insists that there should be an international 
regulation of migration, he says that this is necessary “to prevent unilateral decisions that 
are harmful to the weakest” (M2001 3; cf. also OA 23; ES-JLE). The option for the poor is a 
349 Donal Dorr (1983, 1–10) argues that the main thread which unifies CST is, in fact, the “Option for the 
Poor”. 
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major ordering principle in CST which allows us to prioritise and adjudicate between con-
flicting rights claims (cf. Hollenbach 1979, 203–207). 
G8. Principle of the Acknowledgment of and Resistance to Structural Evil or “Structures of Sin” (cf. 
SRS 36, cited in M1988 5)350.  
a) War is an evil; it causes people to migrate and seek asylum. There are political and economic 
structures in the world which promote various types of wars: wars undertaken for no clear 
just cause; proxy wars fuelled by economic powers, multinational company interests and 
the arms trade; unending cycles of civil wars between different power brokers, nationalistic 
groups and tribes (cf. ES-RDS; SRS 24).  
b) Overly restrictive and calculating legislation on immigration is an evil “machine”, as Pius XII 
argues in his 1952 Christmas address (AAS 45 (1953) 41-42). Similarly, the widening gap be-
tween developed and emerging countries (SRS 14) is an evil; the lack of development in cer-
tain countries and regions is an evil, and when such poverty and underdevelopment oblige 
people to migrate, this is an evil, albeit “necessary” at times (LE 23). It is a structural evil, 
since international political and economic structures make it necessary for moral subjects to 
migrate and suffer the evils of uprooting, possible abuse, discrimination, etc. An evil struc-
ture typically makes itself “necessary” to people with reduced agency, and forces its victims 
to reinforce the structure, causing more suffering to themselves and others. 
c) There are positive aspects to the phenomenon of migration, but we should not forget that 
some aspects of this phenomenon, with the suffering it causes to the migrants and the in-
conveniences it causes to citizens in receiving countries, are evil. This evil is bigger and more 
350 John Paul II seemed to avoid using the term “structural sin”. Some have speculated that he wanted to re-
serve the word “sin” to relationships of individual human persons with God involving human agency and re-
sponsibility, which structural evil often diminishes considerably; however, such a rigorous use of the word 
“sin” would render the term “original sin” equally unacceptable. Some authors also seem to use structural 
evil and social evil interchangeably, but while an act of lynching of an innocent person is “social” and “evil”, 
as is the distribution of child pornography on the internet, these are not the kinds of evils we are referring to 
when we speak of “structural evil”. Structural evils are systemic evils, multiplied by big structures (e.g. the 
labour market, the global currency market) which, though invented and operated by human persons, have 
acquired a certain autonomy of their own, and often “blackmail” their victims to collaborate with and rein-
force the oppressive structure itself. 
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complex than the acts of individuals (e.g. disrespect of just laws, xenophobia, discrimination, 
etc.) or of governments (persecution, mismanagement of the economy, unfair border or in-
tegration policies, etc.). Though it may be difficult to understand the causes and indicate 
who is ultimately responsible for the international structures which oppress people, we still 
have agency and responsibility: we should resist such structures and seek to change them. 
In fact, the more freedom and agency we possess vis-à-vis such structures, the more respon-
sibility we have to resist and change them. 
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Table A7: CST: Derived and Specific Right-Order Principles Concerning 
Migration 
S1. Principle of the Priority of Justice over Relief: “Rulers of States, the heads of agencies, and all up-
right and cooperative men [should] consider and resolve the very serious problems of refugees 
and migrants […] harmonizing the requirements of justice with needs of charity. Relief alone can 
remedy, to a certain extent, many unjust social conditions. But we know that this is not suffi-
cient. In the first place, there must be justice, which should prevail and be put into practice” (EF 
§97 in Baggio and Pettenà 2009). 
S2. Principle of Regulation of Migration and Asylum: 
a) Migration and Asylum need to be regulated, and this should be preferably done on the inter-
national level: “There would be very great benefits from international regulations in favour 
of emigration and immigration” (§111 in Baggio and Pettenà 2009); and “it is necessary to 
have international norms that are capable of regulating everyone´s rights, so as to prevent 
unilateral decisions that are harmful to the weakest” countries and persons (M2001 3). The 
problems posed by international migration today cannot be resolved by single countries act-
ing alone, and purely restrictive policies could backfire, while usually causing more problems 
than they solve (EM 7). When reasonably good international legislation exists that is not 
morally objectionable, states should ratify and implement it (cf. EM 6, M2007, USMX-SNL 77 
and Caritas Europa et al. (2006b) on the ratification of the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of their Families). Trying to 
deal with the migratory phenomenon on a purely national level, today, is ineffective and 
creates even more negative effects (EM 7).  
b) Bilateral harmonization of legislative provisions, especially between sending and receiving 
countries, should be encouraged (M1996 4); this should be done with the aim of safeguard-
ing “the needs and rights of the emigrants and their families, and, likewise, those of the so-
cieties receiving them” (EM 8). 
c) Regulation should be done with the view of serving the needs of the most vulnerable (cf. 
“Option for the Poor”) both among the migrants and within the communities receiving them: 
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“Justice and equity likewise require that the mobility, which is necessary in a developing 
economy, be regulated in such a way as to keep the life of individuals and their families 
from becoming insecure and precarious” (GS 66, cf. M1995 2). This should ensure that there 
should not be wage discrimination against migrants, that family reunification is facilitated, 
and that migrant workers are incorporated into the social life of the country or region that 
receives them (GS 66; cf. ES-JLE, Caritas Europa et al. (2003)). 
d) Immigration laws should not be dictated by narrow-minded nationalism, but should seek the 
universal common good: Laws in receiving countries should recognise that migrants “have a 
right to migrate, favour their integration, facilitate their professional advancement and give 
them access to decent housing” (OA 17). However, the exercise of the right to enter another 
country to seek better conditions of life “is to be regulated, because practicing it indiscrimi-
nately may do harm and be detrimental to the common good of the community that re-
ceives the migrant” (M2001 3).  
e) Laws, conventions and past legal definitions could become a hindrance to just treatment of 
migrants and refugees if taken too literally and not adapted to changing situations by legis-
lators and extended hermeneutically by legal scholars to deal with new cases. For instance, 
there may be cases of forced migration not contemplated by international conventions, but 
which warrant the granting of asylum (cf. M1996 4); in such cases, refoulement cannot be 
justified by referring to the letter of the law (cf. RCS 4, 14). 
S3. Principle of Voluntary Repatriation and Non-Refoulement of Asylum Seekers: “No person must 
be sent back to a country where he or she fears discriminatory action or life-threatening situa-
tions. In cases where the competent government authorities decide not to accept asylum seek-
ers, arguing that they are not true refugees, these authorities are duty-bound to make sure that 
such people will be guaranteed a secure and free existence elsewhere” (RCS 14). This principle 
should be respected scrupulously and is a non-negotiable basis for the treatment of refugees 
(ibid.). 
S4. Principle of Due Respect towards National Sovereignty, deemed important, but not sacred: CST 
often recognises the rights of sovereign states in passing, while emphasising the limits that jus-
tice places on such rights: 
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a) Sharing of one´s own abundant land with others: “Since land every-where offers the possi-
bility of supporting a large number of people, the sovereignty of the state, although it must 
be respected, cannot be exaggerated to the point that access to this land is, for inadequate 
or unjustified reasons, denied to needy and decent people from other nations, provided of 
course, that the public wealth (utilitas publica), considered very carefully, does not forbid 
this”, EF (§102 in Baggio and Pettenà 2009), citing Pius XII´s 1948 letter to Archbishop John 
T. McNicholas and the National Catholic Welfare Conference (AAS 41 (1949): 69-70)351.  
b) Responsibility to protect: The international community should do its utmost to protect 
populations from grave violations of human rights when national governments fail to do so, 
or are committing such violations so as to minimize forced migration (RCS 21; ES-RDS). To 
avoid undue violations of national sovereignty, this is best done following international pro-
cedural rules referred to under the notion of “Responsibility to Protect” (cf. Benedict XVI´s 
2008 address to UN General Assembly – AAS 100 (2008), 333), keeping in mind that undue 
military interventions could cause more harm than good and create even more forced mi-
grants.  
S5. Principle of Historical Accountability and Recognition of Shared Historical Realities. Some of the 
reasons behind forced migration are closely linked to past or present policies of receiving coun-
tries, and this fact must be taken into account when seeking just relations between peoples.  
a) Colonization or past territorial contiguity creates cultural, social, political and economic links 
between countries which cannot be simply interrupted or ignored by present legislation or 
policy (cf. ES-PM II:1:1; ES-IE 76; FR-QEF A:1). 
b) The effects of Cold War politics (and of more recent policies adopted by richer nations to-
wards resource-rich conflict-prone countries) on migration patterns should be acknowl-
edged. Such policies have often entailed erecting legal and political barriers that limit eco-
nomic aid and hamper development plans in poorer countries, while plentiful capital to buy 
weapons was (as is still being) made available to these countries by the developed world (cf. 
SRS 24). Instead of helping these countries to develop, wealthy countries use money sup-
351 For more on this topic, see Carlson and Owens (2003), especially Kelsay (2003). 
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posedly destined to aid “developing countries” to instead prop up their native arms industry 
and increase their political spheres of influence, while fuelling strife and increasing debt 
burdens of poorer countries. Such past and present policies inevitably create exit migration 
today (cf. FR-QEF A:1). 
S6. Principle of Fair and Realistic Integration Policies: 
a) A path to naturalisation should be offered at some point to those who have settled in a re-
ceiving country, having “become native” in the true sense of the word (Cf. EFN §100 in Bag-
gio and Pettenà 2009). People who have lived in a new country for a number of years, com-
mitting themselves to the economic and social development of this country and having de-
cided not to return to their native land should be allowed to integrate themselves complete-
ly and swiftly; for CST, this is a matter of justice (M1992 2). 
b) Integration, at least for the first and second generation of migrants, should ideally allow 
persons to keep their cultures and mother language, while learning and adopting the local 
culture and language. Biculturalism, and holding together multiple identities may be de-
manding, but is enriching (M2008); even within the Church “bi-culturalism must be properly 
exploited in every activity which concerns pastoral care” (CHMa III:5).  
S7. Principle of Fair and Realistic Policies in Dealing with Undocumented Migration. CST asks legisla-
tors and governments to keep the following points in mind when drafting policies concerning 
undocumented migrants: 
a) “The work by which the undocumented aliens participate in the common effort of economic 
development is a de facto form of membership in a society” (M1992 3). If the receiving 
country needs the labour of these persons and is making use of it to drive its economy, then 
it should give “legitimacy, scope and dignity to this membership through the adoption of 
appropriate measures” (ibid.)352.  
352 This point echoes Article 69 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (1990): 
“1. States Parties shall, when there are migrant workers and members of their families within their territory 
in an irregular situation, take appropriate measures to ensure that such a situation does not persist. 
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b) There are also undocumented migrants who do not find jobs, or do not integrate well in the 
receiving countries, and there are times and places when receiving countries are not able to 
assimilate undocumented migrants, or not able to do so beyond a certain rate of entry. In 
such cases (and here we are not referring to convention refugees, asylum seekers and legal 
migrants), a country may refuse hospitality (cf. M1992 3; M1995 2; M1996 2).  
c) “The criterion for determining the level [of immigrants] that can be supported cannot be 
based solely on protecting [the receiving country’s] own prosperity, while failing to take into 
consideration the needs of persons who are tragically forced to ask for hospitality” (M1992 
3). To be sure, it is important to distinguish between persons who fit the classical definition 
of a “refugee” and who enter a country in an irregular way, and undocumented “environ-
mental” or “economic” migrants; nonetheless, the present situation “tends to blur the dis-
tinction between the concepts of ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ to the point that these two catego-
ries are merged under the common denomination of ‘necessity’” (ibid.).  
d) “In the categories of the International [Refugee] Convention are not included the victims of 
armed conflicts, erroneous economic policy or natural disasters. For humanitarian reasons, 
there is today a growing tendency to recognise such people as "de facto" refugees, given the 
involuntary nature of their migration” (RCS 4). 
e) After a long stay in a receiving country, some people may become “so deeply rooted in the 
local society that returning to their country of origin would be tantamount to a form of re-
verse emigration, with serious consequences particularly for children” (M1996 3; cf. ES-JLE) 
and it is unjustifiable to force “into an illegal situation people whose right to live with their 
family cannot be denied by any law” (M1996 4; cf. Caritas Europa et al. (2003)). 
S8. Principle of Reciprocity: Reciprocity is needed to build a society between diverse people through 
dialogue and mutual recognition. It requires that relationships be “based on mutual respect and 
2. Whenever States Parties concerned consider the possibility of regularizing the situation of such persons in 
accordance with applicable national legislation and bilateral or multilateral agreements, appropriate account 
shall be taken of the circumstances of their entry, the duration of their stay in the States of employment and 
other relevant considerations, in particular those relating to their family situation.” 
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on justice in juridical and religious matters”; it also entails “an attitude of heart and spirit that 
enables us to live together everywhere with equal rights and duties” (EM 64).  
a) When such reciprocity exists within a society, members of religious or national communities 
which compose the majority of the population will feel compelled to become “advocates” 
for the rights of minorities within their communities (ibid.).  
b) Immigrants too, when immersed in this dynamic, come to reciprocate the welcome and op-
portunities offered to them by receiving communities, recognising the values of their society 
and adapting to the shared norms of that polity to build a cohesive yet plural and dynamic 
civil society together with the natives (IT-UCD 25).  
c) Huge and rapid influxes of immigrants from different cultures may make it very hard for 
both parties to construct reciprocal relationships; this may at times justify policies that seek 
to restrict certain types of immigration (ibid.). 
S9. Principle of Resistance to all forms of Racism and Xenophobia. These attitudes and ideologies 
have no place in body of Christ, and lead to behaviour that goes against human dignity which is 
inacceptable from a moral standpoint shared with other believers and non-believers (cf. CR 17-
23; L1983). It is not enough to fight xenophobia; the Church needs to build fraternity in a posi-
tive way (Baggio and Pettenà 2009, 1015–7, 1022).  
S10. Principle of Seeking Comprehensive Solutions to Localized Poverty and Marginalisation: The 
problems of the poor neighbourhoods where migrants tend to concentrate and where refugees 
are resettled should be adequately addressed. 
a) “The environmental and social rehabilitation of [these] decaying neighbourhoods” is a mat-
ter of great importance (M1992 2) to ensure that migrants and refugees live in dignity and 
are not discriminated against. All social actors should be proactive in dealing with the prob-
lems of these spaces. In many cases Catholic NGOs are present and active, and parishes are 
often reference-points in such neighbourhoods, offering “a sign of hope and brotherhood” 
(M1999 7). 
b) We should also acknowledge the “widespread fear or feeling of insecurity in people”, espe-
cially in receiving communities and in such neighbourhoods, and their desire for guarantees 
of “due respect for legality [and of safeguarding the] integrity of the host community” (EM 
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40ff). Simply appealing to virtues such as hospitality does not solve the day-to-day problems 
which stoke such fears, but education, moral formation, correct information, and just laws 
and institutions are needed to deal courageously and equitably with such problems and thus 
empower communities to become more welcoming of strangers. 
S11. Principle of Subsidiarity and Solidarity Applied to Local Churches: Churches have an important 
role to play in helping immigrants to integrate, besides preparing them for the experience in the 
sending countries (AG 38; cf. EF part I, DPMC; CHM 21). In the words of EM 21, “welcoming the 
stranger is [...] intrinsic to the nature of the Church itself and bears witness to its fidelity to the 
gospel”. John Paul II, in his Message for World Migrants´ Day 1987, speaks of the “mission” of 
both receiving communities and immigrants as part of the mission of the Church and lists a 
number of ways to which lay persons should commit themselves so as to humanise the phe-
nomenon of migration and transmit the faith which supports such a commitment. Other docu-
ments mention the following points: 
a) Reception as brothers and sisters within the community: “Immigrants [should] not be re-
ceived as ‘mere tools of production’ but as brothers endowed with human dignity and 
builders of a new and broader human community” (DPMC 57). This also applies to undocu-
mented migrants, and Christians may be required to practice solidarity with such migrants 
even when they are in trouble (M1996 5).  
b) Parishes as places of sharing, fellowship and mutual recognition: Local Christian communi-
ties should be a sign of hope and brotherhood to people threatened by precariousness and 
absence of reference points, opening up spaces of trust where people learn to overcome 
their fears in a world haunted by insecurity (M1999 7).  
c) Christian advocacy on behalf of migrants: “Since other questions are connected with the mi-
grant people such as housing, work, social insurance, and the problems which arise from dif-
ference of race, language and culture, let [the Christian faithful] work to see that these are 
solved according to love and justice and equity, lest, as economies and the mobility of peo-
ples grow, ‘the life of individuals and their families [become] insecure and precarious’”, 
(ibid.). Christians should advocate that such rights, especially those pertaining to the unity of 
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the family, be defended in civil legislation and fight against all discrimination (cf. EM 87; ES-
PM II:3:2:c). 
d) Cosmopolitan education in the receiving communities: Christian leaders should be commit-
ted to “educational and pastoral systems that form people in a ´global dimension´, that is, a 
new vision of the world community, considered as a family of peoples, for whom the goods 
of the earth are ultimately destined” (EM 8). 
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ANNEX B: THE PRIORITY RULES 
The Hospitality Rules H1 RECIPIENT COUNTRY SELECTION RULE 
A polity has a greater moral duty to open its borders to immigrants if it is (i) prosperous (high GDP) 
and highly developed (high HDI); (ii) not too densely populated; (iii) not situated on an ecologically-
sensitive territory; (iv) a liberal democracy explicitly committed to the promotion of human rights 
by its constitution. H2 IMMIGRANT ENTRY AND SOJOURN SELECTION RULE 
A modern liberal democracy which can afford to welcome migrants and asylum seekers should 
normally allow legal entry and temporary sojourn, except when this poses a serious and credible 
risk of (i) insecurity; (ii) disruption of public order; or (iii) severe dilution of its political culture and 
weakening of its political institutions, or else (iv) when certain restrictive policies can be shown to 
enhance liberty and equality on a cosmopolitan level in the long run.  H3 HISTORY-LADEN INTERDEPENDENCE RULE APPLIED TO IMMIGRANT ENTRY AND SOJOURN 
Other things being equal, receiving countries have a greater duty to grant entry and sojourn to citi-
zens of countries which are politically, socially and culturally linked to them through close bonds of 
history-laden interdependence. 
The Kinship Rules K1 IMMIGRANT RESIDENCY AND NATURALISATION SELECTION RULE 
a. Immigrants whose security and subsistence rights cannot be adequately guaranteed in their 
home country have a clear prima facie right to enter and stay in countries which can afford to 
provide them such rights while not endangering the security and subsistence of their current 
population.  
b. Other immigrants do not have such a right and may be removed humanely, ensuring the legal 
protections afforded to citizen defendants in civil law cases, unless a long time has passed 
(more or less, 5 to 25 years) and unless they have shown themselves to be quite well “integrat-
ed” into the political culture of the receiving polity. 
c. Persons who are explicitly or tacitly allowed to stay beyond a sojourn period of a few months 
should be considered as long-term residents and potential candidates for naturalisation. The 
basic rights of such residents should be respected and guaranteed as far as is affordable for the 
country, including some access to welfare services in case of destitution, and a flexible (not 
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overly regulated) access to the labour market which reflects the real need of the economy while 
offering other workers some protection against wage competition and depression. K2 NATIONAL NARRATIVE RULE  
Receiving societies have a greater duty to integrate immigrants who demonstrate a willingness to 
buy into the National Narrative, assuming that such a narrative is ethically acceptable, inclusive, 
revisable, and (reasonably) adoptable by newcomers. K3 INTEGRATION CAPACITY RULE 
a. Stressed nations with limited integration capacity and with underdeveloped conceptual tools 
(narratives, laws, rites) to integrate strangers may have a lesser duty to receive and integrate 
immigrants (depending on the stressors), while they develop such conceptual tools.  
b. Stressed migrants (especially “forced security migrants” who were violently pushed out of their 
land), though they may have a greater a priori right to be granted residence (and eventually citi-
zenship) in a safe receiving nation on the basis of need, often need more help to integrate well 
(and deal with trauma, conflicting identities, becoming kin of those they perceive as 
“strangers”).  
c. Regional and international coordination and specialization are desirable in dealing with stressed 
immigrants. Polities whose public culture is relatively similar to that of the migrants in question 
are usually better suited to take them in and integrate them, and their integration capacity 
should be expanded with the help of the international community if needed. Other polities may 
opt to limit more strictly the stay of stressed immigrants, and “specialize” in the reception and 
integration of certain groups of stressed immigrants, provided that they (i) provide adequate 
help to the polities more suited to integrate them, and (ii) offer to integrate other stressed mi-
grants with an adequate investment of resources. K4 HISTORY-LADEN INTERDEPENDENCE RULE APPLIED TO IMMIGRANT RESIDENCY AND NATURALISATION  
Other things being equal, receiving countries have a greater duty to grant residency and naturalisa-
tion to citizens of countries which are politically, socially and culturally linked to them through close 
bonds of history-laden interdependence. P PROCEDURAL RULE  
The local fine-tuning and concretisation of the above rules requires fair democratic processes 
where those most impacted by boundary laws are adequately represented. 
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